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Abstract of Thesis 
This thesis explores the motivation and goals of NHS Trusts which were set up under 
statutory instrument from 1 5t April 1991 by Margaret Thatcher's Conservative 
Government and which continue to have a role under the Labour Government elected 
in 1997. The research question asks 'What are the objectives of Trusts? What is the 
extent of the constraints under which they operate?' 
The central piece of empirical work uses a questionnaire survey to explore 
individuals' objectives, yielding 1,577 responses. A second exercise uses cost and 
volume data to review the performance of 100 Trusts. A third strand uses a case 
study to consider the behaviour of Trusts within their external environment. 
Consultants, or 'doctors', and managers are identified as the main power coalition 
within Trusts. Empirical findings are consistent with the hypotheses that, firstly, 
doctors and managers have different sets of objectives and that, secondly, doctors are 
interested in production, in particular maintenance of service quality, while managers 
are interested in the 'bottom line', defined as financial break-even. Under financial 
conditions described as 'bad times' where the interests of doctors and managers 
conflict, evidence suggests that doctors tend to dominate the performance of Trusts. 
It follows that Trusts will pursue a service objective, defined mainly through quality, 
rather than a financial goal. This dynamic is reinforced by the environment which 
sends signals to actors about how they should behave and, through lack of market 
exit, weakens the financial motivation of Trusts. 
While such behaviour is coherent in terms of the dominant actors, it is at odds with 
the overall goals of the Trust organisation which are perceived by doctors and 
managers alike to be the single-minded pursuit of financial targets. The thesis finds 
that this driver is not owned or acted upon by either doctors or managers and that, in 
accordance with the balance of its internal motivation, the Trust's primary objective is 
to maintain service quality. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis investigates the objectives of NHS Trusts. It asks what Trusts are trying to 
achieve in their role as providers of health care, taking into account their internal 
characteristics and their national health service (NHS) environment. 
The question of what Trusts are striving to achieve was stimulated initially by the internal 
market reforms introduced to the NHS on 1 g April 1991 by Margaret Thatcher's 
Conservative Government. NHS Trusts were established as statutory bodies, independent of 
health authorities which up until then had been responsible for managing their services. The 
reforms were based on the White Paper Working for Patients (Department of Health, 1989) 
which excited widespread debate about the Government's proposal to introduce competition 
for the first time between providers of health care (Ham, 1992). Critics, including the then 
Labour opposition, predicted that quality of care would be put at risk as hospitals cut costs. 
They argued that Trusts would behave as businesses and would be motivated by profits in 
conflict with the interests of patients and the wider public. There was also concern that the 
reforms allowing 'self governing' Trusts to opt out of health authority control represented the 
first steps towards privatisation. 
A further set of reforms has been implemented from l st April 1998, this time by the Labour 
Government elected in May 1997, through the White Paper The New NHS: Modern . 
Dependable', (Department of Health, 1997). This ostensibly abandons market principles, 
arguing that 'The introduction of the internal market by the previous Government prevented 
the health service from properly focusing on the needs of patients. It wasted resources 
administering competition between hospitals' (pp4-5). While the rhetoric of the internal 
market has been abolished, however, Trust status remains in place. Indeed, the concept of a 
Trust which is managed by its own Board has been strengthened by the White Paper: 'the 
Government recognises the intrinsic strength of decentralising responsibility for operational 
management. By giving NHS Trusts control over key decisions they can improve local 
services for patients. The Government will build on this principle and let NHS Trusts help 
shape the locally agreed framework which will determine how NHS services develop' (p12). 
Moreover, the White Paper proposals extend the domain of NHS Trusts to primary care 
through the formation a new type of organisation called Primary Care Groups (PCGs). 
These structures, bringing general practitioners and community nurses together with 'a 
budget reflecting their population's share of the available resources' (p86), will have the 
opportunity to become free-standing Primary Care Trusts in the future, extending the number 
and resource-base of NHS Trusts. 
It remains important, therefore, to try to gain some insight into what motivates Trusts, 
enabling policy makers to anticipate how Trusts will respond to new initiatives. This thesis 
considers Trust motivation in the context of the 1991-97 market environment and then draws 
out the themes which will continue to have application in the post-1997 period of health 
service policy. 
1.1 The Research Question 
The speed with which the reforms were implemented was in spite of, or because of, a lack of 
piloting or research prior to 1991. Kenneth Clarke, in evidence to the House of Commons 
Select Committee, rebuffed the idea of formal monitoring and evaluation and suggested that 
to draw on academic advice was to display a degree of weakness (Health Service Journal, I s 
 June 1989). 
One of the first evaluations of the reforms sought to assess the performance of Trusts by 
employing empirical and theoretical methods of research (Bartlett and Le Grand, 1994). It 
was observed that `Trusts as such seem to have received remarkably little research attention' 
(p54) and that empirical research had been `almost completely atheoretical' (p65) since it 
lacked an underlying model of Trust behaviour. The absence of such a model led to the 
framing of the research question for this study in terms of: 
What are the objectives of Trusts? What is the extent of the constraints under which 
they operate? 
Motivation and the constraints under which Trusts operate may be considered in terms of the 
NHS environment which, for the period 1991 - 1997, has been described as a quasi-market 
(Le Grand and Bartlett, 1993). This differs from a conventional competitive market in a 
number of important respects. In a quasi-market people do not buy their own health care; 
instead an agency relationship is established, mainly through health authorities which 
purchase care on behalf of the patient. While the state purchases or funds care in a quasi-
market it does not necessarily provide treatment, so that purchasing agents may commission 
health care from private hospitals. Monopolistic state providers are replaced by competitive 
independent ones which might not be seeking to maximise profits in accordance with 
conventional market theory. Finally, the financial regime in quasi-markets is often cash 
limited and annual as in the NHS. 
The vocabulary and ethos of competition has changed with the Labour Government's 
abolition of the internal market (Department of Health, 1997) but the underlying structure of 
purchasing and provision has not, so that to all intents and purposes the quasi-market 
structures are intact. This type of market will work - i.e. achieve the ends of efficiency, 
responsiveness and choice without adverse consequences in terms of increased inequity - if a 
range of conditions is satisfied, defined as cream-skimming, market structure, information, 
transaction costs, uncertainty and motivation (Le Grand and Bartlett, 1993). The condition 
of 'motivation', explored in this thesis, requires that the suppliers of health care, namely 
Trusts or hospitals, are driven by a financial goal. This leads to the question of whether 
Trusts have, in practice, a strong financial drive and, if so, what is the nature of this goal? 
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There are a range of plausible objectives which may account for their behaviour. Simply 
balancing the books by matching income and expenditure may be the overriding goal since 
failure to do so would be laid at the door of the Chief Executive who would be called to 
account, either through the NHS Executive Region responsible for monitoring Trust 
performance, by the Trust Board or by the consultant body who, as precedents show', could 
oust the Chief Executive through a vote of no confidence. Alternatively, the Trust may aim 
to maximise service volume in order to fulfil its public service obligations and to meet other 
targets such as waiting lists and waiting times. In principle these objectives of service 
maximisation and financial balance could conflict, as illustrated in the following vignette 
which stimulated the research question: 
In 1993 a District General Hospital in outer London, which had been a Trust for two years 
as part of the first wave, found that it faced a financial deficit in the year ahead. It had 
overperformed by up to 10% against its target volume of activity during the first two years 
of contracting but had succeeded in breaking even in both years (indicating that the real 
unit cost was less than the contracted unit price). In the third year of contracting, 
beginning lg April 1993, the main purchaser reduced the contract value by 5%. The Trust 
management attempted to reduce the planned volume of service output to contain costs and 
fell into conflict with the consultants who resented constraints on their working practice 
through closure of theatre sessions and beds. The drive to maintain in-year financial 
balance was destined to produce short term reductions in total costs but higher average 
costs through introduction of structural inefficiencies within the hospital system. 
The atmosphere of disarray in a hospital such as this has no theoretical resolution. There is 
no model of behaviour which indicates whether a Trust would be driven to maximise its 
surplus, minimise its deficit, maximise its output or, indeed, pursue an entirely different goal. 
Accordingly, this thesis addresses the question of 'what are the objectives of Trusts', taking 
into the account the motivation of consultants and managers working within the organisation 
and the external constraints operating upon Trusts in the NHS. 
The District General Hospital which began to face a f nancial squeeze in 1993, its third year 
as a Trust, is in fact Kingston Hospital which is considered further as a case study in Chapter 
11. 
1.2 Structure of Thesis 
The basic structure of the thesis is as follows. The next chapter describes the backdrop of 
events which led to the formation of Trusts in 1991. NHS Trusts are defined in terms of their 
statutory function, organisational content and role as producers of health care. 
The Chief Executive of Royal Surrey County, Hospital, Guildford, for example, resigned in 1992 after tryin 
unsuccessfully to reverse a financial deficit and losing a vote of no confidence by the consultant staff 
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Chapter 3 explores the literature of motivation according to four levels of analysis, starting 
with individuals working within the Trust, addressed mainly through the psychological 
literature. Groups within Trusts form the second unit, drawing principally on the sociological 
literature concerning relationships of power. Trusts themselves are considered at the third 
level in terms of aggregated individual and group motivation, but also as organisational 
structures and as separate economic entities according to the microeconomic theory of the 
firm. At the fourth level of analysis the chapter considers the environment in which Trusts 
operate, bringing in the role of the public sector and the question of market forces, expanding 
on some of the quasi-market characteristics identified in this introductory chapter. 
The conclusions drawn from this survey of motivational theory are translated into a set of 
hypotheses about Trusts', objectives in Chapter 4. The chapter goes on to identify the 
methodological approach which will be used to test these hypotheses based on three strands 
of fieldwork: a questionnaire survey, a review of Trust performance data and a case study. 
Chapters 5 to 9 present the findings of the main strand of empirical work contained in this 
thesis, summarising the results of a questionnaire survey which involved 1,577 respondents. 
The purpose of the questionnaire was to elicit views of individual doctors and managers 
about their own priorities and those of other groups within the Trust. These perceptions were 
analysed according to occupational and professional grouping. It was also possible to 
examine the attitudes of individuals towards 'the Trust' as an independent entity. The 
questionnaire was subjected to a developmental and trial period called Stage 1, the results of 
which are documented in Chapter 6. The national survey was launched as Stage 2 in 
September 1997, prior to the Labour Government's White Paper which was published in 
December 1997. A comparison of Stages 1 and 2 revealed potential methodological 
problems concerned with sample selection which may have produced bias in the results. This 
was addressed in Stage 3 which replicated the earlier pilot (Stage 1) and formed a 
comparative case study. The three chapters 6 to 8 deal with the quantitative results of the 
questionnaire enquiry, summarising the responses to the closed questions which produced 
frequencies, ratings and ranking scores. Qualitative material was also collected through the 
questionnaire survey using a series of open questions. The range and volume of responses 
which emerged when individuals used free text was extensive; the process of coding and 
analysis of open questions was applied to the large sample base provided by the national 
survey (Stage 2) and is presented separately in Chapter 9. The results of this questionnaire 
survey test the hypotheses relating to motivation and perceived control of groups within 
Trusts. 
The motivation of actors cannot be observed directly, but its impact will be revealed through 
their actions, determining the goals and behaviour of Trusts. Chapter 10 tests the hypotheses 
by attaching the results of the attitudinal survey to specific performance measures of Trusts, 
defined as achievement of financial targets and expansion of services within the Trust. This 
takes forward the internal motivation of the organisation to its manifestation through 
behaviour. 
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The final element of fieldwork takes the form of a case study, described in Chapter 11. The 
model of motivation which starts from internal dynamics of Trusts (Chapters 5 to 9) leading 
to goal-driven behaviour (Chapter 10) is ultimately modified by the feedback which is 
derived from the environment. For NHS Trusts the environment is the local health economy 
which provides a forum for interaction between neighbouring Trusts and purchasers. The 
case study takes a chronological view of events in south west London, with Kingston 
Hospital as the focus of attention, and considers the influences which are external to the 
Trust, such as parliamentary politics and pressures from professional bodies. 
Chapter 12 concludes the thesis by summarising the results of the fieldwork and setting them 
within the new policy framework established by the Labour Government. 
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CHAPTER 2. CONTEXT 
This chapter describes the context in which Margaret Thatcher's Government developed 
proposals for reform of the health service in the late 1980s. It gives details of the changes 
wrought by these reforms and defines the nature of NHS Trusts, in terms of their statutory 
obligations, organisational characteristics and economic boundaries. 
2.1 The Case for Change 
In spite of strong opposition to the 1989 White Paper, a case for change was already 
established which enabled supporters to argue with conviction that 'something must be done'. 
When the NHS was established in 1948, it was generally assumed that expenditure on health 
services would decline with the eradication of the backlog of ill health believed to exist in 
the community at the time (Glennerster, 1995). But, contrary to this assumption, expenditure 
on the NHS has increased steadily, rising from 3.9% of GDP in 1949 to 5.9% in 1988 (Ham, 
1992) with a four-fold increase in the real cost of the NHS: 
Table 2.1: Health Service Costs, Years 1949 - 1988 
Year 	Total Cost of NHS Cost at 1949 Prices 
	
fm 	 fm 
1949 
	
437 437 
1988 23,627 	 1,797 
(Source: Ham, 1992, p39 
When expenditure is forecast to the year 2000 (Source: Health Service Journal Map of the 
National Health Service, 1999), the growth from 1988 is equivalent to the cost of another two 
National Health Services at 1949 prices. 
able 2.2: Health Service Costs, Year 2000 
Year 
	 Total Cost of NHS 	Cost at 1949 Prices2 
fm En; 
2000 
	
45,000 
	
2,819 
(Source: HS.I. Map of the NHS 1999 based on Doll Departmental Report 1999-2000 
Debate continued about the actual level of funding of the NHS and its adequacy to maintain 
and develop services (e.g. Robinson and Judge, 1987; Institute of Health Service 
Management, King's Fund Institute, National Association of Health Authorities, 1989). 
Method: Deflate difference between 1988 and 2000 prices by 3.5% per year (i.e. 0.96512); apply figure as % 
of 1998 prices to 1949 equivalent; add to 1949 equivalent; i.e. reflect 1988-2000 increase in 1988 prices and 
then relate to 1949 prices. 
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Nevertheless, expenditure on Hospital and Community Services slowed during the 1980s in 
line with the policy of the Conservative Government. Ham (1992) estimates that real 
spending on Hospital and Community Services rose by less than 1% per annum during the 
period 1980-90, compared to a target requirement of 1.3%-2.3% per annum identified by the 
government as necessary to fund demographic, technological and service developments. On 
this basis the cumulative shortfall 1981-1988 amounted to £1.8 billion. 
Health Service underfunding became a topic of public debate. The National Association of 
Health Authorities reported that authorities were closing beds to deal with financial pressures 
(NAHA, 1987). The BMA called for additional funds, and the presidents of the Royal 
Colleges of Surgeons, Physicians and Obstetricians and Gynaecologists issued a joint 
statement calling for improved funding to avert a crisis in the NHS (Ham, Robinson and 
Benzeval, 1990). Highly publicised events such as the death of Baby Barber in Birmingham 
through apparent lack of intensive care beds continued to rock the public's confidence in the 
NHS. 
The Government, which so far had taken the position that the NHS made poor use of 
resources (manifest through, for example, Rayner scrutinies into efficiency and introduction 
of Cost Improvement Programmes), responded by promising a wide-ranging review of the 
future of the NHS. This was announced by Margaret Thatcher in a Panorama programme in 
January 1988 with a commitment to publish the results within a year. 
Kenneth Clarke became Secretary of State for Health in July 1988 and played a major part in 
the preparation of the White Paper, Working for Patients, which was published in January 
1989 (Department of Health, 1989). It announced that the NHS would continue to be funded 
mainly out of taxation and that the service would continue to be free at the point of delivery. 
Change would be wrought in the means of delivering care through an injection of market 
forces between hospitals and community services in the construction of what became known 
as a 'quasi-market' for health care (Le Grand and Bartlett, 1993). 
2.2 The 1991 Reforms 
Up until 1991 all hospital and community services had been funded by their local District 
Health Authority which received a budget allocation set by the Regional Health Authority. 
The service providers, described as hospital and community units, received a budget 
determined by historical spend with changes at the margin to reflect movements in revenue 
allocations to the Health Authority. The most senior manager in the hospital was described 
as the Unit General Manager (or Hospital Administrator prior to the Griffiths reforms in the 
mid 1980s) who reported to the District General Manager based at the Health Authority. It 
was understood that catchment or 'planning' populations differed from resident populations 
of health authorities due to cross-boundary flows of patients. This would have an impact on 
historical spend but was not usually funded explicitly. 
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The internal market reforms of 1991 made a distinction between the purchasers and providers 
of health care, both in terms of management and of funding. Providers were given the 
opportunity to become NHS Trusts, described in the White Paper as having self governing 
status, managed by a Chief Executive who would report to a Trust Board which, at that time, 
was accountable directly to the Department of Health and, later, to the Region. With these 
reforms the District Health Authority lost its hospital management function but assumed 
responsibility for the health of its resident population by purchasing services on its behalf 
This purchaser-provider split required hospitals to gain their income by means of contracts 
with health authorities specifying the number of patients to be treated and the price of 
different types of treatment. 
The funding route was restructured so that health authorities received allocations to reflect 
the treatment pattern of patients who were resident within their borders, even if they were 
treated elsewhere. The hospitals engaged in contracts to recover the cost of patients directly 
from the health authority of residence. In the first year the transition between the old and 
new funding structure was achieved through a device called 'steady state'. It determined that 
funding for a hospital in the year beginning 1st April 1991 would be exactly equal to that of 
the previous year, even though it was being recovered from perhaps a dozen rather than one 
health authority. 
By setting prices through the contracts it was envisaged that hospitals would compete with 
each other based on price and that efficient hospitals would attract more patients and 
therefore more income, on the basis that money would follow the patient. As the White 
Paper expressed it, lajn NHS Hospital Trust will earn its revenue from the services it 
provides. The main source of revenue will be from contracts with health authorities for the 
provision of services to their . residents. Other contracts and revenue will come from GP 
practices with their own NHS budgets, private patients or their insurance companies, private 
hospitals, employers and, perhaps, other NHS Hospital Trusts. This form of funding will be a 
stimulus to better performance. There will be an opportunity to finance improved and 
expanded services because the money will flow to where the patients are going. Hospitals 
which prove popular with GPs and patients will attract a larger share of NHS and other 
resources available for hospital services. A successful hospital will then be able to invest in 
providing still more and better services. Contracts will need to spell out clearly what is 
required of each hospital in terms of the price, quality and nature of service to be provided. 
A hospital which fails to meet the terms of a contract will risk losing patients and revenue. ' 
(Department of Health, 1989, p24). 
It was envisaged that NHS Trusts would be different and special since they would have 
powers which would not be generally available. 'NHS Hospital Trusts will be a novel part of 
a system of hospital care alongside health authority-managed and private sector hospitals, 
and will increase the range of choice available to patients and their GPs' (Department of 
Health, 1989, p25). The then Secretary of State, Kenneth Clarke, did not expect Trust status 
to become widespread: We didn't think we'd get very many. The object was to get them 
S 
going and then make them the envy of the service I saw a slower pace of spread' 
(Timmins, 1995, p469). By May 1990, however, rather than ten or twenty hospitals there 
were 140 expressions of interest in self-governing Trust status, 'almost all of them promoted 
managers and some actively opposed by their hospital's doctors' (Timmins, 1995, p469). 
The vocabulary of the 1989 White Paper included the word 'business' by asserting that 
management bodies would be 'reformed on business lines with executive and non-executive 
directors' (Department of Health, 1989, p5) but there was no reference to business failure, 
hospital closure or exit from the market. The tenor of expectation lay in extending choice, 
delegating responsibility to where the services were provided and in securing the best value 
for money. 'NHS Hospital Trusts will earn revenue from the services they provide. They will 
therefore have an incentive to attract patients, so they will make sure that the service they 
offer is what their patients want' (p4). 'Supported by a funding system in which successful 
hospitals can flourish, it [self-government] will encourage local initiative and greater 
competition. All this in turn will ensure a better deal for the public, improving the choice and 
quality of the services offered and the efficiency with which those services are delivered' 
(Department of Health, 1989, p22). 
2.3 The NHS Trust 
This section describes the growth and composition of Trusts. It goes on to identify the 
statutory duties of NHS Trusts and then outlines some of their internal features. 
2.3.1 The Growth and Composition of Trusts 
On 1st April 1991 a 'first wave' of 57 NHS Trusts was established and by the sixth wave in 
1996/97 there were 429 Trusts in England, 30 in Wales, 47 in Scotland and 20 in N. Ireland 
(Fitzhugh, 1998). During this period NHS Trusts grew to encompass the whole of the 
hospital and community service within the NHS, forming the supply side of all secondary and 
community care. 
The growth in Trusts in England between April 1991 and March 1997 is set out in the table 
below, followed by an analysis of the 1996/97 Trust composition. 
Table 2.3: Growth in Trusts in England 1991-97 
Financial Year Wave No. Trusts Core Income 
fm 
No. Staff Assets 
im 
1991/92 1 57 2,602 108,646 2,939 
1992/93 1,2 156 6,539 266,980 7,073 
1993/94 1,2,3 292 12,423 483,971 13,607 
1994/95 1,2,3,4 419 18,494 698,630 19,141 
1995/96 1,2,3,4,5 433 20,102 717,806 21,707 
1996/97 1,2,3,4,5,6 429 21,127 724,331 22,801 
(Source: Fitzhugh, 1998) 
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Table 2.4: Trust Composition in England 1996-97 
Category 
Description 
No. 
Trusts 
Core 
Income 
f000 
No. 
Staff 
Fixed 
Assets 
f000 
% 
Trusts 
% 
Income Staff 
% 
Assets 
1. Multiple 
Activity 
64 4,134,926 143,290 4,769,715 15% 20% 20% 21% 
2. General Acute 
Unit 
152 10,439,447 346,331 12,166,907 36% 49% 48% 53% 
3. District 
Community 
Service 
115 4,209,424 152,828 3,556,601 27% 20% 21% 16% 
4. Mental Health 
& Learning 
Disability 
Service 
40 1,147,851 41,990 1,128,967 9% 5% 6% 5% 
5. Specialist 
Hospital 
23 615,168 18,116 765,722 5% 3% 2% 3% 
6. Ambulance 
Service 
35 580,678 21,776 413,319 8% 3% 3% 2% 
Total 429 21,127,494 724,331 22,801,231 100% 100% 100% 100% 
(Source: Fitzhugh, 1998) 
In the context of this research Trust organisations are characterised mainly as hospitals. The 
emphasis upon hospitals rather than community services is warranted on the basis of scale 
since in 1997, for example, 49% of expenditure was linked to general acute units (see `Vo 
income' in table above) with a further 23% linked to specialist hospitals or multiple activity 
Trusts which are also mainly hospital-based. 5% of income was accounted for by mental 
health and learning disability Trusts, within which two thirds of resources are dedicated to 
hospital services (Audit Commission, 1994). Only 20% of income related to community 
Trusts, many of which would include community hospitals. (The remaining 3% of hospital 
and community services funding is accounted for by ambulance services which are not 
addressed at all in this work.) 
2.3.2 The Statutory Duties of the Trust 
NHS Trusts were established through statutory instrument by the Secretary of State for 
Health under the National Health Service and Community Care Act 1990, separating the 
responsibilities and assets of Trusts from those of District Health Authorities which had 
formerly managed them. The Act stated that Trusts were to be run by a board with a 
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chairman appointed by the Secretary of State; boards would contain up to ten members with 
equal numbers of executive and non-executive directors; executive directors must include the 
Chief Executive, medical director, senior nurse manager and a finance director; revenue 
would be earned through contracts for services; Trusts would be free to set local terms and 
conditions for all employees, including medical consultants; Trusts would be given capital 
debt equal to the value of their initial assets and would be free to dispose of their assets 
(subject to a reserve power of the Secretary of State), and to borrow from the Government or 
private sources. 
Trusts continue to exercise their financial freedoms within a regime which regulates the 
return on capital, access to capital, level and structure of prices charged through contracts and 
the level of operating costs. The NHS Executive, on behalf of the Secretary of State, requires 
Trusts to: 
• break-even on operating costs; 
• achieve an external financing limit (EFL), agreed by the regulator 3 , which determines the 
total resource allocation, i.e. both capital and revenue, to be expended by the Trust; 
• set prices for NHS services which ensure that all costs including depreciation and 6% 
return on assets are covered; 
• set a price structure ensuring no cross-subsidisation between activities; 
• achieve Value for Money, i.e. productivity increases, measured by purchasers through the 
Purchaser Efficiency Index (a formula defined by the Department of Health). 
Most of the freedoms of a Trust are managerial and within year and have been heavily 
circumscribed by the regime which at the outset did not permit them to make or save 
surpluses. Although the White Paper Working for Patients had promised in 1989 that Trusts 
would be free to retain surpluses, to build up reserves with which to improve services and 
finance investment, and to manage any temporary deficits, in the event Trust freedoms 
proved to be more limited than originally envisaged by the White Paper's authors. Financial 
targets set by the annual External Financing Limit proscribed Trusts' ability to retain 
surpluses or manage deficits from 1 st April 1991. Likewise, the Value for Money test 
ensured that the opportunity to borrow from private sources was weak in practice since the 
Government provided the cheapest source of borrowing, so that on financial grounds alone it 
would be impossible to make a case for private sector fund-raising. Funds for restructuring 
of costs and services are required to be sought from the purchasers through price increases, 
posing a particular problem where the Trust is located in a capitation-losing area. Capital 
investment is allocated through adjustment of the EFL based on a business case submitted to 
the Region or Treasury (depending on the scale of the bid). The allocation process takes 
account of purchaser support 
Originally the function of Trust-Outposts but later subsumed by the Regional Offices, now functioning as the 
regional branches of the NHS Executive. 
4  Private sector-sourced funding was also counted against the EFL as a means of controlling public expenditur e 
on health nationally. 
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Central policy directives continue to guide the behaviour of Trusts in all spheres, e.g. Private 
Finance Initiative, New Deal for Junior Doctors' Hours. Managerial discretion is further 
constrained by rules set by the professional bodies such as the Royal Colleges which grant 
recognition for training of medical staff. 
The 1997 White Paper has altered the detail of some of the Trust's duties, for example (a) by 
`replacing the Purchaser Efficiency Index from 1 April 1999 with measures based on [a] new 
broader performance framework' (p65), but not in removing the obligation to achieve 
efficiency, and (b) by recommending the use of three year agreements (p48) while retaining 
the purchaser-provider contracting structure. It also introduced an explicit change of tone and 
emphasis, stating that `market-style incentives drove NHS Trusts to compete to expand their 
`business' irrespective of whether this reflected local NHS principles. Their role was further 
distorted by the almost exclusive emphasis on their statutory financial duties ' (Department of 
Health, 1997, p44). This suggests a change in the role of Trusts with a shift towards non-
financial objectives through 'clinical governance arrangements [which] will be developed in 
every NHS Trust to guarantee an emphasis on quality' (p45). 
2.3.3 Internal Features 
Trusts can be understood in terms of their resources and their organisational structure. 
Drucker (1993) observes that, although 'organisation' has become an everyday term and that 
society in all developed countries has become a 'society of organisations' in which most 
social tasks are done in and by an organisation (e.g. business, trade union, hospital, school), 
the term has gained its current meaning only since World War II. An organisation can be 
described as a man-made construct which groups humans together to work on a common 
task. An organisation is specialised and defined by its task which, in the case of NHS Trusts , 
is delivery of healthcare. 
Trusts are labour-intensive since 72% of NHS costs relate to staff (Department of Health , 
1997) which, according to Department of Health guidelines (1993b) are fixed or semi-fixed. 
Typically the cost structure is: Fixed 28%, Semi-Fixed (mainly staff) 61%, Variable (e.g. 
drugs) 11%. Set-up costs of hospitals are high due to investment in capital and equipment 
including theatres, pathology laboratories and imaging facilities. 
National data serves as a proxy for Trust-specific data in examining the structure of the 
workforce. In 1998 the NHS in England employed 765,000 whole time equivalent (wte) staff 
in hospital and community services (Department of Health 1999a) with a balance between 
staff groups as follows: 
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Table 2.5: NHS Workforce 1998 
Medical & Dental 8% 
Nursing, Midwifery (exc P2000 learners) 44% 
Scientific, Therapeutic & Technical 13% 
Healthcare Assistants 3% 
Support Staff 8% 
Ambulance 2% 
Administration and estates staff 22% 
Total 100% 
(Source: Department of Health 1999a) 
These figures would not reflect non-NHS employees such as ancillary and maintenance staff 
in outsourced services, agency nurses or locum doctors. The major input to the service is 
from professionally qualified staff and within the groups above the proportions of qualified 
staff are: 
Table 2.6: Professionally Qualified NHS Workforce NHS 1998 
Medical & Dental 	 100% 
Nursing & Midwifery (exc education) 	 74% 
Nursing & Midwifery (inc education) 67% 
Professional & Technical 	 82% 
(Source: Department of Health 1999a) 
Although medical staff are one of the smallest staff groups, less than 50% of whom are 
consultants, they represent a major power base within the NHS. 'Administration' is a large 
collective group which includes managers. Much of the organisational change within the 
health service during the 1980s and 1990s has been an attempt to redefine the balance of 
power between the two groups, i.e. to enable managers to manage and also to bring doctors 
into management. The Griffiths report into general management (1983) and the Resource 
Management Initiative (Department of Health and Social Security, 1986) paved the way for 
the management restructuring associated with adoption of Trust status after 1991. 
The NHS introduced a 'clinical directorate model' of hospital management from 1984 
onwards which began with an experiment in Guy's Hospital and was extended to the rest of 
the NHS in the form of the Resource Management Initiative (RMI). In this model the 
hospital was divided into clinical directorates along specialty lines, e.g. surgical specialties, 
medicine, women and children's health, and clinical support such as imaging (radiology), 
pathology and theatres. The clinical director would usually be a member of the consultant 
medical staff, using one or two clinical sessions to undertake management responsibilities, 
and responsible to the hospital general manager, later the chief executive. Clinical directors 
would normally be supported by a manager, described throughout this thesis as a 
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service/business manager. The clinical directorate model represented a devolved form of 
management, intended to locate decision-making as close as possible to the point of service 
delivery. The purpose of the clinical directorate model was: 
`to reconcile clinical freedom with management authority and accountability ... the 
consultants agreed to accept a system that sought to equate power with responsibility. 
In return for the freedom to manage their own affairs, they had to accept responsibility 
for the financial consequences.' 
Smith and Chantler, quoted in Harrison & Pollitt (1994) p90 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has set the context in which NHS Trusts function, observing that: 
• The case for change in the health service was well established as a precursor to 
introducing reforms in 1991; 
• By the sixth wave in 1996/97 NHS Trusts accounted for the supply of all secondary and 
community care in the health service; 
• Trusts have well defined statutory duties, set initially in terms of financial requirements. 
Since 1997, with the new Labour Government, financial objectives have been combined 
with a duty to provide high quality services through the introduction of clinical 
governance; 
• Trusts are labour intensive organisations with a high concentration of professional staff; 
• Trusts each have a Board of Directors with a prerequisite membership including, for 
example, the Chief Executive and Medical Director. The organisations have a common 
type of management structure, described as a 'clinical directorate model', which was 
intended to facilitate devolved management with a clinical lead. The managers of clinical 
directorates are described as service/business managers in this thesis and are a key unit of 
analysis. 
The management structure of Trusts is addressed explicitly through the fieldwork in Chapters 
5 - 9. Chapter 3 which follows builds up a framework of motivation using broader units of 
analysis, namely individuals and groups within Trusts, before considering the organisations 
themselves in their environmental setting. 
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CHAPTER 3. MOTIVATION OF TRUSTS: A FRAMEWORK 
In considering the motivation of Trusts this chapter looks at the motivation of hospitals and 
the people working within them by using four levels of analysis: individuals, groups, NHS 
Trusts and the external environment within which Trusts operate. This structure permits a 
logical development, taking forward the impact of individual motivation into the groups 
interacting within the Trust which are in turn affected by their environment. Evidence across 
the social sciences is reviewed to generate a set of hypotheses about motivation of Trusts. 
3.1 Motivation in Individuals 
The term 'motivation', derived from the Latin movere meaning 'to move', is concerned with 
the question of what energises, directs and sustains behaviour (Steers and Porter, 1991). 
Energetic forces imply an inner drive which motivates individuals or external forces within 
the environment which trigger these drives. The notion of being directed towards something 
implies a goal orientation or set of objectives. The third element, the sustaining element, 
suggests the need for feedback to enable individuals to maintain or alter their objectives in 
the light of experience. This cycle is depicted in Figure 3.1 below. 
Figure 3.1 : A generalised model of the basic motivation process (after Steers and 
Porter, 1991) 
Inner state of disequilibrium: 
Need, desire or expectancy, 
accompanied by anticipation 
Behaviour 
or action 
Incentive 
or goal 
 
Modification 
of inner state 
The model is simplistic since motives can only be inferred and cannot be seen, and at any one 
time a host of motives may be in conflict with each other. There will also be differences 
between individuals in the way they select their dominant motive, and satisfaction of goals 
may have an impact on subsequent motives and behaviour. The intensity of certain motives, 
such as hunger, thirst or sex, is generally reduced upon gratification while others, such as the 
desire for more money or power, may be heightened by their attainment. A further caution in 
considering theories of motivation is that the academic literature is culture bound, since 
linJost motivation theories in use today were developed in the United States by Americans 
and about Americans. they reflect the values system of Americans' (Adler, 1991, p324). 
With these limitations in mind, the literature review considers psychological, managerial and 
economic approaches to individuals . 
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3.1.1 Psychological Approaches to Motivation 
The principle of hedonism, that pleasure will be sought over pain, lies at the root of most 
psychological theories of motivation. It dates back to the early Greek philosophers and re-
emerged in the works of philosophers such as Locke, Bentham (who coined the term 
`hedonic calculus' in 1789 to describe the weighing of pros and cons of various acts of 
behaviour), Mill and Helvetius (discussed in Cherrington, 1991). Toward the end of the 
nineteenth century the empirically based science of psychology overtook philosophy as a 
means of exploring motivation. Psychologists such as Freud (1920) and McDougall (1908) 
emphasised the role of instinct and unconscious motivation in which individuals were 
perceived as having innate predispositions towards certain behaviour in response to internal 
and external cues. Critics of instinct theorists argued that much behaviour was learned rather 
than instinctive, and so developed a new school which developed drive and reinforcement 
theoriess. Woodworth (1918) first introduced the term 'drive' to describe the supply of 
energy that impels an organism towards certain behaviour, leading to identification of a range 
of drives such as hunger. The notion of homeostasis (Cannon, 1939) was developed to 
describe the need to alleviate any disequilibrium or deviation from the normal state by, for 
example, satisfying hunger. Cognitive theories formed the third major line of development in 
psychological approaches to motivation. Unlike drive theories which represented behaviour 
as a function of the past, cognitive theories saw motivation as a 'hedonism of the future' 
which was driven by anticipation of future events and led to goal-directed behaviour. 
Tolman (1932) and Lewin (1938) were early exponents of the expectancy or valence theories 
in which individuals were viewed as choosing behaviours by firstly determining their 
potential outcome and secondly attaching a value to these outcomes. Cognitive theories vary 
from drive theories since they see the individual as selecting their drivers based on 
expectancy, rather than being subjected to non-selective influences. Both, however, stress the 
importance of some sort of goal orientation in terms of a reward or expected outcome. Both, 
also, use the idea of learning, either through past stimulus-response associations or through 
behaviour and outcome. 
Theories which describe the inner state of the individual have encompassed physiological 
needs which, when fulfilled, give way to a need for self-actualisation. Figure 3.2 compares 
Murray's inventory of needs (1954) with Maslow's (1954) and Alderfer's (1969) hierarchies 
of need. 
$ The concept of instinct is undergoing a renaissance in the biological sciences through neo-Darwinism which 
uses the metaphor of the selfish gene (Dawkins, 1976) to explain biological and social behaviour. The life-
cycles of humans, plants and animals are interpreted as being driven by an innate instinct towards gene 
replication and survival. This has been extended to other populist scientific publications, such as Tippler's 
Physics of Immortality (1994) which suggests that space travel is inevitable in the human drive to broadcast 
genes throughout the universe. 
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Figure 3.2: Comparison of Need Theories (based on Cherrington, 1993) 
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McClelland (1965) investigated three of Murray's needs: achievement, affiliation and power, 
and classified individuals according to the strength of their needs in these areas, abbreviated 
as ‘nAch', `nAff and `nPow'. High need achievers were found to have a strong desire to 
assume personal responsibility for performing a task or finding a solution to a problem. If the 
task required the presence of others they would tend to choose coworkers based on their 
competence rather than friendship and would set moderately difficult goals, taking calculated 
risks. High-need achievers have a strong desire for performance feedback, regardless of 
whether they have succeeded or failed. Money is not a strong motivator, since these 
individuals are already highly motivated, and instead acts as a form of feedback and 
recognition, providing evidence of success. McClelland argued that the achievement need 
could be taught and developed through cognitive support and reinforcement. The need for 
affiliation - nAff - is defined as a desire to establish and maintain friendly and warm relations 
with other individuals, seeking approval and tending to conform to the wishes of friends. The 
need for power - nPow - is defined as the need to control others, to influence their behaviour 
and to be responsible for them. It is tempting to use this classification to categorise doctors 
and managers. One could speculate that doctors tend towards ‘nAch', Chief Executives 
towards `nPow' while middle managers who need to manage relationships would tend to 
work as `nAff' types. There is no evidence to support this hypothesis, however, and the 
value of the theory in this context is to highlight the potential differences between individuals 
and their underlying motivation. 
Deci and Ryan (1985) argued against the body of psychology literature which viewed all 
behaviour as being driven by goals, reinforcements and environmental contingencies and 
which denied the existence of intrinsic motivation. They emphasised the role played by 
feelings and joyful experience in stimulating the individual towards autonomy and self-
direction. Deci and Ryan, along with Harter (1978), Angyal (1941) and deCharmes (1968) 
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argued that the need for competence and self-determination (or effectance) prompts 
individuals to seek and conquer challenges which stretch their capacity. Child development 
could be interpreted in this light where, for example, competence produces satisfaction and 
pleasure in the act of walking but over time needs to be stretched to the next stage to prevent 
boredom from setting in. 
Csikszentmihalyi (1975) went further in arguing against anticipated goal-driven behaviour. 
`Chatting with acquaintances, daydreaming, ... drumming with fingertips on tabletops' 
(Csikszentmihalyi, Chapter 10, p209 in Lepper and Greene, 1978) were given as examples of 
non-goal driven behaviour which were essential to mental balance. He suggested that 
enjoyment of the activity was reward in itself and did not need to be stimulated by any 
external, future goal. 'Free will' on the part of the actor produced motivating power, rather 
than genetic evolution or social conditioning. The discovery of new goals and experiential 
rewards defined the 'emergent' state of the organism and produced creativity. True 
enjoyment, he postulated, is accompanied by the experience of 'flow' where one is immersed 
in the task and experiences a loss of ego and unity with time and surroundings. Flow 
experiences may occur in games, sports, rituals, meditative states and aesthetic experiences 
and Csikszentmihalyi's research suggests that flow emerges under specifiable states, the most 
important of which is optimal challenge. This occurs when the individual works to the peak 
of capacity and is engaged in an optimally challenging activity, i.e. one that is not too easy. 
This links with Deci and Ryan's notion of competence since Csikszentmihalyi concludes that 
`the whole issue of intrinsic rewards eventually boils down to this - the acquisition of skills' 
(p211). (This has resonance in the fieldwork later where surgeons indicate that they just want 
to carry out their tasks as efficiently as possible). 
3.1.2 Managerial Approaches to Motivation 
Managerial attention to the role of motivation in organisations began as a consequence of the 
industrial revolution. Employers became interested in ensuring an efficient workforce to 
yield a return on capital investment in large-scale and complex factory operations. 'Good' 
workers were seen as pursuing their own best economic self-interests, leading to a philosophy 
of management sometimes described as the 'traditional' model of motivation (Steers and 
Porter, 1991). 
The 'traditional model', characterised by the Scientific Management approach developed by 
Frederick Winslow Taylor (1911), has exerted a continuing influence on organisational 
design and management practice. It originally focused upon the shopfloor and on the 
techniques that could be used to maximise the productivity of manual workers. This 
approach to motivation rested on the basic contemporary assumptions about the nature of 
human beings, namely that they were lazy, often dishonest, aimless, dull and, most of all, 
mercenary. The aim of 'scientific management', through systematic study of work, was to 
achieve the 'one best way' of performing the job, and raise efficiency for the benefit of all, 
guided by a set of 'great underlying principles of management'. The underlying motivational 
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assumption was that, for a price, workers would tolerate the routinised, highly fractionated 
jobs of the factory and that incentive structures would determine output. 
Taylor's methods have been followed by others including Gantt, Frank and Lillian Gilbreth, 
Bedaux, Rowan and Halsey, and have been developed into what is now called Work Study or 
Industrial Engineering and, more recently, Business Process Re-engineering (e.g. Hammer 
and Champy, 1993). Taylor has been a controversial figure, even in his lifetime, due to the 
alleged inhumanity of his system which was said to reduce workers to the level of efficiently 
functioning machines. The quest for profits led managers to put constraints on the incentive 
system to the point where workers' output was rising without corresponding increases in 
wages. Productivity gains meant that fewer workers were required while workers countered 
this with restrictive practices and growth in trades unionism. Organisations began to review 
their motivational assumptions about employees in an effort to increase production and 
maintain a steady work force. Newer approaches did not, however, eliminate the primary 
economic assumption of the traditional model, and recent studies among both managers and 
workers indicate that money is a primary motivational force and that many workers will 
select jobs more on the basis of salary prospects than job content (e.g. Lawler 1973, Mobley 
1982). 'Overall, organisations that give the greatest rewards tend to attract and retain the 
most people' (Lawler, 1991, p507). 
A second model of behaviour and motivation is approached through the human relations 
movement which, drawing heavily on the Hawthorne studies conducted between 1927 and 
1932 (Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1939), concluded that economic considerations were 
relatively unimportant in motivating workers and in raising productivity and, instead, 
solidarity was the key. Subsequent research was carried out using interviewing and 
observation-based data collection methods. Taken as a whole, the significance of the 
Hawthorne investigation lay in discovering the existence of the 'informal organisation' and 
demonstrating the importance to individuals of stable social relationships in the work 
situation. Huczynski (1993) argues that the human relations movement arose from the 
American wish to humanise their society without interfering with the free operation of market 
forces. Competition outside the firm was considered desirable but was to be avoided within 
the firm. Human relations can be interpreted as a reaction to scientific management or, 
alternatively, as a different tactic which sought to achieve the same goal of destroying work 
group solidarity. 
The human relations message can be reduced to a set of propositions which amount to 'being 
nice to workers'. The message to managers was that, while the informal group captured the 
individual, the firm could capture the informal group since workers were psychologically 
vulnerable to any group which exhibited social concern for them. If workers could be helped 
to belong, human relations would be improved and the workers made more productive. The 
growth of unions and evident general discontent of workers, together with a growing sense of 
responsibility among managers, meant that the 'human factor' taking into account the 'whole 
person' added considerable appeal to management theory. 
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Neo-Human Relations (NI-ER), a popular group of ideas otherwise described as the 'human 
resources model' (Steers and Porter, 1991), represents an ideal of 'empowering' individuals 
by recognising the complexity of their needs and of humanising work in the face of rapid 
social and technological change. It assumes that employees' attitude to the company would 
become entirely positive if they were allowed to do responsible and meaningful work, and 
that they would come to share the goals of management, thus bringing an end to industrial 
conflict. By eliminating hierarchy and specialisation, people would be given room to grow 
and would become involved in a co-operative process. Neo-human relations represents a 
return to dealing with the individual rather than the group, and calls upon employees to return 
to self-reliance and the Protestant work ethic within the sphere of control of the organisation. 
Influential NHR theories, as categorised by Huczynski (1993), include Maslow's needs 
hierarchy (1943), McGregor's Theory X and Theory Y (1960) and Herzberg's Hygiene 
Motivation Theory (1959). Theory X assumptions are that average human beings inherently 
dislike work and need as a result to be coerced, directed and threatened with punishment to 
get them to work. Theory Y postulates that work is as natural to the average human being as 
rest or play and the individual can be self-directing when committed to the objectives served. 
In contrast to the traditional and human relations models which identify managers' tasks as 
being one of manipulating employees to accept managerial authority, the NHR management 
task is of setting up conditions to enable employees to meet their own personal goals at the 
same time as meeting the organisation's goals. 
The traditional model (or Scientific Management), Human Relations, and Neo-Human 
Relations form three popular 'management idea families' identified by Huczynski (1993) on 
the basis of 'a survey of academics and practitioners in the field and a content analysis of 
professional journals, popular texts of selected readings and a reprint series' (p3). In 
considering the popularity of these groups of ideas Huczynski acknowledges the significance 
of the world of management consultancy and training which requires 'touchstone ideas' for 
its own legitimation and development and which imposes constraints on the nature and form 
of evolving management ideas. Key aspects of organisational life, such as its political 
nature, thus tend to be excluded. A second limitation relates to how the management idea can 
be packaged and sold: 
Those that succeed are likely to be presented in the form of logos or pseudo 
theoretical models which form the basis of a two or three day training programme. 
Thus, pragmatic ideas in the form of McGregor's 'Theory X and Theory Y, Maslow's 
`Hierarchy of Needs', Herzberg's Motivators and Hygiene Factors' and Peters and 
Waterman's 7-5' model will be included. All of these can be summarised on one 
page of a course handout in the form of a logo or on an overhead projector 
transparency. 
A. Huczynski, Management Gurus, 1993 (p5) 
The contingency approach to management and motivation, which falls outside this set of 
`popular' ideas, rejects the need to follow any single model. The 1960s represented a 
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watershed in thinking as empirical work began to raise questions about the validity of the 
organisational principles preached by management theorists. Rejection of universal 
prescriptions established the contingency approach (among the research community) which 
aimed to identify the organisational design that 'best fitted' the situation as it existed. 
Contributions came from research into diverse topics such as wage payment systems, 
leadership styles, organisational structures, environmental influences and job design. The 
common feature across this range was a rejection of any 'one best way', substituting an 
emphasis on diagnosis of the situation to determine which approach would be more useful 
and appropriate under the particular circumstances. 
3.1.3 Economic and Welfare Approaches to Motivation 
The classical and neoclassical economic view of humanity is consistent with the traditional 
managerial view of the mercenary worker and of the psychological view that man is goal-
oriented, based on learned or instinctive drives. Homo economicus is a rational individual 
who acts out of self-interest towards financial (or psychic) gain. 
This view of motivation has been heavily criticised within the social sciences community, 
most notably by Richard Titmuss (1970; Oakley &. Ashton, 1997). In his celebrated work 
`The GO Relationship' he challenged the concept of homo economicus by comparing the 
practice of voluntary blood donations with the commercial approach of paying individuals to 
supply blood banks. His study was a riposte to Cooper and Culyer (1968) who argued that a 
financially driven market for blood should be introduced to increase supplies and raise 
productivity. Titmuss countered that use of cash payments would diminish the altruistic 
motivation of individuals and so lead to inferior quality and quantity of blood. In essence, 
introduction of market forces would shift the nature of the donor from that of altruistic, well-
meaning individual to that of homo economicus who would have every incentive to 
contaminate the blood supply by lying about hazardous illnesses in their past such as hepatitis 
Le Grand (1997) translated this observation into the language of 'Knights, Knaves or Pawns' 
in which, following Hume (1875)6, individuals motivated by their own self-interest are 
described as Knaves and the self-denying, altruistic individual as a Knight. Introduction of 
market incentives into the environment has the potential to turn a Knight into a Knave, 
consistent with the work of Lepper and Green (1978) and Deci and Ryan (1985) in the 
psychological literature who found that external motivators such as monetary incentives 
could crowd out internal motivators such as satisfaction in the task itself. 
The implication of this is that the existence of any form of economic incentive brings out the 
`knavish' aspect of human nature whereas the absence of economic incentives allows 
`In contriving any system of government, and fixing the several checks and controls of the constitution, every 
man ought to be supposed a knave and to have no other end, in all his actions, than private interest. By this 
interest, we must govern him and, by means of it, notwithstanding his insatiable avarice and ambition, co-
operate to the public good.' Hume (1875) pp117-18 
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individuals to function as altruists. Le Grand (forthcoming) investigates the evidence relating 
to the size of the payment required to shift the balance of motivation in voluntary and 
informal care sectors. He concludes that 'one set of research results suggests that market 
incentives devalue altruistic activities, another set that they revalue them', but speculates that 
financial reward which recognises but does not compensate for self-sacrifice protects the 
altruistic nature of individuals' motivation. 
3.1.4 Application of Economic Approaches to Social Policy 
The traditional economic view of narrow individual self-interest is consistent with the Public 
Choice (Cullis and Jones, 1992) approach of 'methodological individualism' which argues 
that the public sector is run by individuals who set out to maximise their own income and 
operate services to serve their own interests rather than the needs of the user. 
Le Grand (1997) argues that this view of incentive-driven consumers and providers has been 
imported into the welfare sector during the last twenty years. This is in contrast to the 1948 
Beveridgean welfare state which was founded on the assumption that service providers and 
professionals were motivated by noble and selfless concern for people who had been placed 
in positions of need through no fault of their own. Introduction of market incentives into 
areas of welfare such as health has been interpreted as a move away from trust and altruism 
as a model of human motivation towards the model set out by economists (e.g. Schumpeter, 
1944, and Niskanen, 1973) who reinforce the need for a market to ration resources. 'As an 
account of how people behave in social policy contexts, the rational choice approach has 
won the argument', claims Taylor-Gooby ruefully (1997, p98). Perhaps this is akin to 
Burke's (1729-1797) declaration that 'the age of chivalry is gone. That of sophisters, 
economists and calculators has succeeded.' In short, self-interest is the dominant model of 
human motivation. 
The dominant rote of self-interest as a motivator was applied by the Conservative Government in its policy 
development during the period 1979-97, conveyed in the Conservative Election Manifesto, 1979, which said 
`We want to work with the grain of human nature, helping people to help themselves'. Margaret Thatcher 
expressed this in a controversial magazine interview which stimulated a debate about individual versus 
collective responsibility. 'Them is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women and there are 
families. And no government can do anything except through people, and people must look after themselves 
first. It is our duty to look after ourselves and then to look afte• our neighbour', (Woman's Own, 31 m October 
1987, quoted in Timmins, 1995, p433). Gamble (1994) has argued that the leadership's objectives, apart from 
restoring the fortunes of the Conservative Party, were 'to revive market liberalism as the dominant public 
philosophy and to create the conditions for a free economy'. 
The Labour Government which succeeded in 1997 appears to have accepted this policy context and its implicit 
view of motivation by adopting market principles while simultaneously embracing a language and public spirit 
of partnership, involvement and co-operation. This started while in opposition when the Left redefined its 
economic philosophy by acknowledging the benefits of decentralised markets as a mechanism for economic 
decision-making in contrast to central planning through state control (e.g. Le Grand and Estrin, 1989). The 
new Labour Government (Department of Health, 1997) went on to signal the apparent end of competition and 
market principles in the NHS while retaining the underlying structure of the purchaser/provider split. 
The Labour Government's attempts at building on the former Conservative policy agenda are greeted with 
scepticism by some who opposed Thatcherism in the 1980s. An arts review in The Observer newspaper, for 
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3.1.5 Selecting a Model of Individual Motivation 
The psychological literature provides a model of motivation in individuals which starts from 
inner state, moving through to behaviour or action, orientated to a goal or incentive, the 
experience of which produces a modification of the inner state. This model is not integrated 
in the sense that any single theory unifies these elements. Rather, Steers and Porter (1991) 
use it as a framework to describe the areas which different theorists have sought to address. 
The element of the model described as 'inner state' strives towards some universality in the 
form of a hierarchy of needs, starting from satisfaction of basic physiological needs through 
to personal development or self-actualisation. In general, the psychological literature views 
human behaviour as goal-driven and subject to external motivation. 
Managerial approaches are based on two opposing assumptions about human beings. The 
`traditional' model exemplified by FW Taylor characterises individuals as mercenary and 
self-seeking. According to this view, incentive structures need to be put in place to goad 
workers towards productivity. A more recent approach to individuals, described as Neo-
Human Relations, regards them as committed individuals who could be 'empowered' to 
shoulder responsibility in the workplace and be productive if their needs for fulfilment were 
properly recognised. 
The traditional managerial model of individuals is consistent with the traditional economic 
view of homo economicus as a rational being in pursuit of narrow self-interest. A less 
popular, but still significant, counter argument within the field of economics assumes that 
individuals are fundamentally altruistic, as in Richard Titmuss' thesis on the motivation of 
blood donors. The synthesis of these two contrasting views lies in the notion that individuals 
can be incentivised to move from one category to another, i.e. knights can become knaves 
through introduction of payments for performance. Social policy since 1979 to the present 
leans towards the assumption that individuals will behave as homo economicus rather than as 
self-denying altruists and has favoured the application of market incentives to production and 
consumption, notwithstanding the current Labour Government's rhetoric concerning 
competition in the health service. 
At the level of the individual, it is reasonable to conclude that the 'default' or dominant mode 
of human behaviour tends towards self-interest, reflecting the assumption which underlies 
theories of market behaviour and goal-driven psychological theories. This assertion makes it 
possible to predict how individuals will respond to incentives by analysing their impact upon 
personal well-being. 
example, commented that: '[Jonathan] Miller has an abiding contempt for the batty baroness, and his 
production of 'The Beggar's Opera' examines the 'wolfish' individualism she encouraged Though first 
performed in 1728, this underworld pastoral remains, he believes 'a most timely piece' since New Labour has 
cosily reconciled itself to the vulpine market forces which impel Gay's cheats and swindlers. Miller is 
unimpressed by the shiny Pepsodent patina of Blair.' (The Observer Review, 21' November 1999, p5). 
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The 'default' supposition does not require a cynical view of human nature, nor does it deny 
the existence of altruism or even its status as an aspiration and desirable model of 
motivation8 . Where financial incentives are in place, however, it is supposed that self-interest 
will calibrate human behaviour in a manner which allows us to predict how individuals will 
try to achieve reward. 
3.2 Groups within Trusts 
The sociological literature identifies which groups of individuals within Trusts are likely to 
be important in determining the goals and motivation of the organisation. Sociology as a 
discipline concerns itself with power and conflict and so, in considering Trust motivation, 
provides the necessary arena in which to weigh the power between potentially rival groups. 
Hadley and Forster (1993) highlight the difference between conventional management 
theory, which is based on a societal vision of regulation and stability, and sociology which 
stresses the importance of conflict, coercion and radical change. Like Huczynski (1993) they 
argue that the 'consumers' of organisational theory, i.e. trainees in management methods, 
may not be aware of this sociological distinction but, by their interest in perpetuating the 
organisation, are focused on regulation. 
The sociological approach suggests that management theory, by starting from the viewpoint 
of the executive, confuses the actions of managers with the behaviour of the organisation. 
Hadley and Forster encourage the use of an action perspective which considers the 
viewpoints of different actors, prompting an examination of how motivational factors relate 
to change and conflict within organisations. It implies that at any one time the prevailing 
arrangements for management are likely to represent a negotiated rather than an imposed 
order and that renegotiation and change are intrinsic characteristics of all human institutions. 
They conclude that in practice power is usually wielded by a group of leaders portrayed as a 
coalition rather than a command hierarchy. Given that there may be other coalitions within 
the organisation, this directing group may be described as the dominant coalition. 
The interaction of different interest groups can be analysed with reference to Mintzberg's 
(1989) key elements and coordinating mechanisms in organisations. Trusts can generally be 
described in terms of 'professionals' at the operating core - doctors, nurses, professional and 
technical staff carrying out the productive activity of the organisation; 'management' at the 
analytical technostructure; a combination of management and, arguably, doctors at the 
strategic apex; and support staff defined as ancillary, works and maintenance. 
8 The Judeo-Christian tradition accommodates this through the Pauline distinction between grace and nature, 
which deems nature to be base. The struggle between mankind's natural state and the higher life of morality and 
enlightenment is a recurring theme of Paul's letters, e.g. 'Those who are living by their natural inclinations have 
their minds on the things human nature desires; those who live in the Spirit have their minds on spiritual things. 
...We have no obligation to human nature to be dominated by it. ' Romans 8:5-12 
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3.2.1 The Role of Power 
Lukes (1974) considers three views of power. The first, described as 'one-dimensional' 
lends itself to empirical tests since it is based on the observable outcome of decision-making. 
Dahl (1957) provides the point of departure through his early study 'The Concept of Power' 
in which his 'intuitive idea of power' is described as the ability to get another person to do 
something that he or she would otherwise not have done. Lukes rehearses Polsby's (1963) 
argument that actors' control over events can best be observed in a decision making situation, 
and that identifying 'who prevails in community decision-making' seems 'the best way to 
determine which individuals and groups have 'more' power in social life' (quoted in Lukes, 
(1974) p13). The one-dimensional view of power thus focuses on behaviour in the making of 
decisions on issues over which there is an observable conflict of interests. The two-
dimensional view extends the notion of power to 'mobilisation of bias' where 'those who 
benefit are placed in a preferred position to defend and promote their vested interests' 
(Bachrach and Baratz, 1970, pp43-44). This typology of power embraces 'coercion, 
influence, authority, force and manipulation and involves both decision-making and 
nondecision-making, which can be observed through the allocation of benefits and privileges 
in the community' (Lukes, 1974, pl 7). Lukes notes that the one and two dimensional views 
both have a common stress on actual, observable conflict since, according to Bachrach and 
Baratz, where there is an absence of conflict 'there is no way accurately to judge whether the 
thrust of a decision really is to thwart or prevent serious consideration of a demand for 
change that potentially threatening to the decision-maker' (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970, 
p50). A conflict of interest, according to both paradigms, is therefore necessary in order to 
determine who has power and where the interests of the actors lie. The three-dimensional 
view adds the potential for latent or potential conflict in which 'a contradiction between the 
interests of those exercising power and the real interests of those they exclude' (Lukes, 1974, 
pp24-25) may never be actualised. The underlying concept of power shared by all three 
views is 'the notion that A in some way affects B' which can be generalised as 'the use of 
authoritative decisions to further collective goals'. 
This analysis provides a theoretical framework for building up hypotheses which are capable 
of being tested empirically. The hypotheses developed in Chapter 4 focus on two sets of 
actors, managers and doctors, and aim to assess their relative influence over events by 
attributing different sets of goals to them and then observing which goal appears to be 
achieved. The hypotheses are consistent with the one and two dimensional views of power in 
suggesting that a situation of conflict provides the best environment in which to determine 
which actors exert the most control. 
Morgan (1996) itemises the most important sources of power, noting that these 'provide 
organisational members with a variety of means for enhancing their interests and resolving 
or perpetuating organisational conflict' (p171). The sources of power are identified as: 
1. Formal authority 
2. Control of scarce resources 
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3. Use of organisational structure, rules and regulations 
4. Control of decision processes 
5. Control of knowledge and information 
6 	Control of boundaries 
7. Ability to cope with uncertainty 
8. Control of technology 
9. Interpersonal alliances, networks and control of 'informal organisation' 
10. Control of counterorganisations 
11. Symbolism and the management of meaning 
12. Gender and the management of gender relations 
13. Structural factors that define the stage of action 
14. The power one already has. 
The sociology of the professions, considered in the next section, serves to isolate managers 
and doctors as the two groups which hold the main positions of power in Trusts. It is 
possible to argue that both groups derive power from each of the sources listed above. 
Empirical work is required to determine the weights of their respective sources. 
3.2.2 Selecting Doctors and Managers as Power Groups 
A distinctive feature of public sector organisations is their high degree of professionalisation 
and developments in health service structures and organisation have tended to be viewed as 
an attempt at curtailing the power of professionals in favour of managers. 
Harrison and Pollitt (1994) argue that the main pulls following the 1991 reforms are between 
professionals and management since the tension between management and support staff was 
largely resolved through contracting out in the 1980s. They describe three strategies which 
have been adopted to bring health professionals into management control. 'Challenging the 
professionals' was adopted with the introduction of General Management in 1984 and was 
accompanied by improvements in management information. Trade unions and professional 
associations were weakened by contracting out of support services and by the introduction of 
the Pay Review Bodies to replace pay negotiations in the professions. The strategy of 
`incorporating the professionals' was pursued by extensive organisational development (OD) 
which was intended to change the culture of organisations, to empower all staff working at 
the operating core and to bring doctors into management. The Resource Management 
Initiative (Department of Health and Social Security, 1986) was a large scale national 
initiative designed to achieve this through a change in the organisational structure and a 
development of the management information database through investment in technology. 
(This represents an application of the Neo Human Relations model described earlier). 
`Changing the environment' took place with the introduction of the internal market and the 
split between purchasers and providers and has been accompanied by an empowerment of 
NHS consumers. 
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Ferlie et al (1996) highlight the professional/managerial power balance as part of a central 
and unresolved debate within New Public Management (NPM). The definition of NPM is 
still being refined and, potentially, 'it includes as a central tenet a shift towards 
managerialism and the empowerment of management' (p166), asking lijf this empowerment 
has occurred, has it taken place at the expense of professionals? (p166). They argue that 
the evidence is not conclusive since 'the picture is complex and cannot simply be portrayed 
as a unidimensional shift of power from professionals to managers' (p166). The functions 
and processes within NHS Trusts are deemed to remain essentially unchanged but the level 
of internal management control has increased and public sector managers are perceived to be 
gaining as a group. 'Even doctors can be seen as losing ground to the new cadre of General 
Managers in health care. However, the evidence is still slight and it is too early to conclude 
that this will lead remorselessly to a process of de-professionalisation' (p7). Flynn (1992) 
takes the view that power has clearly shifted towards managers: 'Medical autonomy has been 
increasingly circumscribed by the extension of bureaucratic and managerial authority. 
Professional prerogatives and technical discretion are no longer taken for granted; 
accountability is more than ever defined in terms of corporate objectives, defined, translated 
and enforced by state-appointed executives ' (Flynn,1992: 183, cited in Walby and 
Greenwell, 1994). 
The answers to the questions of power-shift are less important to this literature review than 
the posing of them, since they establish the tradition (e.g. Scott (1985) and Davies (1983)) 
that professionalisation and bureaucratisation are perceived as opposing forces. In terms of 
sociological and NPM perspectives on health service power structures, the relationship 
between professionals and managers is key to the balance of power within the NHS 
organisations. 
Within the professional groups themselves it is necessary to consider whether a single group 
can be regarded as dominant. Walby and Greenwell (1994) deal with this explicitly in their 
examination of iniraprofessional working. Nurses and doctors are identified as the two 
dominant professions (partly justified through their focus on acute hospital ward settings) 
which are considered within two competing principles of leadership. According to one 
principle the nurse assists the doctor in her capacity as 'handmaid', and within the other 
doctors and nurses belong to two complementary professions which do not form a 
hierarchical relationship. Historically medical consultants have had legal and organisational 
responsibility for patient care and from the beginning of the NHS they have been involved in 
managing hospitals. Medicine, therefore, is described as having a dominant position among 
professionals in hospitals by having authority over admissions, treatment decisions and 
discharge of patients. Walby and Greenwell examined the negotiated order between health 
professionals through subjective accounts of experience. They found that consultants' 
authority of treatment was evident throughout the accounts but that the balance between 
nurses and junior doctors was more varied. The essential difference in the balance of power 
between the two professions lies in the consultant's ultimate responsibility for the patient in 
hospital, and the GP's responsibility for patient treatment outside the hospital. This is 
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expressed in a phrase we heard quite frequently; the consultant 'owns ' the patient, an aspect 
of medical control that was not contested by any nurse in our study. Consultants are 
responsible for patients, and this sets a boundary to the extent of nursing influence within 
hospital. A junior doctor is moving toward this responsibility in training to become either a 
GP or a consultant. A nurse, however skilled, does not currently have 'ownership' of any 
hospital patients... ' (p54). 
This justifies the assumption in much of the literature that the professional/managerial 
contest for control in hospitals and Trusts is synonymous with a doctor/manager contest, and 
goes further by singling out the dominance of consultants among professionals. 
The sociological literature surveyed here helps to refine the analytical framework for Trusts 
in that (a) it validates the view that conflicting interests may be at work simultaneously 
within Trusts, contrary to conventional organisational theory which assumes that managers 
and their decisions control the behaviour of organisations; (b) it separates professionals' 
interests and motivation from those of managers; (c) it distinguishes doctors from other 
professionals and (d) isolates consultants as being the dominant professional group, as 
distinct from junior doctors who jostle for positions of authority with nurses. This 
clarification of power groups supports the hypotheses of conflicting interests between 
consultants and managers which are developed in the next chapter. 
3.2.3 Motivation of Doctors and Managers 
The psychology literature relating to motivation of groups indicates that perhaps the most 
important group process is the tendency towards conformity within the group (e.g. Asch, 
1958; Sherif, 1936 and the Hawthorne studies of Roethlisberger & Dickson, 1939). 
Motivation of doctors as a group can be considered by referring to motivation of 
professionals9. Fincham and Rhodes (1992) note that attempts to define a set of 'traits' or 
qualities intrinsic to professionals and their work have never met with success. Johnson 
(1972), for example, has argued that claims of 'altruism' on the part of professionals were 
based on exaggerated accounts of their ethical role, and 'fall into the error of accepting 
professionals' own definitions of themselves' (1972, p25). Fincham and Rhodes (1992) 
suggest that professionalism is best regarded as an occupational strategy which groups 
exercise to reap financial, personal and social rewards. Professional work, they contend, has 
three characteristics (1972, p283). Firstly there is typically a service element, meeting the 
needs of an individual client or contributing to the common good; secondly they are ethical 
occupations, which inspire a relationship of trust; and, thirdly, the professions tend to be self-
regulating occupations. The trust relationship leads to a sense of altruism, lending the work 
an ideological character which serves the interest of the profession while professional censure 
Entry to the medical profession, according to Allen (1994) is determined mainly by ability and scholastic 
performance. Students enrol for medical degrees because they are good at science at school and select their 
specialty during their training on the basis of role models in medical school. 
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is reserved for matters of ethics rather than competence. Competence cannot be judged by 
outsiders since the profession conventionally monopolises knowledge through 'mystification' 
(1972, p286). It serves to guard the indeterminacy of its work, since codification or 
transparency through pursuit of best practice tends to shift control to outside managerial 
elements. The greater the degree of indeterminacy, combined with service, ethics and self-
regulation, the higher the status and rewards available to the profession. 
Activities of doctors may be described in large part as the practice of an inexact art rather 
than a precise science: 'the medical decision making process is a complicated interaction of 
scientific evidence, patient desire, doctor preferences, and all sorts of exogenous influence, 
some of which may be quite irrelevant' (McPherson (1989), quoted in Culyer (1993) p169). 
There is evidence that some procedures have little clinical benefit, such as cholecystectomy 
(Gracie and Ransohoff, 1982; Bouchier, 1983; Roos and Danzinger, 1986), tonsillectomy 
(Roos, 1979; Paradise et al, 1984) and haemorrhoidectomy (The Lancet editorial, 1975). 
Autopsies carried out by pathologists (Cameron and McGoogan, 1981) identified that 46% of 
diagnoses on a sample of 1322 patients were correct prior to death, 40% were wrong and 
14% had been missed. Among those who were wrongly diagnosed, 83% of patients had died 
of their actual condition, suggesting that a correct diagnosis could have prolonged life in 
some cases. Current levels of public awareness pose some challenge to the mystique and 
indeterminacy of medical practices. Peer review through medical audit has recently entered 
the public arena following the inquiry into the Bristol Infirmary heart surgeons, and wide 
differences revealed in practice and performance have gained prominence in the national 
press (e.g. The Independent, 4th November 1999). 
Closure theory (Walby and Greenwell, 1994) provides insight into how the medical 
profession maintains its status and rewards system. 'Closure' describes the process through 
which an occupation controls entry to training and membership, thereby creating a monopoly 
over its skills and preventing others from practising the trade without recognised 
membership. Medicine as a profession is secured through the universities and legitimated by 
the state. Its institutions are well-established and influential, such as the Royal Colleges of 
Physicians and Surgeons, and its professional autonomy is secured through its control of 
clinical standards, training, recruitment and disciplinary procedures. The medical profession 
is underpinned by the Hippocratic ethos, guiding the doctor's relationship with the patient. 
The clinician has responsibilities as the patient's agent, advocate, trustee and fiduciary. 
Medical staff practice with autonomy, the central characteristic defining a profession 
(Friedson 1970), reinforcing responsibility for the individual patient while at the same time 
exerting occupational control (Larson, 1977). Tacit collusion between the patient body and 
the medical profession is highlighted by Klein (1989) who depicts medical accountability as a 
collective contract between the profession and the public. In return for control of entry, 
effective monopoly rights over the exercise of its skills and immunity from lay scrutiny, the 
profession agrees to regulate itself; as members of a profession, doctors are accountable to 
their peers' (p161). He notes the view of the Merrison Committee which reported on 
regulation of the medical profession in 1975: 'An instructive way of looking at regulation is 
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to see it as a contract between public and profession, by which the profession has made sure 
that it will provide satisfactory treatment' (quoted in Klein, 1989, p161). 
This combination of autonomy and responsibility is not in conflict with the proposition that 
clinicians pursue self interest in the form of income maximisation, in keeping with public 
choice theorists and the notion of economic rationalism among individuals. Maximisation in 
the short term depends on (a) access to money (through productivity, incentives, 
public/private mix, contract with employer, e.g. fee per service vs. salary), (b) access to 
resources, in the form of hospital facilities, and (c) access to patients (Gray, 1991). These 
reflect the relationship between the hospital and the clinician and highlight the organisational 
dependence of the doctor. Income maximisation in the long term depends on (a) access to a 
patient base; (b) viability of the specialty, through technological and therapeutic 
developments, e.g. in a switch from surgery towards drugs; and (c) reputation, which has a 
long term impact on the patient base. Consultants' careers are characterised by a lack of 
mobility between specialties and a tendency towards sub-specialisation within the clinical 
field. 
It is a matter of conjecture at this stage whether doctors' long term career objectives are 
dependent on their organisation, i.e. the Trust. The notion of cosmopolitan rather than local 
objectives (Gouldner, 1957) is consistent with doctors' autonomous behaviour and their long 
term dependence on the future of the specialty rather than the local organisation. 
`Managers' is a generic term applied to the administrative , structure of an organisation which 
includes 'extended hierarchies of rewards, status and power, as well as differences of 
occupation and function.... Very senior managers receive rewards of money, prestige and 
other benefits designed to ensure that they identify closely with organisational goals' 
(Fincham and Rhodes, 1992, p376). The commitment and compliance of other managers 
further down the organisation is less assured since the rewards and penalties for performance 
fall short of those going to top management. 
Henry Mintzberg adopts a contingency approach in examining what managers actually do 
and shows a substantial difference between what managers do and what they are said to do. 
The fragmentary nature of their activities leads to the suggestion that managers have to 
perform a wide variety of roles which can be grouped into three areas: interpersonal, 
informational and decisional. Interpersonal roles cover the relationships that a manager has 
to have with others, comprising three roles: figurehead, leader and liaison. They have three 
informational roles: monitor, disseminator and spokesman. Decision-making is regarded as 
the most crucial part of managerial activity and includes four roles: entrepreneur, disturbance 
handler, resource allocator and negotiator. Information is essential to these roles: the 
manager is determining the priority of information; through the interpersonal roles a manager 
acquires information and through the decisional roles it is put to use. The 'contingency' 
aspect is signalled by the manager's scope to choose a different blend of roles with the result 
that management is not reducible to a set of scientific statements and programmes and so 
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there is no solid basis for teaching a theory of management. According to Mintzberg 'the 
management school has been more effective at training technocrats to deal with structured 
problems than managers to deal with unstructured ones' (quoted in Pugh & Hickson, 1989, 
p33). 
3.3 Motivation of Trusts 
The figure below expands Steers and Porters' generalised model of individual motivation 
(1991) into that of the dominant groups within Trusts and then indicates how this behaviour 
would manifest itself through the behaviour of the organisation. 
Figure 3.3: Adapting Steers & Porters' generalised model of individual motivation to Trust 
organisations 
Inner states of disequilibrium 
Need, desire or expectancy, 
accompanied by anticipation 
Modification of 
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Organisational 
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Management theory implies that managers have the controlling position within organisations 
because of their role in co-ordinating and allocating resources. This does not, however, 
square with the role of the medical professional which controls resources in hospitals: 
`Approximately 75% of the ongoing expenditures in health care are attributable to decisions 
made by physicians' (Blumberg M, quoted in Gray, 1991, p166). The literature relating to 
Trusts is not conclusive in pointing to an overall dominance of either doctors or managers. 
3.3.1 Trust as Organisations 
Mintzberg tries to devise a way of understanding the design of organisations by defining 
seven main configurations: entrepreneurial, machine, professional, innovative and 
missionary, diversified and political. Diversified organisations are a sub-set of machine 
bureaucracies and political organisations tend to represent temporary phases, but the first five 
are considered here in more detail. 
The entrepreneurial organisation or Simple Structure is a personal organisation in which the 
strongest pull is by the strategic apex towards centralisation. 	It has little or no 
technostructure , few support staff, minimal differentiation between departments, and a small 
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hierarchy. A top leadership, often a single individual, forms the key part of its structure 
which is the focus for all power and coordination, so it does not need formal planning and can 
be flexible and 'organic'. Many organisations start of as small-scale entrepreneurial 
organisations before they evolve into machine or professional bureaucracies. Examples of 
entrepreneurial organisations within the NHS include some general practices and the medical 
firm within a hospital which may be developing new treatments and promoting its work 
beyond the hospital's boundaries. Some people enjoy working in such an organisation 
because of the sense of mission it gives, and its flexibility. Others resent the domination from 
the top which is seen as autocratic and unfashionable. The organisation is also precarious, 
depending on a single individual. 
The machine organisation is far more secure since it does not depend on one person. It is 
second only to the entrepreneurial organisation in centralisation, but its power is divided 
between the strategic apex and the technostructure which exerts the strongest pull through the 
planners, financial controllers, production schedulers and their kind. It fits with the definition 
of a bureaucratic organisation described by Max Weber (1864-1920) which has its basis in 
legal-rational authority, specialised, highly sub-divided work tasks, hierarchy, rules, the 
appointment and promotion of staff on the basis of qualifications and so on (discussed in 
Pugh and Hickson, 1989). The machine organisation is typically concerned with highly 
routinised activities and standardised products, controlled by the technostructure through 
formalised rules and regulations. Obvious examples of the machine organisation are mass 
production factories, the army and government departments. In health organisations, large 
hospitals usually have strongly developed machine characteristics in their administrative and 
nursing hierarchies. Machine bureaucracies suffer from conflict from top to bottom and 
between departments and, to many of the personnel, the work that they or others do appears 
to be meaningless. 
The third kind of configuration, the professional organisation, is pulled by its operating core 
towards professionalised autonomy and so it is dominated by highly trained professional 
specialists. This configuration tends to emerge wherever the operating work of an enterprise 
is dominated by skilled workers who use procedures that are difficult to learn yet are well 
defined. The professional organisation is like the machine organisation in that the skills of 
staff are standardised, but it differs significantly in that the standards are established outside 
the organisation, in the training of the professionals, and that the day-to day work of the 
professionals requires considerable discretion. Since others without the training cannot 
interfere, the professionals are relatively independent and their working autonomy is usually 
reinforced by a high demand for the service they give. Health organisations tend to conform 
to the professional configuration where the professionals dominate as in general practice and 
in doctor-controlled hospitals. Large hospitals are likely to combine both the machine or 
bureaucratic elements in the administrative hierarchy and the professional and entrepreneurial 
elements in the medical firm, together with mixed machine-professional element of the 
nursing hierarchy. 
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The innovative organisation occurs where the main business of an enterprise is change and 
creativity and includes activities as diverse as those of fashion houses, advertising agencies 
and consultancy firms. It groups its highly trained specialists in project or task teams and is 
pulled towards co-ordination within and between teams by 'mutual adjustment', i.e. by direct 
co-operation, and is both organic and decentralised. Innovative organisations are not typical 
of health services which are primarily concerned with the provision of standard, predictable 
outputs. R&D sections of health organisations, however, may exhibit much in common with 
innovative enterprises, and these may be found within teaching hospitals and the former 
Special Health Authorities which have been designated as research institutions. 
The missionary organisation emerges where the main driving force is the shared beliefs of its 
members, such as pressure groups and campaigning organisations. Missionary organisations 
are unlikely to be encountered in the public health service but voluntary organisations 
representing the interests of various categories of patients and some Community Health 
Councils will have missionary characteristics. 
3.3.2 The Public Sector - Business versus Responsive Managemen 
An analysis of public sector management models by Hadley and Young (1990) argues that, 
prior to the reforms, public services had reached a point of crisis after seven decades of 
stability in which they had been run according to an 'administrative model', that is to say a 
bureaucracy, which was 'hierarchical, rule-based, and theoretically even-handed' (p3). The 
main role of public services had been to administer central and local government policies 
without any duty to interpret or innovate. Richard Titmuss, whose seminal work 'The Gift 
Relationship' informed the analysis of individual motivation in an earlier section, was 
considered to be influential in creating an intellectual climate in which the state was expected 
to provide welfare support. He had a 'profound mistrust of the market and placed powerful 
emphasis in his writing on the use of the state to redistribute resources in favour of equality' 
(Hadley and Hatch, 1981, pi). During the period 1961 to 1976, however, the proportion of 
gross national product devoted to public expenditure and social security had risen from 17% 
to 28% while inequalities had proved intractable. It was judged that the evidence from 
evaluations of professional interventions in education, health and social work hardly serves 
to explain or justify all the resources that have been devoted to them' (p2). Hadley and Hatch 
commented in 1981 that 'not since the Wars of the Roses can the collective self-esteem of the 
English people have been at such a low ebb as it is today' Faith in the centralist model was 
being eroded from three quarters, namely (i) those which advocated use of markets to allocate 
resources, mainly from the radical right, (ii) `empowerers' who promoted the voice of users 
as a challenge to professionals, and (iii) organisational reformers who criticised public 
service organisations for their lack of any clear statement of goals (Hadley and Young, 1990). 
A typology of four alternatives to the administrative model has been identified, described as 
(i) the residual organisation which reduces the range of publicly provided services by 
returning functions to the market, (ii) the defensive organisation which maintains a core 
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collective provision through a policy of concentrating on a reduced range of services, (iii) the 
business organisation which resembles the defensive organisation but uses business methods 
and financial management to maintain firm central control of the organisation, and (iv) the 
responsive organisation which, like the defensive organisation, is a form of collective 
provision but believes that statutory organisations should be entrepreneurial, innovative and 
creative (Hadley and Young, 1990). 
The reforms of 1991 touched on each of these lines of analysis. The creation of NHS Trusts 
within a market environment could be interpreted as an attempt to turn the NHS into a form 
of 'residual organisation'. The 1989 White Paper referred to 'self-governing' NHS Hospital 
Trusts, a term which was subsequently dropped from use in favour of the official 
nomenclature 'NHS Trusts' due to the inference that hospitals had opted out from the NHS °. 
Timmins (1995, p192) refers to a model of provision extended to NHS Trusts which was 
publicly fimded but independently provided, in which the state used the provider as an agent. 
The BMA argued that the 1991 reforms lay the groundwork for the future dismantlement of 
the NHS' (p466). Suspicions of incipient privatisation became diluted as Trust organisations 
rapidly became the dominant form of health care provision and their NHS publicly-funded 
status remained intact. 
The 'business organisation' is a more obvious description of the model which NHS Trusts 
were intended to adhere to, given the undertaking that hospitals were to be 'reformed on 
business lines' (Department of Health, 1989, p5), with an emphasis on strong financial 
management and efficiency. According to Hadley and Young's typology, within the business 
organisation 'all managers are made responsible for financial implications of their actions. 
Although profit is not the goal, the healthy annual balance sheet becomes as much a measure 
of success as in any private business' (p17). In practice, it could be argued that Trusts 
continued to function as 'defensive organisations', where collective is synonymous with 
public provision. 
The idea of a 'responsive organisation' is consistent with the notion of devolved management 
within a Trust through introduction of Clinical Directorates. The structure of the responsive 
service is likely to be highly decentralised and locally integrated, with extensive delegation of 
authority' (p7), although in acute Trusts opportunities for integration with the local 
community are less apparent than for social services. This model is a challenge to the 
`business organisation' since, while it is businesslike in its emphasis on clarity of goals and 
use of information systems, it is service-orientated and decentralist. Hadley and Young 
(1990) argue that the business model threatens to damage motivation of staff and runs the risk 
of organisational rigidity. 'A major strength of public service organisations... has been their 
ability to attract a sigqicant proportion of their stafffrom those committed to the work of its 
own sake rather than primarily for the extrinsic rewards of money or status' (p17). The 
potential clash between a business ethos and a service orientation comes to the fore in the 
io `...self-governing hospitals (later to be known as NHS Trusts as part of the massaging of language that was to 
occur)... ' Timmins (1995), p465 
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distinction between a business and a responsive organisation: `...there would seem to be a 
real danger that business language and thinking will come to represent a change in goals 
and values rather than simply a means to achieve a better public service. In this case there 
would be a major risk that the commitment of many of the most effective staff would be 
seriously affected and that the services would lose an important part of their motive power' 
(p18). Anxiety about an overweening business orientation echoes the feelings of doctors and 
managers which were later captured in the fieldwork enquiry. One of the practical 
consequences identified by Hadley and Young is that `[t]he temptation in redefining the 
activities of a public organisation in business terms is to seek to detail and price every 
operation' (p 18). 
The distinction between a business and a service orientated organisation reflected in these 
contrasting models goes to the heart of the tension in motivation which is addressed in the 
next chapter through a set of hypotheses. 
3.3.3 The Economic Approach: Trusts as Firms 
Economic theory treats Trusts or hospitals as firms. The firm itself has no internal structure, 
according to neoclassical theory (although New Institutional economists demur at this (e.g. 
Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975 and 1985) and is defined by its relationship with other firms. 
Up until the early 1920s neoclassical theory included two main models described as pure 
competition and monopoly. Within these traditional models the objective of the firm is to 
maximise profits (based on marginal pricing) and the owner of the firm is the manager-
entrepreneur; there is no separation of ownership and management. 
The firm is described by a production possibilities set and it is assumed to choose the 
(feasible) production plan that maximises profits (Kreps, 1990), supplying output to the point 
where the cost of an extra unit of production is equal to the revenue gained from that unit. 
For hospitals this would equate to the notion that each unit of production, e.g. patient 
admissions, would yield additional income and that treatment would stop at the point where 
the cost of admitting extra patients exceeded the revenue earned. Hospitals would maximise 
surpluses (as a theoretical equivalent to profits) and would avoid deficits. The theory of 
profit maximisation is considered to be a good positive model of how firms act (Kreps, 1990) 
so that, even if the underlying assumptions do not resemble the way in which decisions are 
made in firms, the theory has credibility on the basis of its predictions. On the basis of the 
Darwinian principle of the survival of the fittest, it is argued that the fittest firms are those 
which maximise their profits. Ultimately, firms which do not maximise their profits will be 
driven out of business or will be taken over by other firms and the managers will be fired. 
Since managers do not want to be fired they will aim to maximise profits. 
The neoclassical model of the firm has not been entirely supplanted by an alternative theory 
of equivalent analytic power and predictive ability. Nevertheless, attacks on the neoclassical 
assumptions are sustained and well documented (e.g. Koutsoyiannis, 1975). It is argued that 
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firms cannot attain the goal of profit maximisation because they do not have the necessary 
knowledge, information or ability. Secondly, it is argued that firms would not pursue profit 
maximisation, even if they could, because they do not want to. The firm may not pursue a 
single goal and, among the multitude of goals available, profit is only one of them. A number 
of alternative models of motivation have been put forward, including the following: 
• Managerialism: maximisation of the managerial utility function. Divorce of ownership 
and management allows some discretion to the managers in goal-setting and factors that 
usually enter the managerial utility function are salaries, prestige, market share, job 
security, quiet life, and so on. There is no consensus among managerial theorists as to 
how the maximisation of the utility of managers will be attained. Baumol (1959) 
postulated that the managerial utility is maximised when the growth of sales revenue is 
maximised. Marris (1963 and 1964) suggests that the managers pursue the maximum 
`balanced growth', i.e. the balanced increase of both the sales and the capital assets of the 
firm. If this is attained then both the utility of managers and of the owners of the firm 
(shareholders) is maximised. 
• Behaviourism: satisficing behaviour. The behavioural theories of the firm started 
developing in the early 1950s, through Simon (1951) and then Cyert and March (1963), in 
which the firm is defined as a coalition of groups with conflicting interests. Goals are 
formed by the demands of the members of the coalition and take the form of aspiration 
levels. The goals of the firm are ultimately set by the top management and include five 
main goals of the firm: production, inventory, sales, share of the market, profit. The firm 
is a satisficing organisation rather than a maximiser, which is rational given the 
limitations of information and computational abilities of the managers, that is to say, it is 
`bounded rationality'. The behavioural model of Cyert and March simulates the 
complexity of the mechanism of a modern multigoal, multiproduct organisation and, as 
such, predicts the behaviour of the firm without providing an explanation of any 
particular action of the firm. Behavioural theories do not deal with industry equilibrium 
in terms of output and price and satisficing is criticised as being tautological : whatever 
the firms are observed to do can be rationalised on the lines of satisficing. 
• New Institutional microeconomic theory has developed the behavioural model by 
acknowledging internal structures and relationships within the firm. Demsetz (1991) 
argues that the neoclassical theory of markets in which the theory of the firm was 
simplified for the purpose of discussing the price mechanism has been developed at huge 
cost. Williamson (1991) sums up this contention: 'What was an analytically convenient 
theory of the firm for purposes of studying markets and equilibrium came to be treated as 
an adequate theory of the firm for purposes of studying economic organisation. The 
advantages of an all-purpose theory of the form notwithstanding, the latter was a fateful 
mistake' (p10). Rather than an unindividuated agent, firms harness divergent individual 
objectives which are influenced through contracts, incentive structures and motivation 
(Putterman, 1986). 
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• Long-run survival and market-share goals. Some writers (e.g. K W Rothschild in 1947 
and more recently C Handy in 1994) have suggested that the primary motive of the 
entrepreneur is long-run survival. Thus managers take action which aims at the 
maximisation of the probability that they will survive over the indefinite future. Other 
writers have reported that many firms set as their goal the attainment and retention of a 
constant market share. While this is compatible with marginalistic behaviour (MC=MR) 
it does not necessarily imply profit maximisation in the long-run. 
• Tull-Cost' Pricing Principle. Hall and Hitch (1939) startled the academic community 
sixty years ago with a survey which suggested that firms did not attempt to maximise 
profits. They published results of a study of 38 'efficiently managed' firms in which they 
found that firms did not behave atomistically, since they were continually conscious of 
the reactions of their competitors, and that oligopoly was the main market structure of the 
business world. The study found that firms did not use the marginalist rule MC—MR and 
that they set their price on the basis of average cost plus a 'normal' profit of margin, 
usually 10%. 
• Entry-prevention and risk-avoidance. The work of Bain (1956) and Sutton (1991) points 
to the possibility that the goal of the firm is to prevent new entrant firms coming into the 
market. Bain formulated his `limit-price' theory in Barriers to New Competition in 1956 
in which he drew on empirical evidence to conclude that firms take into account potential 
threats to entry in making their pricing decision. They set a 'limit price' which is higher 
than a purely competitive price but lower than a monopolistic price and is equivalent to 
the highest price established firms can charge without inducing entry. Bathers to entry 
include set-up costs in the form of initial capital requirements and the structure of the 
market will be determined partly by economies of scale which are a function of 
technology. Bain posits a one-way causation running from structure (level of 
concentration and barriers to entry) to conduct (degree of collusion) to performance 
(profitability). Sutton (1991) has developed the theory of market structure supported by 
empirical analysis of a matrix of industries, which takes into account exogenous sunk 
costs, i.e. costs of set-up and developing a product line, and endogenous sunk costs, i.e. 
advertising and R&D. Sutton analyses the way in which these exogenous and 
endogenous elements of sunk cost interact with each other in determining the equilibrium 
pattern of industrial structure in terms of a two stage game. At stage 1 of the game firms 
incur fixed outlays which are associated with acquiring a single plant of minimum 
efficient scale (set up costs). Entry occurs to the point at which the stage 2 profits of the 
last entrant cover the sunk cost incurred on entry at stage 1. High set-up costs will 
therefore act as a barrier to entry and Sutton's model is designed to be predictive, 
although he observes that there is a trade-off between the degree of predictive accuracy of 
a model and its breadth of application. 
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In summary, arguments for and against the neoclassical model of motivation which is based 
on profit-maximisation cannot be resolved on a priori grounds. The empirical evidence 
regarding the goals of firms is not conclusive in one direction or another but most empirical 
studies (Koutsoyiannis, 1975) suggest that there is a multiplicity of goals in the modern 
enterprise and that managers do not have unlimited discretion in setting their goals. All 
models accept that there is a minimum profit constraint which limits other goals of the firm. 
3.3.4 Models of Hospital Conduc 
McGuire (1985) surveyed the theory of hospitals and identified two main models: (a) 
hospitals as organisms, i,e. single entity, which is equivalent in behaviour to the atomistic 
firm, and (b) hospitals as models of exchange, dealing with behaviour of individuals within 
institutions. 
Two major methodological problems are identified in the literature. The first is a difficulty in 
defining output and prices due to the disparate nature of hospitals (e.g. teaching, research, 
district general) and diversity in casemix, which leads to problems in aggregation. This 
implies that hospitals should be treated as specific rather than general cases. The second 
methodological difficulty arises in identifying the decision-making unit, where discretion of 
behaviour is allowed by the model. Most of the literature focuses on one actor, usually 
doctor or administrator (synonymous with `manager'). Evans (1984) suggests that this may 
result in serious mis-specification of the model. He characterises the structure of the health 
care sector as one of incomplete vertical integration, which includes GPs and community 
services. 
Introduction of the internal market in the UK in 1991 prompted researchers to look at the 
non-profit hospitals in the US as the nearest equivalent to NHS Trusts (e.g. Culyer, 1993; 
Bartlett and Le Grand, 1994). Non-profit organisations have a 'non-distribution constraint' 
(Hausmann, 1980) which requires the organisation to retain net surpluses to advance the 
service rather than distribute the earnings to controlling individuals such as board directors. 
Examples of nonprofits in the UK are charities, mutual societies and NHS Trusts, all of 
which are subject to statute which distinguishes them from profit-driven organisations such as 
privately owned firms or joint stock companies. Much of the US literature on nonprofits 
focuses on the circumstances in which nonprofits flourish in the economy (Bartlett and Le 
Grand, 1994) but are not explicit in stating the underlying aims of nonprofits. Newhouse 
(1970) considers why so few profit-making hospitals exist and concludes that, while trust 
between patients and doctors may inhibit profit-making enterprise, a more likely reason is 
that legal barriers to entry exist for profit-making hospitals and that tax subsidies provide 
shelter for nonprofits. Recent developments in the US healthcare industry indicate that the 
balance between profit and nonprofit hospitals has shifted with the growth of managed care 
among health maintenance organisations (HMOs). 88% of HMO enrollees belonged to non-
profit plans in 1981 with 12% enrolled in for-profit HMOs. By 1989 only 54% of patients 
were enrolled in nonprofit HMOs and by 1999 the proportion had dropped to 36%. 'Wall 
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Street loved the growth of managed care, fuelling the industry consolidation and 
transformation to for-profit status' (USA Today, 20th October 1999). This suggests that 
Newhouse was correct in attributing the financial structure of hospitals to market incentives 
rather than any inherent feature of the doctor-patient relationship in healthcare. 
The neoclassical presumption of profit maximisation can be applied to nonprofits since profit 
is equivalent to surplus and varies only in its manner of distribution. Models of hospital 
conduct have been constructed on the basis that nonprofits will seek to maximise profits (e.g. 
Davis, 1972), or a combination of profit, quality and quantity (Ellis and McGuire, 1986). 
A common model employed has been based on the assumption that nonprofit hospitals jointly 
maximise quantity and quality of service subject to a break-even constraint (e.g. Newhouse, 
1970). Decision-makers, identified as the administrator appointed by the board of trustees, 
are perceived as trying to fulfil the hospital's social purpose by maximising the service 
volume and in gaining prestige for the hospital by maximising quality. This is viewed as 
being consistent with the motivation of medical staff who are also interested in both quality 
and quantity. The relative weight of quality and quantity will be negotiated between the 
administrator, trustees and the medical staff. This type of model implies that hospitals will 
minimise unit costs by producing activity beyond the optimum since the consumer, to whom 
the price is zero, will mediate demand through the clinician who supplies the service (moral 
hazard) and will seek any service with a positive perceived value while the purchaser (the 
insurance company) merely pays at the end (Culyer, 1993). Experience to about 1982 in the 
United States, when retrospective reimbursement was the norm prior to managed care, 
appears to confirm these predictions. Robinson and Luft (1985; 1987) found that hospitals in 
more competitive markets, measured by hospital density, had higher costs per patient day and 
per case than those in less competitive markets. Greater duplication of clinical services was 
found to exist in more competitive markets (tuft et al, 1986). 
Pauly and Redisch (1973) identified clinicians as the locus of decision making within a 
producer co-operative with the aim of maximising income. McGuire (1985) found in general 
that models treating the hospital as a profit maximising entity assume that clinicians are the 
dominant actors whereas managerial theories predicting other forms of maximisation identify 
administrators as the dominant actor. The most common hypothesis is to treat the hospital as 
a quantity maxirniser subject to a quality constraint. 
In modelling hospital objectives it is not necessary to postulate maximising activity since a 
satisficing approach may be adopted which seeks a mixture of market share, volume output, 
income receipts, quality, work effort and so on. 
The main problem with models of nonprofit hospital objectives is that they focus on one set 
of actors, either doctors or managers, and cannot deal with interdependencies. Work 
undertaken by Harris (1979) and Evans (1984) represents complementary approaches dealing 
with internal and external relationships respectively. Harris identifies medical staff and 
39 
administrators as the major actors in the organisation and emphasises that each has its own 
objectives, decision variables and constraints. The major assertion of the model is that it is 
the institutional constraints that arise through the medical and ethical, as distinct from the 
economic, motives of clinicians, that are of importance in the analysis of hospital behaviour'. 
Given these non-economic considerations, 'hospitals with apparent capacity excesses or cost 
overrun may actually be in a deceptively stable environment' (Harris 1979). Evans' study of 
the hospital as firm/industry 'suggests that analysis of the internal structure of the hospital, 
which is where any theory of the hospital should begin, must nevertheless take account of the 
effect of market structure upon behaviour, particularly with regard to how it affects the 
relationship between the clinician and the hospital'. 
3.4 External Environment 
Beyond the logical progression from individual to group to organisation it is necessary to 
consider Trusts in the context of their external environment. The psychological literature 
justifies this on the basis of feedback and triggers which drive and reinforce performance 
while some areas of organisational literature deal with the 'systems perspective'. Economic 
theory, which uses the firm as the basic building block of analysis, focuses on the interaction 
of firms and consumers in the market place. 
3.4.1 Reinforcement and Motivation in Environmen 
The psychology literature considers individuals in relation to their environments. 
Reinforcement theory and contingency management in organisational settings describes how 
behaviour is influenced and is used to explain how managers might achieve control rather 
than what managers do (Hamner, 1991). Learning, which results from reinforced practice or 
experience, is described in terms of two processes known as classical conditioning and 
operant conditioning. Classical conditioning was described by Pavlov (1902) who 
conditioned his dog to expect food upon ringing a bell, after which the dog salivated merely 
at the neutral stimulus of hearing the bell. Operant conditioning relates to consequences 
which are contingent upon the actions of the individual, e.g. passing exams is a consequence 
of studying while failing exams may be a consequence of not studying. Skinner (1969) 
indicates how interpreting the learning process enables managers to reinforce behaviour and 
control the workforce, e.g. through advice, warnings and commands. Reinforcement theory, 
e.g. Komaki, Coombs and Schepman (1991), describes the use of targets, punishments and 
rewards to promote performance. Cognition or learning is part of the interactive process 
within working environments, the analysis of which is further refined by three types of 
cognitive theories: equity theory, expectancy theory and social learning theory. Equity theory 
was developed in the 1960s (e.g. Adams and Jacobsen, 1964, Friedman and Goodman, 1967, 
and Lawler, Koplin, Young and Fadern, 1968) and was concerned with pay rewards and 
differentials. Expectancy theory, also called valence-instrumentality-expectancy (VI) 
theory, supplemented the concept of equity, which was described as distributive justice, with 
the idea of procedural justice which focuses on how decisions to distribute particular rewards 
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or punishments are made (e.g. Cropanzano & Folger, 1989). The third approach to worker 
motivation, that of social learning, stresses the reciprocal interaction of the person, behaviour 
and environment. Proponents (e.g. Wood and Bandura, 1989) emphasise the importance of 
beliefs in one's own competencies and describe how measurement against internalised 
standards or goals produces motivation which is self-regulated. 
3.4.2 Systems Perspective 
A systems perspective seeks to identify what the controller or controllers in an organisation 
see as their main task and asks how they conceptualise the process of structuring and running 
the organisation to achieve them. The primary or survival tasks, based on three sub-systems 
of production, maintenance and regulation, may be defined separately from the secondary or 
mission tasks pursued by the organisation. 
Technological demands place limits on the type of work organisation possible, but the work 
organisation has social and psychological properties of its own that are independent of the 
technology. In studies of mining, Eric Trist of the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations 
found that it was possible, within the same technological constraints, to operate different 
systems of work organisation with different social and psychological effects. This underlined 
the considerable degree of organisational choice available to management to enable them to 
take account of the social and psychological aspects (discussed in Pugh & Hickson 1989). 
The enterprise is conceptualised as an 'open' system because it is concerned with obtaining 
inputs from its environment and exporting outputs to its environment, as well as operating the 
conversion process in between. Environments are classified according to their degree of 
complexity from that of a placid, randomised environment to that of a 'turbulent field' in 
which significant variances arise not only from competitive organisations involved but also 
from the field, e.g. market, itself. This approach highlights the dynamic nature of 
organisations and their functioning, the crucial importance of boundary management between 
sub-systems, and the need for an approach to organisational design which can accommodate 
environmental change. 
3.4.3 The Public Sector - New Public Managemen 
Ferlie et al (1996) isolate public sector settings for particular scrutiny and note that, in the 
context of organisational analysis, there is 'currently a dearth both of theory and of 
evidence'. New Public Management (NPM) points to the reform initiatives undertaken by the 
post-1979 UK Conservative Government in which public sector functions became subjected 
to quasi-market formation, emphasis on securing VFM and stimulation of 'management of 
change', illustrated through appointment of high profile Chief Executive Officers to Trusts 
and Health Authorities. Trust Boards provided the vehicle for state-appointed non-executive 
directors to strengthen the apex of the organisation. Empirical data and analysis in NPM tend 
to be concentrated at the level of the strategic apex, focusing on health authorities (Day and 
Klein, 1987) and Boards (Peck and Spurgeon, 1993), justified on the basis that this strategic 
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tier has gained power through the post-1990 NHS reforms. Critics, however, argue that 
behaviour at the operational level may be unaffected by developments at this tier since the 
functions and processes within NHS Trusts have remained essentially unchanged. 
A typology of four NPM models has been defined by Ferlie et al, representing a 
chronological development of public policy. NPM 1, The Efficiency Drive, was introduced 
in the early 1980s and represented an attempt to inject business values and attention to cost 
reduction. This was seen as a counter, appropriate or not, to the image of a wasteful public 
sector. The Rayner Scrutiny sought efficiency measures in the mid 1980s and resulted in an 
inventory of surplus accommodation identified for disposal. NPM Model 2 is characterised 
as downsizing and decentralisation, consistent with the development of quasi-markets and 
emphasis on flexible and varied systems. NPM Model 3, In Search of Excellence, is 
associated with best-selling texts by Tom Peters (e.g. 1982) and is slotted by Huczynski 
(1993) into the Guru Theory family of ideas. The bottom-up form emphasises the importance 
of organisational culture and acknowledges the existence of leadership in small teams or 
networks as well as senior managers. The critical role of medical firms to organisational 
change would find a place in this model. The top-down form of the model accommodates the 
`coercive and transformatory reorganisations of the 1980s' associated with the top-down 
vision of change, growth of logos, mission statements and uniforms. NPM Model 4, Public 
Service Orientation, emphasises the value of public service ideals, a scepticism about the role 
of markets in public services, a concern with service quality and an acknowledgement of the 
value of high calibre management, strengthened in part by good practice derived from the 
private sector. Ferlie et al (1996) note that this is the least well developed of the four models 
and has yet to reveal its full potential. Events since the change of government in 1997 lend 
support to this type-cast with Labour's emphasis on commitment to the NHS, education and 
public sector in general. The . Conservative opposition subsequently appeared to embrace the 
public sector and lose its private market zeal, signalled by a high profile address from Peter 
Lilley (The Observer, 25 th April 1999), lending support to NPM Model 4 as a contemporary 
outlook. The NHS White Paper, 'Modern . Dependable', (Department of Health, 1997) 
juxtaposes forward thinking with the notion of return to public sector values. Its major 
themes of breaking with the internal market and enhancing quality through clinical 
governance are in accordance with characteristics of NPM Model 4. 
3.4.4 Market Systems 
The economic view of environments is described by the theory of market systems. NHS 
Trusts were conceived as operating in a market setting from 1991 which became known as 
the 'internal market', characterised as a quasi-market (Le Grand and Bartlett, 1993). This 
section considers the culture and substance of market theory to establish the extent to which 
Trusts can be predicted to work in a given market environment 
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Laws 
The economist's view of markets is couched in confident language, using terms such as the 
`law' of demand (e.g. Bannock, Baxter and Rees, 1978). The earliest metaphor, which 
remains powerful, is the concept of the invisible hand at work in market forces, harmonising 
private self-interest with the public good". Its use in the eighteenth century reflected the 
growing conviction that scientific laws thought to be found only in nature could be found in 
society. Classical economists upheld the notion that natural laws are embedded in the 
economic process as beneficial laws, so that the automatic operation of the system is 
consistent with the freedom of individual action, driven by private interest, which fosters the 
prosperity of society. 
Scientific progress in the late nineteenth century paralleled advances in neoclassical thought 
which perceived the world as a smoothly running machine, obeying mechanical laws of 
motion, in harmony and equilibrium. The view of a social world ordered according to 
transcendent ends was abandoned in favour of an ideal of objective knowledge of economic 
phenomena gained through a 'positive' study of the laws that regulate market activities. 
The list of generally accepted economic laws seems to be shrinking, according to Zamagni 
(1989), who quoted Arrow's doubts about the mechanistically inspired understanding of 
economic processes : 'Is economics a subject like physics, true for all time, or are its laws 
historically conditioned?' (Arrow 1985, p322). Publication of books criticising economic 
methodology such as Lament for Economics, a pre-war book by Barbara Wootton, The 
Failures of Economics by Sidney Schoeffler (1955), each noted in Blaug (1980), and The 
Death of Economics by Paul Ormerod (1994) demonstrate that the certainties of positive 
economic theorems are not universally accepted. Schoeffler argues that the entire 
hypothetico-deductive tradition of economic theorising is a blind alley and should effectively 
be scrapped and replaced by an alternative theory of rational action based on studies of 
decision making. Ormerod rejects orthodox economics based on rational behaviour within a 
mechanical, linear world of equilibrium and proffers instead the potential of non-linear 
systems analysis, such as chaos theory. He supports this by drawing on non-economists' 
studies of business and economic phenomena from a purely empirical perspective which 
produce inferences that may be in conflict with positive economic theory. 
Notwithstanding these criticisms of economics as a science, the concept of the invisible hand 
has been developed into a neoclassical theory of competitive markets which has not been 
fully undermined and which has been influential in social policy. Theorists perceive the 
market system as a self-correcting mechanism which clears to achieve equilibrium. The 
`marginal revolution' in the nineteenth century produced the Walrasian General 
Equilibrium' which has become central to the model of economic theory. The rational 
The idea of the invisible hand originates from Bernard de Mandeville in his Fable of the Bees (1714). The 
metaphor itself was introduced by Adam Smith in Wealth of Nations (1776) where he asserted that every 
individual, acting solely in the pursuit of private gains, is led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was 
no part of his intention' that end being 'the publick interest'. 
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individual, homo economicus, is the key building block of the system and the behaviour of 
the economy as a whole is the summation of the behaviour of its component parts 12 . In 
equilibrium no individual or company can be made better off by altering the allocation of 
resources in any way without making at least one person worse off, a property described as 
the Pareto optimum. In the early 1950s Arrow, Debreu and other economists (Debreu, 1959; 
and Arrow and Hahn, 1971) reformulated the Wah-asian system of competitive equilibrium to 
permit general proofs of its logical consistency and to specify the stringency of the conditions 
that are required to guarantee the existence of competitive equilibrium (Milgate, 1989) 1314 . 
The conditions needed to achieve perfectly competitive equilibrium are sufficiently stringent 
to be unlikely to hold in reality. The impact of violation of one or more of these assumptions 
is therefore highly significant in its implications for empirical work and has been articulated 
by Lipsey and Lancaster (1956-7, discussed in Winch 1971) in the 'principle of second best'. 
This starts from the basic premise that all conditions in the model of perfect competition need 
to be fulfilled if Pareto optimal equilibrium is to be achieved, i.e. a first best solution. If one 
condition is violated then it does not follow that a second-best solution can be achieved by 
fulfilling all remaining conditions. There is no corresponding set of rules for the achievement 
of a second-best, or even a better, position in a world where the first-best is unattainable. In 
practice it may be necessary to violate other conditions in order to offset the effect of the first 
violation. 
Quasi-Marke 
Quasi-markets (Le Grand and Bartlett 1993) do not fulfil the stringent criteria required for 
competitive markets and, by their significant divergences from conventional models, 
represented a new breed of markets with untested ways of behaving when they were 
introduced in 1991. Within quasi-markets there exists competition between suppliers, 
namely healthcare providers in the context of the NHS, but these organisations are not 
12 Through the work of Alfred Marshall (1890) and Irving Fisher (1892) the concept of marginal utility was 
developed to account for individual consumer preferences and to draw a relationship between price and demand 
- the downwardly sloping demand curve. The marginal principle was applied to the firm in the law of 
diminishing returns, that is increasing marginal cost, to formulate the ascending supply curve. The market is in 
equilibrium at the price which balances these two forces of supply and demand and represents the point at which 
the consumer's utility and the firm's profit is maximised. 
13 Arrow-Debreu proofs of the existence of general equilibrium depend on assumptions that: (a) consumption 
and production sets are convex, (b) every economic agent owns some resources valued by other agents, and (c) a 
large or infinite number of companies and consumers exist, with no single company being able to exercise any 
control over the market price of its product. The global stability of such an equilibrium depends in turn on the 
presence of a dynamic process that guarantees that every economic agent has knowledge of the level of 
aggregate demand and that no final transactions are actually carried out except at equilibrium prices. For a set 
of prices to exist which will clear all markets it is necessary to assume that (a) the future does not exist, unless a 
future set of prices can be found which will clear all markets today, and (b) there is no uncertainty since 
consumers and producers have perfect information about the market. 
14 While the Arrow-Debreu model of general equilibrium (GE) may appear to be of only historic interest, its 
impact on the direction of economics has been profound: The widespread belief that every economic them, 
must be fitted into the GE mould if it is to qualifi, as rigorous science has perhaps been more responsible than 
any other intellectual force for the purely abstract and nonempirical character of so much of modern economic 
reasoning' (Blaug, 1980, p193). 
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necessarily aiming to maximise profits. In terms of demand, consumers do not exert 
purchasing power directly and, instead, a purchasing agency makes choices and allocates 
funding to the service on behalf of the consumer. 
Within the NHS internal market health care, rather than health, is the tradeable commodity. 
Since health itself is not tradeable it can have no value in exchange, and the demand for 
health and health care are not precisely related due to the lack of information on the part of 
the consumer or patient. The medical profession supplies this information and influences 
what health treatments are then demanded or utilised. The view in neoclassical economics of 
a sovereign consumer lying behind the demand curve is not appropriate in the market for 
health care due to this 'agency relationship' whereby the doctor acts as an agent on behalf of 
and in the interests of the patient. Effective demand for health care, i.e. demand for health 
care by purchasers, is exerted directly by GP Fundholders and DHAs acting as agents. 
Underlying this 'effective' demand are GPs and hospital consultants who induce demand 
through their agency relationship with the patient. 
Health care is a heterogeneous commodity and also an intermediate commodity in the sense 
that it is not consumed for itself; moreover, its consumption per se involves disutility. The 
nature of the commodity health care can be perceived differently on the two sides of 'the 
market', reflecting the distinction between what is wanted (health) and what is supplied 
(health care). While these demand and supply perspectives differ, they tend to come together 
through the exercise of the agency relationship which draws on superior information on the 
part of the doctor to assess the costs and the benefits of the health care. Supply is the 
dominant side of the health care sector (McGuire, Henderson and Mooney, 1988), not least 
because of supplier-induced demand, where the doctor who supplies the medical intervention 
also determines demand for it. Klein observed this phenomenon (1989) in the paradox that 
the NHS 'exercises least control over those who, in theory at least, exercise the greatest 
influence in determining the demand for health care'. The separation between purchaser and 
provider was intended to change the dynamics of demand for health care by giving 
commissioning agencies control over effective demand. 
Financial motivation of Trusts has been identified as one of the key conditions which needs 
to be met to enable a market to behave efficiently (Le Grand and Bartlett, 1993). The 
literature review is inconclusive as to the conduct of hospitals and empirical work in this area 
is somewhat limited. Maximisation objectives, were they to exist, would be consistent with 
efficiency, where production tends towards minimum costs. McCarthy (1998) describes 
Trust behaviour which indicates cost-padding rather than cost-minimisation: 'Trusts are able 
to revise their initial prices in the light of the published district allocations - that is, to tailor 
their 'bid to the funds expected'. This is consistent with Propper's analysis (1993) of the 
impact of asymmetrical information between purchasers and providers. The provider has 
greater information than the purchaser in relation to production, e.g. inputs, technology 
processes and quality or outcomes. If the purchaser attempts to obtain this information and 
embed it into the contract, either through monitoring or as part of the bidding process, then 
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this will increase the transaction costs associated with the contract. If the purchaser does not 
seek this information then the provider will have an opportunity to pad its costs, seeking a 
premium within the contract which would not be paid if the purchaser had better information. 
Elwood (1996) stated that in contracting within two Trusts 'evidence of extensive cost-
shifting and price manipulation was found. Published prices are a starting point; the overall 
contract value is subject to negotiation, and the providers inevitably have long-term 
relationships with their purchasers' p(viv). McCarthy noted that Health Authorities do not 
want their Trusts to go out of business and so may subsidise an overspending Trust to 
maintain existing levels of performance. This points to the difficulty in market exit which 
may influence Trust motivation by undermining any competitive or financial incentive. 
There is no published work (as far as I am aware) which describes hospital or Trust 
motivation in dynamic terms, i.e. as influenced by the behaviour of other providers and 
purchasers. Theoretical models developed in the US focus on maximands which relate to 
profit, quantity, quality, or a combination of these factors, depending upon the locus of 
decision-making, i.e. administrator (manager) on behalf of the trustees or physicians 
(consultants). These are static equilibrium models and do not account for the impact of 
market structure., another condition defined as essential to the efficient operation of a quasi-
market (Le Grand and Bartlett, 1993). 
The US nonprofit hospital literature fails to mirror UK hospital training functions which have 
a direct bearing on market structure, since medical staffing and training is regulated through 
central planning rather than local competition. All acute hospitals which employ junior 
medical staff, i.e. house officers and registrars, perform a training role. Consultants have a 
teaching and supervisory commitment which is specified by Calman, the Chief Medical 
Officer, (Department of Health, 1996), and carefully monitored through accreditation 
processes and visits from Royal College Standards Advisory Committees (SAC). This area is 
centrally regulated through directives such as the New Deal on junior doctors hours, launched 
in December 1990 (Department of Health, 1990). The New Deal and Caiman requirements 
work in opposite directions: Calman determines the maximum number of junior doctors in 
relation to consultants, e.g. one Specialist Registrar (SpR) per consultant, while the New Deal 
specifies the minimum number needed to ensure that junior doctors are not committed to 
more than 72 contracted hours' 5 . In recent years there has been a substantial increase in the 
number of consultants nationally as a logical consequence of these pressures - if extra junior 
doctors are required to meet the New Deal then this will in turn create the need for more 
consultants to meet Calman. The overall effect of these trends will be to challenge the 
viability of small clinical teams, forcing hospitals into larger units. These dynamics operate 
without reference to competition or market forces and their impact has been made explicit in 
a paper by The Joint Consultants Committee of the BMA which, in conjunction with the 
Royal College of Physicians and Royal College of Surgeons, published a paper on 
15 72 hours is the maximum contract for on-call rotas. The 'English' clause provides an exemption which allows 
doctors to have up to 83 contracted hours. 56 is the maximum for shift working, consistent with the rule that 
doctors spend no more than 56 hours on their feet. (National Association for Medical Personnel Specialists, 
1997). 
46 
`Organisation of Acute General Hospital Services' (1999). It predicted that populations of 
200,000-300,000 would continue to be served by District General Hospitals but that the 
`ideal' configuration was a larger hospital with a full range of specialist services serving 
populations of 450-500,00016. Royal College recommendations on medical training indicate 
that 'optimum training of higher specialist trainees (SpRs) requires a concentration of hands-
on experience with supervision which, in the earlier stages of training may well be 
achievable in a medium sized hospital, but needs to take place in larger organisational units 
during the later stages of specialist or subspecialist training' (JCC, 1999, p3). Planning and 
non-market intervention thus continue to exert a strong influence over hospitals and need to 
be taken into account in any consideration of Trust objectives and constraints. 
A further aspect of market structure is the ability or otherwise of Trusts to exit from the 
market through poor performance. The response to high market density in London, 
suggesting high levels of competition, was the commissioning of an 'Inquiry into London's 
Health Service, Medical Education and Research' published in 1992 as the Tomlinson 
Report. The Government responded to the Inquiry through 'Making London Better' 
(Department of Health, 1993a). While arguing that 'the internal health market should work 
in London, as elsewhere' (p2), the Government's response fostered a central planning 
approach, arguing that Itjhe case for action is overwhelming. Inner London has nearly 4 
acute hospital beds for every 1,000 people. The national average is 2.5 (p8). One of the 
recommendations (para 76, p14) called for a review of services in SW London. This review 
subsequently called for closure of Queen Mary's Roehampton (the consequences of which 
are documented as a case study in Chapter 11). The spirited and high profile campaign to 
prevent closure which followed was emblematic of the political bathers to exit of Trusts from 
the market (e.g. Turner 1994). The 1991-1997 regime stimulated competition between 
providers by nurturing their survival instinct, fuelling any local campaign to protect a hospital 
at risk of closure. The relationship between Trusts and their external environment has not 
been changed to any obvious extent with the more recent reforms. 
3.4.5 Assessment of the External Environment 
The literature relating to markets in the NHS suggests that the 1991 reforms did not establish 
a general competitive market (although contestability may have had an impact in specialty 
areas). This lack of competition could be construed as inevitable given the political 
resistance to Trust failure and exit from the market. Barriers to entry exist through high set-
up costs (Sutton, 1991) related to capital building and equipment, in addition to medical staff 
Prior to the internal market, the NHS had set out standards relating to population, geographical location and 
access to services. The 1962 White Paper 'A Hospital Plan for England and Wales' set out normative ratios of 
beds per 1,000 population and established that a district general hospital of 600-800 beds should serve a 
population of 100,000 to 150,000. This was amended by the Bonham-Carter Committee (1969) which advised 
that consultant staffing mixes were better suited to DGHs covering larger populations of 300,000 or more 
people. It noted that travelling distance is a constraint on the size of population which can be served from one 
hospital. Subsequent planning solutions, (e.g. Making London Better (Department of Health, 1993a) which 
succeeded the Tomlinson Report, 1992) continued to try to balance medical staffing and education with 
geographical access. 
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training requirements which determine the specialty configuration of hospitals (JCC, July 
1999). 
It is reasonable to suppose that weak competitive incentives operating in the market will have 
influenced behaviour. Using Lipsey and Lancaster's concept of second-best solutions which 
are unpredictable it may also be inferred that the impact of a collapse of market-led 
incentives (through lack of exit) cannot be determined a priori. There is no theoretical 
construct which would allow us to predict the motivation of Trusts. The model of motivation 
provided by the psychological literature of inner drive, behaviour and modification through 
feedback (Figures 3.1 and 3.3) suggests that the experience of market behaviour will lead 
actors to revise their initial goals. This is consistent with a second-best solution in which 
compensating adjustments are needed to bring market dynamics to some form of stability or 
equilibrium. The evidence that hospitals are not driven 'out of business' through inefficiency 
and cost-overrun provides an incentive structure which could influence what consultants and 
managers, identified as the dominant power coalition through this review, perceive to be in 
their own best interests. It follows that the financial target, defined in the next chapter as a 
break-even constraint, would be weakened through market feedback. 
3.5 Conclusion 
In drawing together the data on motivation across all elements, i.e. individuals, groups, Trusts 
and environment, it is concluded here that: 
• self-interest is the dominant motivator of individuals; this is the preferred model which 
aids prediction of how individuals will respond to incentives, goals and the environment; 
• the individuals relevant to this study are doctors and managers which form groups or 
power coalitions within Trusts; 
• there is little empirical or theoretical evidence to suggest how in practice the power 
coalitions will interact to determine the overall behaviour of Trusts; 
• the market environment will send signals to doctors and managers about how they should 
behave; the lack of market exit is expected to weaken the financial target, and thus the 
financial motivation, set for and by Trusts. 
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CHAPTER 4. HYPOTHESES 
The conclusions of the previous chapter provide a framework for postulating objectives of 
individuals and how they will interact to drive Trust behaviour. This framework is used to 
generate a set of hypotheses which can be tested empirically in subsequent fieldwork. 
4.1 	Individuals' Objectives 
The literature survey suggests that managers have a set of personal, organisational and 
patient-centred, i.e. altruistic, motivations which are interrelated. Figure 4.1 below gives 
examples of goals within each category and shows overlaps between the groups to indicate 
that one set may help to drive another, e.g. personal issues of self-worth may be linked to the 
aim to be altruistic and act on behalf of the patient. Some items, such as reputation, may not 
be unique to any particular set of goals. Managers' goals are represented as a sub-set of 
doctors' because, while both groups share elements of organisational, personal and patient-
centred goals, doctors have an additional set of professional objectives related to their 
Hippocratic ethos. The literature relating to occupational control by professions suggests that 
in general doctors' professional goals will be consistent with their personal aims but may not 
always be aligned with the managerial objectives (e.g. Gouldner, 1957, discussed earlier in 
the context of cosmopolitan and local objectives). It is postulated here that both doctors and 
managers are driven by self-interest or personal goals. 
Figure 4.1: Objectives of Doctors and Managers 
4.2 Groups' Objectives 
Taking doctors and managers as two groupings, the primary objective of self-interest is 
expected to be translated into different organisational objectives, depending on the incentive 
structure. 
For clinicians, present and future earning power is linked to reputation, determining the 
patient base, and to the viability of the specialty. Viability in turn depends on continued 
development and expansion of the specialty and its ability to attract a referral base from GPs 
and other practitioners. In organisational terms this translates into maximisation of service 
(i.e. volume and quality), which is defined here as the primary objective of doctors. 
Doctors' output is subject to the role of convention (Leibenstein, 1979) which slows down 
the pace of change from an individual consultant's existing production function to a higher 
function. Convention, for an individual consultant, may reflect low productivity due to 
limited ability or disutility of work. The hypotheses developed here relate to collective 
behaviour within the hospital, aggregating all performance levels. Even if doctors do not 
alter their personal production function, collectively they can maximise their service by 
increasing capacity through appointing additional consultants to the hospital and increasing 
the bed complement, demonstrating an expansionary instinct. They can deepen the service 
by applying additional radiological, diagnostic and therapeutic intervention, e.g. by using 
MRI scanning techniques, with the aim of increasing the quality of the service. 
This objective of service maximisation is consistent with the altruistic aim of maximising 
patients' welfare and wins popular support among the general public. It is not, however, 
consistent with the restraint needed to control the public purse, which affects the electorate at 
large, leading to the conflict between local service demands and central funding which 
Working for Patients (Department of Health, 1989) had been designed to tackle. 
Managers share the personal aims of self worth and self interest. The financial regime and 
the regulator's performance monitoring framework set break-even as the key measure of 
success for a Trust. Managers' self-interest is linked to financial break-even and so this is 
assumed to be the primary objective of managers. The incentive structure for senior 
managers, it is hypothesised therefore, is tied into the managerial goals of the organisation, 
the primary aim being to achieve financial balance. 
The influence of the two groups, doctors and managers, can only be tested in situations of 
conflict, consistent with Polsby's (1963) view of power and control. Where there is no 
conflict it is impossible to observe which group is dominant because there is no test of their 
respective strength. Conditions of harmony and conflict are described in terms of 'good 
times' and 'bad times' as a barometer of the environment in which Trusts function. 
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4.2.1 Environmental Conditions - Good Times and Bad Times 
Good times represent an atmosphere of prosperity in which resources via the cash limited 
setting of the local health economy are adequate to meet the needs of both doctors and 
managers. In good times revenue would be adequate to meet the cost pressures faced by the 
Trust without radical cost improvement programmes. Bad times, on the other hand, describe 
financial strictures which lead managers to alter methods of production in order to achieve 
financial balance. This in effect means altering the consultants' working patterns by means 
within the managers' control such as reducing capacity and staffing". The tension between 
doctors and managers at this point means that their aims are likely to be in conflict. 
4.2.2 Trust Objectives - Hypotheses 
So far, in building up a theory of motivation, it is assumed that individuals combine into 
groups which face different incentive structures. These groups, doctors and managers, adopt 
different organisational goals in accordance with their self-interest, the relative strength of 
which may be tested in situations of conflict, namely 'bad times'. It is postulated here that 
the dominant group's objectives will drive the Trust, so that the dominant group's objective 
will become that of the Trust. 
The groups' objectives have been summarised as budgetary or financial regulation for 
managers and service goals for doctors. A strong version of these premises is translated into 
maximisation objectives which would ideally be tested through a static equilibrium model. 
Principal Actors 
1. Doctors aim to maximise service (volume and quality). 
2. Managers aim to work within the financial regime by meeting the break-even 
constraint, subject to externally imposed constraints such as waiting list targets and 
service volume. 
Trust 
3. In 'good times' these objectives will converge to form a Trust objective of service 
maximisation subject to a break-even constraint. 
4. In 'bad times' objectives of doctors and managers will diverge. The Trust will not 
have a unified objective. It is hypothesised that doctors will emerge as the dominant 
group in the long run so that the Trust pursues service maximisation and does not 
achieve the break-even constraint. 
Maximands, found through static equilibrium analysis (SAE), require that a relationship is 
modelled between a range of variables through a function or set of equations. Values for 
these variables would be collected on a population sample and the modelled function would 
be tested against the sample values by using, for example, regression analysis techniques to 
The extent of managers' control versus doctors' control over the means of production is explored in a 
questionnaire survey considered in Chapters 5-9. 
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yield coefficients. First and second order differentiation would be applied to identify the 
points in the function where profit or output is being maximised, subject to any specified 
constraints. To achieve robust measures it would be necessary to collect data across a large 
sample which is standardised to take account of predictable differences, e.g. specialty, 
technology, and other variations such as convention. One of the main difficulties in this sort 
of modelling, as McGuire observed (1985), is the problem in defining the nature of output to 
be measured since hospital outputs are heterogeneous in nature. 
These difficulties of scale and specification have been bypassed by a reformulation of the 
hypotheses which considers trends rather than maximands. Trend analysis enables 
performance of an individual hospital to be compared from one year to the next, giving some 
degree of confidence that like is being compared with like, since the currency adopted by an 
individual hospital can be expected to have greater consistency over time than measures used 
by different hospitals at a single point in time s. Trend data can be used to test the weaker 
hypothesis that clinicians aim to expand rather than maximise their service in the short term. 
Break-even can be tested through the 6% financial target since the 6% return on assets is set 
to match the target break-even position for the Trust y. For testing purposes the hypotheses 
have been reformulated: 
Principal Actors 
lA 	Doctors aim to expand their service. Volume is used as a measurable proxy, but in 
reality service means a combination of volume and quality. 
2A 	Managers aim to break-even, measured through the Financial Target Performance of 
6% pre-interest return on assets. 
Trust 
3A 	In 'good times' these objectives will converge to form a Trust objective of service 
expansion subject to a break-even constraint. 
4A 	In 'bad times' objectives of doctors and managers will diverge. The Trust will not 
have a unified objective. It is hypothesised that doctors will emerge as the dominant 
group in the long run so that the Trust pursues service expansion and does not achieve 
the break-even constraint. 
18 The methodology applied in Chapter 10 takes precautions to ensure like-for-like comparisons by excluding 
output from the maternity specialty where the measure of Finished Consultant Episodes is recognised as 
containing inflation from one year to the next. 
19 Annual accounts show actual income and expenditure and give a figure for operating surplus and retained 
surplus (after interest). The NHS Executive have flexibility to adjust interest repayments downwards if the 
actual operating surplus is below the target return; in other words, the Trust may show a balanced post-interest 
budget while failing to meet the Financial Target Performance. 
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4.3 Testing the Hypotheses - Methodological Approach 
The logic developed in this chapter points towards three methods of testing the hypotheses by 
(i) conducting an attitudinal survey, (ii) undertaking a quantitative analysis and (iii) observing 
a case study which is used to cast light on the external pressures impinging on Trusts: 
• Method 1 tests perceptions through administering a questionnaire survey to managers and 
doctors working within Trusts. This method focuses on the motivation of actors within 
the organisation by asking individuals about their own objectives and the perceived 
objectives of other groups. The survey tests the central hypotheses that doctors' self-
interest will translate into a service quantity/quality objective within the Trust while 
managers' incentive structures lead them to focus on financial management. 
• The interaction of these objectives and the balance of power within the organisation will 
manifest itself in Trust behaviour which is observable. Method 2 tests Trust objectives by 
analysis of financial and service performance. This quantitative study of Trust activity 
tests the hypothesis that doctors' objectives will tend to dominate in bad times. This test 
draws on the results of Method 1 to attribute behaviour of actors, i.e. doctors and 
managers, to overall Trust performance. 
• Method 3 examines the incentive structure created by the environment through a case 
study which observes Trust behaviour through a sequence of events. The case study 
provides a test of Trust behaviour in a 'real world' setting and produces empirical 
evidence of external constraints which determine the level of competition operating 
within the environment. This is intended to complement Method 1 since, it is argued, 
market conditions influence the incentive structure within which doctors and managers 
work by providing feedback. The hypotheses are constructed on the basis that underlying 
self-interest will produce a set of objectives which is consistent with the existing 
incentive structure and which, by inference, could change with a new set of incentives. 
4.3.1 Seiectine the Case Study Sites 
Yin (1994) emphasises the contribution of an underlying theoretical framework in selecting 
the structure and number of case studies. He compares single and multiple case studies and 
notes that multiple-case designs tend to be regarded as more robust since they offer scope for 
replication on the basis of similar (i.e. literal replication) or contrasting (i.e. theoretical 
replication) case study characteristics. The disadvantage of multiple case design is a degree 
of unwieldiness which sacrifices the potential depth of a single case study for the breadth of 
multiple case design. 
This thesis uses case studies in both the questionnaire and the environmental context. The 
questionnaire application provides a methodological check on the sampling method adopted 
nationally and uses case study hospital sites A and B which offer scope for literal replication. 
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A and B are first wave hospital Trusts of similar size and function which are located in the 
south east of England and are compared through the questionnaire survey Method 1, the 
results of which are described in Chapter 8. The chronological case study, described in 
Chapter 11, uses an embedded case structure, as opposed to the self-contained holistic 
structure used in conjunction with the questionnaire tool. The embedded case study uses 
Kingston, Epsom and Queen Mary's Hospitals which operate within a local health economy 
extending from south west London to the M25 boundary. By exploring the chronology of 
events, the dynamics between Kingston and Epsom within the early years of the market 
reforms provide evidence about the motivation and behaviour of Trusts within a new market 
environment which is competitive in terms of provider-concentration. The focus of market 
forces throughout the period shifted to the relationship between Kingston and Queen Mary's 
Hospitals, and this dynamic serves to highlight the dominant forces which determine a 
Trust's environment and behaviour. The regulatory and political environment sets the 
incentive structure within which Trusts operate and which, it is postulated, has a bearing on 
the organisational objectives of the actors working within the Trusts. 
4.4 Conclusion 
This thesis has developed an approach to motivation by taking individuals as the first unit of 
analysis and then grouping individuals into the categories of doctors and managers within the 
Trust as an organisation. Trusts can be considered as single entities in terms of goals and 
performance and they need to be observed in part through their relationship with the 
environment. The fieldwork enquiry has been structured to adhere to this framework: 
• A questionnaire survey addresses individuals and groups within Trusts to examine what 
they perceive to be their own goals and what they believe to be the goals of the Trust. 
Hypotheses 1(A) and 2(A) correspond to this level of analysis; 
• The questionnaire survey has been extended to provide a detailed sample in two Trusts, 
described as case study Sites A and B. The purpose of this development is to test the 
validity of the sampling technique used for the questionnaire survey; 
• A quantitative analysis assesses the performance of Trusts. This study is designed to test 
Hypotheses 3(A) and 4(A), which are contingent on the first two hypotheses; 
• A case study is used to examine the environment in which Trusts operate. This provides 
an opportunity to examine the market system which provides feedback to Trusts and, 
according to the psychological model of motivation depicted in Chapter 3, is likely to 
have an impact on the 'inner state' of motivation. In the context of this study, 'inner 
state' relates to the individuals and groups which drive NHS Trusts from within. 
The Figure below summarises the structure of the fieldwork enquiry 
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<Environment in SW London Case Study 
Figure 4.2: Structure of Fieldwork Enquiry 
55 
CHAPTER 5. METHODOLOGY RELATING TO QUESTIONNAIRE 
SURVEY 
This chapter outlines the process of developing a questionnaire survey and then describes its 
content. The purpose of the questionnaire attitudinal survey is to explore the question 'What 
Drives the Trust?' and to gather evidence about Trusts' objectives through the perceptions of 
key players. Managers and consultants are the focus of the exercise since they represent the 
main power coalitions in a Trust, but the scope of the study has been extended to other 
professionals in the organisation. 
5.1 Stages of Work 
The survey was developed and executed through several stages, the first of which comprised 
interviews and then four pilot studies in acute and community settings. Thirteen interviews 
were conducted to generate an initial pilot questionnaire which was then tested in three sites. 
These pilots led to redesign of the questionnaire, after which it was distributed in a final 
extensive pilot in Hospital A. After the results of this pilot had been analysed the second 
stage of fieldwork was begun through a national survey which involved a mail shot to 234 
Trusts across the country. The questionnaire fieldwork might have ended here with an 
analysis of the results. However, a comparison between the outcome of stages l and 2, i.e. 
the results of Hospital A and the national survey, prompted a third stage of work as a 
methodological check on the earlier work. The three stages are described in more detail below 
5.1.1 	Stage 1: Development of Questionnaire: (a) Interviews, (b) Intermediate 
Pilots, (c) Final Pilot at Hospital A. 
(a) 	Semi structured interviews with consultants and managers were conducted at 
Hospital A (also referred to as Site A in this thesis). The interview incorporated a 
closed list of objectives which individuals were asked to rank and discuss. The 
objectives were based on the hypothesis that managers would regard financial goals 
as the most important while consultants would be interested in service quantity 
and quality. It became apparent that the three financial objectives set by the NHS 
Executive of (i) break-even year on year, (ii) remain within External Financing Limit 
(EFL), and (iii) make 6% return on assets, were perceived by all except the Finance 
Director in terms of a single goal of break-even, understood in terms of matching 
expenditure to budget. The technical constraints of EFL and the 6% financial target 
performance were believed to be the responsibility of the Finance Director who 
would meet these constraints as part of the budget-setting process. As a result, 
the definition of financial achievement was reduced in the questionnaire to simply 
`financial break-even' of expenditure against budget. 
(b) 	A questionnaire was drafted and piloted among three Trusts (selected through the 
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National Association of Health Authorities and Trusts (NAHAT) which was co-
operating with the study). Each pilot comprised ten individuals: (i) a community 
Trust piloted the questionnaire through face to face encounters in which individuals 
talked through their responses with the researcher; (ii) a second community Trust 
piloted the questionnaire which was distributed by the Chief Executive (who was 
interviewed initially); (iii) an acute Trust piloted the questionnaire using a mail shot 
via the Chief Executive's office; this acted as a pilot of the final distribution 
process. 
The main fmdings of this set of pilots related to questionnaire design, sample size 
and participation rate. Visual presentation and question structure was refined to 
minimise fatigue on the part of respondents. Repetitive lists, for example, were 
eliminated and replaced with a single matrix and empty tick boxes were replaced by 
descriptive words. The participation rate ranged between 50% and 70%, even with 
a directive by the Chief Executive for respondents to complete the questionnaire. 
On this basis it was apparent that the sample size of 10 was too small to provide 
adequate representation by consultants since CEOs on average selected 7 managers 
and 3 consultants to provide a sample of 10. As a result of this trial, the national 
survey was designed to incorporate a pack of 20 questionnaires per Trust. 
	
(c) 	A final pilot was developed and tested in Site A. This final questionnaire differed 
from earlier pilots in that, firstly, it was more interesting to look at and to complete 
- with the aim of increasing motivation and, secondly, it used a greater variety of 
closed question techniques, including rating, ranking and tick questions. It drew on 
evidence about questionnaire design which encouraged varied approaches to 
stimulate thought and use of descriptive words rather than numbers to rate 
attitudes, e.g. good, very good etc. This pilot was tested across a sample of 40 
individuals, i.e. 20 managers and 20 consultants, and the results were analysed in 
detail. 
5.1.2 	Stage 2: National Survey 
The questionnaire was printed under an academic banner (LSE) rather than NAHAT, which 
had in the meantime dissolved and transformed to become the NHS Confederation. A careful 
method of distribution was developed which involved (a) a phone call to the Chief Executive 
in two thirds of Trusts in the country (278/406 Trusts, 68%) to brief them about the study; 
some took the opportunity to say `no' at this stage; (b) a batch of 20 questionnaires (or less 
in the case of small community Trusts) to all Trusts which did not say 'no' accompanied by 
a personalised covering letter and a tracking sheet to be returned to the researcher with details 
of participants; (c) Chief Executives were asked through this mail shot to select 10 managers 
and 10 consultants within the Trust and to distribute a questionnaire to each of them; the 
questionnaire was to be returned directly to a PO Box address set up for this survey, rather 
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than through the Chief Executive's office, and would therefore be confidential; a total of 4,680 
questionnaires were distributed in this manner, equivalent to 241 Trusts. 
124 Trusts indicated their co-operation by returning tracking sheets. By cross-referencin , 
questionnaire batch numbers against Trusts during the analytical phase it became apparent 
that 143 Trusts had participated, although 19 of these Trusts had not returned a tracking 
sheet to the researcher to signal their involvement. 
5.1.3 Stage 3: Methodological Check - Compare Hospital A with Hospital B 
One notable finding from the Site A survey in Stage 1 was that managers perceived 
relationships and services to have improved since Trust status while consultants took a much 
more pessimistic view and believed that both had deteriorated. The finding was in contrast to 
the national survey which showed a more positive view by consultants. This could have 
been disregarded on the grounds that the discrepancy was due to particular characteristics 
within Trust A. There existed a real possibility, however, that this discrepancy could instead 
be highlighting a methodological problem, and so it was investigated further as Stage 3 of the 
questionnaire survey process. 
The potential problem lay in differences in the method of selecting the consultant sample 
between the Site A pilot and national survey. 20 consultants at Hospital A had been selected 
by the researcher whereas 10 consultants in the national survey were selected by each Chief 
Executive. The combination of a larger sample and bypassing the CEO office at Site A means 
that more of the 'difficult' consultants who have a poor view of managers may have been 
persuaded to participate in the survey. In other Trusts CEOs would be likely to select 
`friendly' consultants who have some sort of relationship with the management of the Trust. 
This methodological diffictilty - summed up as a trade off between co-operation of CEOs and 
depth of consultant response - was addressed by asking a Chief Executive in Site B, which is 
similar to Site A in terms of size, function and market environment, to distribute 40 
questionnaires and select a cross-section of 20 consultants. The similarity between the two 
hospitals provides a comparative case study. 
5.2 Trust Selection and Numbering System 
Trusts were grouped according to three types: (i) acute or whole district Trusts, (ii) 
community or mental health Trusts, and (iii) specialist Trusts, e.g. Birmingham Women's 
Hospital. 
Within these groups a degree of randomness was achieved by working through an alphabetical 
listing. A directory of Trusts (Fitzhugh, 1997) showing the annual accounts, Trust type, 
CEO name and contact details provided the database from which 192 out of 213 acute/whole 
district Trusts were approached by telephone. 11 Trusts were omitted from this canvassing 
58 
Out of 213 Acute/Whole District Trusts, rang: 
19/8/97 
20/8 
21/8 
27/8 
28/8 	 34 
9/9 37 
16/9 	 48 
23/9 4 
192 
Out of 152 Community/Mental Health Trusts rang 
(plus 20 mainly community 5th wave) 
23/9 	 9 
24/9 59 
25/9 	 10 
78 
Out of 21 Specialist Trusts, rang 
8 
Total requests 	 278 	out of 	406 	68% 
3 
exercise due to difficulties in accessing the Chief Executive's office. 	Alternate 
community/mental health Trusts in the alphabetical listing were selected (78/152) and one in 
three specialist Trusts (8/21) were approached. The process of canvassing started with a 
phone call to the switchboard to confirm the CEO's name. The researcher was put through 
to the CEO's office and then asked to speak to the Chief Executive by name. At this point 
the CEO's secretary was briefed about the project and undertook to obtain a response from 
the CEO or, in some cases, agreed to administer the questionnaire without consulting the 
CEO. 
Less than 10% of CEO offices responded with a defmite 'no'. A larger number said either 
`yes', 'perhaps', asked for further details or gave no response at all. A pack of 
questionnaires was sent out to each of these Trusts. The majority of Trusts received 20 
questionnaires but smaller Trusts (indicated by the details of the annual accounts) with 
turnover of approximately £15 million or less received a smaller number, set typically at 10. 
The size of the pack sent to these smaller Trusts was determined through discussion with the 
secretary to the CEO. The telephone-canvassing dates and volumes are summarised in the 
Figure below. 
Figure 5.1: Questionnaire Administration  - Telephone Calls 
Each questionnaire was printed with a four digit number starting at 1001. Trust types were 
allocated blocks of numbers, to assist in subsequent analysis. Packs of questionnaires 
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SENT OUT LETTERS & PACK 
3/9/97 4 
4/9 47 
9/9 35 
12/9 20 
22/9 44 
23/9 14 
24/9 31 
25/9 48 
241 PLUS 9 SINGLE LETTERS AND 7 FAXES 
TOTAL QUESTIONNAIRES SENT OUT: 
ACUTE/WHOLE DISTRICT 
NUMBERS 
1001 - 4400 
	
3400 	170 packs of twenty 
COMMUNITY/MENTAL HEALT 
4501-5640 	 1140 63 average of 	18 	per pack 
SPECIALIS 
5801-5940 
TOTAL QUESTIONNAIRES SENT OUT 
4680 
140 
consecutively numbered were sent to each Trust contact point together with a personalised 
covering letter containing instructions for circulation and a tracking sheet. The instructions 
were simple, inviting the CEO to select 10 managers and 10 consultants within the Trust and 
to circulate a questionnaire to each of them. The tracking sheets contained a list of the 
questionnaire numbers supplied to the Trust and a request to the person administering the 
survey to return this sheet together with the names and an indication of consultant/manager 
status. The purpose of this tracking sheet was to exert a degree of discipline over the 
distribution process. The consultant/manager indicator proved to be useful at the data input 
stage when individuals had failed to identify their status within the organisation. It was also 
intended to provide an audit trail to enable the researcher to chase respondents via the CEO's 
office if required although, in the event, the response rate was sufficiently high within the 
large sample to render this audit trail unnecessary. The tracking sheet contained the name and 
contact detail of the individual administering the survey locally. This added to the audit trail 
but its main function was to raise the level of personal accountability locally and therefore to 
enhance the quality of the administrative process. The volume and numbering system of the 
questionnaires distributed are summarised below. 
Figure 5.2: Questionnaire Administration - Mail Shot 
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You are (please tick all boxes which apply to you): 
a CEO 
a Chairman 
a Board Director 
El Consultant - Chair of Clinical Directorate 
a Consultant 
a Clinical Professional (non-medical ) 
D Corporate Manager 	 
a Service/Business Manager (inc clinician) 
a Other 
5.3 Scale and Production of Questionnaire 
The questionnaire was designed to cover four sides of A4. This was determined on the basis 
of printing and production requirements and with reference to the need to maximise the 
response rate by making the questionnaire attractive and succinct. Appendix 1 includes the 
questionnaire, printed on a folded A3 sheet, and shows that the front page contained a 
briefing to the individual, together with details of the return address. The pilot testing stage 
had been used to ascertain an average duration for completing the questionnaire. This average 
of approximately 10 minutes was included in the briefing details in order to gain commitment 
from the respondent. A PO Box return address was established for ease of administration 
and to add to the credibility of the questionnaire, in preference to a personal reply address. 
The pilot tests had been performed under cover of the National Association of Health 
Authorities and Trusts (NAHAT). Due to the subsequent dismantling of this organisation 
and merger with the NHS Trust Federation to become the NHS Confederation, the option to 
use the NAHAT logo and endorsement was no longer available. Authority was received to 
use the LSE logo on the questionnaire and to send the pack out under cover of LSE 
notepaper. 
5.4 Target Respondents 
Within the questionnaire itself respondents were encouraged to describe themselves according 
to one or more categories to capture clinical and management aspects of individuals' roles: 
Figure 5.3: Question 'You Are...? ' 
These responses were used to categorise doctors and managers across 11 separate and unique 
groups set out in the Figure below. 
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Figure 5.4: Respondent Groups 
Consultan 
Managers 
Category 
1. Chair Clinical Directorates 
2. Board Director 
3. Consultants Only 
4. Chair 
5. CEO 
6. Board Director 
7. Corporate 
8. Clinical Professional 
9. Service/Business Manager 
10.Other Manager 
11.Unidentified 
   
5.5 Statistical Methods 
The questionnaire was coded in advance for data input and analysis. A code was attributed 
to each possible response within closed questions. Open questions were coded before data 
input on the basis of transcripts from one third of the sample which responded. The coding 
structure allowed data to be aggregated to derive frequency of responses according to 
characteristics of the respondents. The manager/consultant grouping was an important level 
of disaggregation, essential in testing the hypotheses. 
5.5.1 Use of Mean Value 
The mean value is a convenient measure for handling both rating and ranking scores and 
observing central tendencies of the results. Results were summarised into mean scores to 
provide an initial account of doctors' and managers' responses. Further tests were applied 
to check whether differences between mean scores could be regarded as significant. These 
tests were applied at Stage 2 of the programme, i.e. to the national sample of questionnaires. 
5.5.2 ANOVA 
The test most commonly employed was a comparison of mean scores using ANOVA (One 
Way Analysis of Variance). The SPSS Definition of One Way ANOVA is : This procedure 
tests the null hypothesis that data is a sample from a population in which the mean of a test 
variable is equal in several independent groups of cases defined by a single grouping 
variable. The single grouping variable in this questionnaire survey is generally 'who', i.e. 
whether the respondent is a doctor or a manager or a subset of either group. 
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5.6 Question 1. To what extent does your career depend on the 
following factors? 
The purpose of this question was to establish the difference in personal motivation between 
doctors and managers, testing the hypothesis that: 
• organisational goals are of less importance to doctors than their wider professional aims, 
i.e. the survival of the clinical specialty is of greater importance to a doctor's career than 
survival of the organisation; 
• the opposite is true for managers: survival of the organisation is very important since 
organisational boundaries define managers' careers. The organisational objectives of the 
Trust will therefore carry more weight with managers than with consultants. 
5.6.1 Question Structure and Coding System 
Respondents were asked to rate the importance of the eight factors (plus other.. ) below to 
their own careers, on a five point scale which was set at 5 intuitively regular intervals: very 
low, low, moderate, high, very high. Individuals circled the word(s) which applied and this 
set of responses was subsequently translated into a I - 5 rating scale for quantitative analysis. 
Is A financially successful Trust 
lb Success of your specialty/dept. within the Trus 
lc Strength of your specialty/profession national 
ld Individual reputation 
le Reputation of Trust/hospital 
I f Standard of R&D or teaching 
Ig Survival of the Trust as an organisation 
lh Continued provision of the Trust's clinical service 
lj Other (specify) 	  
Enquiries about income maximisation and private patients were considered to be too invasive 
to include in a postal questionnaire and so this factor was omitted, although it was explored 
during the developmental phase. 
5.6.2 Method of Analysis 
Doctors and managers were grouped into two categories and the null hypothesis that their 
responses were drawn from the same population was tested at the 5% and the 1% level of 
confidence using the ANOVA technique. The test was repeated within doctors (categories 1- 
3) and managers (categories 4-9) and then across all categories (1-9)". The difference within 
the manager group was explored by considering a range of groupings. 
2° In this case categories 10 (other managers) and 11 (unknown) were omitted, even though the questionnaire 
descriptions indicated that most managers in category 10 would probably belong to category 9 (service/business 
managers); groups 10 and 11 are omitted on the basis of their small size in relation to other categories. 
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The use of mean rating scores could be criticised on the grounds that the ratings are strictly 
ordinal rather than interval measures and so should be examined through non-parametric tests. 
Chi-squared analysis of frequency distributions is used to test whether the distribution of 
rating scores is significantly different between samples (where the null hypothesis assumes 
no difference between the sample populations). The differences between groups of 
respondents has been tested in two ways: (1) retaining the eleven different groupings (where 
`unknown' is the eleventh group), and (ii) by grouping doctors and managers into two 
categories. 
5.7 Question 2. Within the Trust, how would you rank the prioritie 
for the following sets of people? 
This question is the most important within the questionnaire. The aim was to elicit 
individuals' perceptions of their own priorities and to find out what they thought about other 
groups. They were asked to rank their own priorities and those of most business/service 
managers, most consultants, the Trust now and the Trust ideally. The question has been 
structured to separate consultants as a group from managers in order to test the hypotheses 
of differences between them. 
5.7.1 Question Structure and Coding System 
`The Trust' has been identified as a separate entity in the question to give respondents the 
opportunity to make an objective assessment of the organisation's goals and to test the extent 
to which these goals can be aligned to those of individuals. The question structure is 
motivated by the possibility that neither doctors nor managers identify with the Trust as an 
organisation. Should this be the case then, given the powerful position of these two groups, 
its implications would need to be considered in terms of control over Trust performance. 
5.7.2 Method of Analysis 
Respondents were grouped into two categories (1) Doctors (Groups 1-3) and (2) Managers 
(Groups 4-11). They were asked to rank objectives (set out in the Figure below) in order of 
priority 1-7. This is an ordinal variable but some insight has been gained into the data by 
summarising the rankings into mean values". One-Way-ANOVA has been used to compare 
the mean rankings for each variable, e.g. 2a break even-financially, between the two groups. 
A non parametric test, two-tailed Mann-Whitney U, was also applied to test whether 
doctors and managers form two independent samples. This test observes the ranking 
frequencies between the two groups. It is a non parametric alternative to the t test, requiring 
at least an ordinal level of measurement, and uses the ranks of the cases to calculate U. 
21 Oppenheimer comments: 'In strict measurement terms this is wrong, and it follows that the parametric techniques 
for statistical analysis are not applicable. Yet researchers frequently take liberties with the requirements and 
assumptions upon which these statistical techniques are based in the hope that the techniques will prove 
sufficiently robust to withstand a certain amount of abuse, and that the ensuing results and conclusions will not be 
too misleading'. A. N Oppenheimer (1992) p158 
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Break-even financially 
aintain service volume 
You may tie these if you wish 
aintain service quality 
Expand revenue 
—Expand service volume 
You may tie these if you wish 
—Expand service quality 
Other (please specify) 
e.g. innovation, teaching, R&D 
The set of respondents was restored to eleven separate categories of individuals and ANOVA 
and Kruskal-Wallis H tests were applied. The Kruskal Wallis H test is a non-parametric 
alternative to One Way ANOVA. It tests whether several independent samples come from 
the same population. It assumes that the underlying variable has a continuous distribution 
and requires at least an ordinal level of measurement. The results of Kruskal-Wallis were 
used as a cross-check against the validity of the ANOVA test, thus testing the assumption of 
a normal distribution of means. 
Figure 5.5: Question 2 Structure 
Q2. 	Within the Trust, how would you rank the priorities for the following sets of people? 
This question asks for the order of priorities which, in your view, is held by these groups. 
For each column please rank priorities in order 1, 2, 3 etc where 1 is the most important. 
If you tie values, then please adjust rankings, e.g. 1,2,3,3,5 1 8. 
You Most 
Business 
& Service 
Managers 
Most 
Consultants 
The 
Trust 
Now 
The 
Trust 
Ideally 
2a 2h 2r 2y 2af 
2b 2j 2s 2z tag 
2c 2k 2t 2aa 2ah 
2d 2m 2u 2ab 2aj 
2e 2n 2v 2ac 2ak 
2f 2p 2w 2ad 2am 
2g 2q 2x 2ae 2an 
5.8 Question 3. Which body is achieving its main objective? 
3a) Which Body is Achieving its Main Objective Now? 
3b) Which Body will Achieve its Main Objective During the Next Three Years? 
3c) Which Body will Achieve its Main Objective During the Next Six Years? 
Individuals were asked to place a tick against which body they believed was achieving its 
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main objective at the moment and which was likely to achieve it in the medium and longer 
term. Respondents were allowed to tick more than one from a choice of Managers, 
Consultants, Trust and None. This was an impressionistic question designed to reflect the 
general outlook of managers and consultants and to give a sense of which element of the 
organisation was considered to be dominant. A descriptive account of the frequency of 
responses was used to indicate how doctors and managers viewed the balance of power. 
5,9 Question 4. How have priorities changed since the organisation 
became a Trust ? 
Respondents were asked to rate how their own priorities had changed since Trust status and 
were asked to take a view on how the Trust priorities had changed during the same period. 
The description of priorities followed a similar pattern to that used earlier in Question 2, but 
these were collapsed into fewer objectives and two different ones were inserted: 'be 
responsive to patients', 'be responsive to GPs'. The main purpose of the restructuring was 
to avoid fatigue and boredom through repetition on the part of the respondent and also to 
glean additional information. Respondents were asked to circle words and, for purposes of 
analysis, these were coded at intervals where 1=weaker, 2=no change, 3—stronger. 
On a three scale rating the use of the mean as a measure of central tendency overloads the 
scores in terms of importance. Nevertheless, two tests were used against this ratings 
distribution to assess whether doctors and managers responded as independent groups, i.e. 
ANOVA and Pearson Chi Square. Descriptive statistics in terms of frequency distribution of 
responses provide a clearer picture about the balance of responses. 
5.10 Question 5a. Since the change to Trust status, how has the 
relationship changed between consultants and managers? 
Consultants and managers were asked to rate whether they thought the relationship between 
the two groups had deteriorated or improved over the period. This question and, likewise, 
Question 6a was included at the request of the Chairman of NAHAT in response to a request 
for NAHAT endorsement of the questionnaire. Respondents were asked to circle words and, 
as in Question 5, were coded at the analytical stage at equal intervals where 1—much worse, 
2—worse, 3=no change, 4 = better, 5 = much better. 
ANOVA tests of independence were conducted to test the response patterns of a range of 
groupings, starting with the two groups comprising doctors and managers and then exploring 
the similarity or otherwise of sub-groups within doctors and sub-groups within managers. A 
descriptive account of the ratings distribution was also produced. 
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5.11 Question 5b. 	Why has the relationship changed between 
consultants and managers? 
After the rating exercise consultants and managers were given the opportunity to comment on 
their perception of consultantfmanager relationships. The open question allowed them to 
explain the reasons for change. 
A coding system was devised on the basis of a large sample of the open question responses. 
One third of responses were transcribed and printed for review. This text was used to devise 
a thirteen code structure at ten point intervals, e.g. 10, 20 .... 130. The purpose of the 
intervals was to enable sub-division within these codes, e.g. 80, 81. The final presentation of 
responses was collapsed to 11 coding groups. Where several responses were provided, a 
code was applied to the primary response. 
5.12 Question 6a. Since the change to Trust status, how has the service 
to patients changed? 
Consultants and managers were asked to rate whether they thought the service to patients 
had deteriorated or improved over the period. Respondents were asked to circle words 
which were coded subsequently using equi-distant intervals of 1=much worse, 2=worse, 
3=no change, 4 = better, 5 = much better. 
ANOVA tests of independence were conducted according to the same structure used to 
analyse Question 5a. Likewise, a descriptive account of the ratings distribution was 
produced. 
5.13 Question 6b. Why have services to patients changed ? 
Respondents were given the opportunity to explain why they thought services to patients 
had changed since Trust status through an open question `Why?'. A coding system was 
devised on the basis of a large sample of the open question responses. One third of 
responses were transcribed and printed for review. This text was used to devise an eight code 
structure at mainly ten point intervals, e.g. 10, 20 .... 70, 99. Sub-division within these codes 
was applied as required. As in question 5b, where several responses were provided, a code 
was applied to the primary response. 
5.14 Question 7. Since the change to Trust status, do you think the 
goals of consultants have 
Moved closer together 	Not changed 	Moved further apart 
Question 2 asked about current goals and Question 5 asked about the relationship between 
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(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
doctors and managers. Notwithstanding the existing state of goals and relationships, this 
question enquired whether there had been any movement over time. Rating scales were 
applied for coding purposes, using I = Moved closer together, 2 = Not changed, 3 = Moved 
further apart. A battery of ANOVA tests was applied using the same structure as in 
Questions 6a and 5a. Frequency distributions provided a descriptive account of responses. 
5.15 Question 8. Which group, in your view, has the most control over 
the following aspects of service? 
Development of service 
Availability of facilities (e.g. beds, theatres) 
Medical staffing levels 
Nurse staffing levels 
Freedom to admit in-patients 
Decision to treat patient 
The purpose of this question was to examine people's perception of power in terms of 
control of activities and resources. The resource inputs to a hospital include the facilities or 
fixed assets which include beds and operating theatres, together with staffing - regarded as a 
semi-fixed cost (Department of Health, 1993b), and variable costs or consumables. Variable 
costs comprise only 10% of the cost of treating each patient whereas staffing comprises 70%. 
The availability of facilities is a function of the capital capacity of the hospital and the 
workforce needed to staff beds and other elements of service. 
Earlier questions dealt with perceptions of motivation (Question 2 regarding priorities) and 
achievement of objectives (Question 3). Power to meet service objectives or budgetary goals, 
however, is predicated on the ability to control resources within the Trust. It has been argued 
that doctors control the major part of resource allocation within hospitals and it was this 
feature combined with doctors' locus outside the management culture which stimulated the 
Resource Management Initiative (RMI) 1986-1994 (Department of Health, 1986). Resource 
Management was aimed at achieving better use of resources by (a) involving clinicians in 
decision making processes, (b) providing clinicians and managers with the information needed 
to support their roles, and (c) devolving accountability to the level in the organisation closest 
to the point of service delivery. The introduction of Working for Patients (Department of 
Health, 1989) and Trust status coincided with the roll-out of RMI. Many of the features 
subsequently addressed in Question 5b, e.g. clinicians in management, had therefore been 
piloted and developed in the NHS prior to 1991 but were reinforced by the White Paper 
reforms since, in order to achieve Trust status, organisations were obliged to reform the 
management structure to demonstrate clinical involvement. This in effect meant that 
directorate structures were an essential component of applications for NHS Trust status. 
Question 8 seeks to draw a profile of who controls resources and activities, or who is 
perceived to control them, as a cross-check on managers' and doctors' ability to determine the 
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destiny of the organisation. (The results could have some relevance in assembling a model of 
hospital production functions in a separate piece of work). 
Approximately 10% of respondents selected more than one item in response to each 
question. The results were therefore input as a count and displayed as a frequency 
distribution across the doctor and manager categories. 
5.16 Question 9. Do you think the NHS climate will change with the 
new government? 
& Question 10a. Would you welcome change in the future 
This question was inserted to add topicality to the questionnaire since the study was 
administered in the autumn of 1997 in the knowledge that the recently elected Labour 
Government was about to publish its policy intentions through a White Paper, finally issued 
at the beginning of December 1997 (Department of Health, 1997). An enquiry about the 
appetite for change was intended to add an extra dimension to the earlier question about 
changes in services and working relationships. If doctors and managers had proved to be 
either positive or negative in their views about changes since Trust status then further insight 
could be provided through linking this to their view of the future. 
5.17 Question 10b and 10c. Why would you welcome change in the 
future and what sort of change would you like? 
Respondents were given the opportunity to comment on their attitude to change and to 
explain the sort of change they would like through an open question. The blank space 
allocated to this question was more than 4" in length, which is large by comparison to other 
response areas. As the final question in the series it was intended to provide a soap-box for 
respondents who had a strong desire to express their views, adding to the depth of their 
overall response. It also gave space to collect a large volume of observations. 
One third of responses were transcribed in full and printed. A coding system was devised on 
the basis of this large sample in which every item was coded. If a respondent set out four 
separate suggestions, for example, these were allocated four codes. 10 major categories were 
identified using codes 10, 20 100. These were further subdivided and, due to the range of 
observations, it was necessary to use alpha codes a, b, ... to extend the number of sub-groups 
to ten-plus. 
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CHAPTER 6. QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY: RESULTS OF STAGE 1 
This chapter brings together the results of the first stage of the questionnaire survey. It 
focuses on the response to the final pilot survey at Hospital A but also brings in data from 
the developmental part of this stage which used face to face interviews to begin to design the 
questionnaire. This approach is possible because Hospital A was used both at this 
developmental stage and then, after a series of intermediate pilots, in testing the final 
questionnaire pilot. 
6.1 Response Rate and Sample Description 
The Hospital A survey was distributed to 40 individuals, selected by the researcher, 17 
(43%) of whom were consultants and 23 (57%) of whom were managers. The overall 
response was 55% (22/40), comprising 9 (41%) consultants and 13 (59%) managers. 
Respondents were encouraged to describe themselves within one or more categories in order 
to capture clinical and management aspects of their roles. The respondent set is summarised 
in the table below. 
Table 6.1: Set of Respondents 
Hospital A Respondents Category 
18.2% 	4 1. Chair Clinical Directorates 
0.0% 0 2. Board Director 
22.7% 5 3. Consultants Only 
40.9% 9 Total Consultants 
0.0% 0 4. Chair 
4.5% 1 5. CEO 
4.5% 1 6. Board Director 
22.7% 5 7. Corporate 
4.5% 1 8. Clinical Professional 
18.2% 4 9. Service/Business Manager 
4.5% 1 10. Other Manager 
0.0% 0 11. Unidentified 
59.1% 13 Total Managers 
100.0% 22 
63% % Management Time 
6.2 Question 1. To what extent does your career depend on the 
following factors? 
Consistent with the concept of cosmopolitan boundaries at work within professions, 1g) 
survival of the Trust as an organisation was markedly more important to managers than to 
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doctors. Only two other areas showed significant differences between the disciplines: 1c) 
strength of the specialty/profession nationally which, as one would expect, is more widely 
supported by doctors and 1.fi Standard of R&D and Teaching to which again doctors award 
greater importance. Personal reputation was considered to be of equal importance by both 
groups. 
Table 6.2: Mean Rating Scores on a Scale 1-5 where 1 is very low and 5 is very high 
Hospital A la lb lc id le lf lg lh lj 
Total Sample - Mean 3.3 3.95 3.2 4.52 3.86 2.95 3.77 4.18 3.5 
Doctors Sample - Mean 3.38 3.75 3.75 4.44 3.89 3.78 3.22 4.44 4 
Managers Sample - Mean 3.25 4.08 2.83 4.58 3.85 2.27 4.15 4 
Point Difference: Doctors - Managers 0.13 -0.33 0.92 -0_14 0.04 1.51 -0.93 0,44 4 
As the first question in the sample, Question 1 was designed to be simple to fill in and to 
shed some light on the personal motivation of managers and consultants in terms of their 
career. The issue of personal income and private practice was not included in the 
questionnaire on the grounds that consultants might resent the intrusion, but this was 
explored during Stage 1 through interviews with three surgical consultants, all of whom were 
candid about the importance of private practice. 
One clinician disclosed that for just over one private day a week he earned £100,000 per 
annum, thereby more than doubling his NHS salary. The choice between NHS and private 
work is not clear cut since private work comes in through the NHS umbrella; GPs refer 
patients via outpatients and private insurance covers for inpatient treatment. `If a consultant 
went purely private he would lose that source of referral. The stream of patients needs to be 
kept alive'. As for consultants' primary objective, the same clinician observed 'First of all, 
consultants want the NHS to survive, because if it didn't they wouldn't get private practice. ' 
In considering whether doctors, unlike managers, were motivated by altruism he was frank in 
his remark that 'No, most surgeons are primarily interested in running a private practice. 
A second consultant argued that consultants are more concerned about their NHS work than 
their private work, but conceded that his personal finances depended on private income: 
`Consultants first of all want to make a success of their job and then build up their private 
practice. I would love to do all my work in the NHS - I could be so much more efficient, 
instead of running round to 6 different places; the majority of doctors want to organise their 
service efficiently. I couldn't afford to give up private work with my commitments - I still have 
two daughters whose education needs to be paid for. I earn about BOOk a year which dwarfs 
my consultant salary. ' A third consultant responded in similar vein: 'If I am forced to make a 
choice I must choose the private practice. I can't afford to do anything else. Doctors in the 
NHS are grossly underpaid ' 
There was a common view among surgeons that the NHS would benefit by insisting that 
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consultants performed their private practice on the NHS hospital site: 'Private practice is 
fine as long as you do the NHS work. Barbara Castle screwed it up. She should have made 
all doctors stay on site to do private work. You know where they are then and they are always 
available if problems arise. ' 
The reasons for entering medicine as a career were touched upon and the consultants indicated 
that enjoyment of the work and environment was important: 'Working as a hospital doctor 
is fine, until you get hassle. There is a lot more hassle now "I enjoy it. I like eyes and I am 
fascinated by ophthalmic surgery. ' One started to describe how his approach had mellowed 
but went on to display the vigour with which consultants maintain their autonomy and 
control resources: 'I don't often get het up nowadays. Although on Friday I got angry with J 
[a fellow consultant with responsibility for the Day Surgery Unit]. He has become terribly 
pompous, terribly pompous. I brought a patient into the Day Surgery Unit who needed to be 
admitted as an inpatient. J told me she couldn't be treated in the DSU and we had a fight on 
the phone. Of course I treated her. Luckily J was ringing from the L [private hospital down 
the road] and couldn't come and stop me. ' General motivation of clinicians was summed up 
by a consultant quite simply: 'Doctors are a pain in the neck. They behave badly. Their 
main aim is their own self interest, so they can be obstructive. Self-interest isn't necessarily 
financial, and in most cases is not. In general doctors don't want hassle. They want to work 
in good units and don't want them to be made worse. They want good working conditions. 
This, it was felt, bred medical intransigence in the face of change and, specifically, meant that 
clinicians would be reluctant to merge services with unfamiliar colleagues at neighbouring 
hospitals. 
6.3 Question 2. Within the Trust, how would you rank the priorities 
for the following sets of people? 
A closed set of objectives was defined after discussion with 13 managers and clinicians at 
Hospital A. The aim was to elicit individuals' perceptions of their own priorities and to find 
out what they thought about other groups. The table which follows summarises perceptions 
by calculating the mean ranking for each priority. 
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Table 6.3: Summary of Question 2 Responses 
Q2 
Priorities Perceived as 
Belonging to : 
objective Doctors 
Mean 
Managers 
Mean 
Difference Total 
Mean 
You Break-even financially 3.78 1.92 1.9 2.68 
You Maintain service velum , 2,22 2.54 -0.3 2.41 
You Maintain service quality 1.67 2.15 -0.5 1.95 
't:i  
IM
161.■
• 
You Expand revenue 4.56 3.00 1.6 3.64 
You Expand service volume 3.67 3.54 0.1 3.59 
You Expand service quality 2.33 3.31 -1.0 2.91 
You Other (specify) 4.40 4.50 -0.1 4.45 
Most Service/Business Managers Break-even financially 1.57 2.69 -1.1 2.30 
Most Service/Business Managers Maintain service volu . 3.00 2.23 0.8 2.50 
Most Service/Business Managers Maintain service quality 2.14 2.54 -0.4 2.40 
E Most Service/Business Managers Expand revenue 2.57 3.54 -1.0 3.20 
Most Service/Business Managers Expand service volume 3.14 3.62 -0.5 3.45 
Most Service/Business Managers Expand service quality 3.00 3.54 -0.5 3.35 
Most Service/Business Managers Other (specify) 6.67 6.7 5.38 
....t
o)
.—
k
x 
Most Consultants Break-even financially 4.25 4.85 -0.6 4.62 
Most Consultants Maintain service volum , 2.63 2.85 -0.2 2.76 
Most Consultants Maintain service quality 1.88 2.46 -0.6 2.24 
Most Consultants Expand revenue 4.00 5.08 -1.1 4.67 
Most Consultants Expand service volume 3.38 3.38 0.0 3.38 
Most Consultants Expand service quality 2.50 3.00 -0.5 2.81 
Most Consultants Other (specify) 4.00 4.43 -0.4 4.30 
y The Trust Now Break-even financially 1.75 1.77 -0.0 1.76 
z The Trust Now Maintain service velum: 3.63 2.85 0.8 3.14 
as The Trust Now Maintain service quality 2.50 2.92 -0.4 2.76 
ab The Trust Now Expand revenue 2.75 2.69 0.1 2.71 
ac The Trust Now Expand service volume 2.88 3.38 -0.5 3.19 
ad The Trust Now Expand service quality 2.63 4.08 -1.5 3.52 
ae The Trust Now Other (specify) 6.67 6.7 5.56 
of The Trust Ideally Break-even financially 2.88 2.08 0.8 2.38 
ag The Trust Ideally Maintain service volum - 3.38 2.62 0.8 2.90 
ah The Trust Ideally Maintain service quality 2.75 2.31 0.4 2.48 
aj The Trust Ideally Expand revenue 2.75 2.46 0.3 2.57 
ak The Trust Ideally Expand service volume 2.50 3.31 -0.8 3.00 
am The Trust Ideally Expand service quality 1.75 2.77 -1.0 2.38 
an The Trust Ideally Other (specify) 4.00 4.0 4.20 
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6.3.1 Break-Even 
The greatest divergence between doctors and managers lay in their views about the 
importance of financial break-even. Managers saw it as the most important duty to 
themselves whereas consultants perceived it as being among the least important factors. 
Hospital A shows an interesting lack of consistency in what managers think about their own 
goals (question 2a) compared to what they believe about the sub-group of service/business 
managers (question 2h). The management group as a whole regards break-even as its own top 
priority but believes that maintaining volume and quality is more important to their 
service/business manager colleagues. A detailed analysis of response patterns (Appendix 2c) 
shows that service/business managers themselves endorse this view since three quarters of 
them (3 out of 4) rank maintaining service quality as the most important goal to themselves. 
This response is consistent with the interviews conducted at Hospital A during the design 
phase where, contrary to the hypotheses underpinning the questions, service managers saw 
their primary role as maintaining the service quality within a break-even constraint and 
believed that quality or safety ultimately overrides financial considerations. It reflects a 
tension in decision making at the service/business manager level which was articulated during 
interviews: 
`People imagine that my prime concern is a balanced budget, but my job is to provide a 
children's and women 's service. My main concerns are operational, ensuring good 
practice. But I try to do it within a balanced budget. ' 
Doctors believe, to a marked extent, that most service/business managers pursue break-even 
as an overriding priority. This might explain the feeling of deteriorating relationships brought 
out in Question 5. It is not necessarily a cynical view and the comments by three consultants 
who were interviewed provided some context: 
`Service managers would wish to maintain the service in the context of break-even. This is 
not unlike any other business, e.g. research-based business or other business with 
professional employees. ' 
`Trust managers have a completely different perspective. They need to keep afloat, to keep 
the business going. Patients can't be treated if there is no contract. ' 
6.3.2 Revenue Expansion 
Expansion of revenue and service volume is not considered to be an important duty by 
consultants or service/business managers. The interviews suggest that Hospital A had latterly 
given up on this objective although in the early days of the market it had been important: 
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`Expand revenue - no. The focus has changed over the last 5 years. We were keener 5 
years ago to generate business. We used to visit new GP Fundholders. Now we are 
sceptical about the arrangement. GP Fundholders have run out of money. ' 
A consultant described his pessimism about revenue expansion and market behaviour: 
`We don't pursue objectives in the same way as in business. We're not in an open market; 
we're not free to make profits and losses. This is one of the main problems in Obs & 
Gynae hospital-wide. At Kodak, for example, it would be possible to expand - there is a 
large pot which the company can tap into if it works hard The problem in Trusts and 
Departments is that money is limited. Here we have a new Maternity Unit built to a Rolls 
Royce model. Yet we're trying to fit 10 people into it to reduce the cost per person per mile. 
We would have been better to have built a Ford Transit. Everyone would be more 
comfortable. The Health Authority doesn't have the money for a Rolls Royce, (even though 
some people in this area would be willing to pay). I have been considering whether a pot 
of gold could be obtained through private insurance. I am very frustrated I have been 
Chairman of the Clinical Directorate. I understand how we are tied in the contracting 
process. Every hospital charges £1600 per delivery so we can't go above that If I hadn't 
been Chairman I wouldn't appreciate or understand the problems. The market has 
depressed us. ' 
A senior manager showed equal fatigue: 
`It's dispiriting. In the first 2 or 3 years the climate was dynamic. In the last 2 or 3 years 
it's become a bureaucracy. It's soulless... 
A surprising result of the survey was the extent to which service volume is seen as a 
relatively low priority by doctors themselves. A comment by a senior manager adds insight 
to the relationship between volume and quality in the minds of consultants: 
The distinction between volume and quality is another matter. For example, when it 
comes to diagnostic equipment they tend to justify the case by volume; they use volume to 
sell the case to managers, when they are really after improved techniques and technology. ' 
6.4 Question 3. Which body is achieving its main objective? 
Individuals were asked to tick against which body they believed was achieving its main 
objective at the moment. They were allowed to tick more than one from a choice of 
Managers, Consultants, Trust and None. This is an impressionistic question which was 
intended to convey the mood or attitudes of different groups. 
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Managers Consultants Trust None Coun Ratio Count: 
Sample 
3a: Which Body is Achieving its Main Objective at the Moment ? 
a Total Sample 34% 21% 21% 24% 
b Total Consultants 20% 0% 10% 70% 
c Total Managers 39% 31% 26% 4% 
100% 	 1.5 
100% 1.1 
100% 	 1.8 
3b) Which Body will Achieve its Main Objective During the Next Three Years? 
a Total Sample 21% 21% 31% 27% 
b Total Consultants 0% 11% 11% 78% 
c Total Managers 30% 25% 40% 5% 
100% 
	
1.3 
100% 	 1.0 
100% 1.5 
3c) Which Body will Achieve its Main Objective During the Next Six Years ? 
a Total Sample 	 16% 	32% 	32% 20% 100% 	 1.4 
33% 
	
45% 100% 1.0 b Total Consultants 0% 22% 
100% 	 1.7 c Total Managers 23% 32% 36% 9% 
Table 6.4: Response to Question 3 
70% of consultants believed that no-one was currently achieving their objective. Only one 
manager, by contrast, (4% of count) believed that no-one was achieving their goal while the 
highest vote (39%) went to managers themselves. None of the consultants believed that 
consultants were achieving their aim. In summary, managers were seen to be achieving their 
goals overall. 
Asking the same question over a three year period produced a shift away from managers 
towards the overall view that the Trust would dominate. The majority of consultants 
maintained their view that nobody would achieve their aims. 
Over a six year period consultants continued to believe that nobody would dominate (45%) 
although they perceived a strong shift in their own favour. Managers believed that the Trust 
would be the strongest body with the balance between managers and consultants reversing in 
the consultants' favour. 
The overall impression is that managers feel that they have a degree of control at the moment 
but that in the longer term they will lose it. Consultants are pessimistic in their view that 
nobody will get what they want, even over six years, but they rate their chances above those 
of the managers in the long term. 
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6.5 Question 4, How have priorities changed since Trust status? 
Respondents were asked to rate how their own priorities had changed since Trust status and 
were asked to take a view on how the Trust priorities had changed during the same period. 
This question considers dynamic changes in objectives rather than providing a snapshot of 
current rankings as in Question 2. 
Table 6.5: Response to Question 4 
Mean Scores: Extent of Change where 1 = Weaker, 2 = No Change and 3 = Stronger 
Your Priorities 
moors Manager Sample Diff. 
Trust's Priorities 
Doctors Managers sarnple W. 
Break-even financially 2.22 2.62 2.45 -0.4 2.78 2.85 2.82 -0.07 
Maintain service volume/quality 2.44 2.31 2.36 0.13 2.13 2.15 2.14 -0.02 
Expand service volume/guar 2.33 2.54 2.45 -0.21 2.33 2.62 2.50 -0.29 
Be responsive to patients 2.56 2.85 2.73 -0.29 2.22 2.85 2.59 -0.63 
Be responsive to GPs 2.50 2.69 2.62 -0.19 2.44 3.00 2.77 -0.56 
The responses indicate that all groups feel that these objectives are being pursued with more 
vigour, both by themselves and by the Trust. The greatest degree of change is reflected in the 
Trust's energetic pursuit of fmancial break-even. Both doctors and managers believed that 
their own responsiveness to patients had increased. Managers thought that this was also true 
of the Trust, although consultants perceived a lower degree of change by the Trust in this 
area. The manager-sample was unanimous in its view that the hospital had become more 
responsive to GPs since Trust status. 
The interviews indicate that the Trust had, to some extent, moved to a position where it was 
at the mercy of GPs: 
`That was the attraction of Trusts - that efficient hospitals would be allowed to develop 
through the market. But it hasn't been the case. Problems have arisen because of GPs 
and through lack of loyalty by GPs. GPs have become power hungry and have lost sight 
of providing care in an effective way. GPs are moving patients on the basis of leverage. ' 
6.6 Question 5a. Since the change to Trust status, how has the 
relationship changed between consultants and managers? 
Consultants and managers were asked to rate whether they thought the relationship between 
the two groups had deteriorated or improved over the period. 
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Table 6.7: Response to Question 6a 
Doctors Managers Total Sample 
Doctor-Manage 
Difference 
in % Points 
1 Much Worse 2 25% 0 0% 2 10% 25% 
2 worse 1 13% 0 0% 1 5% 13% 
3 No Change 3 38% 2 17% 5 25% 21% 
4 Better 2 25% 8 67% 10 50% -42% 
5 Much Better 0 0% 2 17% 2 10% -17% 
Count 8 100% 12 100% 20 100% 
Mean Rating 2.63 4.00 3.45 
Table 6.6: Response to Question 5a 
Doctors Managers Total Sample 
Doctor-Manage 
Difference 
in % Points 
1 Much Worse 1 13% 0 0% 1 5% 13% 
2 Worse 5 63% 0 0% 5 24% 63% 
3 No Change 1 13% 1 8% 2 10% 5% 
4 Better 1 13% 8 62% 9 43% -49% 
5 Much Better 0 0% 4 31% 4 19% -31% 
Count 8 100% 13 100% 21 100% 
Mean Rating 2.25 4.23 3.48 
76% of consultants thought that relationships between the two groups had deteriorated, 
whereas none of the managers believed that relationships had become worse and 92% believed 
that they had improved. This shows a remarkable difference in perceptions between the 
groups. Their different experiences of Trust status perhaps square with Question 3 in which 
none of the consultants believed they were achieving their objectives while managers believed 
that they themselves were achieving their objectives to a greater extent than anybody else. 
The pattern of consultant responses suggests that they are distinctly dissatisfied. 
Consultants explain the deterioration in terms of supeificial consultation only', 'no real 
consultation - mainly a master servant relationship', although financial pressures and other 
strictures were mentioned: 'hands tied by financial restrictions and pressure to increase 
turnover + restriction to decrease turnover or inpatients if not contractually acceptable.' 
6.7 Question 6a. Since the change to Trust Status, how has the service 
to patients changed? 
Consultants and managers were asked to rate whether they thought the service to patients had 
deteriorated or improved over the period. 
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38% of consultants believed that services had deteriorated, 38% saw no change and only 25% 
saw an improvement, whereas 84% of managers believed that services had improved. 
In passing, it might be noted that an external perception was provided by the local MP at the 
time who, on the basis of his mail bag, believed that services had improved: It's a very good 
hospital. It's got a lot of strengths, no doubt about it. It's very much more highly regarded 
now than it was when I was first MP. We used to get a lot of complaints back in the mid 80s 
but I get very, very few complaints now. If you look at the Patient's Charter League Tables 
for Hospital A it is scoring terribly well, and the various units they have set up there, they are 
all going very well. I do believe it's an excellent hospital. And that's the impression I get from 
99.5% of my constituents. ' 
6.8 Question 7. Since the change to Trust status, do you think the 
goals of consultants and managers have 	? 
Moved closer together 	Not changed 	Moved further apart 
Managers believed that objectives had converged. The majority of consultants, however, 
believed that goals had moved further apart. Only 11% of consultants believed that goals of 
the two groups had moved closer together. 
Table 6.8: Response to Question 7 
Managers Total Sample 
Doctor-Manage 
Difference 
in % Points 
1 Moved closer together 1 11% 9 69% 10 45% -58% 
2 Not changed 1 11% 3 23% 4 18% -12% 
3 Moved further apart 7 78% 1 8% 8 36% 70% 
Count 9 100% 13 100% 22 100% 
Mean Rating 2.67 1.38 1.91 
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Question 8. Which group, in your view, has the most control over the following aspects of service? 
Consultants 
(a) Development of service 
Nurses Managers Chief Executive Trust Board Purchasers Other Count 
Doctors 	1 0 0 6 0 0 2 9 
Managers 3 0 0 8 0 1 1 13 
Total 	 4 0 0 14 0 1 3 22 
(b) Availability of services (e.g. beds, theatres) 
Doctors 	0 0 2 7 0 0 0 9 
Managers 2 0 5 4 2 0 0 13 
Total 	 2 
(c) Medical staffing levels 
0 7 11 2 0 0 22 
Doctors 	 2 0 1 5 0 0 1 9 
Managers 5 0 3 1 3 0 1 13 
Total 	 7 
(d) Nurse staffing levels 
0 4 6 3 0 2 22 
Doctors  , 0 2 2 1 0  2 7 
Managers 	0 1 9 2 1 0 2 15 
Total 	 0 1 11 4 2 0 4 22 
(e) Freedom to admit in-patient 
Doctors 	1 0 5 1 0 0 0 7 
Managers 	11 0 2 1 0 0 0 14 
Total 	 12 0 7 2 0 0 0 21 
(0 Decision to treat patient 
Doctors 	7 0 1 0 0 1 0 9 
Managers 	13 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 
Total 	 20 0 1 0 0 1 0 22 
Count for all category 
Doctors 	11 0 11 21 1 1 5 50 
Managers 	34 1 19 16 6 1 4 81 
Total 	 45 1 30 37 7 2 9 131 
Doctors 	22% 0% 22% 42% 2% 2% 10% 100% 
Managers 	42% 1% 24% 20% 7% 1% 5% 100% 
Total 	 34% 1% 23% 28% 5% 2% 7% 100% 
6.9 Question 8. Which group, in your view, has the most control over 
the following aspects of service? 
Table 6.9: Response to Question 8  
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The purpose of this question was to examine people's perception of power in terms of 
control of activities and resources. The only area in which managers are perceived to have 
control is in the area of nurse staffing levels. As the nursing workforce comprises nearly 50% 
of the total workforce this indicates that managers have a strong element of control in 
balancing expenditure with the budget to achieve financial break-even. Quality, equated with 
safety, will form part of the manager's decision-making process and, since this will be the 
product of professional judgement by other nurses, the budgetary control is likely to be 
influenced by the opinion of professionals. A service manager described how she breached 
the budget to ensure a safe service: 
`Maintaining the quality of service often overrides the financial goal when the chips are 
down, e.g. I had to put in some extra nurses into A&E and maternity even though there is 
no budget to And them, just to ensure quality and safety of the service. But break-even is 
also in mind ' 
Consultants in Hospital A perceive the Chief Executive to be the most dominant agent, with 
purchasers being seen as having very little control. The only category in which consultants 
believe they have control lies in the decision to treat patients. Doctors believe that managers 
control admission of patients whereas managers believe that doctors have this power. 
Managers also believe that doctors have the most control over medical staffing levels whereas 
the consultants themselves believe that this power resides with the Chief Executive. The 
CEO is also regarded by both groups as having control in development of services. 
Responses to this question suggest that the CEO is perceived as something of an autocrat by 
consultants. The advantages and disadvantages of this style were articulated by a manager in 
an interview: 
think of the Trust as K [the CEO]. He has an autocratic style. This can thwart 
initiative and shouldering of responsibility. To sum it up, on the negative side people 
don't get developed or empowered so they either leave or get comfortable; on the 
positive side it is possible to build up a good relationship of trust and loyalty with the 
CEO which is reciprocated'. 
One consultant expressed a rather less charitable opinion in the questionnaire: 'Consultants 
have been sidelined by the chief executive who has successfully structured the establishment so 
that all financial decisions are taken by his acolytes. ' The Chief Executive would take a 
different view of involvement of clinicians since during an interview he noted that 'All Clinical 
Directorate Chairs were given the opportunity to take responsibility for resource issues but 
elected to let their managers take accountability. ' He also pointed out that 'Consultants have 
a different mind set. They have a view of themselves as priests of the NHS. Attempts at 
managing them tend to be fought of successfully. Managers see themselves as in charge. 
Doctors also see themselves as in charge. They don't like having to manage and don't like 
the curbs that that imposes, but they have to play the game to get the resources. They can use 
their collective power to break the situation; they always win... they always win. ' 
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6.10 Question 10. Would you welcome change in the future? 
The data drawn from the questionnaire survey so far indicates that Hospital A's financial 
problems have created an environment which has dispirited the consultant body. Although 
they do not care about financial break-even themselves they do not believe that they have 
control over resources. In their opinion, power is largely vested in the Chief Executive 
although in his opinion consultants have the power to 'break the situation'. This indicates a 
degree of conflict and frustration which the managers themselves are aware of but do not 
share. 
Responses to the free-text Question 10 add further weight to the picture of consultant 
disenchantment, feeling of disempowerment and financial pressures. 'Doctors have too little 
influence in clinical matters and are not involved in any managerial discussions that involve 
clinical care (hence loss of all our beds). Would like more medical input into the running of 
the unit. Doctors would like more useful management input and a more equal relationship 
with managers. ' The competition between Hospital A and a neighbouring Trust also features 
in consultants' responses: 'Two hospitals linked in a battle 'to the death' is desperately 
destructive of morale. They must link together and not fight each other. Trust status has been 
very damaging. ' 
6.11 Conclusion 
The questionnaire responses are summarised here on the basis of the postal questionnaire but 
also incorporate data from the earlier interview phases (which targeted a smaller sample). 
These two data sources provide mutually consistent results since the responses of the written 
questionnaire are in keeping with the tone and content of the earlier interviews in Hospital A 
(italicised in quotations throughout this chapter). This is reassuring in terms of questionnaire 
design since it suggests that the structure of closed and open questions captures the 
qualitative content of doctors' and managers' views as accurately as would a face to face 
interview where the respondent has an opportunity to ask for guidance and clarification. 
The question about objectives (Question 2) produced results which are in line with the overall 
hypotheses since doctors and managers voted for quality and financial break-even 
respectively. The responses suggest a finer balance than originally predicted, however, within 
the management group between financial duties and quality issues due to diversity of their 
roles. Service/business managers are closer to the point of service delivery, and therefore to 
consultants, than are their senior and corporate colleagues. This category is perceived by the 
management group as a whole as being more concerned about service delivery (quality and 
volume) than about financial management. Service/business managers themselves endorse this 
perception by ranking maintaining service quality as their first priority above financial break-
even. This indicates a degree of tension within the management group. Since service/business 
managers are budget holders, their alignment with consultants could, on the one hand, 
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strengthen the power of consultants and, on the other, shift the balance of objectives within 
the management group as a whole. The choice between service and budgetary considerations 
is taken forward for testing against a larger sample through the national survey. 
The mood of the hospital appears to be captured by questions 3, 5, 6 and 7 which ask about 
who is achieving their objective in the hospital, how relationships and patient services have 
faired since Trust status, and whether the goals of doctors and managers have converged. The 
perceptions of consultants and managers differed widely in this survey, with consultants 
adopting a deeply pessimistic outlook which was consistent throughout these four questions. 
Question 8 is designed to test the consistency of views about who has control over decisions 
and resources in a Trust. Managers attributed power mainly to consultants although the 
clinicians themselves believed that the CEO had most control, again showing a difference in 
perception and a feeling of disempowerment on the part of consultants. 
This survey sets the scene for the national study which moves from the particular case of 
Hospital A to a larger sample of Trusts, permitting generalisations to be made about the 
attitudes and motivation of consultants and managers within Trusts. 
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CHAPTER 7. QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY: RESULTS OF STAGE 2 
(CLOSED QUESTIONS) 
This chapter brings together part of the findings of the national survey, i.e. Stage 2, by 
analysing the results of the closed questions. 
The survey was administered over the period September-October 1997, preceding the Labour 
Government's White Paper published in December 1997 (Department of Health, 1997). The 
response of 1,577 was equivalent to 34% of the original mail shot and 56% of the sample 
among participating Trusts. 
Table 7.1: Response Rate 
RESPONSE RATE 
TRACKING SHEETS 	 124 indicating participation through Chief Executive's Office 
Questionnaires returned from 	143 Trusts 
EQUIVALENT TO 	 2824 Questionnaires 
60% 	out of 	4680 questionnaires sent 
Number of Questionnaires returned 
1577 	out of 	2824 questionnaires in participating sample 
Response Rate = 56% out of participating Trusts, and 
34% of the total mail shot 
The sample of 1,577 respondents produced more than 1,800 descriptions due, for example, to 
consultants describing themselves as both Board Director and Consultant, or Clinical 
Professionals being also Service/Business Managers. Double counting was eliminated by 
adopting a priority classification which resulted in the following profile of respondents: 
Table 7.2: Respondent Categories 
Total 	of whom 	 Category 
Consultants 	 681 330 	1. Chair Clinical Directorates 
36 	2. Board Director 
315 	3. Consultants Only 
Managers 	 896 	 5 	4. Chair 
73 	5. CEO 
221 	6. Board Director 
131 	7. Corporate 
81 	8. Clinical Professional 
316 	9. Service/Business Manager 
('Other' mainly comprises service/ 	61 	10. Other Manager 
8 	11. Unidentified 
Total 
	
1,577 	1,577 
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7.1 Question 1. To what extent does your career depend on the 
following factors? 
Respondents were asked in the first place to rate the importance to their own career of 8 
selected factors, and were also given the opportunity to specify a ninth factor. 
(Approximately 10% of respondents used this opportunity). 
The table below shows the mean value of ratings 1 - 5 where 1=very low, 2=low, 
3=moderate, 4=high, and 5=very high in importance. The largest contrast between doctors 
and managers is to be found in 1(a) - Financially Successful Trust. Doctors on average 
regarded this as moderate, verging towards low in importance while managers regarded it as 
having high importance to their own careers. The smallest difference lies in 1(h) - Continued 
provision of the Trust's clinical service. ANOVA tests are applied below to check whether 
any of these differences can be regarded as significant. 
Table 7.3: Comparison of Raw Mean Rating Scores in Question 1 
la lb lc ld le lf lg lh lj 
Sample Mean 3.424 3.968 3.413 4.194 3.621 3.076 3.683 4.023 4.348 
Sample Standard Deviation 1.032 0.862 0.962 0.756 0.805 1.032 1.071 0.913 0.874 
Doctors Mean 2.929 3.662 3.527 4.096 3.540 3.385 3.295 3.960 4.362 
Doctors Standard Deviation 1.046 0.939 0.892 0.829 0.825 0.957 1.126 0.908 0.874 
Managers Mean 3.802 4.209 3.324 4.269 3.684 2.837 3.980 4.071 4.339 
Managers Standard Deviation 0.845 0.710 1.006 0.686 0.785 1.025 0.924 0.914 0.877 
Difference 
Doctor - Manager Means -0.873 -0.547 0.203 -0.173 -0.144 0.548 -0.685 -0.111 0.023 
Figure 7.1 : Mean Scores in Question 1 
Mean Rating Scores in Question 1, Ranked by Sample Mean I 
11 Other (specify) 	 
ld Individual reputation 
lh Continued provision of the Trust's clinical service 
lb Success of your specialty /dept. within the Trust 
lg Survival of the Trust as an organisation 
le Reputation of Trust1hospita 
la A financially successful Trust 
lc Strength of your specialty/profession nationally 
lf Standard of R&D or teaching 
1 
	
2 
	
3 	4 	5 
N Sample Mean U Doctors Mean ❑ Managers Mean 
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The graph above highlights the result that both doctors and managers regard 1(d), persona 
reputation, as the most important factor to their career among the closed set of options. In 
addition: 
• managers gave substantially higher ratings to the importance of 'Survival of the Trust 
as an organisation'; 
• managers also regarded the 'success of your specialty/dept. within the Trust' as 
considerably more important than did consultants; 
• out of the nine factors above, managers gave a higher average score in seven. The two 
which consultants considered to be more important were lc 'Strength of your 
specialty/department within the Trust' and If 'Standard ofR&D/Teaching'.  
The results of the ANOVA test shown below indicate that there is a significant difference in 
the responses of doctors and managers for all factors in Question 1, with the exception of 10 
- Other. 
Table 7.4: ANOVA Results in Two Respondent Groupings: Doctors and Managers 
Probability 
rence 	Difference 
Significant at 0.05? 	Significant at 0.01? 
ANOVA 	 ANOVA 
a ✓ ✓ 
1b 0 ✓ ✓  
1c 0 ✓ ✓ 
ld 0 ✓ ✓  
1 e 0.001 ✓ ✓ 
If 0 ✓ ✓  
1g 0 ✓ ✓  
1 h 0.0073 ✓ ✓  
1j 0.9517 
The test was repeated within doctors (categories 1-3) and managers (categories 4-9) and then 
across all categories (1-9)22. 
Table 7.5: ANOVA Test Within Doctor and Manager Groupings 
Doctors 
1-3 
Probability 
Managers 
4-9 
Probability 
All 
1-9 
Probability 
is 	A MandeHy successful Trust 0.7869 0 " 0 .* 
lb 	Success of your specialty /dept. within the Trust 0.5029 0.0083 " 0 ** 
lc 	Strength of your specialty/profession nationally 0.81 0.0002'"` 0 " 
ld 	Individual reputation 0.425 0.0874 0.0002 " 
le 	Reputation of Trust/hospital 0.0782 0 ** 0 ** 
If 	Standard of R&D or teaching 0.8984 acaos* 0** 
ig 	Survival of the Trust as an organisation 0.1097 0.0164 * 0 ** 
lh 	Continued provision of the Trusts clinical service 0.2945 0.0239 * 0.0033 
11 	M Other (specify) 	  0.7566 0.8882 0.9694 
* = Significant at 0.05 level but not at 0.01 ** = Significant at 0.01 level 
   
22 Categories 10 (other managers) and 11 (unknown) were omitted due to size, even though the questionnaire 
descriptions indicated that most mangers in category 10 would probably belong to category 9 (service/business 
managers) 
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The results show that there is no significant difference in responses between doctors but that 
there exists a greater degree of heterogeneity between managers. The differences between all 
categories are stronger than the differences between managers, indicating that the 
doctor/manager split is the stronger line of division. This is consistent with the underlying 
hypothesis of this exercise which is that managers and doctors are driven by different 
motivators. 
The difference within the manager group has been explored by considering (a) the distinction 
between Corporate category 7 and Clinical category 8 which show a potentially significant 
division (see Question la detailed below), and (b) Chair+CEO+Director+Corporate 
Categories 4-7 compared to Clinical+Service/Etusiness+Other+Unidentified. The results are 
set out below and show that the division between the two corporate and clinical professional 
groups is stronger than the aggregated divisions in (b). 
Table 7.6: ANOVA Test - Dividing Up the Manager Group 
(a) 
7& 8 
Probability 
(b) 
44 & 8-11 
Probability  
la A financially successful Trust 0.0015 0** 
lb Success of your specially /dept. within the Trust 0.0845 0.0456* 
lc Strength of your specialty/profession nationally 0.0031 0.1708 
id Individual reputation 0.0093 0,141 
la Reputation of Trust/hospital 0.0779 0.0001 ** 
lf Standard of R&D or teaching 0.0981 0.9752 
19 Survival of the Trust as an organisation 0.0094 0.0116* 
1h Continued provision of the Trust's clinical service 0.03* 0.9188 
li Other (specify) 	  0.5673 0.7787 
= Significant at 0.05 level but not at 0.01 	** = Significant at 0.01 leve 
The Chi Squared results summarised below mirror the ANOVA test, with the exception of 
1(h) Continuation of Trust's clinical service which narrowly fails the 5% test, indicating that 
the difference between doctors' and managers' responses is not significant, (consistent with 
the finding earlier that the mean ratings vary by only -0.111 between the groups). The 
differences between groups of respondents has been tested in two ways: (i) by retaining the 
eleven different groupings (where 'unknown' is the eleventh group), and (ii) by grouping 
doctors and managers into two categories. The results of the doctor/manager grouping (first 
method) are very similar to those of the second grouping method, suggesting that significant 
differences are largely attributable to differences between doctors and managers rather than 
within groups. 
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Table 7.7: First Method of Grouping: Eleven Categories of Individuals 
Chi Squared 
Pearson 	Likelihood 
p = 	Ratio 
Difference 	Difference 
Significant at 0.05? 	Significant at 0.01? 
(Pearson Chi Squared) (Pearson Chi Squared) 
1 a 0 0 ✓ i 
1 b 0 0 ✓ ✓ 
lc 0 0.00001 ✓ ✓  
I d 0.00004 0.00001 ✓ ✓ 
le 0 0.00003 ✓ ✓  
lf 0 0 
1 g 0 0 ✓ ✓  
lh 0.05492 0.03945 X X 
1 j 0.90651 0.83848 X X 
Table 7.8: Second Method of Grouping: Doctors & Managers as Two Categories 
Chi Squared 
Pearson 	likelihood 
Ratio 
Difference 	Difference 
Significant at 0.05? 	Significant at 0.01? 
(Pearson Chi Squared) (Pearson Chi Squared) 
1 a 0 0 
lb 0 0 ✓ ✓ 
lc 0.00002 0.00001 ✓ ✓  
ld 0.00002 0.00002 ✓ ✓  
1 e 0.00108 0.00093 ✓ ✓ 
lf 0 0 ✓ ✓  
1 g 0 0 ✓  1.■ 
lh 0.05167 0.0515 X X 
1 j 0.76984 0.64732 X X 
The strongest result in terms of doctor/manager differences is in the importance of the Trust's 
financial success. The table below summarises the mean rating score provided by each of the 
groups together with their standard deviation and a ranking order of the mean rating scores. 
(A score below 3 veers towards the unimportant end of the scale). At a glance there is 
consistency between the average importance attributed to financial success and the position 
of the individual within the hierarchy. Chief Executives attach most importance followed by 
non-medical Board Directors moving steadily through the corporate and service manager tiers 
to managers with a clinical professional background. The three groups of consultants are 
below the line (less than 3) and stand out as a contrast to the managers in their responses. 
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Mean Ratings for Question la - Financial Success of Trust 
Manager - Chief Executive 
Manager - Board Director 
Manager - 
Total Managers 
Manager - Corporate 
Manager - Service/Business Manager 
Manager - Other/Unknown 
Total Sample 
Manager - Clinical Professional 
Consultants - Chairs of Directorates 
Total Consultants 
Consultants - Board Directors 
Consultants only 
I IMEMMEIMMEIMI=MIMM 
j1111111•111111111■11.1 
1111111111■111111•11=11111M  
2 	 3 
	
4 	 5 
Table 7.9 : Mean ratings for Question la 
Q1. 	To what extent does your own career depend on: 
la 	A financially 
Ranked 
Mean 	Means 
a 	Total Sample 	 3.424 
b 	Total Consultants 	 2.929 
c 	Total Managers 	 3.802 
successful Trust 
Standard Deviation 
1.032 
1.046 
0.845 
1 Consultants - Chairs of Directorates 2.958 8 1.074 
2 Consultants - Board Directors 2.917 9 0.841 
3 Consultants only 2.901 10 1.039 
4 Manager - Chair 4.000 3 1.225 
5 Manager - Chief Executive 4.329 1 0.625 
6 Manager - Board Director 4.068 2 0.796 
7 Manager - Corporate 3.800 4 0.875 
8 Manager - Clinical Professional 3.413 7 0.807 
9 Manager - Service/Business Manager 3.645 5 0.816 
10 Manager - Other/Unknown 3.544 6 0.800 
Figure 7.2 : Mean ratings for Question la 
7.2 Responses to Question 2. Within the Trust, how would you rank 
the priorities for the following sets of people? 
This question focuses on the central question of objectives of managers and doctors. It is 
intended to permit analysis of individuals' views about their own objectives and to consider 
how they are seen by other people. Respondents were asked to rank objectives in order of 
priority 1-7 where 1 is high. The results of Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney U tests (non- 
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parametric alternatives to ANOVA, summarised in Appendix 4) proved to be almost identical 
to the ANOVA test, suggesting that the comparison of means on this ordinal data does not 
produce distorted results. The table below summarises the mean ranking and significance at 
the 5% and I% where the null hypothesis of similar populations fails (i.e. where the 
responses of consultants and managers are significantly different). 
Table 7.10: Two Groups: Doctors and Managers - Mean Ranking Scores 
Priorities Perceived as 	Objective 
Belonging to : 
Doctors• 
Mean 
Managersl 
Mean 
Diff. ANOVA significance 
5%* only and 1%** 
2 a You 	 Break-even financially 3.908 2.037 1.9 0 " 
2 b You Maintain service volume 2.754 2.593 0.2 0.0477 * 
2 c You 	 Maintain service quality 1.776 2.281 -0.5 0 " 
2 d You Expand revenue 4.076 3.457 0.6 0 ** 
2 e You 	 Expand service volume 3.472 3.433 0.0 0.6714 
2 f You Expand service quality 2.124 2.792 -0.7 0** 
2 g You 	 Other (specify) 2.97 3.459 -0.5 0.0004" 
2 h Most Service/Business Managers Break-even financially 1.557 2.08 -0.5 0 " 
21 Most Service/Business Managers Maintain service volume 2.505 2.374 0.1 0.063 
2 k Most Service/Business Managers Maintain service quality 3.067 2.484 0.6 0 ** 
2 m Most Service/Business Managers Expand revenue 2.798 3.185 -0.4 0 ** 
2 n Most Service/Business Managers Expand service volume 3.419 3.262 0.2 0.0536 
2 p Most Service/Business Managers Expand service quality 3.968 3.241 0.7 0 " 
2 ci Most Service/Business Managers 	Other (specify) 5.223 4.545 0.7 0 " 
2 r Most Consultants 	Break-even financially 4.601 4.54 0.1 0.4216 
2 a Most Consultants Maintain service volume 2.565 2.762 -0.2 0.0110* 
2 t Most Consultants 	Maintain service quality 1.756 2.3 -0.5 0 -- 
2  u Most Consultants Expand revenue 4.245 4.085 0.2 0.0746 
2 v Most Consultants 	Expand service volume 3.154 2.821 0.3 0.0001 ** 
2 w Most Consultants Expand service quality 2.126 2.297 -0.2 0.0150 * 
2 x 1 Most Consultants 	Other (specify) 3.263 2.847 0.4 0.0004 " 
2 y The Trust Now Break-even financially 1.479 1.492 -0.0 0.7873 
2 z The Trust Now 	 Maintain service volume 2.648 2.53 0.1 0.1176 
2 as The Trust Now Maintain service quality 3.107 2.707 0.4 0 ** 
2 ab The Trust Now 	 Expand revenue 2.766 2.966 -0.2 0.0116 * 
2 ac The Trust Now Expand service volume 3.459 3.369 0.1 0.2815 
2 ad The Trust Now 	 Expand service quality 3.939 3.452 0.5 0 ** 
2 ore The Trust Now Other (specify) 4.814 4.04 0.8 0 ** 
2 of The Trust Ideally 	 Break-even financially 2.911 2.177 0.7 0 ** 
2 ag The Trust Ideally Maintain service volume 3.175 3.023 0.2 0.1143 
2 eh The Trust Ideally 	 Maintain service quality 2.609 2.738 -0.1 0.16 
2 aj The Trust Ideally Expand revenue 3.316 3.152 0.2 0.1026 
2 ak The Trust Ideally 	 Expand service volume 3.024 2.945 0.1 0.391 
2 am The Trust Ideally Expand service quality 2.265 2.385 -0.1 0.1298 
2 an The Trust Ideally 	 Other (specify) 3.382 3.196 0.2 0.1566 
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7.2.1 Your Priorities 
Within Question 2 the issue of individuals' own priorities may be regarded as the most 
revealing in relation to the hypotheses about motivation. Response categories 2a - 2g 
provide an insight into what individuals believe is most important to themselves. 
Two Categories: Doctors and Manage 
49% of managers (429/875 - see 2a in Appendix 2) ranked financial break-even as their 
number one priority compared to 7% (45/653) of doctors (where the median and modal 
ranking was 4 out of 7 and the mean score was only marginally higher than that for expanding 
revenue). A further 19% of managers (170/875) ranked it in second place. The widest 
divergence in the priorities of doctors and managers is reflected in this area of financial 
control. The ANOVA tests above show that managers and doctors behave as two 
independent categories in their responses. 
The most important objective among consultants is to maintain service quality (2c) where 
62% (404/651) ranked this in first place and a further 18% (120/651) ranked it second. 
Managers also regarded this as an important factor with 67% (586/873) ranking it in first or 
second place. Expanding service volume is a low priority for both groups and, as shown 
earlier, shows no significant difference in the responses of either consultants or managers. 
The difference between the groups' rankings is significant in each area except service volume . 
Maintain service volume produced a difference in responses which had borderline significance 
at the 5% level; the ANOVA measurement produced a probability p = 0.048 while the 2-
tailed Mann-Whitney test measured p = 0.055. Expansion of service showed a weaker level 
of difference between the groups' responses, which meant that the null hypothesis of 
dependence could not be rejected in relation to these objectives. 
The graph below summarises the mean ranking set against each objective by both doctors and 
managers. 1 is the highest ranking so that the smaller the bars, the higher the ranking. 
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Figure 7.3: Your Priorities - Mean Rankings 
I Your Priorities - Ranked According to Managers' Preferences 
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Variations within Categories 
Mean Responses. Doctors were homogeneous in their responses (Appendix 2a) since all 
categories i.e. Chairs of clinical directorates, Board Directors and consultants without board or 
directorate commitments, ranked maintenance of service quality in first place with expansion 
of service quality ranked second. Managers, on the other hand, showed marked differences in 
their response patterns, depending upon where they are located in the hierarchy. The 
summary of means (shown in Appendix 2b) indicates that Chief Executives, Board Directors 
and corporate managers clearly rank financial break-even above maintaining service quality. 
Clinical managers follow the reverse by ranking maintaining service quality above financial 
break-even. The response of service managers, however, is equivocal. By a narrow margin 
(0.03 mean points) this group accords greater overall importance to financial break-even than 
to maintaining service quality. This result is due to the impact of higher volumes of second 
and third rankings being attached to financial break-even. 
First Preference. If we consider only the first preference then service/business managers 
have voted for maintaining service quality as their most important goal. The corporate 
groups of CEO, Board Directors and other corporate managers each placed the need for 
financial break-even above other goals, even though maintaining quality in all these cases was 
ranked as the second priority. Clinical managers gave a clear signal that maintaining quality 
was the most important goal, with three times more people ranking this in first place than 
financial break-even (47 cf. 16). Service managers have produced a somewhat surprising 
result by asserting that maintaining quality is their first priority to a greater extent than 
financial break-even. 
Implication. In the context of NHS Trust management this result has important 
ti, 
consequences. Service/business managers represent the group which has been accorded 
responsibility for budgetary management within the Trust Clinical Directorate model of 
management. Senior managers and directors at the corporate level may set strategic objectives 
but financial break-even must be implemented by the service/business managers who manage 
budgets on a day to day basis. The responses of this group are similar to those of 
consultants, in terms of quality, rather than directors and other corporate groups. 
It could be argued from these results that quality is likely to override budget constraints 
within Trusts and that the management structure is designed to implement consultants' 
wishes rather than those of senior executives. 
7.2.2 The Priorities of Most Service/Business Managers 
Respondents were asked to state what they thought was important to most service/business 
managers. 
Figure 7.4: Most Service/Business Managers' Priorities - Mean Rankings 
I Most Service/Business Managers' Priorities 
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Maintain service volume 
Maintain service quality 
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1111 Doctors' Mean Ranking 	• Managers' Mean Ranking 
Both doctors and managers asserted that they believed financial break-even to be the most 
important goal of service/business managers and so gave this the highest ranking. Although 
the average ranking attributed by both groups set financial break-even above other goals, 
there were significant differences between the two groups' pattern of responses. 67% of 
doctors (436/648) took the view that most service/business managers ranked it first compared 
to 47% (409/864) of managers. 
Doctors attributed financial break-even to managers in the same measure as they gave weight 
to maintaining quality for themselves, whereas managers ranked financial break-even for 
themselves and for most service/business managers in equal measure. They gave more 
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Priorities of Most Consultants 
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NM Doctors' Mean Ranking 	• Managers' Mean Ranking 
importance to maintaining quality within their own priorities, however, than they attributed 
to most service/business managers, taking the view that they had a more conscientious 
approach to quality than most of their peers. 
7.2.3 The Priorities of Most Consultants 
Managers and doctors followed similar ranking patterns but with different score magnitudes 
in all categories with the exception of service quality where managers gave equal weight to 
expand and maintain whereas consultants clearly elected maintain service quality to first 
place. 62% (391/631) ranked it number one and a further 17% (110/631) ranked it as second 
priority, reflecting consultants views of themselves as individuals. 
Figure 7.5: Priorities of Most Consultants - Mean Rankings 
The difference between the rankings of clinicians and managers was significant at the lc%) level 
in relation to maintain service quality and at the 5% level for expand quality. Perceptions of 
service volume also showed significant variation between the groups. Expanding service 
volume was perceived to be less important by consultants themselves than maintenance of 
volume, whereas managers believed that consultants gave this similar weighting. These 
results showed significant variation at the 5% level (maintain volume) and the 1% level 
(expand volume). In financial matters both doctors and managers tended to take the same 
view. Each group believed that expanding revenue was not important to consultants and that 
financial break-even was at the bottom of their priority list. There was therefore no 
significant difference at either the 5% or the 1% level. 
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Priorities of The Trust Now 
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7.2.4 The Priorities of the Trust Now 
This questionnaire preceded the White Paper The New NI-IS: Modern. Dependable (December 
1997) with its emphasis on clinical governance and so one can only speculate as to the 
changes in perceptions of Trust priorities post December 1997. At the time of this exercise, 
however, the perceptions of doctors and managers showed a high degree of consistency with 
one another. 72% of doctors (459/639) and 72% of managers (620/861) believed that the 
Trust's main objective is to achieve financial break-even. 
There is no significant difference between perceptions of both financial break-even (ranked 
first), maintaining service volume (ranked second) and expanding service volume (ranked 
fifth). Strong differences emerged in the view of quality since doctors believed that both 
maintaining and expanding quality was significantly less important to the Trust than did 
managers. Doctors believed that expanding revenue was more important to the Trust than 
maintaining quality. 
Figure 7.6: Priorities of the Trust Now - Mean Rankings 
7.2.5 The Priorities of the Trust Ideally 
There is no significant difference between what doctors and managers believe the priorities of 
the Trust should be ideally, with the exception of financial break-even. Doctors believe that 
this should be ranked below quality whereas managers ranked it highest overall, consistent 
with their view of their own priorities. The importance of service quality to doctors is 
consistent with their view of their own objectives. 
When we compare perceptions of the Trust now and the Trust ideally it is apparent that 
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I Priorities of The Trust Ideally 
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1111 Doctors' Mean Ranking 	Managers' Mean Ranking 
doctors and managers have clear and similar views about the current set of priorities, showing 
a sharp discrimination between financial break-even and expand service quality, for example, 
whereas the delineation is less marked for the ideal set of priorities, illustrated by the lack of 
spread in the range of the bars in the graph below. 
Figure 7.7: Priorities of the Trust Ideally - Mean Rankings 
7.3 Question 3. Which body is achieving its main objective? 
7.3.1 3a) Which body is achieving its main objective now? 
The table and graph below show the distribution of opinion. The widest divergence is in 
None where consultants assigned 24% of their vote to suggest that none of the bodies is 
achieving its objective compared to 11% by managers. This opinion was strongest among the 
consultants with limited management input (labelled 'consultants only') and was least 
pronounced in Chief Executives and management Board Directors. Of the three bodies, 
consultants received the lowest vote at 22%, followed by managers with 27% overall; the 
largest proportion of ticks went to the Trust with 35% overall, made up of a contrasting 38% 
vote by managers and 30% vote by consultants. 
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Table 7.11: 3a: Which body is achieving its main objective at the moment? 
Managers Consultants Trust None Count Sample 
Ratio Count: 
Sample 
a 	Total Sample 682 548 876 414 2,520 1,577 1.6 
b 	Total Consultants 236 221 301 244 1,002 681 1.5 
c 	Total Managers 446 327 575 170 1,518 896 1.7 
1 	Consultants - Chairs of Directorates 115 120 159 113 507 330 1.5 
2 Consultants - Board Directors 19 12 16 10 57 36 1.6 
3 Consultants only 102 89 126 121 438 315 1.4 
4 Manager - Chair 2 3 2 1 8 5 1.6 
5 Manager - Chief Executive 45 38 51 12 146 73 2.0 
6 Manager - Board Director 127 104 155 35 421 221 1.9 
7 Manager - Corporate 70 46 88 25 229 131 1.7 
8 Manager - Clinical Professional 34 17 54 16 121 81 1.5 
9 Manager - Service/Business Manager 138 96 190 62 486 316 1.5 
10 Manager - Other/Unknown 30 23 35 19 107 69 1.6 
Figure 7.8: 3a: Which body is achieving its main objective at the moment? 
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7.3.2 3b) Which body will achieve its main objective during the next three years? 
The distribution of results is very similar to that in 3a above. 
Table 7.12: 3b: Which body is achieving its main objective during the next 3 years? 
Managers Consultants Trust None Count 
Ratio Count: 
Sample 	Sample 
a 	Total Sample 724 617 954 336 2,631 1,577 1.7 
b 	Total Consultants 246 222 326 216 1,010 681 1.5 
c 	Total Managers 478 395 628 120 1,621 896 1.8 
1 	Consultants - Chairs of Directorates 124 118 166 102 510 330 1.5 
2 Consultants - Board Directors 18 15 19 6 58 36 1.6 
3 Consultants only 104 89 141 108 442 315 1.4 
4 Manager - Chair 2 2 3 2 9 5 1.8 
5 Manager - Chief Executive 49 53 57 3 162 73 2.2 
6 Manager - Board Director 134 110 159 30 433 221 2.0 
7 Manager - Corporate 63 52 96 22 233 131 1.8 
8 Manager - Clinical Professional 38 25 51 10 124 81 1.5 
9 Manager - Service/Business Manager 165 123 214 43 545 316 1.7 
10 Manager - Other/Unknown 27 30 48 10 115 69 1.7 
Figure 7.9: 3b: Which body is achieving its main objective during the next 3 years? 
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Total Sample 
Total Consultants 
Total Managers 
Consultants - Chairs of Directorates 
Consultants - Board Directors 
Consultants only 
Manager - Chair 
Manager - Chief Executive 
Manager - Board Director 
Manager - Corporate 
Manager - Clinical Professional 
Manager - Service/Business Manager 
Manager - Other/Unknown 
mai 22% 
OP 26% 
0% 100% 
III Managers I Consultants ❑ Trust 	❑ None 
 
7.3.3 3c) Which body will achieve its main objective during the next six years? 
Table 7.13: 3c: Which body is achieving its main objective during the next 6 years? 
Managers Consultants Trust None Count 
Ratio Count: 
Sample 	Sample 
a 	Total Sample 642 788 881 282 2,593 1,577 1.6 
b 	Total Consultants 216 303 281 193 993 681 1.5 
c 	Total Managers 426 485 600 89 1,600 896 1.8 
1 	Consultants - Chairs of Directorates 112 143 167 89 511 330 1.5 
2 Consultants - Board Directors 15 19 6 18 58 36 1.6 
3 Consultants only 89 141 108 86 424 315 1.3 
4 Manager - Chair 2 3 5 0 10 5 2.0 
5 Manager - Chief Executive 42 55 49 2 148 73 2.0 
6 Manager - Board Director 110 127 143 24 404 221 1.8 
7 Manager - Corporate 60 72 91 11 234 131 1.8 
8 Manager - Clinical Professional 33 33 50 11 127 81 1.6 
9 Manager - Service/Business Manager 149 157 211 37 554 316 1.8 
10 Manager - Other/Unknown 30 38 51 4 123 69 1.8 
Figure 7.10.- 3c: Which body is achieving its main objective during the next 6 years? 
Looking ahead six years there is a marked increase in the proportion of people who believe 
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that consultants will achieve their main objective over the period. The data suggests that all 
groups believe that consultants' aims will prevail over those of managers in the longer term (6 
years) whereas in the short term managers' goals are regarded as dominant. Consultants, who 
tend to regard themselves as losing out against everybody (even against None) in Question 3a, 
see themselves as the dominant group ahead of the Trust in Year 6. 
7.4 Question 4. How have priorities changed since the organisation 
became a Trust? 
The majority of the sample felt that their own focus on priorities in the selected areas had 
become stronger, and a larger still majority believed that the Trust's priorities were being 
more vigorously pursued in these areas. 
The graphs which follow summarise the frequency of ratings by doctors and managers. The 
tests used to examine the independence of doctors' and managers' responses produce almost 
identical results. The only area in which there was no significant difference between the 
answers of doctors and managers related to the Trust's attitude towards financial break-even. 
83% of doctors and 79% of managers believed that this had strengthened as a Trust priority. 
Figure 7.11: Total Sample - Changes in Priorities 
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Figure 7.12: Doctors and Managers - Changes in Your Priorities 
Figure 7.13: Doctors and Managers - Changes in the Trust's Priorities 
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I Managers - Changes in "The Trust's" Priorities 
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Figure 7.13 (continued) : Doctors and Managers - Changes in the Trust's Priorities 
The tables below summarise the statistical tests run through SPSS and reduce the ratings 
frequencies into mean scores which are also depicted in graphical form. Doctors' ratings of 
every factor are, on average, below those of managers. The only exception is financial break-
even as a Trust priority where doctors' ratings exceed the managers' scores although, as the 
statistical tests suggest, there is no significant difference in their responses for this category. 
Table 7.14 : Tests of Significance Applied to Question 3 
Doctors/Managers 
'Your' Priorities 
ANOVA 
p value 
Pearson 
Chi Sq 
p value 
Break-even financially 0 0 
Maintain service volume/quality 0 0 
Expand service volume/quality 0 0 
Be responsive to patients 0 0 
Be responsive to GPs 0 0 
Other (Specify) 0.0001 0.00008 
'Trust' Priorities 
Break-even financially 0.0777 0.09273 
Maintain service volume/quality 0 0 
Expand service volume/quality 0 0 
Be responsive to patients 0 0 
Be responsive to GPs 0 0 
Other (Specify) 0.0361 0.04922 
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Change in Your Priorities Since Trust Status' 
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Table 7.15: Question 3 Mean Ratings 
Your Priorities 
Doctors 	Manager Sample Diff. 
Trust's Priorities 
Doctors Managers Sample Diff. 
Break-even financially 2.409 2.586 2.509 -0.177 2.804 2.76 2.779 0.044 
Maintain service volume/quality 2.397 2.583 2.502 -0.186 2.339 2.598 2.486 -0.259 
Expand service volume/quality 2.351 2.503 2.437 -0.152 2.332 2.545 2.453 -0.213 
Be responsive to patients 2.469 2.671 2.583 -0.202 2.549 2.697 2.633 -0.148 
Be responsive to GPs 2.438 2.746 2.612 -0.308 2.725 2.861 2.802 -0.136 
Other (Specify) 2.349 2.742 2.557 -0.393 2.373 2.616 2.511 -0.243 
Figure 7.14: Change in Your Priorities - Question 3 
Figure 7.15: Change in Trusts' Priorities - Question 3 
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Groups 
0.0983 4-6 
0.0068 4-7 
0.8358 7-8 
0.4751 7-11 
0.0000 416 - 7111 
0.0000 
0.8104 
0.0955 
0.1836 
0.5327 
0.0998 
Question 4 
Your Priorities 
Groups 1-3 
Doctors 
ANOVA 
a 	Break-even financially 0.0067 
Maintain service volume/quality 0.3158 
Expand service volume/quality 0.8602 
d 	Be responsive to patients 0.2037 
e 	Be responsive to GPs 0.6363 
Other (Specify) 0.6837 
Trust's Priorities 
9 	Break-even financially 0.0620 
h 	Maintain service volume/quality 0,7524 
Expand service volume/quality 0.4082 
k 	Be responsive to patients 0.0637 
Be responsive to GPs 0.5770 
Other (SPectfY) 0.7581 
Groups 4-11 
Managers 
ANOVA 
0.0516 
0.1591 
0.1565 
0.0660 
0.2177 
0.4982 
7.4.1 Differences Within the Doctor/Manager Groups 
ANOVA was used to test the independence of groups within the doctor and manager 
categories. This test was selected on the basis that (a) the rating system satisfies the interval 
scale data structure required by ANOVA and (b) the preceding analysis indicates that for this 
data-set it produces the same results as non-parametric tests such as chi-squared. 
The results are quite strong in suggesting that, while doctors and managers are independent 
groupings, there is no significant difference within the groupings in the way separate 
categories of doctors and managers answer the questions. The only exception to this relates 
to (4g), i.e. the answer by managers about financial break-even as a Trust priority. 
The results below show that the grouping combinations behave independently once corporate 
managers (7) are added to the (4-6) grouping of Chair/CEO/Board Director. The remaining 
groupings of managers further down in the corporate structure show no significant internal 
difference. This sequence of tests led to (4-6) categories and (7-11) being recoded into two 
separate groups within the management category and the probability readings shown below 
highlight this as the significant break point within the management category. 
This analysis of Question 4, therefore, highlights three distinct groupings within the Trusts 
which are independent from each other but internally consistent. These are (a) all doctors, (b) 
director level and above within the management group, and (c) all other managers which 
include corporate managers, clinical professional heads of service and service/business 
managers. 
Table 7,16: Probability Results from ANOVA Test in Question 4 
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7.5 Question 5a. Since the change to Trust status, how has the 
relationship changed between consultants and managers? 
70% of managers thought that there had been an improvement whereas less than half of 
doctors (48%) believed that relationships had improved. 14% of managers perceived a 
deterioration compared to 28% of doctors. The modal response in both groups was 'better'. 
This is a more optimistic assessment than the Hospital A pilot in which most consultants 
saw a deterioration whereas most managers believed that relationships had improved. At the 
same time, the national response indicates that managers take a more up-beat view of change 
than do the clinicians. 
Table 7.17: Total Sample - Question 5a  
Doctors Managers Total Sample 
Doctor-Manage 
Difference 
in % Points 
1 Much Worse 36 6% 14 2% 50 3% 4% 
2 Worse 143 22% 104 12% 247 16% 10% 
3 No Change 157 24% 136 16% 293 20% 8% 
4 Better 263 40% 462 54% 725 48% - 14% 
5 Much Better 54 8% 135 16% 189 13% -8% 
Count 653 100% 851 100% 1504 100% 
Mean Rating 3.24 3.71 3.50 
Table 7.18: Consultants - Question 5a 
Clinical Chairs Board Directors Consultants Only 
Consultant 
Total 
1 Much Worse 10 3% 1 3% 25 8% 36 
2 Worse 58 18% 5 14% 80 27% 143 
3 No Change 84 26% 5 14% 68 23% 157 
4 Better 140 44% 18 52% 105 35% 263 
5 Much Better 27 9% 6 17% 21 7% 54 
Count 319 100% 35 100% 299 100% 653 
Mean Rating 3.36 3.66 3.06 
The consultant body shows differences between those with a management responsibility and 
those without. Progression up the management hierarchy from clinical consultants through 
Chairs of Clinical Directorates and up to Board Directors shows a progression in the 
proportions believing that relationships had improved and a diminution in those which feel 
that relationships have deteriorated. The modal response in each case continued to be 
`better'. 
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7.5.1 Degree of Independence Between & Within Categories of Respondents 
Doctors and managers behave clearly as two independent groupings, according to the results 
of ANOVA tests. Within these categories it is necessary to consider different permutations 
to identify patterns of responses. 
Table 7.19: ANOVA Results - Question 5a 
Group Description ANOVA Probability 
(1-3) - (4-11) Whole Sample: Doctors/Managers 0.0000 
Doctors 
1-3 AIII Doctors (Internally) 0.0001 
1-2 Clinical Chairs/Board Directors 0.0943 
2-3 Board Directors - Consultants 0.0025 
(1+2) - 3 Chair/Board - Consultants 0.0000 
Managers 
4 - 11 Managers (Internally) 0.0000 
4 - 6 Chair/CEO/Board Director 0.0642 
4 - 7 Ditto + Corporate Manager 0.0092 
7 - 11 Corporate...Other 0.0167 
8 - 11 Clinical Professional....Other 0.3728 
9 - 11 Service/Business Mgr ....Other 0.9937 
8 - 9 Clinical Prof./Service Mgr 0.0842 
7 - 8 Corporate / Clinical Professional 0.0008 
(4-7) - (8-11) 0.0000 
(4-6) - (7-11) 0.0000 
Figure 7.16: Change in Relationship Between Consultants and Managers - Score Distribution 
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The data above shows that Clinical Chairs and Board Directors (1-2) do not reveal 
significantly different attitudes whereas Board Directors and Consultants (2-3) do. The 
grouping of Clinical Chairs/Board Directors into one category for comparison with 
Consultants shows the most significant difference in grouping (1&2 - 3). This suggests that 
consultants who do not have a position within the management structure of the Trust take a 
different view of trends in consultant/manager relationships to their colleagues. A larger 
number (although still a minority) believe that relationships have deteriorated. The responses 
to this question suggest a division in perceptions between the Trust-affiliated consultant 
body and the rest. 
Managers 
Chair/CEO/Board Director post-holders respond as a group (4-6) with no significant 
difference between them at the 1% level. The consistency of the sample weakens when we 
add Corporate managers (7), but at the 1% level (rounded) there is no significant difference 
within the grouping. The rest of the management cohorts do not display strong internal 
differences which leads to testing the structure of the management response by recoding 
individuals into two camps: corporate (4-7) and service (8-11). These two groupings behave 
as independent samples. The robustness of this conclusion is tested by incorporating group 7 
(corporate managers) into the second group so that we have a distinction between Trust 
Directors and above (4-6) and the rest (7-11). This, too, suggests that the two groups behave 
as independent camps. The rogue category is therefore the Corporate Manager body which 
sits between the Trust group and the service group. This is consistent with the position of 
these individuals within the organisation because they have less service involvement and 
therefore less personal contact with consultants than clinical and service/business managers 
but, at the same time, do not have the seniority and Trust-affiliation of the CEO/Chair/ 
Director group. 
7.6 Question 6a. How has the service to patients changed? 
A similar relationship between consultants' and managers' views is reflected in this question 
to that of Question 5a, although there is a slight increase in the proportions of respondents 
who feel that the service has improved (compared to changes in manager/consultant 
relationships in Question 5). Again the modal response is 'better'. 
Clinical Chairs are the most optimistic group of consultants, closely followed by consultants 
who are Board directors, i.e. Medical Directors. Consultants without these management 
responsibilities show a greater degree of pessimism with the largest proportion of the three 
groups declaring that services had deteriorated and less than half of the group indicating that 
services had improved. The table below sets out the details. 
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The battery of tests used for Question 5a was repeated for 6a with very similar results: 
• Doctors and managers behave independently in their responses; 
• Within the consultant group there is a significant distinction between Clinical 
Chairs/Board Directors on the one hand and Other Consultants on the the other; 
• Managers can be divided into two independent groups: (i) Chair/CEO/Board Directors 
on the one hand and Corporate/Clinical/Service/Business Managers on the other. 
Table 7.20: Total Sample - Question 6a 
Doctors Managers Total Sample 
Doctor-Manager 
Difference 
in % Points 
1 Much Worse 9 1% 9 1% 18 1.2% 0% 
2 Worse 160 25% 87 10% 247 17.0% 15% 
3 No Change 131 20% 112 13% 243 16.1% 7% 
4 Better 315 49% 570 67% 885 58.8% -18% 
5 Much Better 36 6% 76 9% 112 7.4% -3% 
Count 651 100% 854 100% 1505 100.0% 
Mean Rating 3.32 3.72 3.55 
Table 7.21: Consultants - Question 6a 
Clinical Chairs Board Directors Consultants Only Consultant Total 
1 Much Worse 4 1% 0 0% 5 2% 9 
2 Worse 66 21% 8 23% 86 29% 160 
3 No Change 56 17% 7 21% 68 23% 131 
4 Better 174 54% 17 50% 124 42% 315 
5 Much Better 21 7% 2 6% 13 4% 36 
Count 321 100% 34 100% 296 100% 651 
Mean Rating 3.44 3.38 3.18 
Table 7.22: ANOVA Results - Question 6a 
Group Description ANOVA Probability 
(1-3)- (4-11) Whole Sample: Doctors/Managers 0.0000 
Doctors 
1-3 AIII Doctors (Internally) 0.0028 
1-2 Clinical Chairs/Board Directors 0.7207 
2-3 Board Directors - Consultants 0.2493 
(1+2) - 3 Chair/Board - Consultants 0.0007 
Managers 
4 - 11 Managers (Internally) 0.0000 
4 - 6 Chair/CEO/Board Director 0.5198 
4 - 7 Ditto + Corporate Manager 0.0194 
7 - 11 Corporate...Other 0.0671 
8 - 11 Clinical Professional....0ther 0.0450 
9 - 11 Service/Business Mgr ....Other 0.3429 
8 - 9 Clinical Prof./Service Mgr 0.0316 
7 - 8 Corporate / Clinical Professional 0.0315 
(4-6) - (7-11) 0.0000 
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7.7 Question 7. Since the change to Trust status, do you think the 
goals of consultants have 	? 
Moved closer together Not changed Moved further apart 
The majority of respondents (61%) believed that the goals of consultants and managers had 
moved closer together while only 20% believed that they had moved further apart. Managers 
were more optimistic in their response than consultants, but the overall medical opinion 
reflects a convergence in goals. Within the consultant body the spread of opinion among non-
board/chair consultants (group 3) was 44% closer : 22% no change : 34% further apart, 
indicating that less than half the sample believed that goals had converged, but a smaller 
(though significant) proportion believed that the gap had widened. This contrasts with a 
spread of 56% closer : 20% no change : 24% further apart, among their board/clinical chair 
colleagues. 
Table 7.23: Total Sample - Question 7 
1 Moved closer togethe 
2 Not changed 
3 Moved 'further apart 
Count 
Mean Rating 
331 
136 
188 
655 
1.78 
50% 
21% 
29% 
100% 
Managers 
114 	13% 
1.45 
Total Sample 
	
914 	61% 
291 	19% 
302 	20% 
1507 	100% 
1.59 
Doctor-Manage 
Difference 
in % Points 
-19% 
3% 
15% 
The ANOVA test of significance between the sample groups was repeated for Question 7 
using the same structure as that employed for Questions 5a and 6a. The results are consistent 
with these earlier questions in that doctors and managers are two independent samples 
(p=0.0000). Within the consultant grouping, however, the results are weaker in that there is 
no significant difference at the 5% level between the three categories although, at the 5% level 
there is evidence of independence in the responses of board directors/chairs of clinical 
directorates and all other consultants (group 3). Managers can be divided into the distinct 
groupings of Chair/CEO/Board Director on the one hand and all other managers on the other. 
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Table 7.24: ANOVA Results - Question 7 
Group Description ANOVA Probability 
(1-3) - (4-11) Whole Sample: Doctors/Managers 0.0000 
Doctors 
1-3 AIII Doctors (Internally) 0.0802 
1-2 Clinical Chairs/Board Directors 0.3822 
2-3 Board Directors - Consultants 0.0216 
(1+2) - 3 Chair/Board - Consultants 0,0446 
Managers 
4 - 11 Managers (Internally) 0.0000 
4 - 6 Chair/CEO/Board Director 0.8683 
4 - 7 Ditto + Corporate Manager 0.5187 
7 - 11 Corporate...Other 0.0059 
8 - 11 Clinical Professional....0ther 0.0583 
9 - 11 Service/Business Mgr ....Other 0.3326 
8 - 9 Clinical Prof./Service Mgr 0.0376 
7 - 8 Corporate / Clinical Professional 0.0004 
(4-6) - (7-11) 0.0000 
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Question 8. Which group, in your view, has the most control over the following aspects of service? 
Consultants Nurses Managers Chief Executive Trust Board Purchasers 	Other 	Count 
(a) Development of service 
Doctors 216 10 74 89 63 
Managers 265 35 139 105 90 
Total 481 45 213 194 153 
(b) Availability of services (e.g. beds, theatres 
Doctors 38 19 283 
Managers 148 51 378 
Total 186 70 661 
(c) Medical staffing levels 
Doctors 166 3 109 
Managers 370 4 115 
Total 536 7 224 
(d) Nurse staffing levels 
Doctors 8 122 329 
Managers 12 203 466 
Total 20 325 795 
162 	17 	727 
151 	23 	956 
313 	40 	1683 
145 	61 	760 
127 	59 	977 
272 	120 	1737 
82 	88 	93 	18 	740 
61 	140 	98 	33 	1013 
143 	228 	191 	51 	1753 
(a) Freedom to admit in-patient 
(t) Decision to treat patient 
Count for all categories 
Doctors 	1557 	180 	887 
Managers 	2314 	375 	1218 
Total 	3871 	555 	2105 
% Across All Categories 
Doctors 	36% 	4 	2 
Managers 	39% 	6% 	21% 
465 370 787 132 
408 531 875 190 
873 901 1662 322 
11% 8% 18% 3% 
7% 9% 15% 3% 
4378 
5911 
10289 
100% 
100% 
Total 37.6% 5.4% 20.5% 8.5% 8.8% 16.2% 3.1% 100% 
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7.7 Question S. Which group, in your view, has the most control over 
the following aspects of service? 
Table 7.25: Frequency Results of Question 8 
1 1 1 
(a) Development of service 
Total 
Managers 
Doctors 28% 37% 
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Figure 7.17: Results of Question 8 
I (b) Availability of services (e.g. beds, theatres) 
1 (c) Medical staffing levels 
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(d) Nurse staffing levels 
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Figure 7.17 (continued): Results of Question 8 
(f) Decision to treat patient 
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The responses show a high level of consistency in certain areas: 
• Development of the service - doctors and managers produced a similar range of 
views. Purchasers are deemed by 37% of the sample to wield the most control, 
followed by consultants which received 26% of managers' votes and 28% of 
consultants'. The pattern of responses shows a coincidence of views between the 
two groups. 
• Availability of facilities - both doctors and managers attribute 39%-40% of control 
over facilities such as beds and theatre to the management group. The main area of 
variation in views concerns the level of control held by consultants: 15% of managers' 
votes were directed to consultants as the main control-base whereas only 5% of 
doctors (i.e. consultants) thought that they held the most control over facilities. 
• Medical staffing levels - Both groups believed that consultants have the most 
control in determining medical staffing levels, but there is a wide disparity in the level 
of control. Managers gave 38% of their vote to consultants as the main controllers 
whereas only 22% of doctors' responses selected consultants. Managers perceived 
doctors as having more power in this area than did the clinicians themselves. 
• Nurse staffing levels - Again there was a high level of consistency between the 
groups' responses, each of whom identified managers as the main controlling body 
over nurse staffing levels, with a strong supplementary influence by nurses. 
• Freedom to admit in-patients - doctors and managers attributed 73% and 76% 
respectively to the consultant body, showing consistency in their view that 
consultants have the major share of control in admitting in-patients to hospital. 10%- 
11% of responses from both groups attributed control to managers. 
• Decision to treat patients - both doctors and managers believed that consultants 
have control over the decision to treat patients. Managers attributed 81% of control 
to consultants and 5% to nurses whereas doctors attributed 89% of their vote to 
consultants and only 1% to nurses. 
• Across all categories - the voting patterns produce a consistent response between 
the two groups with 20%-21% of votes cast for managers, and an average of 38% cast 
for consultants, with a slightly higher perception of consultants' power in these areas 
being expressed by the management group. Doctors take a stronger view of the Chief 
Executive's discretion to control than do managers themselves. This discrepancy is 
expressed in terms of availability of facilities, medical staffing levels and nurse staffing 
levels. 
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On the basis of this response managers have the major control over service capacity in terms 
of facilities and nurse staffing levels. This is significant given that pay comprises over 70% of 
costs and the nursing budget is generally approximately 50% of the wage bill. Within the 
available capacity consultants are perceived as having control over admission and treatment of 
patients. Chief Executives and Trust Boards are perceived as wielding a lower level of direct 
control in most categories, although the aggregate control outweighs that of other groups in 
determining medical staffing levels. 
This data can, on the one hand, be interpreted as a support for the view that doctors are 
responsible for decisions which account for 75% of expenditure, i.e. direct patient care costs 
as opposed to central overhead. However, it also indicates that doctors make those decisions 
to treat within a framework or set of constraints which are largely beyond their control in 
terms of beds and nurse staffing levels. The term 'managers' is distinguished here from the 
Chief Executive and Trust Board, and so is pitched at service/business manager level. 
According to this survey they have a high level of control over direct expenditure (i.e. the 
nursing budget) which is consistent with the directorate budget structure introduced in Trusts 
according to resource management principles. The question then concerns the motivation of 
this group of individuals. The aggregate result of this national survey suggests that budgetary 
control, taking an overall average, ranks highest among service/business managers' priorities 
and so, on this basis, Trusts should be in a strong position to balance the nursing workforce 
budget. The issue of quality or safety in nurse staffing levels would be an important 
consideration in meeting the budgetary constraint. 
This analysis suggests that the pattern of views among service/business managers within 
Trusts could be decisive in determining the Trust's overall objective and performance. 
7.8 Conclusion 
The aim of this stage of the research programme is to test the hypothesis that doctors and 
managers are motivated by different and explicit goals. The results appear to confirm that 
this hypothesis is correct. 
7,8.1 Motivation 
Doctors on the whole conformed with each other as a group in the way they answered the 
questions. Managers also responded as a group but in important respects showed a 
distinction between the service and corporate ends of the spectrum. Specifically, service 
managers showed a greater service orientation in their responses, attaching a higher priority to 
quality of service than did the Board members and corporate managers. The response of 
service managers was more like that of consultants since maintaining service quality appeared 
to override financial break-even as the dominant objective, in terms of first-preference. This 
distinction bears out the assertion in Chapter 3 that `managers' is a generic term applied to 
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different groups and functions; whereas very senior managers receive benefits to ensure that 
they identify closely with organisational goals, more junior managers do not receive such 
strong incentives. It also conforms with the Mintzberg typology in which top management 
has a role at the strategic apex, distinct from middle management located at the 
technostructure and the service managers supporting the operating core. Nevertheless, the 
first condition of 'difference between doctors and managers' underlying the hypotheses is 
satisfied by the consistency with which doctors and managers respond as two independent 
groups. 
The second condition is that their motivation points in two different directions. Specifically, 
doctors are postulated to pursue service goals while managers overall aim to manage resources 
by balancing income (i.e. operating budget) and expenditure. This condition is, again, broadly 
satisfied. The hypotheses used the term 'service' loosely to mean a combination of quality 
and quantity. However, an unexpected result of this work is that quality is regarded by 
doctors as significantly more important than quantity. Managers fulfilled the hypothesis that 
financial break-even was a more important issue to them than either service quality or 
quantity. But the heterogeneity of managers, highlighted by this survey, cannot be 
overlooked and, to some extent, qualifies the results. The closer the proximity of managers to 
the operating core of Trusts, the closer do the views of managers resemble those of 
consultants. Quality is clearly the overriding factor among clinical service managers and could 
be interpreted as the dominant objective among service/business managers (although the mean 
ranking score favours break-even" ). Since these managers have responsibility for resource 
management within the clinical directorate structure it could be argued that the overall 
management objective of financial break-even is fundamentally weakened by the attitudes of 
managers at the operating core. 
This perspective is further supported by the attitude of all groups towards the Trust as an 
organisation. The results are striking in that nobody allied themselves with the Trust, which 
was perceived as aiming for financial targets above all else, with none of the equivocation 
between service and finance observed by many managers within their own aims. The 
projected aims of the Trust, therefore, are alien in tone to both doctors and managers alike. 
This would indicate a dichotomy between Trusts' perceived aims - which are consistent with 
statutory objectives - and their actual aims as revealed by the principal actors. If doctors are 
not at all interested in financial management and managers are interested but subject to tight 
constraints relating to quality then, unless managers - and senior executives at that - have a 
clear dominance within the Trust, the weight of probability is that the Trust will not be 
coherent in its objective of balancing the budget. Where service and financial objectives 
conflict the attitudinal data suggests that service goals will prevail. This is subjected to 
testing in Chapter 10. 
23 The mean score takes account of second and third preferences even though the first preference of service 
managers favoured maintenance of service quality. 
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7.8.2 Dominance 
Evidence discussed in Chapter 3 indicated that doctors control the major part of resource 
allocation, e.g. Blumberg's assertion that 75% of expenditure is attributable to physicians (in 
Gray, 1001, p166). If this indicates the level of control exerted by doctors then it would 
appear that hospitals have a remote chance of meeting financial targets. The questionnaire is, 
however, designed to address this question of dominance and control within hospitals. 
Answers to questions 4 - 7 indicate that the move to bring consultants into management and 
to achieve corporate identity through Trust status has been largely successful, although there 
is still no fundamental change in the orientation of doctors. Question 8, on the other hand, 
which deals with control of aspects of the production function shows that consultants' 
discretion to spend money is constrained by capacity limits set by managers in terms of the 
number of beds, theatres and nurse staffing levels. Doctors are perceived to have a major 
influence on medical staffing numbers and service developments, and they determine who is 
to be admitted to hospital and who is to be treated. But the decision to treat may be a 
deferred decision, amounting to an addition to the waiting list in surgical specialties where 
there are constraints on theatre or bed capacity. Nevertheless, doctors are resourceful and 
may fmd alternative means of achieving their service aims, e.g. by treating patients as day 
cases rather than inpatients, or as outpatients rather than day cases. This is dependent on 
availability of technology through service developments, e.g. more sophisticated anaesthetics 
with shorter recovery periods, and as such lie within the consultants' sphere of 
implementation. 
Question 3 is an impressionistic question which seeks views on who is running the Trust by 
asking which groups are thought to be achieving their goals. The Trust is seen to be enjoying 
the most success in achieving its goals (Question 3a, Figure 7.8). This is consistent with the 
view that managers, who have the ability to rein in resources as described in Question 8, are 
perceived to be more successful than consultants in achieving their goals in the short term. If 
the objective of the Trust is fmancial balance (as agreed by both managers and clinicians in 
Question 2) then it is difficult to explain the response to this question in the long term 
(Question 3c, Figure 7.10) where the Trust is still seen as being the most successful body but 
consultants are seen as more successful than managers. One interpretation is that the goals of 
the Trust could be expected to come into line with those of doctors, using service 
developments (Question 8a) as a means of achieving this. These responses suggest that, in 
the end, doctors get the service developments they want, but that on a day to day basis they 
are constrained by funding. 
7.83 Comparison with Stage 1 
The results of the national survey are similar in many respects to those of the Stage 1 survey 
in Hospital A described in the previous chapter. Individual reputation was identified by 
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doctors and managers (Question 1) as the most important factor to their career. In the key 
Question 2, break-even was most important to managers (Question 2a) and maintenance of 
quality was most important to consultants (Question 2c) in both surveys, with consultants 
and managers behaving as two independent groups in both studies. The management group 
displayed internal tensions through the divergence in profile between service/business 
managers and their senior/corporate colleagues. Service/business managers showed a very 
strong interest in service delivery which, in the case of Hospital A, overrode the budgetary 
interest and, in the national sample, showed equivocation. (Maintaining service quality 
received more first preferences than financial break-even but the use of second preferences 
led to a higher mean ranking for break-even among this group). 
The main difference between the two surveys lay in the mood of consultants, conveyed in 
Question 5, concerning the relationship between doctors and managers. Questions 3, 7 and 8 
also reflect the disposition of consultants by asking who is achieving their objective, how 
patient services have changed and whether the goals of doctors and managers have converged. 
The results from Hospital A (Stage 1) showed a consultant workforce which felt that 
relationships had deteriorated, nobody was achieving their objective, doctors and managers 
had moved further apart in their goals and that the Chief Executive dominated the Trust. In 
the national survey (Stage 2), on the other hand, only a minority of consultants believed that 
relationships with managers had worsened. Most of them felt that the goals of doctors and 
managers had moved closer together. Like managers, they believed that the Trust was 
achieving its objectives in the short term (Question 3a) and that consultants controlled most 
of the service features listed in Question 8. Hospital A showed negative attitudes among 
consultants whereas the national sample was much more optimistic. 
The contrast in the pattern of responses by consultants to these questions raised the 
possibility of a flaw, or strong bias, inherent in the sampling method which may have targeted 
two different types of consultants. A further stage was added to the questionnaire to test the 
validity of the national survey. This is the subject of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 8. QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY: RESULTS OF STAGE 3 
(CLOSED QUESTIONS 
Stage 3 of the questionnaire survey was introduced as a response to differences which 
emerged between the national sample (Stage 2) and the initial findings of the final pilot 
conducted in Hospital A as part of Stage 1. The evidence from Stage I indicated that 
managers and doctors had different perceptions of their own situation to the extent that 
managers thought that relationships with their consultant colleagues had markedly improved 
whereas the consultants believed that these same relationships had deteriorated since the 
advent of Trust status (Table 6.6). By contrast, both doctors and managers across the 
national sample believed by and large that relationships had improved, although the pattern of 
responses between the two groups was significantly different with a distinctly less upbeat 
note sounded by the clinicians (Table 7.17). 
The possibility of truculent clinicians forming the sample in Hospital A compared to more 
manager-friendly consultants comprising the national sample posed a methodological problem 
relating to the way in which doctors had been selected. The Hospital A sample was 
composed of 20 consultants and 20 managers who were selected and contacted directly by the 
researcher. The national survey, in contrast, was administered through Chief Executive 
Officers who targeted half this number of consultants and managers per Trust. Each CEO 
received a pack of 20 questionnaires with an invitation to participate in the exercise and 
simple guidance which was restricted to a request to distribute the forms to 10 managers and 
10 consultants. The smaller sample size and the difference in selection method provided 
potential bias in the national consultant sample on the basis that Chief Executives might tend 
to select their allies who were also engaged in management duties. While this potential 
problem was understood, it was judged on balance that extensive participation in the exercise 
was more important than bias due to sampling technique and that any complex instructions or 
reduction in CEOs' ability to select freely would reduce their participation rate. The 
questionnaire was designed to capture a measure of this potential bias through a description 
by each respondent of the amount of time spent on clinical and management duties. Stage 3 
was then added to the process to mimic the sampling technique of Stage I and to assess the 
impact of differences in sample size and selection method between Stages 1 and 2. The CEO 
of Hospital B was, therefore, asked to distribute questionnaires to 40 individuals with a 
specific request to involve a cross-section of consultants. 
The comparison of results is restricted to analysis of the closed questions. 
8.1 Response Rate and Sample Description 
Respondents were encouraged to describe themselves within one or more categories in order 
to capture clinical and management aspects of individuals' roles. The Hospital A and 
Hospital B respondents are compared with the national set: 
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Table 8.1: Respondent Categories 
Hospital A Respondents Hospital B Respondents National Category 
18.2% 	4 33.3% 	7 20.9% 1. 	Chair Clinical Directorates 
0.0% 0 4.8% 1 2.3% 2. 	Board Director 
22.7% 5 33.3% 7 20.0% 3. 	Consultants Only 
40.9% 9 71.4% 15 43.2% Total Consultants 
0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.3% 4. 	Chair 
4.5% 1 0.0% 0 4.6% 5. CEO 
4.5% 1 4.8% 1 14.0% 6. 	Board Director 
22.7% 5 9.5% 2 8.3% 7. 	Corporate 
4.5% 1 4.8% 1 5.1% 8. 	Clinical Professional 
18.2% 4 0.0% 0 20.0% 9. 	Service/Business Manager 
4.5% 1 9.5% 2 3.9% 10. Other Manager 
0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.5% 11. Unidentified 
59.1% 13 28.6% 6 56.8% Total Managers 
100.0% 22 100.0% 21 100.0% 
63% 32% 62% 	% Management Time 
The Hospital A survey was distributed to 40 individuals, 17 (43%) of whom were 
consultants and 23 (57%) who were managers. The overall response was 55% (22/40), 
comprising 9 (41%) consultants and 13 (59%) managers. The response rate for the national 
sample was also 55% with 43%:57% balance between doctors and managers, so that in this 
respect Hospital A typified the pattern across other Trusts. The overall Hospital B response 
rate was consistent with other Trusts at 53% (21/40) but the doctor:manager respondent ratio 
was 71%:29%. The sampling fears of 'management bias' in terms of consultant roles between 
the pilot and the national survey were ill-founded since the Hospital A response was typical 
of the national sample whereas Hospital B was more heavily weighted towards clinical staff. 
Likewise, the average managerial commitment within the Hospital A sample was consisten 
with the national sample whereas Hospital B's was half, in line with the high consultan 
representation. 
8.2 Question 1. To what extent does your career depend on the 
following factors? 
Hospital A and B samples did not differ significantly from each other in their responses to 
question 1 (on the basis of ANOVA tests) and they are broadly consistent with the national 
result. As hypothesised, Ig) survival of the Trust as an organisation was markedly more 
important to managers than to doctors, in line with national results. The Trusts part 
company with the national sample on la) A financially successful Trust. This was an area 
which showed the widest disparity between doctors and managers in the national study, 
where doctors attached little importance to this issue. In the Hospital B/Hospital A sample 
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Managers la lb lc ld le if lg ih ij 
Managers National Mean 3.80 4.21 3.32 4.27 3.68 2.84 3.98 4.07 4.34 
Hospitals A & B Sample Mean 3.22 4.00 3.00 4.33 3.74 2.29 4.00 3.84 3,00 
Point Difference -0.58 -0.21 -0.32 0,06 0.06 -0.55 0.02 -0.23 -1.34 
Hospital B Mean 3.17 3.83 3.33 3.83 3.50 2.33 3.67 3.50 
Hospital A Mean 3.25 4.08 2.83 4.58 3.85 2.27 4.15 4.00 
Point Difference: Hospital A - Hospital B 0.08 0.25 -0.50 0.75 0.35 -0.06 0.48 0.50 
Doctors 11 	ig 	lh la 	lb 	lc 	id 
Table 8.2: Mean Rating Scores on a Scale 1-5 where 1 is very low and 5 is very high 
Total Sample la lb lc id le If ig 1h lj 
National Sample Mean 3.42 3.97 3.41 4.19 3.62 3.08 3.68 4.02 4.35 
Hospitals A & B Sample Mean 3.24 3.81 3.41 4.40 3.70 2.85 3.63 3.95 4.25 
Point Difference -0.18 -0.16 -0.00 0.21 0.08 -0.23 -0.05 -0.07 -0.10 
Hospital B Mean 3.19 3.67 3.62 4.29 3.57 2.76 3.48 3.71 5.00 
Hospital A Mean 3.30 3.95 3.20 4.52 3.86 2.95 3.77 4.18 3.50 
Point Difference: Hospital A - Hospital B 0.11 0.28 -0.42 0.23 0.29 0.19 0.29 0.47 -1.50 
National Doctors Mean 2.93 3.66 3.53 4.10 3.54 3.39 3.30 3.96 
Hospitals A & B Sample Mean 3.26 3.65 3.74 4.46 3.71 3.25 333 4.04 
Point Difference 0.33 -0.01 0.21 0.36 0.17 -0.14 0.04 0.08 
Hospital B Mean 3.20 3.60 3.73 4.47 3.60 2.93 3.40 3.80 
Hospital A Mean 3.38 3.75 3.75 4.44 3.89 3,78 3.22 4.44 
Point Difference: Hospital A - Hospital B 0.18 0.15 0.02 -0.03 0.29 0.85 -0.18 0.64 
4.36 
4.67 
0.31 
5.00 
4.00 
-1.00 
both doctors and managers regard it as being moderately important. 
The two main areas of difference between Hospital A and B Trusts lie in If) Standard of 
R&D and Teaching, which Hospital B doctors perceive as unimportant, and 1h) Continued 
provision of the Trust's clinical service which, again, Hospital B doctors rated consistently 
lower. This might indicate a less territorial attitude by Hospital B consultants and have a 
bearing on future behaviour since Hospital B Trust was expected to merge with a 
neighbouring Trust within twelve months of the survey period. 
When the doctors and managers were considered separately between the two Trusts only two 
areas showed significant differences between the disciplines: 10 Strength of the 
specialty/profession nationally which, as one would expect, was more widely supported by 
doctors and 1fi Standard of R&D and Teaching to which again doctors awarded greater 
importance. 
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8.3 Question 2. Within the Trust, how would you rank the prioritie 
for the following sets of people? 
uestion 2 is the most important within the questionnaire and has been analysed extensively 
in earlier chapters. This section compares the response patterns of Hospitals A and B. 
(Appendix 2d provides detailed data and Appendix 4 summarises the results). 
.3.1 Hospital A and Hospital B Comparison 
Break Even 
The aggregated Hospital A/Hospital B rankings are very similar to those of the national 
sample in general. The strongest result in the national study was in the relative importance 
of financial break-even between doctors and managers. Managers saw it as the most 
important duty to themselves whereas consultants perceived it as being among the least 
important factors. This is mirrored in the case study results of Hospital A and Hospital B 
(2a), although Hospital A shows a lack of conviction in the financial objectives in relation to 
service/business managers generally (question 2h). Hospital B, on the other hand, revealed a 
more stringent managerial attitude to financial balance than either Hospital A or the national 
sample (comparing results of 2a, 2h, 2y) and seemed to regret this emphasis since managers 
took the view that the Trust 'ideally' should rank it last in importance. 
Revenue Expansion 
When we consider the two Trusts separately the main difference lies in their attitude to 
quality and to revenue expansion. Expansion of revenue and service volume is considered to 
be an important duty of service/business managers in Hospital B but much less so in Hospital 
A. 
Hospital A is more like the national sample in its perception of revenue expansion and this 
links into the disenchantment with market mechanisms highlighted by the national survey. 
Hospital B is significantly different from both Hospital A and the national sample against this 
criterion and it suggests that a different set of messages are circulating within the Hospital B 
Trust, leading to a different order of objectives. 
8.3.2 Comparison Between Consultant Group 
Doctors show a high level of consistency in their own priorities, both in the national 
comparison and within the internal check between Hospital B and Hospital A. Maintenance 
of service quality is their primary objective. They are also consistent in what they think the 
rust's objectives should be 'ideally'. The main area of divergence lies in the Hospital B and 
Hospital A consultants' perceptions of their own Trust and of service/business managers. 
Both believe that the Trust pursues financial balance above other factors, but the Hospital A 
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consultants believe that maintenance and expansion of service quality is a much higher 
priority for the Trust than do the Hospital B doctors. Likewise, the Hospital A consultants 
believe that most service and business managers place a high emphasis on maintaining quality 
- coming second to break-even - whereas Hospital B's perception is that the managers give 
quality a low order of priority. 
8.33 Comparison of Management Groupings 
The national and Hospital A+B aggregated samples are closely aligned in terms of managers' 
views. They see break-even as their chief priority but in Hospital B the need to maintain 
service volume is considered to be equally important whereas in Hospital A this is less so, 
perhaps because Hospital A had historically exceeded its volume targets each year. 
Individuals in Hospital A believe that other business managers were mainly interested in 
maintaining volume, followed by maintaining quality and then, thirdly, in break-even; this 
shows a divergence in managers' view about themselves in Hospital A which is not reflected 
in the Hospital B or national sample. 
Managers in Hospital B Trust believe that the consultant's main concern is expanding the 
volume of service provided. This is a plausible assumption which underpinned the original 
hypotheses about consultants' motivation. One of the surprising results of the survey has 
been the extent to which this is seen as a relatively low priority by doctors themselves. 
Hospital B diverges from Hospital A and the national sample in this management perception 
of consultants and Appendix 4 shows that consultants themselves do not regard volume 
targets as particularly important. 
Hospital A and Hospital B managers' view of the Trust's current priorities show some 
differences in intensity, (e.g. higher scores are attributed by Hospital B to break-even and 
maintaining volume) but the overall ranking remains similar with break-even first and 
expanding quality seen as the least important to the Trust. Hospital A's view of the Trust's 
ideal priorities are similar to the national sample, with break-even placed first and expanding 
service volume ranked last overall. Hospital B managers, on the other hand, believe that the 
Trust should place maximum priority on expanding revenue, followed closely by volume 
expansion. The basic break-even objective is regarded as the least important in the Trust's 
ideal set of priorities. 
8.3.4 Difference Between Consultants' and Managers' Perceptions 
The strongest result in the Hospital A/Hospital B analysis of doctors and managers is 
consistent with the national sample, namely that doctors and managers have widely diverging 
views about the importance of financial break-even. Likewise, all groups show a high degree 
of consistency in their view of consultants' objectives and the pattern of responses in relation 
to the Trust is similar between the national and local study. Doctors believe that most 
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Managers Consultants Trust None Count Ratio Count 
Sample 
27% 22% 35% 16% 100% 1.6 
24% 22% 30% 24% 100% 1.5 
29% 22% 38% 11% 100% 1.7 
34% 21% 21% 24% 100% 1.5 
20% 0% 10% 70% 100% 1.1 
40% 30% 26% 4% 100% 1.8 
12% 16% 12% 60% 100% 1.2 
11% 11% 11% 67% 100% 1.2 
14% 29% 14% 43% 100% 1.2 
National Figures 
a Total Sample 
b Total Consultants 
c Total Managers 
Hospital A 
a Total Sample 
b Total Consultants 
c Total Managers 
Hospital B 
a Total Sample 
b Total Consultants 
c Total Managers 
Managers Consultants Trust None Count 
Ratio Count: 
Sample 
28% 23% 36% 13% 100% 1.7 
25% 22% 32% 21% 100% 1.5 
30% 24% 39% 7% 100% 1.8 
21% 21% 30% 28% 100% 1.3 
0% 11% 11% 78% 100% 1.0 
30% 25% 40% 5% 100% 1.5 
25% 14% 32% 29% 100% 1.3 
25% 10% 30% 35% 100% 1.3 
25% 25% 37% 13% 100% 1.3 
National Figures 
a Total Sample 
b Total Consultants 
c Total Managers 
Hospital A 
a Total Sample 
b Total Consultants 
c Total Managers 
Hospital B 
a Total Sample 
b Total Consultants 
c Total Managers 
service/business managers pursue break-even more resolutely than do the managers 
themselves but in the Hospital A study the gap between doctors' and managers' perceptions 
is more marked. 
8.4 Question 3. Which body is achieving its main objective? 
Individuals were asked to tick against which body they believed was achieving its main 
objective at the moment. They were allowed to tick more than one from a choice of 
Managers, Consultants, Trust and None. This is an impressionistic question which was 
intended to convey the mood or attitudes of different groups_ 
Table 8.3: 3a: Which body is achieving its main objective at the moment? 
Table 8.4: 3b: Which body is achieving its main objective during the next three years?  
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Table 8.5: 3c: Which body is achieving its main objective during the next six years? 
National Figures 
a Total Sample 
b Total Consultants 
c Total Managers 
Managers Consultants Trust None Ratio Count: 
Sample 
25% 30% 34% 11% 100% 1.6 
22% 31% 28% 19% 100% 1.5 
27% 30% 37% 6% 100% 1.8 
16% 32% 32% 20% 100% 1.4 
0% 33% 22% 45% 100% 1.0 
23% 32% 36% ' 9% 100% 1.7 
29% 18% 24% 29% 100% 1.3 
25% 15% 25% 35% 100% 1.3 
37% 25% 25% 13% 100% 1.3 
Hospital A 
a Total Sample 
b Total Consultants 
c Total Managers 
Hospital B 
a Total Sample 
b Total Consultants 
c Total Managers 
The national sample showed that consultants and managers each believed that the Trust was 
achieving its objectives at the moment to a greater extent than either consultants as a group or 
managers. Both groups also believed that managers were achieving their objectives to a greater 
extent than consultants. The main divergence in the national sample lay in the proportion 
who thought that 'nobody' was achieving their objective: 24% of consultants took this 
pessimistic view compared to 11% of managers. 
The Hospital B and Hospital A samples behaved rather differently from the national sample. 
Two thirds of consultants in both Hospital A and Hospital B believed that nobody was 
currently achieving their objective. A large proportion of Hospital B managers (43%) also 
took this view whereas managers in Hospital A appeared to be very up-beat since only one 
person (4% of count) believed that nobody was achieving their goal while the highest vote 
(40%) went to managers themselves. None of the consultants in the Hospital A sample and 
only 11% in the Hospital B sample believed that consultants were achieving their aim. In 
summary, the majority view nationally was that the Trust was achieving its aim now whereas 
in Hospital B nobody was believed to be winning and in Hospital A managers were seen to 
be achieving their goals overall. 
Asking the same question over a three year period produced little shift in the national 
response where the Trust was still perceived to be dominant by most groups. Hospital B 
respondents shifted markedly to take the same overall view that the Trust would dominate, 
although the consultant vote (35%) still reflected a view that nobody would achieve their aim 
and that consultants (10%) themselves would be the least successful group. The overall 
Hospital A vote reflected the view that influence would shift away from managers and that 
the Trust would dominate. The consultants maintained their view that nobody would achieve 
their aims. 
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Over a six year period there was a perception that consultants would increase their level of 
control. In the national sample consultants believed that they themselves would be more 
successful than the Trust in achieving objectives. This was not echoed by the Hospital B 
survey in which consultants felt they would be the weakest group and managers believed that 
influence would shift towards managers while consultants still believed in the main that 
nobody would achieve their aim. Hospital A consultants likewise believed that nobody 
would dominate (45%) although they perceived a shift in their favour. Hospital A managers 
believed that the Trust would be the strongest body with the balance between managers and 
consultants reversing in the consultants' favour. Both Hospital A and the national sample 
envisaged a shift of power from managers to consultants over six years but Hospital B 
reflected a view that in the longer term either managers or nobody would be the most 
successful group. 
The overall impression is that Hospital A managers feel that they have a degree of control at 
the moment but that in the longer term they will lose it. Managers in Hospital B at the 
moment appear to feel powerless but take the view that given time they will gain control. 
Consultants in both sites are cynical or pessimistic in their view that nobody will get what 
they want, even over six years, but Hospital A consultants rate their chances above those of 
the managers. Both Hospital A and Hospital B are more pessimistic than the national sample 
since a high proportion believe that nobody will achieve their goal. 
8.5 Question 4. How have priorities changed since Trust status? 
Respondents were asked to rate how their own priorities had changed since Trust status and 
were asked to take a view on how the Trust priorities had changed during the same period. 
This question considers dynamic changes in objectives rather than providing a snapshot of 
current rankings as in Question 2. 
In the national sample doctors felt that all their objectives had strengthened, with particular 
emphasis on being responsive to patients and being responsive to GPs. They also believed 
that break-even had become more important to them as a priority. This suggests that, though 
it ranked last in Question 2, it would have been even less important prior to Trust status. 
Managers also gave these two factors the highest rating in terms of strengthened priorities. 
Both groups believed that the Trust's objectives had become even stronger in all the areas 
listed, but consultants identified financial break-even as the area where Trust priorities had 
strengthened most, followed by being responsive to GPs. Managers also selected these as the 
two areas where Trust priorities had most changed but gave highest rating to responsiveness 
to GPs. The Hospital A response was consistent with the national sample while Hospital B 
was more idiosyncratic: consultants believed that their own priority of expanding service 
volume/quality had strengthened most whereas managers believed that on the whole their own 
priorities had not changed but were unanimous in believing that responsiveness to GPs had 
become stronger as a priority. 
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Table 8.6: Response to Question 4 
Mean Scores: Extent of Change where 1 = Weaker, 2 = No Change and 3 = Stronger 
National Sample Your Priorities 
Doctors Manager Sample Duff 
Trust's Priorities 
Doctors Managers Sample Diff 
Break-even financially 2.409 2.586 2.509 -0.177 2.804 2.760 2.779 0.044 
Maintain service voIumeIpuality 2.397 2.583 2.502 -0.186 2.339 2.598 2.486 -0.259 
Expand service volume/quality 2.351 2.503 2.437 -0.152 2.332 2.545 2.453 -0.213 
Be responsive to patients 2.469 2.671 2.583 -0.202 2.549 2.697 2.633 -0.148 
Be responsive to GPs 2.438 2.746 2.612 -0.308 2.725 2.861 2.802 -0.136 
Hospital A Your Priorities 
Doctors Manager Sample Diff 
Trust's Priorities 
Doctors Managers Sample Diff 
Break-even financially 2.220 2.620 2.450 -0.400 2.780 2.850 2.820 -0.070 
Maintain service volume/quality 2.440 2.310 2.360 0.130 2.130 2.150 2.140 -0.020 
Expand service volume/quality 2.330 2.540 2.450 -0.210 2.330 2.620 2.500 -0.290 
Be responsive to patients 2.560 2.850 2.730 -0.290 2.220 2.850 2.590 -0.630 
Be responsive to GPs 2.500 2.690 2.620 -0.190 2.440 3.000 2.770 -0.560 
Hospital B Your Priorities 
Doctors Manager Sample aft 
Trust's Priorities 
Doctors Managers Sample Duff 
Break-even financially 2.470 2.200 2.400 0.270 3.000 2.330 2.810 0.670 
Maintain service volume/quality 2.330 2.000 2.250 0.330 2.000 2.330 2.100 -0.330 
Expand service volume/quality 2.730 2.000 2.550 0.730 2.400 2.330 2.380 0.070 
Be responsive to patients 2.600 2.000 2.450 0.600 2.600 2.170 2.480 0.430 
Be responsive to GPs 2.470 3.000 2.580 -0.530 2.800 3.000 2.860 -0.200 
8.6 Question 5a. Since the change to Trust status, how has the 
relationship changed between consultants and managers? 
Consultants and managers were asked to rate whether they thought the relationship between 
the two groups had deteriorated or improved over the period. In the national sample 70% of 
managers thought that there had been an improvement in consultant/manager relationships 
whereas less than half of doctors (48%) believed that relationships had improved. 14% of 
managers perceived a deterioration compared to 28% of doctors. The modal response in both 
gimps was 'better'. This is a far more optimistic assessment than Hospital A where 76% of 
consultants thought that relationships between the two groups had deteriorated, whereas 
none of the managers believed that relationships had deteriorated and 92% believed that they 
had improved. 
In the Hospital B sample a different picture emerged. The majority of consultants (60%) 
believed that relationships with managers had improved and, in line with the national sample, 
only 27% believed that relationships had deteriorated. Managers in Hospital B were more 
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Hospital B 	 Doctor-Manage 
Doctors 	Managers 	Total Sample 	Difference 
in % Points 
1 Much Worse 	1 	6.7% 	0 	0.0% 	1 	5.0% 	7% 
2 Worse 	 3 20.0% 	1 	20.0% 	4 	20.0% 	0% 
3 No Change 
4 Better 
5 Much Better 
Count 
Mean Rating 
2 13.3% 2 40.0% 4 20.0% -27% 
8 53.3% 1 20.0% 9 45,0% 33% 
1 6.7% 1 20.0% 2 10.0% -13% 
15 100% 5 100% 20 100% 
3.33 3.40 3.35 
Managers Total Sample 
Doctor-Manage 
Difference 
in % Points 
14 2% 50 3% 4% 
104 12% 247 16% 10% 
134 16% 291 20% 8% 
462 54% 725 48% -14% 
135 16% 189 13% -8% 
849 100% 1502 100% 
3.71 3.50 
Nation 
1 Much Worse 
2 Worse 
3 No Change 
4 Better 
5 Much Better 
Count 
Mean Rating 
Doct 
36 6% 
143 22% 
157 24% 
263 40% 
54 8% 
653 100% 
3.24 
Hospital A 	 Doctor-Manage 
Managers 	Total Sample 	Difference 
in % Points 
1 12.5% 0 0.0% 1 4.8% 13% 
5 62.5% 0.0% 5 23.8% 63% 
1 12.5% 1 7. 7% 2 9.5% 5% 
1 12.5% 8 61.5% 9 42.9% -49% 
0 0.0% 4 30.8% 4 19.0% -31% 
8 100% 13 100% 21 100% 
2.25 4.23 3.48 
1 Much Worse 
2 Worse 
3 No Change 
4 Better 
5 Much Better 
Count 
Mean Rating 
Docto 
pessimistic than their consultants and more pessimistic than the national sample since less 
than half believed that relationships had improved. This may be related to the perception in 
Question 3 that consultants are achieving their own objectives to a greater extent than 
managers, suggesting a feeling of powerlessness on the part of managers. 
Table 8.7: Results of Question 5a 
These results indicate that the sampling method did not account for the difference between 
the Hospital A and national surveys since the Hospital B sampling approach mimicked that 
of Hospital A to a large extent. It was Hospital A's extreme response to this question which 
had prompted a detailed comparison with another Trust to test the impact of sample size and 
selection procedure. 
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Doctor Managers Total Sample 
Hospital B 
1 Much Worse 
2 Worse 
3 No Chang 
4 Better 
5 Much Better 
Count 
Mean Rating 
Doctors Managers Total Sample 
Doctor-Manage 
Difference 
in % Points" 
1 7% 0 0% 1 5% 7% 
2 13% 3 50% 5 24% -37% 
3 20% 0 0% 3 14% 20% 
7 47% 3 50% 10 48% -3% 
2 13% 0 0% 2 10% 13% 
15 100% 6 100% 21 100% 
3.47 3.00 3.33 
Nationa 
1 Much Worse 
2 Worse 
3 No Change 
4 Better 
5 Much Better 
Count 
Mean Rating 
Managers Total Sample 
Doctor-Manag 
Difference 
in % Points 
9 1% 9 1% 18 196 0% 
160 25% 87 10% 247 17% 14% 
131 20% 112 13% 243 16% 7% 
315 48% 570 67% 885 59% -18% 
36 6% 76 9% 112 7% -3% 
651 100% 854 100% 1505 100% 
3.32 3.72 3.55 
Hospital A 	 Doctor-Manage 
Difference 
in % Points 
2 25.0% 0 0.0% 2 10.0% 25% 
1 12.5% 0 0.0% 1 5.0% 13% 
3 37.5% 2 16.7% 5 25.0% 21% 
2 25.0% 8 66.7% 10 50.0% -42% 
0 0.0% 2 16.7% 2 10.0% -17% 
8 100% 12 100% 20 100% 
2.63 4.00 3.45 
1 Much Worse 
2 Worse 
3 No Change 
4 Better 
5 Much Better 
Count 
Mean Rating 
8.7 Question 6a. Since the change to Trust status, how has the service 
to patients changed? 
Consultants and managers were asked to rate whether they thought the service to patients had 
deteriorated or improved over the period. 
Table 8.8: Results of Question 6a 
All sample groups responded that they believed services to patients had improved, with the 
exception of Hospital A consultants who on average believed that services had deteriorated. 
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Managers Total Sample 
Doctor-Manage 
Difference 
in % Points 
3 50% 9 45% -7% 
2 33% 2 10% -33% 
1 17% 9 45% 40% 
6 100% 20 100% 
1.67 2.00 
1 Moved closer together 	6 	43% 
2 Not changed 	 0 	0% 
3 Moved further apart 	8 	57% 
Count 	 14 100% 
Mean Rating 	 2.14 
Hospital B 
Doctor 
Doctor-Manage 
Difference 
in % Points 
331 50% 583 69% 914 61% -19% 
136 21% 155 18% 291 19% 3% 
188 29% 114 13% 302 20% 15% 
655 100% 852 100% 1507 100% 
1.78 1.45 1.59 
1 Moved closer together 
2 Not changed 
3 Moved further apart 
Count 
Mean Rating 
Hospital A 
1 Moved closer togethe 
2 Not changed 
3 Moved further apart 
Count 
Mean Rating 
Managers Total Sample 
Doctor-Manage 
Difference 
in % Points 
1 11% 9 69% 10 46% -58% 
1 11% 3 23% 4 18% -12% 
7 78% 1 8% 8 36% 70% 
9 100% 13 100% 22 100% 
2.67 1.38 1.91 
8.8 Question 7. Since the change to Trust status, do you think the 
goals of consultants and managers have 	? 
Moved closer together 	Not changed 	Moved further apart 
The majority of all respondents in the national sample believed that the goals of managers and 
consultants had moved closer together. Managers in Hospital A and Hospital B also believed 
that objectives had converged. The majority of consultants in both hospitals, however, 
believed that goals had moved further apart. The Hospital A consultants were again the most 
negative since only 11% believed that goals of the two groups had moved closer together 
compared to 43% in Hospital B. 
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Hospital B Consultants Nurses Managers Chief Executive Trust Board Purchasers 	Other 	C 
Across All Categories 
Doctors 32% 2% 18% 25% 5% 15% 3% 100% 
Managers 40% 7% 20% 20% 2% 11% 0% 100% 
Total 34% 3% 19% 24% 4% 14% 2% 100% 
National Consultants Nurses Managers Chief Executive Trust Board Purchasers 	Other 	Count 
% Across All Categories 
Doctors 36% 4% 20% 11% 8% 18% 3% 100% 
Managers 39% 6% 21% 7% 9% 15% 3% 100% 
Total 38% 5% 20.5% 8.5% 9% 16% 3% 100% 
Hospital A Consultants 
% Across All Categories 
Nurses Managers Chief Executive Trust Board Purchasers 	Other 	Coun 
Doctors 22% 0% 22% 42% 2% 2% 10% 100% 
Managers 42% 1% 24% 20% 7% 1% 5% 100% 
Total 34% 1% 23% 28% 5% 2% 7% 100% 
8.9 Question 8. Which group, in your view, has the most control over 
the following aspects of service? 
(a) Development of service, (b) Availability of facilities (e.g. beds, theatres), 
(c) Medical staffing levels, (d) Nurse staffing levels, (e) Freedom to admit in-patients, 
Decision to treat patient 
Table 8.10.- Results of Question 8 
The balance of power over resources in the national sample (where each area of control is 
given equal weight) is perceived to lie with consultants, and this view is shared by doctors 
and managers. Consultants have the major share of control in medical staffing levels, freedom 
to admit in-patients and the decision to treat patients. Managers on the other hand are 
perceived to have control over facilities (e.g. beds and theatres) and nurse staffing levels 
(which comprises a third of the budget) while purchasers are believed to have the main say in 
development of services. The overall ranking of control, using a crude aggregation of 
unweighted votes, emerges as (1) consultants, (2) managers and (3) purchasers, and this view 
is shared by both the consultant and manager groups. 
Hospital B's response shares similar features. The highest overall proportion of control is 
attributed by all groups to consultants, but the Chief Executive himself is regarded as the 
second most influential, followed by the managers. 
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Hospital A consultants perceive the Chief Executive as being the dominant agent, with 
purchasers seen as having very little control. The only category in which consultants believe 
they have control lies in the decision to treat patients. Doctors believe that managers control 
admission of patients whereas managers believe that doctors have this power. Managers also 
believe that doctors have the most control over medical staffing levels whereas the consultants 
themselves believe that this power resides with the Chief Executive. The CEO is regarded by 
both groups as having control in development of services whereas both Hospital B and the 
national sample believe that purchasers control this area. On balance Hospital A consultants 
believe that the Chief Executive controls the hospital whereas managers believe that 
consultants have overall power across the areas described. 
8.10 Conclusion 
The main purpose of the Hospital A/Hospital B comparison is to test the impact of sampling 
methods in the national survey by examining divergences from the national results, while at 
the same time providing a case study in which similar market conditions allow literal 
replication (Yin, 1994). 
The litmus test set up at the outset consisted of questions 5a and 6a which yielded a strong 
mood of pessimism among Hospital A consultants that was not reflected in the national 
sample. If Hospital B were to perform more like Hospital A than the national sample then 
this would provide evidence to support the view that selection methods in the national 
survey had biased the sample towards management-friendly consultants through its selection 
process and through the smaller target of 10 rather than 20 consultants. In the event, the 
questionnaire survey in Hospital B produced results which were consistent with the national 
pattern of responses and were at odds with Hospital A. This suggested that Hospital A's 
results were a product of the local hospital profile rather than of sampling methods. It meant 
that the national results could legitimately be interpreted as a generalisation of consultant 
opinion, rather than the view of a sub-section of consultants. The results allowed the 
conclusion to be drawn that the Trust samples in the national survey were neither too small 
nor too selective on the part of Chief Executives to allow general conclusions to be drawn 
about the population of consultants in the country. 
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CHAPTER 9. QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY: OPEN QUESTIONS 
This chapter draws together the findings of the open questions completed as part of the 
national survey. The open questions were included in the first place to enhance the overall 
design of the questionnaire. Their purpose was to add stimulation to the completion process 
and to counteract boredom and fatigue which could set in partway through the questionnaire. 
They were inserted in the second half of the questionnaire after a series of closed questions as 
an opportunity for creative thinking. The last question gave extra space for comments to 
enable respondents to round off the process and provide a feeling of completion. 
A coding structure was devised for each question on the basis of a review of transcripts taken 
from one third of the sample. The coding structure which emerged was then applied to the 
full sample of respondents. 
9.1 Question 5b. 	Why has the relationship changed between 
consultants and managers? 
85% of responses to this question was encapsulated within five broad categories: (i) 
priorities/objectives, (ii) clinicians in management, (iii) communication & information, (iv) 
leadership and (v) consultants' feelings and power. A further four categories were identified, 
all of which are dealt with in some detail below. 
The responses were coded according to the primary reason where two or more factors were 
built into the same comment. The first three groupings, i.e. (i) priorities/objectives, (ii) 
clinicians in management and (iii) communications, inevitably have strong areas of overlap 
since the line of causation tends to be described as greater involvement by clinicians in 
management which leads to better communication and which then stimulates appreciation of 
each other's point of view and a convergence of goals or objectives. Two thirds of responses 
covered this area (875/1313, 67%), 80% of whom (704/875) associated it with an 
improvement in relationships between doctors and managers. 
Altogether 66% (865/1313) of respondents gave positive accounts of changed relations with 
only 22% (283/1313) of explanations describing deteriorating relationships. Reference to 
Question 5a in Chapter 7 (Table 7.17) indicates that 1,504 people attached a rating to the 
change in relationship between consultant and manager. 17% (109/653) doctors and 10% 
(82/851) managers declined to answer the open Question 5b to explain 'why' relationships 
had changed. 95% (283/297) of people who thought that relationships had deteriorated (Q5a) 
provided an explanation (Q5b). Only 56% (165/293) of those who thought there had been 
`no change' proffered an explanation. Likewise 95% (865/914) of those who observed an 
improvement in relations gave explanations. There is no bias, therefore, in the tendency to 
supply answers to Q5b between those who take a positive view and those who take a 
negative view of change. 
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Figure 9.1: Responses to Question 5b 
Open Question Coded Responses to Question 5b - Why have relationships changed between consultants and managers? 
The same cateaow of response may aaaly to aositive chanste and negative chance 
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Figure 9.1 lists the detailed categories within each heading and gives examples of some of the 
vocabulary used, e.g. 'frustration' and 'demoralisation' to describe consultants' feelings. The 
table below summarises the frequency of responses across the headings described here and 
links them to the response to 5a which showed whether manager-consultant relationships 
have improved or deteriorated. 
Table 9.1: Responses to Question 5b 
5b Doctors Managers Total % Improvement Deterioration No Change 
Priorities/Objectives 164 294 458 35% 324 105 29 
Clinicians in Management 64 194 258 20% 243 9 6 
Communication 83 76 159 12% 137 16 6 
Leadership 75 33 108 8% 78 24 6 
Trend 56 43 99 8% 20 9 70 
Consultants' Feelings 20 42 62 5% 22 28 12 
Consultant Power 35 26 61 5% 8 48 5 
Resources 22 22 44 3% 5 35 4 
Other 8 17 25 2% 7 5 13 
Market Structure 11 11 22 2% 5 3 14 
Trust status 6 11 17 /% 16 1 0 
Grand Total 544 769 1313 100% 865 283 165 
Question 5a Sample 653 851 1504 914 297 293 
5b response as % of 5a 83% 90% 87/0 95% 95% 56% 
9.1.1 Priorities/Objectives 
Table 9.2: 5b Responses Linked to 5a Ratings: Priorities/Objectives 
5a Ratings : Much Worse Worse No Change Better Much Better Total 
Doctors 10 49 9 83 13 164 
Managers 4 42 20 181 47 294 
Total Priorities/Objectives 14 91 29 264 60 458 
Figure 9.2: 5b Responses  Linked to 5a Ratings: Priorities/Objectives  
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35% (458/1313) of respondents described the changes in terms of the goals or objectives of 
consultants and managers. On the positive side this was described as a `sharing of 
objectives', 'working together', 'pragmatism', 'co-operation and collaboration' between the 
groups and accounted for 37% (324/865) of responses of all those who thought that 
relationships had improved. Within the managers' group only 16% (46/294) of respondents 
believed that issues of priorities and objectives were linked to a deterioration in 
doctor/manager relationships whereas 36% of consultants (59/164) believed this to be the 
case. However, the majority of both groups thought that relationships had improved due to 
better co-operation and collaboration. Examples of the comments below highlight whether the 
respondent was a consultant or manager (showing in brackets the questionnaire response 
number for audit purposes) and links it to the nature of the response to the previous question 
5a: 
Consultant - (3091) (Response 5a: Better) On most issues there has been an 
improvement as Consultants' desires to expand services have fitted in with Trust 
desires to become 'leading edge'. 
Consultant - (1253) (Response 5a: Better) Both understand the financial footing. 
Consultant - (1522) (Response 5a: Better) In some respects managers are 
prepared to listen to consultants (some) more, although the bottom line is almost 
always financial. 
Manager - (1536) (Response 5a: Better) Contracting and business development 
has led to closer working and understanding of clinical needs in relation to 
corporate constraints. 
Consultant - (2524) (Response 5a: Better) There has been an increase in 
awareness of managerial problems by consultants. 
Manager (1960) (Response 5a: Better) Managers have focused on helping 
consultants to achieve their objectives as a method of motivating consultants to 
manage resources more effectively. 
Manager (CEO) (1441) (RespOnse 5a: Better) Better understanding of each 
other's roles and grown in respect 
To some extent this convergence of objectives has been a by-product of poor external 
relations with the purchaser and a means of dealing with adversity created by the internal 
market: 
Consultant (1677) (Response 5a: Better) The only way to cope with the immense 
pressure caused by the internal market system is by co-operation. Also, in the 
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new system consultants feel less secure and are forced therefore to be more co 
operative. 
Manager (2181) (Response Sa: Better) Fostered a climate of 'working together'; 
still a long way to go; the HAs have become the focus for being responsible for 
lack of resources etc. 
Consultant (4163) (Response Sa: Better) United against a common foe! - the 
Purchasers who are seen as incompetent. 
Consultant (2005) (Response 5a: Better) Common aim of survival 
The negative side of objectives/priorities, however, was given by people who felt that 
relationships had deteriorated. 37% (105/283) of this group believed that there was a conflict 
of interests between the needs of the individual patient and the overall financial aim of the 
Trust, that objectives were not shared and that the financial footing adopted by the Trust had 
led to pressures and conflict. Examples of verbatim comments include: 
Consultant (1254) (Response 5a: Much Worse) Conflict of interest. Trust 
financially oriented at all costs. Consultants patient oriented at all costs. 
Manager (1494) (Response 5a: Worse) The need for financial control 
fundamentally clashes with the increasing amount of clinical need - neither side 
believes that the other understands their pressures. 
Consultant (2813) (Response 5a: Much Worse) They work to di, fferent agendas 
with 'lip service' paid to common ground. 
Consultant (1527) (Response Sa: Worse) Pressure of clinical work means contact 
is minimal; aims and objectives are not clearly shared by these two groups. 
Consultant - (2175) (Response 5a: Worse) Loss of common objective - to provide 
quality of care. 
Consultant - (5474) (Response 5a : Worse) Many of the senior managers have 
found a conflict between their professional (e.g. nursing) views and Trust 
Priorities - the vision of a National Health Service has been replaced by a small 
business mentality. 
Manager - (2846) (Response to 5a: Worse) There is still an uneven balance; 
some clinicians are signed up to business but others are clinically led only. 
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Only 6% of individuals commenting in this category associated priorities/objectives with 
`no change' in the relationship between consultants and managers in question 5a. The 
majority (71%) believed that priorities/objectives were associated with an improvement 
in relationships. A tone of 'it was ever thus' emerges from respondents who believed 
that relationships had not changed: 
Consultant - (3099) (Response 5a : No Change) The managers generally seem to 
have very little understanding of the ethos of the hospital and patient care. They 
only seem to wish to balance the books. 
Manager (2265) (Response 5a : No Change) There is still a culture of 'them and 
us' irrespective of which stance you are taking - even when some clinicians are 
also managers. 
Consultant - (2143) (Response 5a : No Change) Some consultants still feel distant 
to the aims etc of the Trust. 
9.1.2 Clinicians in Management 
Table 9.3: Sb Responses Linked to 5a Ratings: Clinicians in Management 
5a Ratings Much Worse Worse No Change Better Much Better Total 
Doctors 2 3 4 46 9 64 
Managers 4 2 141 47 194 
Total Clinicians in Management 2 7 6 187 56 258 
Figure 9.3: 5b Responses Linked to 5a Ratings: Clinicians in Management 
Involvement of clinicians in management has provided the vehicle for much of the movement 
towards common aims and objectives and 20% (258/1313) of all respondents described this 
factor as the reason for relationship changes. Unlike the preceding factor (priorities/ 
objectives) which accounted for more than a third of positive and negative change alike, the 
issue of clinicians in management was highlighted mainly by those who felt that changes had 
138 
been constructive. 28% (243/865) of individuals who observed improved relationships 
referred to directorate structure and management involvement of clinicians as positive reasons 
while only 3% (9/283) of those who observed deterioration gave this as their primary reason. 
Some consultants saw a division and growing tension between those involved in the 
management process and those who are not. 94% of respondents on this group (243/258) felt 
that changes had improved relationships and 75% of the group (194/258) were managers, 
compared to an overall representation of 59% (769/1313) in the sample. 
The idea of two consultant camps, representing those engaged in management and those not, 
was articulated by consultants: 
Consultant ( 2146) (Response to 5a: No Change) Consultants not in management 
continue to be suspicious and fear control from outside; those involved in 
management are so because they did not previously suffer from these delusions. 
Consultant (1104) (Response to 5a: No Change) Relationships here have always 
been quite good but there is tension developing between clinical directors and 
their consultant colleagues. 
Consultant (3229) (Response to 5a: Better) In my case better thru' my work as 
clinical director. For many consultants not involved in management, worse. 
The overlap between priorities/objectives in the earlier classification and the use of 
management structures to effect this was made explicit in responses such as: 
Service/Business Manager (3234) (Response to 5a: Much Better) Clinical 
directorate structure and development of this has resulted in greater 
understanding of each others' objectives/concerns + much more joint working, 
e.g. on service developments, business plans etc. 
Consultant - Board Director (1182) (Response to 5a: Better) More involvement 
of clinicians in management. Decisions more explicit; but then that means some 
consultants don't like it. 
The preponderance of managers, i.e. (188/258) managers compared to (55/258) doctors , 
reflecting that clinicians in management is 'a good thing' is highlighted, e.g. 
Manager (1361) (Response to 5a: Much Better) Consultants have been brought 
into management, pricing, contracting, quality, patient issues. 
Manager (CEO) (2860) (Response to 5a: Much Better) With the involvement of 
clinical directors at the heart of the decision making process; consultants have 
felt that they can influence what happens. 
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9.1.3 Communication 
Table 9.4: 5b Responses Linked to 5a Ratings: Communication 
5a Ratings . Much Worse Worse No Change Better Much Better Total 
Doctors 3 11 6 54 9 83 
Managers 2 56 18 76 
Total Communication 3 13 6 110 27 159 
Figure 9.4: 5b Responses Linked to 5a Ratings: Communication 
Communication leads on from the issue of clinical involvement in management and the 
creation of directorate structures. 12% of respondents overall (159/1313) highlighted 
communication and information as the reason for changed relationships, 86% of whom 
(137/159) attributed it to improvements while 10% (16/159) of these people considered that 
communication had deteriorated. 
More doctors responded in terms of communication than did managers, representing 52% 
(83/159) of the group. While the overall impression was one of improvement, the tone of 
managers was decidedly more positive since 97% (74/76) felt that communication had 
improved with 24% (18/76) saying that relationships were much better. 76% (63/83) of 
doctors felt that communication had improved; 11% (9/83) believed it was much better with 
17% (14/83) claiming it had deteriorated. 
The overlap between communication and clinicians in management was apparent in the logic 
of some responses which stressed day to day contact and working towards the same goals: 
Consultant (1799) (Response to 5a : Much Better) More communication between 
groups. Generally working towards same goals. More understanding of each 
other's problems and united against central bureaucracy. 
Consultant (2140) (Response to 5a : Better) Some more discussion; an attempt to 
make smaller directorates and therefore allow better (i. e. fuller) representation of 
specialties. 
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Consultant (1995) (Response to 5a: Better) Manager/clinician divide has 
diminished through personal contact and escalating number of meetings to 
decide policy. 
Manager (2 134) (Response to 5a: Much Better) Communication improved; 
consultants are more involved in decision making and better able to make 
choices because they are better managed. 
Consultant (2855) (Response to 5a: Better) More day to day contact with 
managers of directorates; hence improved understanding of differing 
roles/stresses; more senior managers not obviously aware of local issues. 
Consultant (2523) (Response to Sa: Better) Common aims when communication 
is good. 
Diverging views within the same Trust show how managers' positive views may be at 
with the clinical perspective: 
Manager (1031) (Response to 5a: Better) Increased communication - working 
together in partnership. 
Consultant (1035) (Same Trust as 1031) (Response to Sa: No Change) 
Communication poor. Money always available for 'prestige projects'. Money 
not available for clinical services. 
Some consultants took a grim satisfaction in managers' new obligation to talk to the 
since Trust status: 
Consultant (2232) (Response to 5a: Better) They now do have to communicate on 
a regular basis. 
Consultant (2274) (Response to 5a: Better) Because they have to talk now. 
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9.1.4 Leadership and Management Calibre 
Table 9.5: 5b Responses Linked to 5a Ratings: Leadership and Management Calibre 
5a Ratings : Much Worse Worse No Change Better Much Better Total 
Doctors 5 12 5 37 16 75 
Managers 7 1 16 9 33 
Total Leadership 5 19 6 53 25 108 
Figure 9.5: 5b Responses Linked to 5a Ratings: Leadership and Management Calibre 
Leadership and management calibre was highlighted by 8% of respondents (108/1313) as the 
reason for change. This pattern was reflected across the positive and negative divide with 9% 
of improvement and 8% of deterioration votes being explained by this factor. Over two 
thirds of these respondents were consultants. 
Leadership quality was selected by 14% of doctors in the sample (75/544) compared to only 
4% of managers (33/769). The comments were generally positive with 76% (25/33) of 
managers and 71% of doctors (53/75) suggesting an improvement in relationships. The calibre 
of the CEO was noted in both positive and negative contexts and, unlike the previous three 
categories, the issue of leadership and management quality was capable of being separated 
from Trust status: 
Consultant (1424) (Response to 5a: Much Better) Excellent CE who knows how 
to deal with consultants, patients, staff and builds up a good team. Good 
chairman and less local political interference from councillors). 
Consultant (2590) (Response to 5a: No Change) Almost uniquely good 
relationship in the hospital before and after trust status; excellent CE/DGM 
inspires confidence and loyalty in consultants and managers through being 
obviously interested in services for patients rather than self seeking. 
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Consultant (2629) (Response to 5a: Better) Excellent CE who listens responsively 
to medical staff and vice versa; good team work 
Manager (2029) (Response to 5a: Worse) I don't think this worsening is due to 
Trust status, more a lax management style has resulted in minor problems 
becoming much more severe. This hopefully will change with a new Chief Exec. 
The notion of 'one man's meat is another's poison' is again apparent in the critical tone of a 
consultant and the optimistic tone of a manager within the same Trust: 
Consultant (2181a) (Response to 5a: Worse) Numerous changes in managemen 
Manager (2181b) - Same trust as above - (Response to 5a: Much better) During 
the last six months change of CE and radical change of culture and working 
arrangements, 
Consultants may spend over thirty years in the same hospital, starting from their 
appointment in their thirties and ending at retirement. One of the important dynamics 
between consultants and managers within hospitals is due to the transience of managers who 
are pursuing their career and the stability of the consultant population who have reached the 
top of their career ladder. It would seem that implementation of Trust status has had the 
desired effeci of improving the quality of management through changes in the management 
structure and in making Trusts more attractive to career managers: 
Consultant (1817) (Response to 5a: Worse) Managers tend to be transient but 
doctors feel a commitment to the service and are left with the consequences of cost 
saving procedures which can affect services. 
Consultant (1318) (Response to 5a: Better) Management have certainly 
remained in post longer. 
Consultant (2003) (Response to 5a: Much Better) The new managers on the 
whole are more attuned with the consultants body - less confrontational attitudes 
Manager (2170) (Response to 5a: Better) Consultants have experienced the 
benefits of effective management within an organisation which previously had 
little or no business focused culture. 
Consultant (2895) (Response to 5a : Better) Higher quality managers with a 
more developed management structure. 
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9.1.5 Consultants' Feelings and Consultant Power 
Table 9.6: 5b Responses Linked to 5a Ratings: Consultants' Feelings and Power 
5a Ratings Much Worse Worse No Change Better Much Better Total 
Doctors 11 33 4 7 55 
Managers 6 26 14 17 5 68 
Total Cons. Feelings /Power 17 59 18 24 5 123 
Figure 9.6: 5b Responses Linked to 5a Ratings: Consultants' Feelings and Power 
10% of all respondents described consultants' feelings and power status as the reason for 
changes in the relationship between consultants and managers. Only 4% (30/865) of those 
who saw an improvement in relationships used these factors to describe the change whereas 
27% (78/283) of those who saw a deterioration used this reason. Descriptions of 
consultants' feelings include the words frustration, threatened, mistrust, demoralisation, 
fearful of change, reluctance to accept or, on the positive side, realisation/acceptance and 
respect towards managers. Consultant power is described in terms like loss of authority in 
relation to managers, constrained, ignored, losing control, losing power base, marginalised, 
questioned, no support from managers, conflict over treatment or admission of patients and 
ceding control to managers. 
The response in this category was reasonably balanced with 45% (55/123) comprising 
doctors and 55`)/0 (68/123) managers. 80% of doctors (44/55) believed that loss of authority 
had diminished the relationship between the groups. A smaller, but still substantial, group of 
managers who responded in this category (32/68, 47%) observed an adverse impact on 
relationships through consultants' loss of power and esteem. 10% (55/544) of doctors 
compared to 6% (66/769) of managers responded to question 5b in these terms. In short, 
consultant views of loss of morale and authority dominated these responses. 
Consultants' Feelings 
Managers referred to consultants' conservatism to explain their dislike of rece 
developments: 
Manager (1416) (Response to 5a: Better) Some consultants feel threatened by 
continual change, some welcome it openly. 
Manager (1418) (Response to Sa: Worse) Mistrust - consultants not wanting to 
change practice even though the organisation needs to. Creates pressures. 
Manager (1443) (Response to 5a: No Change) The consultant body on the 
whole is conservative and reluctant to change. 
The market and Trust changes generated a degree of mistrust which was made explici 
Consultant (1818) (Response to Sa: Worse) General mistrust of 'market forces 
motivation. 
Manager (2031) (Response to 5a: Worse) Consultant colleagues appear 
suspicious of hoard/executive motives and are irritated by constant financial 
pressures. 
Some managers felt a degree of contempt emanating from consultants which had not changed 
with Trust status: 
Manager (2386) (Response to Sa: No Change) Although there are different 
issues, overall there is mistrust and even loathing for managers; managers need 
to adopt an 'ethical value system' to be taken seriously, otherwise they will 
always be seen as 'administrators ' or civil servants! 
Manager (5918) (Response to 5a: No Change) They treat us like dirt now, and 
they did before we went Trust. 
Consultants' Power 
A deep sense of injury emerged from some consultants and a feeling of being treated badly o 
being sidelined through lack of recognition: 
Consultant (2397) (Response to 5a: Worse) Failure to accept consultants' 
opinion if it counteracts current 'management' ideas which have no proven base 
of effectiveness; in general if anyone is wrong it is the doctor. 
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Consultant (3098) (Response to 5a: Worse) Exclusion/marginalisation of 
consultant body - many measures taken to achieve ranging from imposition of 
medical staff at senior levels to withdrawal of consultants' dining room. 
Consultant (1456) (Response to 5a: Worse) The feeling that consultants are 
simply employees of the Trust rather than the Trust being the mechanism by 
which the consultants can exercise their art. 
The opposite perspective , taken by managers, saw the consultant power base as remaining 
intact: 
Manager (1468) (Response to 5a: No Change) Always worked together; 
consultants always ensure they get their way. 
Manager (2126) (Response to 5a: No Change) Consultants still treated like 
gods and get whatever they want while everybody else has to struggle. 
A stronger view, however, conveyed a feeling of constraint and encroachment on clinical 
ground in which the balance of power had shifted away from consultants: 
Consultant (2240) (Response to 5a: Much Worse) Conflict between consultants 
and managers over admission/treatment of 
Manager (1497) (Response to 5a: Worse) Consultants appear to think that 
managers are taking away from their power base and are interfering in clinical 
matters. 
Manager (1609) (Response to 5a: Worse) They don't like their clinical 
judgement being questioned. 
The loss of consultant power, even where it produced worse consultant-manager 
relationships, was not considered to be a bad thing in all cases, showing a degree of dispassion 
if not approval: 
Consultant (1715) (Response to 5a: Worse) The strong sudden shift to financia 
emphasis and the increasing influence and power of managers (not necessarily a 
bad thing). 
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9.1.6 Resources 
Table 9.7: 5b Responses Linked to 5a Ratings: Resources 
5a Ratings : 
Doctors 
Managers 
Total Resources 
Much Worse 
3 
1 
4 
Worse 
16 
15 
31 
No Change 
4 
4 
Better 
3 
2 
5 
Much Better 
0 
Total 
22 
22 
44 
Figure 9.7: 5b Responses Linked to 5a Ratings: Resources 
Only 3% of respondents (44/1313) identified resources as the reason for changes in 
consultant/manager relationships, but among those who felt that relationships had 
deteriorated it accounted for 12% of the response (35/283). Issues of funding, resources, 
investment and control were identified as the source of conflict between doctors and 
managers. This follows on the heels of consultant power where financial priorities may 
undermine professional autonomy to practice and, likewise, it overlaps with the issue of 
priorities/objectives where service and financial aims may conflict. 
A sense of pessimism and disappointment with the internal market was conveyed: 
Consultant (1368) (Response to 5a: Much Worse) Despite very hard work we 
were going further into debt resulting in dissatisfaction and frustration. 
Manager (2025) (Response to 5a: Worse) Consultants see managers as having 
failed to obtain better resource profile from internal market. 
The tension between resource management and quality was highlighted by some: 
Consultant (1675) (Response to 5a: Worse) Financial pressure on managers has 
become so great that they are forced into imposing saving measures without 
adequate consultation or regard for quality. 
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Consultant (4429) (Response to 5a: Worse) The increasing cash crisis has 
reduced the ability to offer a quality service and the pressure on acute units to 
downgrade (merge) has dented morale severely. 
The position of service managers as bending to the demands of senior management became 
apparent: 
Manager (2532) (Response to 5a: No Change) There is more pressure to cut 
budgets and still provide a quality service; constantly under pressure from the 
Trust and higher management. 
9,1,7 Changes Over Time and Variation 
8% of respondents described changes in consultant/manager relationships in terms of trends, 
i.e. (a) initially better, now deteriorating; (b) initially worse, now better, (c) varied, and (d) 
always good (without qualifying remarks about why). The modal response of both doctors 
and managers in this category represented, on balance, no change in the relationship between 
doctors and managers. This feature would have links with other factors such as leadership 
calibre; financial pressures have a particular bearing on the varying fortunes: 
Manager (1533) (Response to 5a: No Change) There have been areas of 
improvement and areas or decline. There are obvious areas of financial 
pressure and of control in activity which affect  the relationship. 
Consultant (2007) (Response to 5a: No Change) For some it is better for others 
worse or no change - always some consultants not prepared to listen - less 
managers in this category. Trust has financial difficulties so there is a cutback in 
staff and surgery in particular. 
Manager (2m) (Response to 5a: No Change) The changes from 'much worse ' 
to 'much better' depend on the agenda; until the financial crisis I would have said 
`much better ' ; this is I think understandable. 
9.1.8 Trust Status 
Just over 1% of respondents (17/1313) used issues related to Trust status to explain changes 
in manager/consultant relationships and these were almost all (16/17) associated with positive 
change. Freedom, local control, corporate environment, decisions nearer to home and 
concentration on fewer sites were among the descriptions which were grouped under this 
heading. 
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9.1.9 Market Structure 
Nearly 2% of respondents (22/1313) identified features of market structure as explanatory 
factors, most of whom (12/22) had identified no change in the relationship with the remaining 
10 spread across the positive and negative view of change. Three sub-sets were identified 
under market structure: relationship with other Trusts; internal market forces/forces external 
to Trust; nothing to do with Trust status. 
9.2 Question 6b. Why have services to patients changed ? 
1,314 responded to this open question, compared 1505 for the closed Question 6a. This was 
similar to the 5a/5b response relationship outlined earlier which amounted to 1313/1504. 
87% (1314/1505) of people who responded to Question 6a gave an explanation of 'why' 
services to patients had changed. The majority of people who declined to give a reason were 
among those who felt that there had been no change in the service, since 30% (72/243) of the 
group did not comment compared to 7% of those who saw a deterioration and 10% of those 
who felt services had improved. 
Answers have been structured under seven headings, which are reported in descending order 
of magnitude. The frequency of responses is summarised in the table which follows. 
Detailed sub-categories are identified in Figure 9.8 which shows frequencies and gives 
examples of quotes within the sub-categories. 
Table 9.8: Response to Question 6b 
6b Doctors Managers Tote % Improvement Deterioration No Change 
Customer Care 109 259 368 28% 345 5 18 
Changes since trust status 112 192 304 23% 260 36 8 
Resources 132 106 238 18% 93 125 20 
Quality Factors 91 92 183 14% 156 20 7 
Qualified Improvement 65 58 123 9% 18 24 81 
Workload 27 32 59 4% 19 36 4 
No Impact 13 22 35 3% 2 33 
Other 3 1 4 0% 4 0 
Grand Total 552 762 1314 100% 897 246 171 
Question 6a sample 651 854 1505 997 265 243 
fib response as % of ea 85% 89% 87% 90% 93% 70% 
Each of the headings and sub-headings has been coded as a means of organising the views of 
respondents (detailed in Figure 9.8) although there is clearly some overlap between groupings. 
The factors and their sub-components are treated in greater detail in the following sections. 
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Figure 9.8: Responses to Question 6b - Frequency of Responses and Sample Quotes 
Open Question Coded Responses to Question fib - Why have services to patients changed? 
10 
Customer Care 
Frequency 28% 
20 
Quality Factors 
Frequency 14% 
30 
Resources 
Frequency 18% 
40 
Workload 
Frequency 5% 
50 
Changes 	(since Trust 
status) 
Frequency 23% 
60 
Qualified 
Improvement 
Frequency 9% 
70 
No Impact 
Frequency 3% 
11 Responsive 
Frequency 6% 
Manager (1671) 
(Response to 6a: 
Better) Much more 
responsive to 
patients' comments 
and a change in how 
timely our responses 
are. More focused in 
quality delivery. 
20 Quality 
Frequency 3% 
Manager (1667) (Response 
to 6a: Worse) No emphasis 
on quality of care given - no 
time to see projects through 
no time, no time! 
Consultant (1670) (Response 
to 6a: Worse) Quantity and 
quality of care has 
remarkably deteriorated. 
30 Resources 
Frequency 10% 
Consultant (2807) (Response to 6a: 
Worse) Multifactorial - less 
resources, more demand  , poorer 
nurses, less commitment of staff to 
patient care, changing practices of 
junior hospital doctors. 
Consultant (1456) (Response to 6a: 
Worse) Too many demands on an 
underfunded service. Probably not 
a Trust issue, rather a central 
government one. 
40 Workload 
Frequency 1% 
51 Service configuration/ 
development 
Frequency 3% 
Consultant (1997) 
(Response to 6a: Better) 
Development of 
specialist services i.e. 
one stop clinics, 
specialist appointments 
etc 
some, worse for 
 
71 Always been 
themselves to 
 
61 Better for 
others! Some 
things better, 
others worse, e.g. 
access better, 
quality worse/ 
Patients Charter 
offset by 
deteriation 
elsewhere 
Frequency 8 % 
good - staff still 
strive/ work hard! 
'killing' 
achieve 
everything 
Frequency 6% 
12 Patient focused 
Frequency 6% 
21 Care, e.g. staff stressed, 
rushed 
Consultant (2387) (Response 
to 6a: Worse) Too much 
pressure on those delivering 
the service to work happily 
and effectively. 
Manager (2569) (Response 
to 6a: Worse) Patients 
discharged early, they feel 
their treatment is rushed; 
also staff are much busier 
and cannot always give the 
necessary time. 
31 More - through purchaser 
negotiations 
41 Demand on 
service; workload 
increase; 
overheated 
hospital 
Frequency 1% 
52 Clinicians in 
management 
62 Initially better, 
then worse 
Figure 9.8: Responses to Question fib - Frequency of Responses and Sample Quotes 
Open Question Coded Responses to Question 6b - Why have services to patients changed? 
10 
Customer Care 
13 Consultant focus 
on individual patient 
(better/worse) 
20 
Quality Factors 
22 Infrastructure/ facilities/ 
environment 
Frequency 1% 
Consultant (1428) (Response 
to 6a: Better) Lots of 
changes to the fabric of the 
building and change of 
attitude of the staff. Waiting 
times come down. 
Consultant (1874) (Response 
to 6a: Better) Environment 
improved: more services 
provided locally; more 
consultants employed; more 
efficient organisation 
because people feel 
empowered and involved. 
30 
Resources 
40 
Workload 
50 
Changes 	(since Trust 
status) 
60 
Qualified 
Improvement 
70 
No Impact 
32 Targeting - good 8 bad. Bad, e.g. 
diverted to bureaucracy 
42 Higher volume 
of service, 
throughput; 
service 
development 
Frequency 2% 
53 Team working/ 
communication! 
cohesion 	Frequency 
2% 
63 Superficially 
better 
Frequency 1% 
Figure 9.8: Responses to Question 6b - Frequency of Responses and Sample Quotes 
Open Question Coded Responses to Question fib - Why have services to patients changed? 
10 
Customer Care 
14 Customer 
Orientated 
Frequency 2% 
20 
Quality Factors 
30 
Resources 
40 
Workload 
50 
Changes 	(since Trust 
status) 
60 
Qualified 
Improvement 
70 
No Impact 
23 Waiting list/ times/ 
access 
Frequency 5% 
Manager (2763) (Response 
to 6a: Better) Forced us to 
consider what we do well or 
not and to plan around this; 
waiting times are 
dramatically improved; 
services have become more 
focused. 
Manager (2882) (Response 
to 6a: Better) Overall the 
service has become better 
but mainly due to reducing 
waiting times for some 
groups of patients; however 
quality of service has not 
significantly improved and 
operating two tier quality 
standards for GPs has 
created tensions. 
33 No increase in relation to 
workload 
Frequency 2% 
43 Quantity 
reduced 
Frequency 1`1/0 
54 Effort/ focus/ 
awareness of managers, 
doctors & Trust 
Frequency Pk 
Consultant (1368) 
(Response to 6a: Better) 
Increased effort and 
better organisation 
Consultant (1423) 
(Response to 6a: Better) 
Better focus of 
management and doctors 
15 Emphasis on 
patient/ patient's 
perspective 
Frequency 5% 
24 Complaints 
Frequency 1% 
34 Allocation of resources 
44 Limits imposed 
on amount of 
treatment; forced 
to work to contract 
55 Organisation 
Frequency 1°/0 
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Open Question Coded Responses to Question 6b - Why have services to patients changed? 
10 
Customer Care 
20 
Quality Factors 
30 
Resources 
33 No increase in relation to 
workload 
Frequency 2% 
40 
Workload 
43 Quantity 
reduced 
Frequency 1% 
50 
Changes 	(since Trust 
status) 
60 
Qualified 
Improvement 
70 
No Impact 
14 Customer 
Orientated 
Frequency 2% 
23 Waiting list/ times/ 
access 
Frequency 5% 
Manager (2763) (Response 
to 6a: Better) Forced us to 
consider what we do well or 
not and to plan around this; 
waiting times are 
dramatically improved: 
services have become more 
focused. 
Manager (2882) (Response 
to 6a: Better) Overall the 
service has become better 
but mainly due to reducing 
waiting times for some 
groups of patients; however 
quality of service has not 
significantly improved and 
operating two tier quality 
standards for GPs has 
created tensions. 
54 Effort/ focus/ 
awareness of managers, 
doctors & Trust 
Frequency 7% 
Consultant (1368) 
(Response to 6a: Better) 
Increased effort and 
better organisation 
Consultant (1423) 
(Response to 6a: Better) 
Better focus of 
management and doctors 
15 Emphasis on 
patient/ patient's 
perspective 
Frequency 5% 
24 Complaints 
Frequency 1/0 
34 Allocation of resources 
44 Limits imposed 
on amount of 
treatment; forced 
to work to contract 
55 Organisation 
Frequency 1% 
Figure 9.8: Responses to Question 6b - Frequency of Responses and Sample Quotes 
Open Question Coded Responses to Question fib - Why have services to patients changed? 
10 
Customer Care 
20 
Quality Factors 
30 
Resources 
40 
Workload 
50 
Changes (since Trust 
status) 
60 
Qualified 
Improvement 
70 
No Impact 
27 Choice - less for referrers 
19 Patients Charter 
(sometimes pejorative) 
Frequency 4% 
Manager (1031) 
(Response to 6a: No 
Change) Reliance on 
conforming to 
Patients Charter 
instead of 'proper' 
clinical quality issues. 
Consultant (1799) 
(Response to 6a: 
Much Better) Quality 
of service and 
implementation of 
Patients Charter have 
forced everyone to 
look at quality from 
the patient's point of 
view. 
68 Emphasis' priorities 
Frequency 6% 
Consultant (1826) 
(Response to 6a: Worse) 
Not directly linked to 
trust status. more to do 
with the reforms. Too 
much has been spent on 
administration/ 
management by clinical 
staff - the balance is 
wrong; also the impact of 
insufficient resources. 
Manager (2027) 
(Response to 6a: Much 
Worse) Greater financial 
pressures have led to 
prioritisation which has 
not benefited the majority 
of patients; staff are less 
valued leading to poor 
attitude towards patients. 
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9.2.1 Customer Care 
Table 9.9: 61) Responses Linked to Oa Ratings: Customer Care 
6a Ratings : Much Worse Worse No Change Better Much Better Total 
Doctors 1 6 4 84 14 109 
Managers 1 5 7 216 30 259 
Total Customer Care 2 11 11 300 44 368 
Figure 9.9: Oh Responses Linked to 6a Ratings: Customer Care 
The expression 'customer care' was introduced with the internal market and some 
respondents have used it as a means of describing the change in focus towards the users of the 
service, namely the patient. Patient focused was another popular expression which was used 
as jargon or short-hand to mean a change in perspective away from staff or organisational 
convenience towards the patient. The umbrella concept of customer care accounted for 28% 
of the primary factors used to explain changes in the service to patients and, among those 
who believed that services had improved, accounted for 38% of comments (345/897) 
compared to 5% (13/254) of respondents who thought that services had deteriorated. 
This was the most popular area of comment among managers with 34% (259/762) describing 
service changes in these terms compared to 20% (109/552) of doctors. Both groups perceive 
these factors as having a beneficial effect on services to patients, with 95% (247/259) of 
managers and 90% (98/109) of doctors associating customer care factors with better or much 
better services. 
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9.2.2 Changes Since Trust Status 
Table 9.10: Oh Responses Linked to Oa Ratings: Changes Since Trust Status 
6a Ratings : Much Worse Worse No Change Better Much Better Total 
Doctors 22 4 78 8 112 
Managers 1 13 4 146 28 192 
Total Changes Since Trust Stat 1 35 8 224 36 304 
Figure 9.10: 66 Responses Linked to 6a Ratings: Changes Since Trust Status 
Changes since Trust status account for 23% of responses, the two largest sub-groups of 
which concern the effort and emphasis invested by the Trust organisation to improve patient 
services. 14% of comments associated with poorer services (36/254) fit into this category 
compared to 29% (260/897) of comments linked to improved services. 
20% of doctors (112/552) and 25% of managers (192/762) gave examples of change related to 
Trust status as explanations for changes in service. 90% (172/92) of management responses 
linked this to improvements with 7/0 (14/192) linked to deterioration, compared to 77% 
(86/112) of doctors who were positive and 20% (22/112) who saw a negative impact in the 
changes. 
Nearly all negative comments resided in the sub-category of emphasis/priorities, with 19/22 
of the doctors' and 13/14 of managers' expressions of poor service since Trust status. The 
emphasis on, for example, throughput or volume of service was considered to be excessive 
and damaging towards quality. 
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9.2.3 Resources 
Table 9.11: Oh Responses Linked to 6a Ratings: Resources 
6a Ratings : Much Worse Worse No Change Better Much Better Total 
Doctors 6 80 10 33 3 132 
Managers 4 35 10 51 6 106 
Total Resources 10 115 20 84 9 238 
Figure 9.11: 6b Responses Linked to 6a Ratings: Resources 
Resources account for some of the issues of priority and balance included above. 18°/0 of 
comments highlighted resources or workload/funding relationships as the immediate cause of 
change to patient services. 10°A) of respondents (93/897) who believed that services had 
improved used resources in terms of increase or better targeting to explain the changes. 
Among those who felt that services had deteriorated, resources accounted for 49% of 
comments (125/254) and two thirds of the group were doctors. Surgical specialties seemed to 
feel the impact of resource pressures particularly acutely, e.g. 
Manager (1538) (Response to 6a: Worse) With regard to emergency patients 
resources not available to meet demand, beds blocked by social services patients, 
knock on effect to elective beds, cancelled operations etc. 
Consultant (1680) (Response to 6a: Worse) Loss of surgical beds, staff and 
operating lists 
Resources was the most important single category to doctors since 24')/0 (132/552) couched 
their comments in these terms compared to 14% (106/762) of managers. 65% (86/132) of 
doctors in this category believed that services had deteriorated, and resources account for 
more than half (86/160) of doctors' overall set of explanations for poorer services. Managers, 
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on the other hand, take a more positive view with 56/106 (53%) linking resource issues to 
improved services. e.g. 
Consultant (2807) (Response to 6a: Worse) Multifactorial - less resources, more 
demand, poorer nurses, less commitment of staff to patient care. changing 
practices of junior hospital doctors 
Manager (1113) (Response to 6a: Better) The service in my specialty has benefited 
by an additional £1.2 million, although the directorate negotiates direct with the 
purchaser. Without a directorate structure 1 doubt the needs of psychiatry would 
be pushed up the corporate agenda. 
9.2.4 Qualit), Factors 
Table 9.12: 6b Responses Linked to 6a Ratings: Quality Factors 
5a Ratings : 
Doctors 
Managers 
Total Quality Factors 
Much Worse 
1 
Worse 
15 
4 
19 
No Change 
5 
2 
7 
Better 
66 
75 
141 
Much Better 
4 
11 
15 
Total 
91 
92 
183 
Figure 9.12: 6b Responses Linked to 6a Ratings: Quality Factors 
Quality factors overlap to some extent with the customer care category and relate also to 
Resources. Responses were coded to the quality group if the first comment identified a 
specific factor such as complaints or waiting lists or covered the issues identified in the sub-
groups earlier. 14% of comments were coded to quality factors, and these were weighted 
towards improvements in service: 17/o (156/897) of responses associated with improvements 
fell into this category compared to 8% (20/254) of comments identified with deteriorating 
services. 
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17% of doctors (91/552) and 12% (92/762) of managers highlighted special quality issues, in 
which 96% (70/91) of doctors and 96% (88/92) of managers believed services had been 
improved through these changes. 
The verbatim comments show how the coding structure underestimates the contribution of, 
for example, complaints handling or waiting lists since the coding picks up the primary, i.e. 
the fist, main topic identified, even where an inventory of other factors follows, e.g. 
Manager (1430) (Response to 6a: Better) More emphasis on patients through 
communications, attention to complaints, improved waiting times, growth in the 
number of consultants, many quality awards. 
9.3 Question 9. Do you think the NHS climate will change with the 
new government? 
Both groups thought that there would be some change, although doctors were the most 
sceptical about the degree of change with 31% feeling there would be little change compared 
to 12% of managers. 
Table 9.13: Responses to Question 9 
Doctors Managers Total Sample 
Doctor-Manager 
Difference 
in % Points 
1 No - there will be little change 206 30.8% 102 1/.5% 308 19.8% 19% 
2 Yes - there will be some change 390 58.3% 602 67.9% 992 63.8% -9.6% 
3 Yes - significant change 73 10.9% 182 20.5% 255 16.4% -9.6% 
Count 669 /00% 886 /00% 1555 /00% 
Mean Rating .80 2.09 1.97 
9.4 Question 10a. Would you welcome change in the future? 
There was a strong appetite for change among both doctors and managers, with greater 
intensity in favour of change among doctors. This is notwithstanding the responses to 
Questions 5 and 6 in which the two groups indicated that both relationships and services to 
patients had improved over the period since Trust status. 
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Table 9.14: Responses to Question 10a 
Doctors Managers Total Sample 
Doctor-Manager 
Difference 
in % Points 
1 Yes - very much 322 48.1% 329 37.3% 651 42.0% 11% 
2 Yes - probably 249 37.2% 417 47.3% 666 42.9% -10% 
3 Not sure 71 10.6% 98 11.1% 169 10.9% 0% 
4 No - probably not 24 3.6% 36 4.1% 60 3.9% -1% 
5 	No - definitely not 4 0.6% 1 0.1% 5 0.3% 0% 
Count 670 100% 881 100% 1551 100% 
Mean Rating 1.71 1.82 1.78 
Figure 9.13.. Responses to Question 10a 
9.5 Question 10b & 10c. Why would you welcome change in the future 
and what sort of change would you like? 
This section of the question provided about four inches depth of writing space and some 
individuals used it to make lengthy comments or lists of factors. Unlike the the other open 
questions (5b) and 6b) where the primary explanation was used for coding purposes, in this 
question every piece of material has been used and coded. Up to six separate aspects of 
change were identified per individual. 
9.5.1 Coding Mechanism 
Responses have been structured within ten umbrella headings for change and up to twelve 
sub-headings in a single category have been identified during the coding process. The total 
count was 2,791 factors (equivalent to 1.8 factors for each respondent in the 1,577 sample 
base) organised according to the summary in Table 9.15 and itemised in Figure 9.14. 
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Figure 9.14: Responses to Questions 10b and 10c 
Open Question Coded Responses to Question 10 - What sort of change would you like to see and why? 
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Figure 9.14: Responses to Questions 10b and 10c 
Open Question Coded Responses to Question 10 - What sort of change would you like to see and why? 
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Figure 9.14: Responses to Questions 10b and 10c 
Open Question Coded Responses to Question 10 - What sort of change would you like to see and why? 
Table 9.15: Inventory of Responses to Questions 10b and 10c 
Code Main Category Doctors % Managers % Total % 
10 Reduce bureaucratic process 100 8% 256 16% 356 13% 
20 Resources (including staffing 197 16% 206 13% 403 14% 
30 Priorities 135 //% 180 11% 315 11% 
40 Influence 137 11% 137 9% 274 10% 
50 Market 224 19% 277 17% 501 18% 
60 Service Configuration 77 6% 113 7% 190 7% 
70 Structure 79 7% 141 9% 220 8% 
80 Technology, Staff and Facilities 41 3% 31 2% 72 3% 
90 Government/Public 79 7% 81 5% 160 6% 
100 Motivation/Local Working Practices 126 11% 174 11% 300 11% 
Total 1195 100% 1596 100% 2791 100% 
The strongest message to emerge from this question was a desire for reform or abolition of 
the internal market, which is in keeping with the new Labour Government's subsequent 
policy. 
9.5.2 Main Categories 
Five broad headings accounted for two thirds of responses, described as 'the market', 
`resources% 'reduce the bureaucratic process', 'priorities' and 'influence'. There is a strong 
degree of overlap in the meaning behind these comments. Complaints about the market, for 
example, are motivated in large measure by a feeling that resources are being misdirected 
towards wasteful bureaucratic processes due to wrong-headed priorities. The categories of 
priorities and influence overlap where respondents feel that professional and clinical influence 
is overruled by financial and market-led priorities. Nevertheless it was possible to isolate 
responses into 73 sub-categories which were coded within ten main topic headings. 
The largest single area, described as 'the market', accounted for 18% (501/2,791) of topics 
raised. Within this the emphasis varied, with the largest group (119/501- code 50c) calling for 
changes to the internal market, arguing that it was not working, was messy and fragmented 
and was not meeting its objective since money was not following the patient. A slightly 
smaller but significant number (97/501 - code 50b) argued that the internal market should be 
abolished. The dividing line between the two categories is not altogether clear because calls 
for abolition are qualified with comments such as efficiency is not rewarded so it needs 
removal or rehabilitation. Some comments had a degree of internal inconsistency where there 
were calls for abolition of the market but retention of the purchaser-provider split, and vice 
versa. Nevertheless the responses indicate the mood of respondents. The comment below 
shows how a feeling that the internal market system was not working well led to a feeling of 
waste in the cost of running it: 
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Consultant (1478) The present system is not working well. The fundamental provider 
and purchaser philosophy costing the health service a lot of money. As a result the 
people who are doing clinical work not getting enough pay - causing dissatisfaction. 
Top heavy unnecessary administration costs money. GPs are a non-homogeneous 
group, although they are branded totally 'purchaser' they are not functioning 
adequately. More money and motivation will be necessary. 
81 (code 50b) individuals called for abolition of GP Fundholding and the two tier purchasin 
split while 50 made the less specific suggestion that GP Fundholding should be amende 
(code 50aa). 70 people (code 50d) argued that competition was a problem in the context o 
market structure, which links closely to the category of responses described as `motivati 
local working practices', accounting for 11% of the sample (300/2,791), in which 156 peopl 
(code 100c) called for more co-operation and less competition in local working arrangement 
with other health colleagues. This subsequently became the underlying theme of governmen 
policy in the White Paper which was published two months after this survey w 
undertaken. 
16% of doctors' and 13% of managers' comments highlighted resource issues, mainly in term 
of the need for an increase and for resources to be set at a more realistic level (code 20a) e. 
Consultant (1456) We need to accept that the current funding of the NHS has been 
similar to a 'chain letter' and we are reaching the end of the chain. 
57 people (code 20g) recommended that funding arrangements should be reviewed and 7 
people (code 20c) called for improvements in access and equity of provision through targetin 
of resources. This linked with 30c) in which 31 people called for priorities to be set accordin 
to a form of rationing which accepts the gap between demand and funding, and with 40c) i 
which 30 people indicated that priorities should be set which are evidence-based and geare 
towards health gain, e.g. 
Manager (1113) Welcome a united view of service development that is based on 
informed purchasers/GPs taking account of evidence-based medicine rather than 
confrontational stories. 
The question of resources linked to the area described as `govemment/public' in which 12 
respondents (code 90) called for an open debate by Government about the affordability of 
services and rationing priorities. The word honesty was invoked in this context and a call for a 
realistic approach to costs, arguing that 'good health care costs, e.g 
Consultant (1365) The current system is demoralising and demotivating. A little 
honesty from the government to the people would help - like an admission that there is 
not enough money in the nation to pay for the Patient's Charter would be a start 
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13% of comments (356/2,791) pressed for a reduction in bureaucracy, with some specific 
suggestions directed towards long term contractual arrangements, e.g. 
Consultant (1130) Too much paper pushing; longer service agreements with less 
checking of individual service episodes would release energy to do more constructive 
things. Main obstacle - 6 years of competition between organisations cannot change 
overnight. 
Bureaucracy was described in terms of transaction costs which should be eliminated and 
management costs which should be reduced through changes to the management structure and 
redirection of resources to patient care. 
11% (315/2,791) of responses identified a need for a change in NHS priorities, described as a 
return to the NHS philosophy of universal provision and public service ethos, putting quality 
and clinical need of the patient first, irrespective of origin, and removal of business thinking to 
be replaced by freedom of choice. This set of comments pinpointed the need for a return to a 
value system which many felt had been eroded and was shared by doctors and managers alike. 
This was in contrast to a small number of comments (2/2,917, code 30m) which called for a 
more business like approach and 7 (code 100j) which revealed concern that changes made by 
the new Labour Government would reverse improvements made by the 1991 reforms. 
10% of responses (274/2,791) sought a change in influence, with 50 individuals (code 40a) 
calling for greater professional and clinical input as against 23 (code 40f) who wanted to 
reduce consultant influence and intransigence. The flavour of most comments worked 
towards restoring clinical input, with a move towards evidence-based decisions based on 
health gain, greater involvement of clinicians in management and Board decisions, and an 
improvement in the quality of purchaser understanding and performance. 
8% of comments (220/2,971) related to structural issues, the main one of which (66/220, 
code 70e) identified a need for longer term and strategic planning with a further 25/220 (code 
70a) looking for greater centralism and regional planning. 
Service configuration accounted for 7% (190/2,791) of comments , with 77/190 advocatin 
rationalisation through merger and service integration. 
9.5.3 Passion !! 
Questions 10b and 10c provided respondents with an opportunity to give a detailed account 
of their views. Some respondents brought a high degree of passion and commitment to their 
responses, with liberal use of exclamation marks and other means of emphasis. Four 
comments are quoted below, partly to show the range and quality of responses. It also 
allows the final word in this area to the consultants and managers who participated in the 
exercise: 
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Consultant Anaesthetist - Chair of Clinical Directorate (4399) - Responses : No-
there will be little change; Yes - very much welcome change. 
Why? I cannot face 10 more years working at the rate I am doing, carrying 
responsibility for everything from increasing service and keeping waiting lists 
down to being liable for deficiencies in my colleagues' work/teaching medical 
students/postgrad trainees/paramedics while keeping a smile plastered to my face 
in case outsiders think that something is wrong in our Trust and our image is 
ruined 
Manager (1469) Reduce purchaser bureaucracy and give Trusts greater freedom 
to develop local services. Reduce power of GPs, improve standard of GP services 
and remove their ability to make money out of the system, whilst bleeding 
secondary care to death! 
Corporate Manager - Head of Community Services Directorate (4819) -
Responses : Yes - there will be some change; Yes - probably welcome change. 
I would like to see a move away from purchasing/providing split which I find 
practically and culturally prohibitive to creativity and innovation. I would like to 
see Primary Care Led NHS mean something other than expecting busy GPs 
converted to accountants. I would like to see a return to the emphasis on 
prevention of ill health as the focus of community service and I would like to see 
significant changes to remove the demarcations between health and social care. I 
would like to see the abolition of Eligibility Criteria which perpetuate these 
demarcations and I would like to see evidence of needs led practice rather than the 
clerically contrived administrative bureaucracy currently inhibiting dynamic health 
and social care. I would like to see Health Authorities merged into larger 
strategically focused organisations and I would like to see change managed by 
coalition and collaboration rather than through crippling mergers of Trusts. 
Thank you for asking! 
Consultant in Accident & Emergency (3378) Responses • No- there will be little 
change; Yes - very much welcome change. 
Get rid of the stupid internal market. NHS is a "single company" with no 
competitors so how can you have a market. Illness in Inverness the same as 
Illness in Illchester. Allow consultants more say in managing the NHS. We are 
supposed! to be the top output of our Universities. There is a lot of talent 
available. Get rid of financiers and auditors like Coopers & Lybrand, KPMG. 
They have NO idea about health only businesses like BT etc. Get rid of stupid 
league tables and childish star systems. There are improvements and saving to be 
made, efficiencies to be gained but not the way as now We need More NURSES 
and a few more Doctors, Phlebotomists, Porters, Receptionists, clerks and Medical 
secretaries! The pistons of the NHS Engine!!! Patients are the petrol!!! Many 
managers in Health Authorities have no idea about health care needs. A doctor 
and a nurse enters the NHS from 18-20 years through to 65 years old. It's our 
LIFE, not just a job as it is for the Business executives!! 
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9.6 Conclusion 
The open questions had been developed initially to enhance the design of the questionnaire 
with no preconceptions about the likely coherence or otherwise of responses. In the event, 
these questions provided a rich set of data yielding a high degree of consistency in the 
explanations given to describe changes in relationships and services. Trust status on the 
whole was perceived to have brought consultants and managers to a shared view of the world, 
helped by engaging clinicians in the management process. Benefits to patients had been 
realised, it was felt, through greater responsiveness and an awareness of the patient's 
perspective. The responses evoked a sense that Trusts had adopted a greater degree of self-
determination and a clearer approach in trying to improve services to patients. At the same 
time, there was a strong desire for change and a clarion call to dismantle the internal market. 
The White Paper, published two months after the survey period, addressed this desire for 
greater co-operation and partnership and restoration of a public service ethos, without 
rejecting Trust status. 
Some individuals, particularly consultants, made colourful and rather heartfelt responses 
which betrayed a degree of stress, anger and, in some cases, despair which under the statistical 
aggregation of closed question responses would be concealed. These sentiments were 
consistent with the feeling that clinical views ought to have greater prominence, with a shift of 
control in the future from managers to doctors, articulated in the response to Question 10. 
The analysis of closed questions in Chapter 7 reveals an instinct on the part of respondents 
that doctors, in the longer term, would be more successful in achieving their goals than 
managers. Question 3, asking which group is believed to be achieving their objectives, shows 
that managers are perceived to dominate in the short term but that the balance of power will 
shift to consultants in the long term. This moves in the same direction as the appetite for 
change highlighted in this chapter. During the period in which this questionnaire was 
completed (September-October 1997) it was known that a new government policy was about 
to be announced. This is reflected in the response to Question 9 in which 80% of 
respondents believed that there would be some form of change in the NHS climate due to the 
(then) new Government. In Question 10, 31% of people sought removal of bureaucracy and 
internal market mechanisms and 20% sought a change of direction towards higher priority for 
clinical needs of patients and a less financially-driven set of goals. On balance there was a call 
for greater clinical/consultant input and a reduced managerial influence. 
The implication is that pressure of opinion exists within Trusts to weaken the financial 
strictures imposed on them since, according to the responses analysed in this chapter, the 
orientation of Trust objectives towards financial break-even is an unpopular feature. The 
results of Question 10 shed light on the results of Question 2 analysed earlier in which all 
groups of individuals appeared to be alienated from the priorities of Trusts which were felt to 
be unequivocally driven by financial goals. 
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The results of the open questions indicate that the apparently clear objectives of Trusts will 
be eroded in practice by the force of opinion of doctors and managers working within them. 
The distance between the perceived aims of Trusts and those of individuals (Question 2) 
indicates a divergence between the formal goals and the real motivation of Trusts. The role of 
managers as financial controllers was put in doubt by the responses of service/business 
managers analysed earlier, which indicated that the budgetary constraint could be weak in the 
face of service demands. The qualitative responses put forward in this chapter reinforce this 
lack of conviction that financial targets should be met. 
The purpose of the next chapter is to test the financial performance of Trusts to examine 
whether service constraints override financial priorities in practice. 
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CHAPTER 10. TRUST PERFORMANCE 
Chapters 5-9 dealt with the first and most detailed line of enquiry which studied motivation of 
Trusts through an attitudinal survey. This chapter considers the actual behaviour of Trusts 
through an analysis of financial and service performance, using a quantitative approach which 
corresponds with 'method 2' described in Chapter 4 earlier. 
It is perhaps worth repeating the hypotheses which were formulated in Chapter 4 and are 
tested in this chapter. These hypotheses evade the strong testing conditions of static 
equilibrium analysis (SEA) by considering the weaker hypothesis that clinicians aim to expand 
rather than maximise their service in the short term. Break-even is tested through the 6% 
financial target since the 6% return on assets is set to match the target break-even position for 
the Trust?' 
lA 	Doctors aim to expand their service. Volume is used as a measurable proxy , 
but in reality service means a combination of volume and quality. 
2A 	Managers aim to break-even, measured through the Financial Target 
Performance of 6% pre-interest return on assets. 
3A 	In 'good times' these objectives will converge to form a Trust objective of 
service expansion subject to a break-even constraint. 
4A 	In 'bad times' objectives of doctors and managers will diverge. The Trust will 
not have a unified objective. It is hypothesised that doctors will emerge as the 
dominant group in the long run so that the Trust pursues service expansion and 
does not achieve the break-even constraint. 
Chapters 5-9 dealt with hypotheses 1 and 2 by trying to explain the motivation of doctors 
and managers, the principal actors within hospitals. The study summarised in this chapter 
deals with hypotheses 3 and 4. 
10.1 Sample 
A sample of 100 acute hospital Trusts has been selected in order to examine movements in 
volume and income between the financial years 1993/4 and 199415 (Fitzhugh, 1996). Selection 
criteria for this exercise were applied as follows: 
• first, second and third wave Trusts are included. Fourth wave Trusts are 
excluded because no data was available for 1993/94. 
• only general acute Trusts are included, i.e. Trusts which are coded as Category 
24 Annual accounts show actual income and expenditure and give a figure for operating surplus and retained 
surplus (after interest). The NHS Executive has flexibility to adjust interest repayments downwards if the actua l 
operating surplus is below the target return; in other words, the Trust may show a balanced post-interest budget 
while failing to meet the Financial Target Performance. 
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2 in the Fitzhugh Directory of Annual Accounts. This enables episodes to be 
used as a simple measure of output. (A mixed Trust with community elements 
would have required a different unit of activity measurement, e.g. district nurse 
contacts). 
The selected output measure is finished consultant episodes. This was extracted first of all 
from the published annual accounts but, since Trusts publish this activity information at their 
discretion, there was no uniformity of structure and 56% of Trusts presented no activity data. 
A second source of national data was then used instead (Department of Health 1993c, 1993d, 
1994, 1995). 
10.2 Possible Outcomes 
In terms of the hypothetical objectives of doctors and managers, which may or may not 
converge, there are four possible outcomes which can be measured through service and 
financial data. These are described as: Type 1, Win-Win, where both financial targets are 
achieved and volume is increased, enabling both managers and doctors to achieve their 
objectives; Type 2, where managers win by achieving the financial target performance (FTP) 
but volume reduces; Type 3 where doctors win by pushing up service volumes but managers 
fail because the Trust does not achieve its financial target; Type 4 where both parties lose 
because the Trust fails to break-even and service volume is reduced. The figure below 
summarises these typologies. 
Figure 10.1: Possible Outcomes Linked to Hypothetical Objectives 
Outcome 6% FTP (Break Even) 
Managers' Aim 
Expanded Output 
Doctors' Aim 
Shorthand 
Type 1 Ea 0 Win-Win 
Type 2 EC x Managers Win 
Type 3 n Doctors Win 
Type 4 E2 Lose-Lose 
10.3 Partial and Full Sample 
Two exercises were conducted to find out how Trust behaviour was distributed across these 
four types. In the first exercise, which drew on annual accounts, activity data was absent for 
56% of Trusts, limiting the sample to 44 hospitals. The second exercise introduced activity 
data from a separate source published by the Department of Health (1993c, 1993d, 1994, 
1995) which enabled the full sample of 100 Trusts to be analysed. The results are 
summarised in the table below and they show that the missing data did not produce any 
systematic bias in the first exercise since the distribution of results was similar for both. The 
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missing data, for example, might have been masking poor service performance in 56 Trusts and 
so could have been split between Type 2 and Type 4 results. Exercise 2 shows that this is 
not the case since the distribution of types between 100 Trusts follows the same pattern as 
for the 44 Trusts. 
Table 10.1: Distribution of Results between Types 
Exercise 1 
Trusts 	% 
Exercise 2 
Trusts (=%) 
Type 1 29 	66% 63 
Type 2 4 	9% 6 
Type 3 11 	25% 28 
Type 4 0 	0% 3 
Sample Total 44 	100% 100 
Missing 56 0 
Total 100 100 
10.4 Trust Performance and Financial Environment 
The results have been analysed in two groups (0 Trusts which received an increase in 
revenue and (ii) Trusts which received reduced revenue. The results of both exercises, 
splitting the sample into revenue increasing and revenue reducing sets, is summarised in Figure 
10.2. In situations where revenue is reducing there is an increase in the proportion of Type 3 
where doctors win and a reduction in Type 1 where both managers and doctors win. 
Table 10.2: Summary of Results according to Financial Environmen 
Exercise 1 (n=44) 
£ Up 	£ Down AU 
Exercise 2 (n=100) 
€ Up 	£ Down 	All 
Type 1 Win-Win 73% 45% 66% 67% 55% 63% 
Type 2 Managers Win (>=6%) 6% 18% 9% 6% 6% 6% 
Type 3 Doctors Win (Volume Rise) 21 % 36% 25% 25% 35% 28% 
Type 4 Lose-Lose 0% 0% 0% 3% 3% 3% 
Sample n = 33 11 44 69 31 100 
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..%b i.N Reduced vow 
4 Trusts 
Figure 10.2: Trust Performance within Financial Environment of Growth or Constrain 
Income 	 Financial  
Change 	 Target 
Group Performance 
>=6% 
50 Trusts 
Output Change 	Typology 	% 
(Episode) of Group 
Increased Volume 
.....,../ 17 Trusts 
< 6% 
19 Trusts 
Increased Volume 
/ 17 Trusts 
>=6% 
19 Trusts 
Reduced Volume 
2 Trusts 
Another way to consider these results is by grouping the occasions when managers win 
(Types I and 2) and comparing with the occasions when doctors win (Types 2 and 3). The 
table below shows that the objectives of doctors, as set out in the hypotheses, tend to 
dominate even though managers succeed in achieving their aims in more than half of all cases in 
each group. Where there is a reduction in income compared to the previous year then both 
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doctors and managers achieve a lower total degree of success, but the reduction in the 
proportion of manager wins is greater than the reduction in the proportion of doctor wins. 
Table 10.3: Summarising Managers' and Doctors' Wins 
Exercise 1 (n=44 
£ Up 	£ Down AU 
Exercise 2 (n=100 
£ Up 	£ Down All 
Managers Win (Types 1 and 2 
Doctors Win (Types 1 and 3 
79% 
94% 
63% 
81% 
75% 
91% 
73% 
91% 
61% 
91% 
69% 
91% 
10.5 Interpreting the Results 
The results of this study need to be considered in relation to the hypotheses and compared 
with the results of the questionnaire survey set out in the previous chapters. 
10.5.1 In Relation to Hypothese 
The results are consistent with the hypotheses in that two thirds of Trusts which experienced 
revenue growth also succeeded in achieving both their financial target and a growth in service 
delivery. In these revenue-gaining Trusts managers failed in their postulated objective 27% of 
the time while doctors failed only 9% of the time. Where Trust income contracted, managers 
failed to meet the financial target in 39% of Trusts while doctors saw output reduction in only 
9% of cases. To put it another way, where income reduces, i.e. in the 'bad times', then 
managers experience greater difficulty in achieving the financial target performance; the service 
continues to expand at the expense of financial constraints. The most striking result is that, 
while doctors and managers each succeed in achieving their objectives in the majority of cases, 
both where income is rising and where income is reducing, this does not invalidate the 
conclusion that, where the aims of doctors and managers are mutually exclusive, doctors' 
behaviour will tend to prevail. The results lend support to hypothesis 4A which suggests 
that doctors will emerge as the dominant group over time, overriding the management 
objective, postulated in hypothesis 2A, of meeting budget constraints. 
10.5.2 In Relation to the Questionnaire Survey 
The summary of responses set out in the previous chapter suggested that service volume was 
less important to clinicians than quality, indicating that doctors' primary motivation was 
based on quality of the service. This does not invalidate the hypotheses expressed here in 
terms of volume since consultants still observed this to be more important to them than 
financial targets. The mean rankings showed consistency between consultants' view of 
themselves, consultants' view of other consultants and managers' view of consultants. The 
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order of priority was determined as: (1) maintaining quality, (2) expanding quality, (3) 
maintaining volume, (4) expanding volume, (5)1(6) expanding revenue/breaking even. 
Hypotheses 1A-4A and the associated test remain valid in the light of the questionnaire 
responses. The questionnaire results suggest also that the hypotheses and corresponding test 
would be stronger if related to quality but, given the difficulties in measuring quality at a 
global level, the secondary objective of service volume is adequate as a counter-objective to 
financial break-even's . 
10.6 Conclusion 
This empirical study is a pragmatic review of service and financial performance in 'good 
times' where income is rising and in 'bad times' where income is falling and service reductions 
could be expected to be meted out. It tests the probability of outcome-combinations and finds 
that Trusts expand their service more often (91% of occasions) than they meet financial 
targets (69% of occasions). This service objective is associated with doctors through the 
hypotheses and the attitudinal survey, and so the results of this exercise are consistent with 
Hypothesis 4A that doctors' priorities dominate those of managers. 
The findings of earlier chapters have been used to test Hypotheses 1 A and 2A relating to 
motivation of groups within Trusts. The results of the quantitative test in this chapter 
support Hypothesis 4A, i.e. that doctors will be dominant within Trusts, only in so far as the 
underlying motivation of doctors and managers has been correctly discerned. The 
questionnaire attitudinal survey produced results for consultants which were consistent from 
every perspective. Both doctors and managers perceived this group as being interested 
primarily in service quality, followed by service volume, with financial control ranking as least 
important to them. The motivation of managers proved to be more complex. The group 
overall conformed with Hypothesis 2A by identifying financial break-even as their most 
important goal. Within this group, however, there is a spectrum of seven categories: Chair, 
CEO, Board Director, Corporate Managers, Service/Business Manager, Other Manager (which 
according to job titles within the questionnaire responses comprised mainly service/business 
managers) and Clinical Professional. The groups closest to service provision or the operating 
core are the last three, comprising 51% (458/896) of managers who responded to the 
questionnaire survey (Table 7.2). The other groups of managers are located at the centre of 
the organisation and, in the case of Board members, at the apex or most senior level within 
Trusts. The pattern of responses varied between these two broad categories, with service and 
clinical managers showing a strong drive towards service quality goals while still observing 
break-even as a constraint. Their responses fell part way between those of consultants and 
the senior/corporate group of managers who had a clearer focus on financial break-even as an 
objective. The equivocation of service managers has the effect of weakening the assumption 
25 Depth of service in terms of investigations, technology and other levels of care associated with a single episode 
provides a possible method of framing quality in relation to volume and finance. Where extra funding is invested in 
this way rather than in expanding the service it could be argued that the hypothesis of quality taking precedence over 
quantity is supported. 
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that managers have a clear set of objectives which are independent of those of consultants. 
Instead, this group may be seen as colluding with consultants in opposition to the goals of the 
Trust as a whole which are clear to all groups as being financially driven. 
Lukes' study of power (1974, discussed in Chapter 3) highlighted Polsby's argument (1963) 
that power or control can best be observed in situations where there is an observable conflict 
of interest. Where there is no conflict, as in the 'good times' postulated in Hypothesis 3A, 
there is no test of relative strength. Hypothesis 4A, therefore, sets the conditions under 
which doctors and managers can be seen to compete for control. The competition, such as it 
is, appears to be won more often (i.e. lost less frequently) by consultants. Managers struggle 
to achieve their overall aim of financial control in the face of conflict. 
In summary, the performance of Trusts in this chapter, which can be interpreted as producing 
financial failure more often than service failure, is consistent with the aims of doctors 
(Hypothesis 2A). It is also consistent with medical dominance (Hypothesis 4A) in so far as 
managers fail to achieve their own goal. However, this medical dominance could be determined 
by a reluctance on the part of managers to be single-minded in managing the budget, rather 
than a show of strength by doctors. 
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CHAPTER 11. COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT: A CASE STUDY 
The third line of enquiry uses a case study to follow events 1991 to 1998 within the health 
economy of south west London. Kingston Hospital is the main case study site but the 
sequence of events incorporates dynamics between Kingston and its neighbouring hospitals, 
Epsom and Queen Mary's. 
A descriptive case study of this nature permits some analysis of the behaviour of Trusts in -a 
market environment. In this external environment Trusts receive feedback on their 
performance through interaction with purchasers and other providers and, to this extent, 
corresponds with the final element of the motivational process outlined in Chapter 3 which 
reviewed the psychological literature. At the close of the literature survey it was remarked 
that a competitive market does not appear to have developed in the NHS and that the external 
incentive structure may play a part in shaping the goals of the principal actors. Feedback 
from market behaviour provides a mechanism for shaping motivation. 
11.1 Overview 
The market reforms of 1991 satisfied certain conditions of a competitive market necessary to 
achieve efficiency. The government injected a financial component into the motivation of 
Trusts through strict financial targets and introduced a competitive contracting environment 
through the 'purchaser/provider split. Legislators, however, had limited control over the 
fundamental market structure which determined the behaviour of Trusts/firms since political 
and community interests act as a formidable external constraint to any market exit. The 
survival instinct of Trusts, stimulated by the competitive market regime, coincides with the 
local community's desire to defend its own hospital. As a result hospital closure is difficult 
and politically distasteful and produces a block to market forces. 
The Kingston case study supports this analysis. It shows how, in the first place, Kingston 
Hospital embraced the notion of competition, particularly in relation to neighbouring Epsom 
Hospital, and goes on to show how barriers to exit dominated the market structure, fuelled by 
political interests, community reactions and organisational 'survival' behaviour on behalf of 
Queen Mary's Hospital. 
This case study provides a chronology of events, derived from a search of files at Kingston 
Hospital and supplemented by interviews with key personnel. 
11.2 Description of Case Study Sites 
Kingston Hospital is a medium sized (approximately 400 beds) district general hospital with 
an annual budget of £50 million (Fitzhugh, 1997). It became an NHS Trust as part of the first 
wave from April 1991. Epsom Hospital Trust also joined the first wave and is located 
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approximately six miles south of Kingston. A third hospital, Queen Mary's Hospital 
Roehampton, is located four miles to the north of Kingston and was part of the fourth wave 
Richmond, Twickenham & Roehampton Trust. 
All three hospitals are part of a health economy which covers south west London and part of 
Surrey and which mimics central London in its problems of overcrowding in the acute 
hospital sector (Tomlinson, 1992). St George's, St Helier, Epsom, Queen Mary's, West 
Middlesex, Charing Cross and Chelsea & Westminster each lie within a radius of seven 
miles. Financial problems led purchasers to find some means of reducing hospital costs and 
rationalising services. This is relevant to both aspects of the case study in setting the scene of 
sustained pressure on acute services in the area. 
Kingston hospital developed a reputation for innovation and efficiency, partly through use of 
day surgery. It opened one of the first surgical day units in the country in 1979 in a 
successful attempt to deal with the effect of closure of a general surgical ward. In 1991 a 
hospital hotel was opened, owing to another initiative by the general surgeons, to receive 
patients who were medically fit to be discharged from hospital but who lacked home support. 
This enabled patients to be treated as day cases who, perhaps because they lived alone or in a 
tower block with a broken lift, would otherwise be admitted as inpatients. The business plan 
for 1995/96 noted that the Trust's activity of 32,000 episodes represented a 'high ratio of 
episodes to beds (90:1)... achieved by making extensive use of day surgery.' The business 
plan for 1996/97 again highlighted Kingston's high level of productivity: 'National 
performance indicators have consistently shown the hospital to be very productive compared 
to other acute units and to have relatively low unit costs. Recent figures from the national 
Until Labour Cost Survey, for example, showed Kingston Hospital to be among the I% most 
efficient units in the country.' 
The negative aspect of this lean performance was that the hospital had little scope to absorb 
cost pressures, such as increased emergency admissions. The Trust had achieved its financial 
targets in seven out of eight financial years 1991/2 to 1998/9 26 (in spite of an underlying 
operating deficit of i1m27 ) but by 1996/97 the hospital was submitting a frankly pessimistic 
business plan. It projected a deficit of nearly £2m which it hoped to bridge by selling the 
staff residences (in a sale and lease-back arrangement). The staff residences represented the 
last piece of capital available for release and thereafter the Trust would be fully exposed to its 
growing recurrent deficit. 
11.3 1991-92 : Competitive Ethos in the Early Days of the Marke 
As a first wave Trust Kingston Hospital adopted an energetic approach to the internal market 
and was considered to be aggressive and somewhat predatory. This has an impact later in the 
26 1993194 was the exception to this 
27 Noted in 1996/97 Business Plan. 
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chronology when Kingston's perceived strength proves to be a negative image and a 
drawback to merging with Queen Mary's. 
11.3.1 Marketing Spare Capacity to GP Fundholder 
Like other Trusts at the time Kingston Hospital was trying to attract patients from GP 
Fundholders (GPFH) which represented the fluid element of the internal market where 
funding followed the patient. Extracts from a Trust Board paper 28 illustrate how the Trust 
viewed the market and GP Fundholders in the earlier days of the reforms: 
As a hospital we need to be alert to GP Fundholders as these represent the volatile element 
of the internal market. We need to draw in almost £700,000 (estimated at 700 cases) just to 
stand still. GP Fundholders will switch loyalties between different hospitals within a 
reasonable geographical radius, probably equivalent to 45 mins - 1 hour in travel time. ... 
GP Fundholders from these areas have already expressed interest in testing out Kingston's 
services as the hospital has a reputation for efficiency and innovation. The marketing 
exercise has already been done to a certain extent - all GPFH practices have received copies 
of our tariff and newsletters containing waiting times and they were each approached 
individually at the beginning of the year. 
Now that their interest has been stimulated we need to meet their expectations, and this can 
best be done by identifying their patients on the waiting list and scheduling them at the 
earliest available date (taking into account clinical urgency and other contractual 
commitments). If we respond promptly to GPFH's referrals then we will (a) succeed in 
securing the E700k which is already built into the budget, and (b) draw in additional 
referrals. If a GPFH has a sufficiently large number of patients waiting then we can reserve 
spare capacity and treat them as special waiting list initiatives. 
11.3.2 Competition on Epsom's territo 
The Old Cottage Hospital had been closed by Mid Surrey Health Authority prior to Trust 
status. An Epsom-based practice was part of the first wave of GP Fundholders and achieved 
national recognition for its entrepreneurial approach by buying the Cottage Hospital with 
plans to develop it into an outpatient and minor surgery facility, converting the premises back 
to its original function as a community hospital but this time run by GPs. The practice 
entered talks with Kingston Hospital to develop the service jointly using consultants from 
Kingston Hospital. This was launched as a new service upon Epsom's patch which provided 
additional income to Kingston Trust at Epsom's expense. 
Epsom retaliated by placing consultants in Surbiton Hospital which is the community 
hospital local to Kingston and managed by Kingston & Esher community unit. Both Trusts 
28 Marketing Spare Capacity, Paper to Trust Board Meeting 27.5.92 
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had in effect shifted the boundaries of their catchment population and traded market share. 
The Cottage Hospital initiative became increasingly unpopular with surgeons at Kingston 
Hospital since they were obliged to conduct these 'outreach' sessions personally and see 
perhaps 12 patients, most of whom would have routine problems. Their hospital-based 
services, by contrast, were run with the assistance of junior doctors who dealt with much of 
the routine work. Up to 60 patients could pass through a single session at Kingston, enabling 
the consultants to concentrate on the more complex or interesting cases. A further irritation 
was fuelled, as one consultant put it, by the fact that 'there were no kick backs' from the 
Cottage Hospital, i.e. no private patient referrals. The initiative remained controversial. 
11.3.3 Kingston Hospital Proposes a Merger with Kingston & Esher Community Unit 
Discussions were held in July 1992 between the acute Trust and the community unit (still 
directly managed) on the possibility of a merger. The community unit opposed it, not least 
because it considered it a marriage of 'unequal partners - Kingston Hospital viewed as 
predator'29. The proposal to merge the acute and community service was rejected, leaving 
Kingston Hospital strategically vulnerable as an acute hospital with no community hospitals. 
Any strategy to transfer resources from secondary acute care to community-based services 
would threaten Kingston Hospital, acting as a future disincentive to transferring services 
between secondary, community and primary care. 
11.4 1993: Market Structure and the Case for Closure of Queen Mary's 
Kingston Hospital sits on the outer London and Surrey border. It is not sufficiently central to 
have been included in the Tomlinson review of London's Health Service (Tomlinson, 1992) 
which concentrated on inner London's problem of many hospital sites over a small 
geographical area. It nevertheless shares similar problems which can be characterised as too 
many hospitals facing cost pressures and jostling for increasing shares in a cash-limited fund. 
The Department of Health put the spotlight on the south west London health economy in the 
response to Tomlinson presented by the then Secretary of State, Virginia Bottomley 
(Department of Health, I993a): 
In south west London, St George's role may be affected by the outcome of 
any Guy's/St Thomas' site appraisal. The services provided at St George's 
also need to be considered in conjunction with those at Queen Mary's 
Roehampton, Kingston and St Helier Hospitals. We have asked LIG 
[London Implementation Group], in cooperation with South West Thames 
RPM, to report further on likely developments in this sector in the autumn. 
(paragraph 76) 
29 Source: Position Paper on Business Planning & Contracting Function, 14th July 1992, Kingston 
Community Unit and Kingston Hospital Trust 
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Following the Secretary of State's directive a review of acute services was undertaken for 
south west London. The review, chaired by the Chief Executive of Kingston & Esher Health 
Authority (now Kingston & Richmond Health Authority), considered the viability of 
Kingston, Queen Mary's Roehampton, St Helier and St George's. The Review recommended 
the closure of accident and emergency services on the Queen Mary's site and reprovision of 
inpatient services elsewhere, mainly to Kingston. The review stated that four hospitals 
needed to reduce to three and, in the longer term, possibly to two, (throwing into question the 
viability of St Helier which ultimately merged with Epsom Hospital on 1 st  April 1999). 
Following hostile reaction to the public consultation - stimulated by a high profile survival 
campaign orchestrated by Queen Mary's (including hands around the hospital and candlelight 
vigils) - the Regional Health Authority refused to recommend the findings to the Secretary of 
State. In short, the proposals were too contentious and were not accepted. Providers were 
then urged to find a solution which was acceptable to both. South Thames Region distanced 
itself from the decision making process and the onus fell to the Trusts to sort something out. 
The general view was that the case for change was too overtly driven by a search for financial 
savings. This was unacceptable to the public and hence with politicians, so that a revised 
proposal based on clinical grounds was sought as an alternative. 
11.5 1994-96: New Strategy 
The management drive to close Queen Mary's Hospital on financial grounds had failed. The 
resource pressures continued to exist, however, and health authorities in south west London 
were forced to continue to look for savings by rationalising services. Kingston & Richmond 
Health Authority and Merton, Sutton and Wandsworth Health Authority were overspent by 
£13 million recurrently30 on services to a local population which received 95% of its 
treatment from 9 hospitals (Kingston, Queen Mary's Roehampton, Charing Cross, Chelsea & 
Westminster, St Thomas', West Middlesex, St George's, St Helier, Epsom 31 ), thus 
representing an excess of capacity over funding. Although the local health economy was 
weak, with Health Authority deficits of over £10m, the immediate force for real change 
proved to be clinical through threatened withdrawal of training recognition for junior doctors' 
posts. The catalyst was a critical report by the Standards Advisory Committee of the Royal 
College of Surgeons on training in Kingston and Queen Mary's. To maintain an emergency 
service the two hospitals were forced to work together, in effect by merging their junior 
doctor rotas by a given deadline, or lose their ability to employ junior medical staff. 
The clinical drive for change came from a combination of Oilman and Junior Doctors' New 
Deal requirements which affected general surgery and orthopaedics. These specialties need 
larger numbers of consultants to survive, forcing the consultants themselves to search for a 
30 Proposals for Changes in Services at Kingston Hospital and Queen Mary's Hospital Roehampton - Public 
Consultation Document presented by Kingston & Richmond and Merton Sutton & Wandsworth Health 
Authorities, September 1996, page 7 
31 Ibid 
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solution by pooling their resources. This stimulated a second review which was ultimately 
brought to a successful conclusion in 1996. Its aims were32 
• the provision of clinically safe and effective services in the immediate and long term 
which will better meet the health needs of the local population; 
• the provision of viable services on both hospital sites - Kingston and Queen Mary's 
Hospital Roehampton - building on the particular strengths of each; 
• services that are affordable within the money likely to be available to the Health 
Authorities. 
The review resulted in a shift of inpatient services in paediatrics, obstetrics and gynaecology 
to Kingston and transfer of emergency in-patient surgery to Kingston from 1st April 1997. 
The chronology of events leading to this highlights the influence of medical staff and the 
importance of clinical opinion in influencing events. It also illustrates the protectiveness of 
local communities towards their local hospital and how politicians need to respond to this, 
emphasising the strong political dynamic within the internal market structure. 
11.5.1 Chronology 
In March 1994 an orthopaedic consultant at Queen Mary's Hospital tried to rationalise 
orthopaedic services in the area. The Postgraduate Dean wrote congratulating him saying 
that he believed the scheme was meeting opposition from Chief Executives of the Trusts. 
The Kingston Hospital CEO responded to the consultant challenging his planning 
assumptions (beds, length of stay, funding, day case proportions), while not objecting to the 
principle of the proposals. The Local Medical Committee (LMC) did not support the 
proposal although encouragement was received from Brian Mawhinney MP, Tom Sackville 
MP, the Regional Director and the CEO of Queen Mary's Hospital. The Regional Health 
Authority was pleased that a collaborative approach was being taken: 'There is clearly both 
the need and the opportunity for some radical developments in SW London and it would be 
preferable if this could be achieved through collaboration between purchasers and providers 
rather than external direction.' A statement from the London Implementation Group (LIG) 
in April 1994 said that the Secretary of State would not be giving direction; it is a local 
matter. 
In May 1994 the Chief Executives of five south west London providers met in a forum which 
represented Kingston Hospital, St George's, Mayday, Epsom, Richmond Twickenham and 
Roehampton (RTR), and St Helier. At the same time a purchaser initiative was launched 
when the Chief Executive of Merton, Sutton & Wandsworth Health Authority proposed 
meetings to develop new models of care for the future, in the knowledge that recurrent 
funding could not sustain existing service patterns into the future. The first service to be 
tested in this way was urology. The weakness in the urology review lay in establishing a case 
for change since the financial dilemma pointed to problems but no obvious solution and there 
32 'bid 
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was no consensus among clinicians on the best way forward. The urology review 
demonstrated that no case could be regarded as robust if it did not have backing from the 
consultants involved. It also showed how difficult it would be to reconfigure services on a 
specialty by specialty basis. 
hi February 1995 Queen Mary's proposed a new development on its site known as the Rapid 
Diagnostic Centre, which would provide a modern diagnostic facility enabling patients to 
receive a same-day results and diagnostic service. The prospect of new capital investment 
on a site which was under pressure to close was not well received by Kingston Hospital 
Trust. The scheme was dependent upon being a co-operative venture with Kingston Hospital 
but the Trust did not support it as it appeared to be a whole hospital development of an acute 
site which was expected to close. The idea was never fully dispelled and three years later, in 
March 1998, Alan Milburn, Labour minister for health, wrote to the CHC assuring it that a 
high level Rapid Diagnostic Centre would be built and that he expected Health Authorities to 
show commitment and move quickly on it. This was a political response to the CHC's 
objection to moving services off the Queen Mary's site. 
In July 1995 a Joint Strategy Group was established, led by Kingston & Richmond Health 
Authority, and its first meeting took place 7.7.95 attended by GPs, Merton, Sutton & 
Wandsworth Health Authority, Kingston & Richmond Health Authority, Kingston Hospital 
Trust and RTR Trust. The strategy was to be bound by the following constraints: 
• an accident and emergency (A&E) department to remain on both sites; 
• cost savings of £600,000 to be realised by each Trust; 
• a directive to both Trusts to examine the feasibility of providing services jointly. 
The financial constraint formed part of the Health Authority's agenda to meet funding 
targets, but it conflicted with the instruction to ensure that accident and emergency services 
continued to be provided on both Kingston and Queen Mary's sites. This condition was a 
political rather than a clinical constraint, a legacy from the unsuccessful 1993 Review which 
had proposed closure of Queen Mary's A&E department and had ultimately been rejected. 
Kingston Hospital was sceptical that any savings could be made while there remained so 
little scope for rationalisation since A&E would need to be supported by the full range of 
medical and surgical specialties, thereby ensuring that full District General Hospital services 
would be retained on both sites. 
The Kingston Hospital CEO wrote to business managers informing them that they were to be 
engaged in service reviews between Kingston and Queen Mary's during July-August 1995. 
This would involve joint meetings between managers and clinicians across departments and 
should provide information for the purchasing intentions by 15.9.95. 
In October 1995 Kingston & Richmond Health Authority stated in its purchasing intentions 
that its strategy was to shift care from acute/secondary to the primary sector and that 
`reconfiguration and development of local services will be actively promoted'. Prior 
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approval would be needed, particularly from consultants, to service changes in Kingston 
Hospital/Queen Mary's. 
In April 1996 the £600k savings sought for 1996/67 were not achieved and, instead, cost 
pressures led to increased unit costs and activity in local acute hospitals. Kingston & 
Richmond Health Authority therefore planned a deficit in 1996/97 and GP Fundholders 
accepted a reduction in the budget. The Regional Office insisted that a plan should be put in 
place to clear the deficit. A study to produce recommendations was proposed for mid July in 
advance of the September 1996 purchasing intentions to plan contract changes for 1997/978. 
The Kingston & Richmond Health Authority CEO wrote to Jeremy Hanley, local MP, on 
12.4.96 inviting him to a meeting. As briefing he supplied a DHA paper 16.4.96 which 
summarised the position to date: 
Kingston & Richmond Health Authority and GP Fundholders have encouraged 
collaboration between Queen Mary's and Kingston Hospitals. Over the last year 
collaborative arrangements have been developed in several clinical areas. The purpose 
is to (i) strengthen clinical services and (it) reduce unit costs to release money for service 
developments. Pressures for change are clinical and economic and have increased 
sharply in recent months. A new study is therefore proposed with the aim of delivering 
tangible changes over the next 12 months. 
The clinical reasons for change are linked to adman and include: 
(1) Training of junior doctors. Registrar posts in general surgery and anaesthetics have 
already been withdrawn from hospitals that cannot achieve accreditation. Early 
indications have been received that Kingston Hospital/Queen Mary's Hospital will 
lose accreditation; 
(2) Cancer services - greater degree of specialisation in cancer treatment from April 
1997; 
(3) emergency hospital treatment - local pressures; 
(4) pressure to develop specialist services, e.g. MRL 
Economic reasons for change include: 
(1) The need to reduce unit costs; 
(2) The need to find savings to respond to cost pressures, e.g. Beta-Interferon, Taxol, 
blood products; 
(3) The need to release funds to develop primary care. 
Mid July provided the next critical point and all subsequent events happened in the 
knowledge that a review decision would be forthcoming soon. This presented a specific 
threat to Queen Mary's which undertook its own independent study known as the 'Flind 
Review', led by the Trust's Chairman Christopher Flind. 
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The Health Authority issued a press release informing the public of a new impending review. 
This received adverse press comment and the CEO of Merton, Sutton and Wandsworth 
Health Authority wrote to Kingston Hospital's CEO on 22.4.96 that the press response had 
been substantial and misleading and suggested that they should meet to give a Press briefing. 
In the meantime Kingston was having its own discussion with the Regional Office about its 
deepening fmancial problem with a predicted recurrent income and expenditure gap of Ll .4 
million. Kingston Hospital was asked in April 1996 to provide a 'contingency plan', to show 
the impact of standing alone on the basis that service mergers with Queen Mary's could 
happen slowly or not at all. This contingency plan was requested by a relatively junior 
officer at the Region and cut across the higher level review described in the 16.4.96 briefing 
paper above. Nevertheless, Kingston complied by setting out a contingency plan which 
demonstrated that it would be impossible to achieve financial balance and remain a viable 
DGH since this would require fmancial savings which would destabilise the service, 
summarised in the following extract: 
If Kingston Hospital stands alone it will need to find savings of L3m-,17m during the 
next two years. The Regional Office asked Kingston to develop a contingency plan to 
cope with this and show how, as a minimum, the Trust would deal with its recurrent 
deficit plus medical staff increases arising from adman and the New Deal, i.e. £3m. 
This paper examines a comprehensive set of options and concludes that, to make 
savings on this scale, it will be necessary to remove large elements of the clinical 
service. Cost reductions would be led by closing beds: 
• 50/60 beds closed to save £3m - bed closures would need to be accompanied by 
proportionate reductions in all clinical support departments as well as forcing a cut 
in Trust-wide overheads. 
• 100 beds closed to save £7.3m - feasible only with slowing of emergency admissions . 
This could be elected by part-closure of A&E. 
District General Hospitals have a range of specialties which are balanced to provide 
medical training and experience as well as patient services. A change in the balance 
of specialties creates a domino effect in which recognition is withdrawn due to lack of 
experience in specific areas, e.g. cancer surgery, airways for anaesthetics, and 
renders the specialty unable to provide emergency cover. ' 
The paper concluded that cuts on this scale (6.5% - 15.5% of expenditure) would make the 
hospital non-viable as a DGH service. The Regional Office did not pursue this line of 
reasoning further and was, in any case, overtaken by events associated with the separate 
Review process. The Kingston & Richmond Health Authority CEO wrote to Kingston 
Hospital's CEO 14.6.96 urging him to take no action on downsizing. 
Higher level discussions were taking place at the regional and political level. William Wells 
(Regional Chairman) met David Mellor MP and Gerald Malone MP and minister for health 
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21.5.96 and wanted a briefing on progress from the CEOs of both Kingston and Queen 
Mary's Hospitals. Shortly after this the Director of the Regional Health Authority wrote to 
the four Health Authority/Trust Chief Executives 24.5.96 that he was sceptical about the 
affordability of proposed service solutions and asserted his authority by summoning a 
meeting on 29.5.96 at 4pm in Paddington. Clinical viability versus affordability was the key 
theme of the meeting and it produced a timetable of communication and agreement to defer 
appointment of a general surgeon at Queen Mary's. This cut across Queen Mary's desire to 
continue to fill vacant posts to retain the 'Putney market'. 
In July 1996 a report was published which recommended the merging of surgical and 
orthopaedic departments between the two sites with a separation of elective and emergency 
work: emergency work would be conducted at Kingston while elective work would be 
undertaken at Queen Mary's. It recommended that these changes should take effect from 1st 
April 1997. 
This document fed the consultation document which appeared in September 1996. However 
the split site arrangement was privately recognised as 'intermediate' and non-viable in the 
long term, a point made by the Regional Finance Director when the review results were 
disclosed in July 1996. South Thames Regional Director of Finance wrote to the Chief 
Executive of Merton, Sutton & Wandsworth Health Authority 9.7.96 that he was 
disappointed since the proposals put forward were clinically viable but not financially viable 
and were 'deemed unaffordable'. He urged the service to look at other configurations. 
The Kingston & Richmond Health Authority CEO wrote to Health Authority and Trust Chief 
Executives 16.7.96 on the acceptability of options under three criteria: clinical, financial, 
political. He argued that there was a conflict between financial and political success although 
less of a conflict between financial and clinical viability. This conflict was made quite 
explicit in the letter which showed the following: 
Figure 11.1: Acceptability of Options 
Clinical Financial Political 
Option 
1. Status Quo X X K 
Intermediate: 
General Surgery & Trauma & Orthopaedics Inpatients: 
emergency @ Kingston Hospital, elective @ Queen Mary's 
Gynae, obstetrics, paediatric inpatients at Kingston Hospita l 
1,1 x i 
Long Term Configuration 
As for 'intermediate' with additional inpatient activity from 
Queen Marys to Kingston Hospital: elective surgical and som e 
acute medical 
✓ ✓ K 
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Management consultants were engaged to begin a new phase of work. The Kingston & 
Richmond Health Authority CEO wrote 19.7.96 to a member of the team outlining 
`alternatives' for consideration: 
(1) Consultant only service - emergency services on both sites (i.e. no training grade 
cover); 
(2) Consultant plus staff grade only service; 
(3) Reconfiguration of inpatient activity for the surgical specialties along the lines of 
Simpson Option 2 and the 'And Report'. This alternative would be recommended. 
Region promised to provide transitional funding if the four parties could present a united 
front. 
Roy Galley (Chairman of Kingston & Richmond Health Authority) wrote to Toby Jessell, 
MP, that the message about Queen Mary's and Kingston could be summarised according to 
three themes: (i) increasing specialisation; (ii) Calman training; (iii) neither Queen Mary's 
nor Kingston Hospital alone has sufficient consultants to justify the number of higher trained 
surgical trainees needed for 24 hour cover. 
CEOs of the two health authorities (Kingston & Richmond and Merton, Sutton & 
Wandsworth) wrote to Queen Mary's Hospital CEO 15.8.96 about shifting inpatient work 
relating to paediatrics, gynaecology and obstetrics from Queen Mary's as a 'clinical necessity 
and we will be forced to signal change in our purchasing intentions. ' An extract from the 
Multifund Purchasing Intentions September 1996 showed that they wanted to purchase 
Kingston Hospital/Queen Mary's joint services based on one administration, one price list 
and one service. 
In September 1996 Health Authorities tried to add their pressure after the CEO of Kingston 
Hospital wrote to the Kingston & Richmond Health Authority CEO 20.9.96 suggesting that 
managers at Queen Mary's had been 'instructed not to liaise or communicate with their 
colleagues at Kingston Hospital'. The CEO of Merton, Sutton & Wandsworth Health 
Authority wrote to the two hospital CEOs 23.9.96: 'Individual clinicians appear, at the 
present time, to be pursuing different options and this is causing great confusion for 
everybody, which does not bode well for the success of departments as envisaged in the 
consultation document'. He added that the Health Authority needed to feel confident if it 
were to purchase services from either hospital. 
In October 1996 10 public meetings were held 14th October - 26th November 1996 to 
consult on the review recommendations. The Royal College of Nurses responded that 
`change is inevitable'. The GP view was expressed through Kingston & Richmond 
Multifund Press Release 15.10.96, "Doctors call for Hospital Merger", in which GPs 
unanimously agreed that merger of management of Queen Mary's/Kingston Hospital was 
essential to maintaining viability of both hospital sites. The Health Authority CEO (Kingston 
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& Richmond) wrote to the Finance Director at the Region putting forward the GP views 
about a merged management. The Local Medical Committee (LMC) wrote to Kingston 
Hospital's CEO 22.10.96 that it would support full merger under management of a single 
Trust; the GPs on the LMC were concerned at change which would compromise the acute 
medical service at Queen Mary's [i.e. suggesting that they want managerial overhead savings 
but not site cost savings through service transfers]. 
The proposals were accepted by the local population and the Secretary of State. This resulted 
in closure of the accident and emergency service at Queen Mary's Hospital from 1st April 
1997. Inpatient gynaecology, paediatrics and obstetrics plus emergency surgery was 
transferred to Kingston 1.4.97 and elective surgery was transferred to Queen Mary's 1.4.97. 
After this surgical reorganisation a further review tackling medical services was undertaken. 
A senior health authority source noted that 'it had to take place after the election and it was 
to be clinically led.' The work concluded in a final transfer of inpatients services from 
Queen Mary's, mainly to Kingston, scheduled for 4th August 1998. 
Ministers emphasised throughout the consultation process that Queen Mary's had a strong 
future as a local community hospital. The Rapid Diagnostic Centre (RDC), combining 
outpatient services with pathology and other investigative services to allow a 'one stop' 
service to local patients, gained increasing prominence as a means of developing new local 
services on the site. A survey by Finnamore Consultants found that GPs in the Roehampton 
area were very supportive of this idea while GPs in the Kingston area felt that it would be an 
unnecessary duplication and dilution of resources and that the money would be more 
effectively used by investing it on the Kingston site. The RDC was given ministerial support 
in March 199833 in the parliamentary response to Merton, Sutton & Wandsworth 
Community Health Council's objection to the Health Authority proposals. The service 
transfer was therefore approved by the Secretary of State but with conditions attached. 
11.6 Queen Mary's Fight for Survival 
RTR Trust orchestrated a long and determined battle for Queen Mary's in a 'Save our 
Hospital' campaign. Its aim was clearly survival and is central to the question 'What 
Motivates Trusts?'. Its behaviour was perceived as being very different from that of 
Kingston Hospital although it could be argued that both Trusts were pursuing a survival 
strategy but from positions of different strength, using different methods and with different 
degrees of success. Queen Mary's ultimately lost its role as an acute hospital and most of the 
services were transferred to Kingston. The quotations in the chronology which follows 
illustrate the passionate and emotive defence of the hospital which met disapproval from 
policy makers. The tide of opinion at Queen Mary's Hospital turned after it commissioned 
33 by Alan Milburn, MP, and minister for health to the Chairman of Merton, Sutton & Wandsworth 
Community Health Council, March 1998 
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an independent study of its own which concluded that Queen Mary's was not viable as a 
District General Hospital. As a health authority executive remarked: 'This clinched it for 
Queen Mary's consultants. This was overwhelming evidence from an internally 
commissioned study. A tortuous process'. The chronology section illustrates Queen Mary's 
approach, described as a 'bunker mentality, and the role of politicians as perceived by 
people outside the Trust. 
11.6.1 Chronolog 
In June 1996 Christopher Flind, Chairman of RTR Trust, published a review of Queen 
Mary's future (undertaken independently of the Health Authority) in which he proposed that 
Queen Mary's University Hospital should be specialist and local. He conceded that inpatient 
ENT, urology, paediatrics and gynaecology should be moved elsewhere and proposed that 
links should be developed with St George's (teaching) Hospital. The review made it clear 
that Queen Mary's University Hospital saw its future with a teaching hospital rather than 
through links with a District General Hospital, revealing a distaste for collaboration with 
Kingston. Christopher Flind stated that elective surgery would be conducted on site and a 
new hospital would be developed on 7 acres. The local press handling was noted by a 
manager at Kingston: 'Rind announced a new hospital to be built on Queen Mary's 
Hospital site at £43 million. The Local Authority was present and said planning permission 
OK Lorraine's deadline [local Informer journalist] was yesterday lunchtime and she has 
reported this wonderful news! She didn't seem to realise that this was Flindspeak and that 
an independent report was due in 2 weeks. " 
David Mellor (Conservative MP for Putney, a marginal seat, which covered Queen Mary's 
Hospital) was very vocal in his support for the hospital. A senior figure acknowledged the 
dynamics: 'Politicians play a role. Christopher Rind (Chairman of RTR Trust) is very close 
to David Mellor. Mrs Flind is Chairman of the Conservative Association. David Mellor he 
owes them one34. RTR Health Authority was drawn with strange boundaries - it was drawn 
with politicians in mind in order to preserve Queen Mary's Hospital. Queen Mary's is 
assured that the politicians are behind them.' At the same time a Conservative party source 
close to David Mellor who worked in Kingston Hospital believed that the MP was really 
working to their agenda: The politicians won't stand in the way of the Queen Mary/Kingston 
merger. I've sorted a political deal. Its sorted. That's where I've been this morning -
explaining the impact of the market to local MPs. But no-one in the management structure 
has the guts to make a decision. ' The public face of events suggest that this unspecified 
merger 'deal' was not secure and a parliamentary colleague of Mr Mellor was clear in his 
view that the impending general election added an extra urgency and instability to the battle 
ground: 'It's become excessively highly charged at the Queen Mary's end of it. All the 
politicians in Wandsworth, whether David Mellor or the Labour parliamentary candidate for 
Putney, they are vying one against the other about who can fight the best battle. With an 
34 following local constituency support in the aftermath of the Victoria de Sanchas affai 
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election looming the idea of the Conservative MP and the Labour candidate vying for who 
can fight best for Roehampton is quite important. They are arguing from a rather emotive 
position. ' Mr Mellor used his column 'View from Westminster' in Wandsworth Borough 
News to launch personal and scathing attacks on the Chief Executive of Kingston & 
Richmond Health Authority, which his parliamentary colleagues disapproved of as 'quite 
unjustified.  I don't think it's the business of MPs to be writing that sort of comment in a 
newspaper piece. ' 
In September 1996 Stephen Dorrell (Secretary of State for Health) wrote to David Mellor: 'I 
can confirm that we are continuing to plan on the basis that hospital provision on the 
Roehampton site will form an important part of services for local residents, whatever the 
conclusion of the current processes, although the exact configuration of services will 
naturally evolve and change over the years to reflect changes in patterns of treatment and 
local demand. Queen Mary's seized on this statement by issuing a press release 25.9.96 
`Secretary of State for Health gives his assurances about the future of Queen Mary's 
University Hospital'. 'Yet again, the purveyors of doom and gloom have been confounded 
Let us hope that Queen Mary's can now be allowed to get on with its job of treating the sick 
without continuing threat and rumour. 
Later on in the process (October 1996) Queen Mary's held its Annual General Meeting in 
which the Trust's Board was seen by observers to be publicly supporting the consultation 
document while undermining public confidence in the loss of the accident and emergency 
department and, hence, District General Hospital status: If you have a major car accident 
with broken bones, you will not be brought to Queen Marys'; 'unless your family doctor is 
absolutely sure of what's the matter with you, you won't be able to go to Queen Mary's 
During the public meeting Christopher Flind addressed a packed audience: 'We need your 
active support. The threat which hangs over our hospital is complex... We need extra people 
to write letters to Health Authorities.. ' David Mellor stated 'there is nothing I personally 
will not do in order to maintain a quality hospital on this site. If we all go forward with this 
conviction - forget about party politics.' The Queen Mary's Local Support Group Report 
reported on the AGM that 'Christopher Mind and John Dennis told the meeting that the 
Trust was facing an extremely serious situation .... to lose flOm.' 
The Chief Executive of Kingston & Richmond, Chairman of Kingston & Richmond and the 
sitting local MP were each interviewed and discussed the aims of Queen Mary's in relation to 
Kingston Hospital. 
`The aims of the hospitals (Queen Mary's and Kingston) are not exactly the same. 
The Boards are pursuing something different RTR is aiming for survival as an 
organisation. We need a merger/demerger. Some Trusts are less willing to 
contemplate that. RTR is unwilling. Kingston Hospital and Kingston & District 
Community - they wouldn't mind being disbanded and put back. I think the Boards 
have different objectives from each other. RTR is seeking its own preservation, i.e. 
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Queen Mary's Hospital. They behave as if they want to preserve themselves as a 
Board or an organisation. RTR has got into the habit of protection. If they had a 
different  attitude the dynamics would be different. Kingston Hospital is realistic - it 
sees no future as an independent hospital. 
It was recognised that the Trust Board and the clinicians within Queen Mary's were not 
necessarily working to the same ends: 'There are quite a lot of consultants at Queen 
Mary's who are very helpful and supportive. (Not all of them.) That puts them in a 
difficult position because they are being managed by a Board which has a different view 
from the clinicians. ' 
11.7 Medical Staffing as the Key Driver for Change 
The intransigence and hostility of RTR Trust's Board to change was clear to all observers. 
Nevertheless it has been noted here that the review process was ultimately successful in 
achieving service change. The key to this success lay in the consultant body and their 
recognition that clinical services would fail unless the two hospitals merged their services. 
The issue turned on medical education and the recognition needed to train junior doctors. 
Royal Colleges are the guardians of medical and dental education and they have the power to 
withdraw training recognition, rendering hospitals unable to employ the junior doctors 
needed to cover on-call rotas (i.e. out of hours emergency cover) and thus unable to provide 
the emergency service needed to function as a district general hospital. 
In June 1996 the Chairmen of Kingston & Richmond and Merton Sutton & Wandsworth 
Health Authorities wrote to Christopher Flind 28.6.96 spelling out their concern about 
general surgery and the lack of intention to merge services with Kingston Hospital 'We hope 
that you can appreciate that this outcome would be unacceptable because it would leave the 
population of Kingston & Richmond without a viable DGH service'. 
In July 1996 the Clinical Tutor of General Surgery at Kingston Hospital applied to the 
Deanery in Post Graduate Medical and Dental Education to gain approval for a locum 
specialist registrar post for a grace period. Without this approval the general surgical service 
would fold since both Queen Mary's and Kingston Hospital were scheduled to lose 
recognition of registrar posts from October 1996 due to failure to meet junior doctors' hours 
requirements. He received a letter 29.7.96 from the Joint Committee on Higher Surgical 
Training agreeing to extend the period of recognition to 31.3.97. 
In September 1996 a meeting took place between consultant surgeons from Queen Mary's, 
Welwyn, Hillingdon, Chelsea & Westminster, Kingston Hospital, Royal Marsden & Watford 
to discuss trainee attachments. This followed the very critical SAC (Royal College Standards 
Advisory Committee) report after a visit to Queen Mary's and Kingston Hospital suggesting 
that both North Thames and South Thames should pull out their trainees from these hospitals. 
The view of Kingston Hospital and Queen Mary's was that 'the most likely development was 
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for the surgical service at Roehampton to be assimilated into Kingston. The rate of this 
progress was hard to predict but there would be an interim period when elective surgery was 
undertaken at Roehampton and non-elective work at kingston Hospital.' 
Progress on joining clinical services on trauma & orthopaedics continued (letter 25.9.96 from 
Kingston Hospital's CEO to the Trust Medical Director) but problems emerged and a 
consultant general surgeon at Kingston wrote to the CEO that he was very concerned that 
Queen Mary's was still talking to St George's. A series of meetings followed. 
The importance of clinicians to the process was highlighted in a letter from Kingston & 
Richmond's CEO to a consultant at Kingston Hospital, on how to merge a department. He 
set out four stages: (i) refer the matter to the two Trust chief executives, (ii) bring together 
clinicians and managers from Queen Mary's and Kingston Hospitals in a series of 
discussions, (Hi) agree, (iv) then bring into the discussions health authorities, GPs, and 
medical schools. A senior figure in the Health Authority commented in interview: ' Doctors 
are very important. This time it is the clinical argument which is leading - they are strong 
arguments. And the GPs say the hospitals should merge. Among the consultants there is 
mixed support - some consultants are not keen. It was acknowledged that clinicians were 
pivotal to securing agreement: 'If clinicians feel that it makes clinical sense then that will 
drive it. If doctors feel it is not safe to practice then that will mobilise GPs. I would prefer 
consultants to influence GPs and then for the Health Authority to publicise it.' 
11.8 1997-1998 : Leading to the Current Position 
Clinical departments have now merged, thus producing the necessary changes to sustain a 
viable clinical service. Kingston Hospital and Richmond, Twickenham & Roehampton 
Trusts continue to operate as separate Trusts with separate management boards. The Queen 
Mary's site remains open as a hospital but does not have a district general hospital function. 
It belongs to the RTR Trust (subsequently restructured to become the South West London 
Community NHS Trust) even though clinical outpatient services are provided there by 
Kingston Hospital Trust, setting an agenda of potential conflict for the future. The key issue 
now exercising the minds of Health Authority and Trust managers is the poor financial state 
left by the merger. At this stage it would be fair to suggest that clinical service aims have 
been achieved but the management financial agenda is in a state of disarray. The chronology 
of events from April 1997 onwards is charted below. 
11.8.1 Chronology 
In April 1997 an interim Chief Executive appointment was made at Queen Mary's and a 
permanent Chief Executive was later appointed to head the RTR Trust from May 1998. A 
senior figure within Kingston Hospital summed up the situation prior to the April transfer of 
services. 'Kingston Hospital is seen as the dominant party. This is a disadvantage. 
Changes are to take place from 1st April 1997 - it is very hard to be certain what will 
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happen. Queen Mary's is being dcult. Their CEO resigned the day after the Health 
Authority announcement was made. A new Chief Executive is being appointed for two years. 
We shouldn't do it. We should just merge from April. ' 
A consultancy group, Finnamores, had been commissioned to undertake financial analysis as 
part of the review process. It projected a net saving of £9m revenue to be achieved by 
decanting remaining acute inpatient services from Queen Mary's, selling Putney Hospital, 
and allowing patients to flow naturally to an alternative hospital. It projected that Kingston 
would take 70%-80% of work, with some going to Chelsea & Westminster, St George's and 
Charing Cross. Kingston & Richmond Health Authority made it clear in the strategy 
document published in November 1997 that £9m net saving to the three health authorities 
(Kingston & Richmond, Merton Sutton & Wandsworth and Ealing, Hammersmith & 
Hounslow) would be the minimum needed and that , due to capitation problems, further 
savings would be needed in the future. 
At the beginning of the financial year, in March 1997, a senior Kingston Hospital manager 
described how a £4m deficit had been brought down to £750k by a combination of cost 
saving measures and cash injection: 'Central departments are to lose 10% and clinical 
departments are to lose 1%. The purchasers coughed up. Kingston & Richmond put up 
£2.9m, taken largely from Queen Mary's. But there is a rumour (via the Estates Department) 
that Queen Mary's spent Ulm on roof repairs to get rid ofstoplus cash. You can never know 
the truth of these things. 
In June 1998 the £9m projected savings were to comprise over 60% site costs which would 
only be realised when a satellite site, Putney Hospital, closed and services were consolidated 
on Queen Mary's. In other words, there was no timescale attached to it. In the meantime 
Queen Mary's continued to generate an ever-increasing deficit. It was estimated as Ll .6m by 
March 1998, then rose to a rumoured £4.4m by June 199835 . Since there existed £6m of 
transitional (non-recurrent) funding injected by Region into the local health economy, this 
pointed to a recurrent deficit of £10.4m, enough to eliminate any future savings from the 
Queen Mary's changes. In the meantime, Kingston Hospital and other Trusts distanced 
themselves from the Finnamore projections'''. Finance Directors were feeling beleaguered. 
Inpatient services from August 1998 are being accommodated in the short term at Kingston 
by a 'temporary' ward block of 132 beds which, although firmly bolted into the ground and 
clad around a steel frame, has received only 5 years planning permission by the Royal 
Borough of Kingston and so needs to be replaced by a permanent structure by the year 2002. 
The anticipated permanent structure at Kingston is known. as 'Phase 5' and is being planned 
Acute Strategy Group Meeting, Kingston & Richmond Health Authority, 16th June 1998 
36 They estimated that the work transfer to Kingston Hospital would cost £20m to reprovide rather than E16m a 
originally projected. The original value of the work being transferred from Queen Mary's to Kingston w 
£19m, suggesting that the shift would result in a net increase of £1 m rather than an immediate saving of £3m 
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by the Trust with potential for extra bed capacity, on the basis that factors such as 
neighbouring Trust mergers, consolidation of accident and emergency services on a single 
site and withdrawal of medical staffing accreditation could expand the flow of patients to 
Kingston Hospital. One of the hospitals likely to be affected would be Epsom Hospital, 
harking back to the early days of the market and rivalry between the two Trusts. In the 
meantime, a press release announced that Epsom Hospital and St Helier are to engage in talks 
to produce a Trust merger from 1st April 1999. This is a different model of action from the 
Kingston Hospital/Queen Mary's transaction where services merged but the Trusts did not. 
In the case of St Helier/Epsom a new Trust, i.e. managerial merger, will precede any service 
reconfiguration. 
A snapshot at August 1998 showed the financial situation to be a shambles. The previous 
estimate of £9 million savings projected by management consultants, Finnamore, had been 
recalculated as a projected cost increase of £10.4 million. The local health economy was 
already being supported by £6 million transitional funding from the Region and the Trusts 
agreed a further deficit budget of £4.6 million with the Regional Office. This implied a 
recurrent deficit of £21 million in 1999/00. The Regional Office was alarmed and warned 
the Kingston & Richmond Health Authority CEO that 'There is now a very real threat that 
the steering group will fail to deliver a viable plan'. The Health Authority CEO felt 
aggrieved and replied ' You will appreciate that ... I feel frustrated in being held to account by 
you for the overall financial performance of this reconfiguration without any matching 
control over the Trusts ' behaviour. Moreover, I feel particularly frustrated about the 
problems arising from the inadequacy of the RTR financial information. .... What I cannot 
accept responsibility for, and do not have the power to resolve, is the management of the 
release of overhead and estates costs from RTR.' He concluded that the RTR Trust was 
insolvent and could not continue to operate without a substantial subsidy. He urged the 
regional office to turn the RTR Trust to a form of receivership by requiring the Trust `to 
operate in a mode akin to receivership but working in partnership with the receiving Trusts '. 
In terms of control, the Health Authority insisted that the main levers for dealing with RTR's 
costs lay with the Regional Office: 'We do not have levers of control. You do. 
Further correspondence was directed to Chief Executives of the Trusts insisting that they 
should exert greater control over costs. The underlying problem appeared to be that 
insufficient resources were being pulled from Queen Mary's to sustain the new services at 
Kingston. Logically, this must be a consequence of either protectionism by RTR Trust who 
were holding back resources, an overstatement by Kingston concerning the resources needed, 
or an indication that the RTR service over the previous year had been running a low cost 
service due to high vacancies and a poor quality of service. RTR's ability throughout the 
process to obfuscate and withhold information means that the Health Authorities and other 
Trusts have had limited leverage with which to grasp this problem. Region, which might be 
expected to hold the ring, could exert pressure but not control and perceived it as a local 
issue. 
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The financial objective of the acute strategy had been to eliminate the underlying deficit, 
much of which was located at Queen Mary's. As the business plan for 1999/2000 at 
Kingston Hospital was being drafted it became apparent that the impact of the merger had 
been to shift the Queen Mary deficit to Kingston without any compensatory changes. 
11.9 1999: Service Developments 
In August 1998 the radiology department in Kingston Hospital submitted a proposal to the 
Trust Board to invest in a Magnetic Resonance Imaging scanner, attempting to make the case 
for this service development on the basis of funding. It was argued that the volume of 
patients referred to the neighbouring Atkinson Morley Hospital (2 miles away) was 
sufficiently high to warrant a scanner on site since the costs charged by AMR were 
equivalent to the cost of running the same level of activity on the Kingston site. The case 
was rejected on the basis of risk since it was anticipated that a scanner on site would 
stimulate demand for the service, raising utilisation and with it costs. 
In September 1999 the case was resubmitted, this time on the basis of service quality. It was 
argued that every other hospital in the vicinity had an MRI scanner and that Kingston 
Hospital would be perceived as a second rate hospital over time. It would become impossible 
to recruit high calibre consultant radiologists and the hospital would be weakened 
strategically: 
The distribution of imaging services in south west London reflects the status of MRI as a 
district general hospital facility. Kingston Hospital is unique, within a 45 minute travel 
radius, in failing to provide MRI as part of its radiology service. Consultants within 
radiology and other specialties have expressed concerns about the clinical standard of a 
radiology service which is not capable of providing ready access to MRf to both in-patients 
and outpatients. It is felt that an up-to-date and high quality service needs to provide MI as 
a standard modality along with other radiological examinations.   A further driver of 
service quality is the clinical reputation of an acute hospital. This is inevitably influenced  by 
the range of services provided and, in the case of radiology, depends on availability of MRL 
Kingston Hospital's ability to attract high calibre recruits to consultant staffing  in this 
specialty will depend in large measure on the Trust's range of services in relation to its 
neighbours. 
The Figure below shows hospitals within a five mile radius to the north of Kingston (beyond 
which the concentration of hospitals increases in the inner London area, e.g. with proximity 
of Charing Cross, Hammersmith, Ealing, Chelsea and Westminster, St Thomas's, Guys and 
so on) and 10 miles to the south. Apart from the Queen Mary's/Kingston axis, every hospital 
has an MRI scanner. At the beginning of the internal market period only St George's (which 
owns Atkinson Morley Hospital) possessed an MRI scanner. 
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The economic case was made on the basis of risk-sharing with a private sector partner which 
would market spare capacity to other consumers. Kingston Hospital Board approved the 
strategic case to procure an MR1 scanner and verbal approval was also received from the 
London Region NHS Executive. 
Figu 	 Facilities in South West London 
11.9.1 Record of Key Decisions 
Secretary of State prompts review of SW London Acute Services in 'Making 
London Better, February 1993, her response to the Tomlinson Enquiry. 
SW London Review presented in Autumn 1993 recommended closure of Queen 
Mary's as an acute hospital, with closure of the Accident & Emergency 
department. 
The review was rejected. It was perceived as being too financially driven and 
politically unacceptable. 
Queen Mary's wanted to keep the Accident & Emergency Department open and 
to continue functioning as a District General Hospital (DGH). A vigorous 
survival campaign engaged the support of the local MP who was defending a 
marginal seat in Putney. 
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(5) Clinical reviews 1994 - 1996 indicated that Queen Mary's was not viable as a 
DGH. 
(6) Royal College of Surgeons insisted on a merger of services September 1996. 
(7) Consultants at both hospitals agreed. 
(8) A&E department at Queen Mary's closed 1 st April 1997. 
(9) All inpatient services transferred out of Queen Mary's, mainly to Kingston 
Hospital, by 4th August 1998. 
(10) Minister for Health responded to pressure from the Merton, Sutton & 
Wandsworth Community Health Council by promising a redevelopment of the 
Queen Mary's site in the form of a Rapid Diagnostic Centre. 
(11) Financial targets remain unmet. The merger has not produced anticipated savings 
in the short term. Financial balance in the future needs to be achieved alongside 
the capital redevelopment of the Queen Mary's site which is now a political 
imperative, described locally as a 'phoenix rising from the ashes' . 
12) Kingston Hospital Trust Board supported the Strategic Outline Case and Outline 
Business Case for developing an Imaging Centre which includes a new Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging scanner. 
11.10 Conclusion 
The underlying theme of the Queen Mary's and Kingston case study is one of survival. RTR 
Trust Board wanted their organisation to survive, the consultants wanted their clinical 
practice to survive, and Kingston Hospital was also working towards a survival objective. 
Competition theory acknowledges that survival is the firm's ultimate aim and so the 
motivation rests on what behaviour is required to ensure that survival. 
The case study shows a health economy under severe financial pressure and lends support to 
Hypothesis 4 in which cost pressures bring managers and doctors into conflict, with doctors 
achieving the greater degree of success. In spite of managerial pressure the Trust was still 
unable to balance the books and incurred a growing recurrent operational deficit. Ultimately 
the clinical service configuration changed and the deficit in the health economy has 
subsequently widened rather than diminished. 
The Queen Mary's/Kingston case study of the competitive market environment highlights the 
political nature of change in the health service and how market exit can be hindered if it 
conflicts with the interests of local politicians. 
The changes which were eventually effected were driven by Royal College medical training 
requirements, presenting a cast-iron case which won the support of consultants, GPs and the 
local community. The financial pressures in themselves were not sufficiently powerful to 
produce change in the first South West London Review (1993) and by themselves were 
acknowledged to be insufficient in the next wave of reviews. Change was negotiated with 
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the consultants and where they refused to form a consensus, as in the urology review, the 
case for change became insubstantial. 
The element of the case study relating to Magnetic Resonance Imaging provides an example 
of how consultants will endeavour to pursue service developments with the aim of improving 
the quality of their service. This is also consistent with the need to establish a good 
reputation for the service and to attract new consultant recruits. In the Kingston example, 
financial arguments could not support the case for development since purchase of an MRI 
scanner would lead to higher service costs. Instead, it was necessary to establish a service 
case based on the issue of service quality to gain agreement in principle. Thereafter the 
economic case was based on how to meet this service demand most cost-effectively. 
The case for providing MRI facilities in a market environment was strengthened by the fact 
that each of the neighbouring hospitals owned a scanner. In a centrally planned system this 
high level of capacity would weaken the case for capital development since capacity would 
be collective rather then Trust-specific. In summary, this aspect of the case study suggests 
that service quality is a more potent driver of change than finance and that competition 
between neighbouring hospitals stimulates investment in technology, inducing cost pressures. 
The Chief Executive of Kingston and Richmond Health Authority perceived a clear 
distinction between clinical, financial and political priorities. He observed (Figure 11.1) 
that there would be a conflict between financial and political success in the effort to 
reconfigure services by moving acute hospital services from the Queen Mary's to the 
Kingston site. This was, nevertheless, considered to be the only financially viable solution 
so he took steps to ensure that it was followed through. He was also clear that this solution 
produced no conflict between financial and clinical viability, conscious that the earlier 1993 
review had foundered by producing a solution that was financially viable but had no clinical 
support. The Chief Executive's analysis proved to be accurate since the consultation 
process met with acceptance of the clinical and financial case, but politicians ceded ground 
to make the plan more palatable. Specifically, Alan Milburn promised the CHC that Queen 
Mary's would be redeveloped. While this flies in the face of financial objectives, it 
demonstrates the superior strength of political over managerial pressures, inhibiting the 
closure of hospitals and further weakening the budgetary constraint of local health 
economies. 
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CHAPTER 12. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This thesis has explored the motivation and goals of Trusts which were set up under statutory 
instrument from Vt April 1991 by Margaret Thatcher's Conservative Government and which 
continue to have a role following the Labour Government's White Paper (Department of 
Health, 1997). The research question asked 'What are the objectives of Trusts? What is the 
extent of the constraints under which they operate?' 
In this final chapter the results of the empirical work are drawn together according to a 
framework which starts with the 'inner state of Trusts', then looks at how this drives the 
behaviour of Trusts as organisations and, finally, how feedback from the environment 
modifies the underlying motivation or 'inner state'. The literature review established that 
consultants and managers could be treated as the dominant coalition working within 
hospitals, although there was no consensus upon what motivated these groups, nor on which 
group would dominate, if either. The motivation and behaviour of Trusts, it is postulated 
here, is determined by the interaction of these groups, with feedback provided by what used 
to be called the internal market. 
12.1 Hypotheses 
The basic premise is that doctors and managers have different sets of objectives in 
accordance with their incentive structure and professional duties. The divergence in 
objectives is consistent with the self-interest of each group, which takes into account feelings 
of self-worth and fmancial and career goals. Self-interest on the part of doctors is also 
consistent with any altruistic motivation they may have towards their patients' welfare 
encapsulated by the Hippocratic ethos of the profession. Self-regulation on the part of the 
medical profession has allowed a confluence of personal and professional aims, aligning 
doctors' interests with those of the individual patient. The groups' respective objectives have 
been summarised as budgetary or financial regulation for managers and service goals for 
doctors. The thrust of the hypotheses is that doctors are interested in production while 
managers are interested in the 'bottom line' and that doctors will win in the long term 
The central piece of empirical work used a questionnaire survey to ask the dominant power 
coalition about their own and other people's objectives. This approach acknowledged the 
existence of potentially opposing interests without prejudging the balance of power. The 
second empirical study took cost and volume data and reviewed the performance of Trusts, 
going some way to answer the question of which group dominated Trusts' behaviour through 
the organisations' success in meeting fmancial targets or achieving service growth. The third 
strand of empirical work used a case study to consider the behaviour of Trusts in the context 
of their external environment. It portrayed the political imperatives which operate within the 
NHS and compared the success of financial and clinical drivers in producing change. 
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12.2 'Inner State' of Trusts 
Management theories attribute organisational control to managers through decision systems 
and allocation of resources, so that management objectives and organisational objectives 
become indistinguishable. This line of reasoning was deemed inappropriate to the NHS 
setting in which doctors make decisions accounting for up to 75% of revenue costs (Gray, 
1991). A more satisfactory model treated organisations as the product of the actions and 
interactions of motivated people pursuing purposes of their own. The sociological 'action 
perspective' encouraged an examination of how motivational factors related to change and 
conflict within organisations and implied that at any one time the prevailing arrangements for 
management are likely to represent a negotiated rather than an imposed order and that 
renegotiation and change are intrinsic characteristics of all human institutions . 
It was supposed that, where one group of actors was dominant in an organisation, then the 
objectives of that group would represent the underlying objectives and therefore the 
behaviour of the organisation as a whole. 
The first step was to test perceptions in order to postulate the objectives of actors within 
NHS Trust organisations. A questionnaire was devised, after detailed interviews and 
piloting, and doctors and managers were approached directly through an England-wide 
survey administered by Trust Chief Executives. 
The questionnaire survey, which produced 1,577 responses, was conducted in September/ 
October 1997, ahead of the Labour Government's White Paper published in December 1997 
(Department of Health, 1977). The sample of respondents comprised 43% consultants and 
57% managers, providing a cross-section of both groups. The survey revealed that 
consultants and managers harbour significant differences in their attitudes and perceptions. 
Consultants are the more homogeneous group while managers show greater complexity with 
a division between operational managers, described as service/business managers, and 
corporate managers comprising the Chief Executive and non-medical Trust Board directors 37. 
Consultants are, indeed, driven by service goals although, rather surprisingly, service volume 
was consistently less important than service quality. Break-even and revenue expansion was 
unimportant to consultants. Managers ranked financial break-even as their most important 
goal but were less focused on this than consultants believed, since maintaining service quality 
Other central functions such as finance and contracting sat on a spectrum between the two group 
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was ranked a close second, revealing an attempt to balance these two objectives. The Trust 
as a whole, however, was perceived by all groups to pursue break-even as its unequivocal 
priority. 
It was apparent from the questionnaire that the introduction of Trust status made a difference 
to the priorities of individuals and the organisation as whole. Doctors' objectives appear to 
be the least affected by the change since over 50% believed that their own priorities had 
remained unchanged or even weakened across a range of factors which included, for 
example, maintenance of service volume/quality. Managers, on the other hand, felt that their 
own objectives had gained in strength since Trust status. Both groups were agreed that the 
Trust had become more focused on its priorities and more energetic in their pursuit. 
These responses support the underlying hypotheses about the difference between doctors and 
managers and their respective service and financial aims. They also show that both groups 
see the Trust as something distinctly different from themselves, since it is perceived as 
pursuing a set of objectives which are quite different from those of consultants and more 
stringent than those of managers; there is a clarity of view about the existing priorities of the 
Trust even though these are not owned by the dominant groups within the Trust. This begs 
the question of how the Trust can achieve its perceived goal of break-even when consultants 
believe it to rank low in the scheme of priorities and managers are ambivalent about its 
importance in relation to quality. 
This ambivalence was highlighted by the responses of clinical managers and service/business 
managers, sub-categories of the overall group, to the question of their individual priorities. 
Although the highest mean ranking was attributed to financial break-even with maintaining 
service quality ranked second overall, closer inspection of the responses showed that the 
majority of service managers believed that maintaining service quality was their first priority. 
The high average ranking of financial break-even was achieved through the combination of 
first and second rankings, lifting the mean score. This group has service interests which are 
more akin to those of consultants. Their interest in financial management, however, sets 
them apart from consultants and ties them to the management body. Given that this group of 
managers has resource management responsibilities within Trusts, the analysis highlights the 
tension between meeting service demands and balancing budgets within NHS Trusts. This 
casts further doubt on Trusts' ability to achieve their statutory financial objectives, since the 
financial incentive is weakest of all among the managers who are employed to deliver the 
service and manage the budget. 
The questionnaire asked individuals to consider whether the NHS climate was likely to 
change with the new Government, the extent to which this was welcomed and the sort of 
change they anticipated. 80% of respondents believed there would be some degree of change 
and 85% welcomed this. Doctors were the most emphatic in their desire for change since 
48% wanted change 'very much' compared to 37% of the manager sample. Respondents 
were given the opportunity to state in their own words the sort of change they would like and 
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a strong pattern of responses emerged which was consistent with the government's 
subsequent White Paper. To this extent the claim in the 1997 White Paper that 'The new 
arrangements go with the grain of what NHS Trusts and their staff want' (p53) is supported 
by the findings of this survey. 
Both doctors and managers identified market reforms as the most popular change with 32% 
of respondents (501/1577) advocating abolition or amendment of the internal market. 5% of 
respondents specifically called for abolition of the two tier GP Fundholder system. Both 
measures subsequently became government policy. Second to market reform was a call by 
26% of the sample for additional and better use of resources (403/1577) and, allied to this, 
was the proposal by 23% to reduce bureaucratic processes and eliminate management and 
transaction costs (356/1577). At the same time there was a call for a public debate about 
affordability of health care and rationing priorities (10%, 160/1577). The Government, 
however, is unequivocal in rejecting this in favour of efficiency gains: '...the choice posed 
between unaffordable levels of funding or charges and rationing is a false dilemma.... The 
NHS needs to make better use of its resources' (Department of Health, 1977, p8). In 
response to the argument that the NHS cannot accommodate cost pressures and needs to 
increase funding or restrict care Itlhe Government rejects this analysis. So do the public' 
(P7). 
Another major theme emerging from the same open question was a desire for collaboration to 
replace competition (162). The purchaser/provider split and competition among Trusts was 
felt to need reform, although only 4 out of 1,577 respondents called for Trusts to be 
abolished. A small but increased number (8) declared that Trusts were a good thing and a 
further group (11) wanted to develop Trust freedoms. It is reasonable to interpret these open 
question responses as a weariness and criticism of market structures but, if anything, an 
endorsement of local Trust freedoms which is consistent with the White Paper (1997) 
direction. 
After market structure, resources, and bureaucracy the fourth most important change was 
described under the label 'priorities' (315/1,577). This broadly described the desire for a 
return to an NHS philosophy of universal provision and a public service ethos and was 
described in terms of quality and a requirement to put the clinical need of the patient first, 
irrespective of origin. It called for an attitudinal change through removal of business thinking 
and freedom of choice. This is encapsulated in the first of the key principles enumerated in 
the White Paper 'to renew the NHS as a genuinely national service. Patients will get fair 
access to consistently high quality, prompt and accessible services right across the country' 
(Department of Health, 1977, p 11). This area was closely related to responses grouped under 
the title 'influence and leadership' (274/1,577) comprising 20% of consultants (137/681) and 
15% of managers (137/896). Respondents in general sought a more clinical/consultant/ 
professionally driven service and better quality leadership. The tension in organisational 
relationships was apparent within this category since a vocal minority (23) called for less 
consultant influence and intransigence. 
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The response to this question about change, however, needs to be weighed against the view 
(Questions 5 and 6) that 62% of respondents (914/1502) believed that relationships between 
consultants and managers had improved and 66% (997/1505) believed that services to 
patients had improved. The responses of doctors and managers diverged at this point with 
48% (317/653) of consultants perceiving an improvement in relationships compared to 72% 
(597/849) of managers, although 'better' was the modal response of each group and only 
28% of doctors believed that relationships had deteriorated. 58% of doctors (351/651) and 
76% of managers (646/854) believed that services to patients had improved with, again, 
`better' being the modal response. The main reason for the improvement in working 
relationships was described (through Question 5b) in terms of shared priorities and 
objectives, accounting for 37% of positive comments (324/865) and using phrases such as 
`partnership', 'co-operation' and 'collaboration'. An identical proportion of negative 
comments (105/283) identified conflicting priorities as the reason for poorer relationships. 
Involvement of clinicians in management was used to account for better relationships by 28% 
(243/863) of positive respondents, most of whom admittedly were managers. 
These responses show that there is a balance to be struck between reporting a strong desire 
for change and casting a light on developments over the previous seven years. Government 
policy since 1991 was seen to have produced positive change on doctor/manager working 
relationships but market structure and resource pressures were exerting their own forces 
which staff were keen to dismantle. The Labour Government captured the spirit of this desire 
for change, without acknowledging the debt to earlier developments starting with the 
Resource Management Initiative in 1986, by stating that Iflor the first time in the history of 
the NHS the Government will align clinical and financial responsibility to give all the 
professionals who make prescribing and referring decisions the opportunity to make 
financial decisions in the best interests of their patients' (p9). 
61% of respondents believed that the goals of doctors and managers had moved closer 
together (Question 7) with only 13% of managers and 29% of consultants believing that their 
goals had moved further apart. Taken with the other results, showing (a) that doctors' 
priorities had changed less than those of managers, (b) that relationships had improved 
through shared priorities and objectives and (c) that managers who were closest to 
consultants, i.e. clinical and service/business managers supporting the operating core, shared 
objectives which were closer to those of consultants than to those attributed to the Trust, it is 
possible to form an alternative notion of the result of bringing clinicians into management. 
The Resource Management Initiative (DHSS, 1986) began with the intention of involving 
clinicians in management to give them responsibility and information to enable them to 
manage resources better and to take greater resource management responsibility. The Labour 
Government's pledge to align clinical and financial responsibility follows the same direction 
of thought. The dynamics of motivation revealed by the questionnaire survey suggest that the 
impact of this may be the reverse of the Government's intention. Rather than consultants 
being converted into managers, the evidence suggests that managers are more likely to be 
converted by consultants. Consultant motivation has a consistency and clarity which appears 
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unmoved by health service reforms. Management goals show greater fluidity and diversity, 
and vary according to their proximity to the operating core and, thereby, proximity to 
consultants. (If doctors were to have a greater presence at the strategic apex then the 
evidence produced in this survey allows one to speculate that the goals of the Trust could be 
altered explicitly to reflect service goals and to reject financial constraints). Where power is 
delegated to the operating core, as envisaged by the Resource Management Initiative, then 
managerial priorities, it is demonstrated here, become subverted towards service needs. 
12.3 Trust Behaviour 
After considering the internal motivation of Trusts the programme of work went on to 
consider Trust behaviour. A study of 100 general acute Trusts was undertaken based on three 
years of Annual Accounts up to 1994/95 which were set alongside Department of Health 
activity data for the same financial years. The results were consistent with the hypotheses in 
that two thirds of Trusts which experienced revenue growth also succeeded in achieving both 
their financial target and a growth in service delivery. In these revenue-gaining Trusts 
managers failed in their postulated objective 28% of the time while doctors failed only 9% 
of the time39. Where Trust income contracted, managers failed to meet the financial target 
in 38% of Trusts while doctors saw output reduction in only 9% of cases. The results showed 
that where income reduced then managers experienced greater difficulty in achieving the 
financial target performance since the service continued to expand at the expense of financial 
constraints. ,It was striking that doctors and managers succeeded in achieving their objectives 
simultaneously in the majority of cases, both where income rose and where income reduced, 
but this did not invalidate the conclusion that, where the aims of doctors and managers are 
mutually exclusive, doctors' behaviour tends to dominate. 
The questionnaire survey had suggested that service volume was less important to clinicians 
than quality, indicating that doctors' primary motivation was based on quality of the service. 
This does not invalidate the quantitative results supporting the hypotheses which have been 
expressed in terms of volume since consultants observed volume to be more important to 
them than financial targets. The mean rankings showed consistency between consultants' 
view of themselves, consultants' view of other consultants and managers' view of 
consultants. The order of priority was determined as (1) maintaining quality, (2) expanding 
quality, (3) maintaining volume, (4) expanding volume and (5)46) expanding revenue/ 
breaking even. Hypotheses 1A-4A and the associated test remained valid in the light of the 
questionnaire responses since the secondary objective of service volume was shown to be 
adequate as a counter-objective to financial break-even4° . 
38 Postulated as breaking-even to meet the Financial Target Performance set as 6% return on assets. 
39 it was postulated that doctors sought expansion of service volume (in the absence of quality measures). 
40 
Depth of service in terms of investigations, technology and other levels of care associated with a sing 
episode provides a possible method of framing quality in relation to volume and finance. Where extra fundin 
is invested in this way rather than in expanding the service it could be argued that the hypothesis of quali 
taking precedence over quantity is supported. 
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12.4 Feedback from the External Environment 
The third piece of empirical work used a case study approach to consider the behaviour of 
Trusts in the context of their external environment. It tracked through Kingston Hospital's 
behaviour in the early days of the internal market and showed its relationship with Epsom 
Hospital, considered to be a strong competitor with expansionist instincts to rival those of 
Kingston. The latter part of the period had been characterised by a strategic review of 
hospital services within South west London (excluding Epsom Hospital) which 
recommended closure of Queen Mary's Hospital on financial grounds. This was bitterly 
resisted by the Richmond, Twickenham and Roehampton Trust which owned Queen Mary's, 
drawing the community into a vociferous 'Save Our Hospital' campaign. The Trust was 
successful in thwarting a full-scale closure of the hospital but was deemed clinically non-
viable as a District General Hospital and has since lost its acute hospital services. 
Queen Mary's was located in the marginal constituency of Putney where David Mellor held 
the seat as a Conservative up to 1997. The case study portrayed the political imperatives 
which operate within the NHS environment and which, driven by MPs' accountability to the 
community, work to neutralise market forces. It also exemplified the weakness of financial 
incentives to produce change within the NHS in contrast to clinical objectives which, driven 
by doctors, had a clearer direction and greater impact. 
Neutralisation of market forces stems from failure to close hospitals. Economic theory 
requires a competitive market structure driven by some form of financial motivation to 
sustain a competitive environment. The failure to deliver financial objectives in the internal 
market, witnessed by the political unwillingness to be seen to let financial targets override 
public wishes in the case of South west London, means that clinical priorities have greater 
impact. It is also contended here that this incentive structure will feed back to managers and 
consultants and will affect their motivation, encouraging a disregard for the already weak 
financial constraint. Political exigencies go further to weaken financial control, illustrated by 
Alan Milburn's commitment to the local CHC to redevelop the Queen Mary's site, requiring 
additional resources. 
12.5 Implications of Results in Relation to Labour's Reforms 
Managers and doctors were approached as two groups of individuals who are alike in their 
human qualities but are placed under different incentive structures by dint of their 
professional setting, reward patterns and lines of accountability. 
The conventional view of homo economicus as a rational being who will make choices at the 
margin based on financial gain has been extended by public choice theorists who take the 
`methodological individual' as the starting point of analysis and lay emphasis on narrow 
economic self-interest as the prime motivator of all actors in the public sector. This public 
choice approach to motivation is useful because it signals the role of incentives and allows us 
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to predict that, should the incentive structure change, actors will realign their secondary goals 
with the primary one of narrow self-interest. It also goes some way to explain why 
consultants, considered to be maverick and individualist in their behaviour, emerged as a 
homogeneous group through the questionnaire, since their professional status provides a 
uniform incentive structure. Managers proved to be the more heterogeneous group, reflecting 
their lines of accountability which differ between the corporate and service levels of the 
organisation. Consultants placed service issues, defined predominantly in terms of quality, 
squarely at the top of their list of priorities within the Trust while they ranked financial break-
even as least important. Managers on the other hand purported to strive for financial balance, 
ranking it as their first priority, while balancing this with quality considerations which were 
also considered to be important. 
12.5.1 Impact of Market Abolition 
An analysis of market structure would suggest that consultants are entirely rational in their 
order of priorities since failure to break-even does not drive a Trust out of existence, contrary 
to competitive theory. The public choice approach supports the prediction that consultants 
would reshape their priorities in the event of a change in market structure. Figure 12.2 shows 
how managers' and doctors' objectives interact with the market environment and indicates 
that 1991-1997 has been marked by barriers to market exit; efficiency has not been rewarded 
by growth in market share and inefficiency has not been punished by failure through closure. 
In the balance between quality and cost-effectiveness it is therefore rational for doctors to 
pursue quality vigorously, reinforced by dependence upon reputation. Added to the balance 
of objectives held by managers, it is logical that the weight of motivation within Trusts 
should fall to pursuit of service rather than fmancial goals. 
If, however, the link between Trust funding and performance were to prove more robust then 
there would be an incentive for consultants to reshape their objectives'''. Interviews 
conducted in Stage 1 of the questionnaire fieldwork revealed the extent to which consultants 
depend on the NHS to pursue their aims. Surgeons rely on their NHS position to receive a 
stream of private patient referrals which generates the major part of their income. These 
referral patterns would be disrupted by any geographical reconfiguration of service through 
hospital closure. A real threat of closure through poor financial performance and, conversely, 
real reward through strong fmancial performance, would have a bearing on consultants' 
priorities and would raise the importance of financial break-even as an objective. 
If money really were to flow with the patient and hospitals allowed to close then the sequence of events in a 
general hospital would be (I ) a shift in elective surgery which would (2) reduce the viability of surgical 
specialties in the losing hospital; (3) absence of surgery would make it impossible to run an accident and 
emergency department, resulting in (4) closure of accident and emergency and (5) shift of all general medical 
and other acute specialties to another centre. 
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In the light of this market dysfunction the question arises as to the impact of abolishing the 
internal market upon the motivation of Trusts. The answer would appear to be 'not much' 
since neither the incentive structure nor the market structure would change with abolition. 
The survey demonstrated that the internal market was unpopular in a way which the 
purchaser/provider split was not, yielding proposals such as revised contractual arrangements 
between purchasers and providers as possible solutions. The White Paper (Department of 
Health, 1997) has captured this, declaring that InJot everything about the old system was 
bad' (pit) and aiming to retain the 'separation between the planning of hospital care and its 
provision' (1312) while still planning to abolish the internal market. This is consistent with the 
questionnaire responses but at the same time reveals a potential triumph of perception and 
tone over substance, (which in itself has a rationale in the context of the government's sixth 
key principle to  rebuild public confidence'), since the internal market cannot be defined as 
anything other than a system of resource allocation through agreements/contracts which 
separate purchasing or planning of the service from its provision. 
The key to this conundrum must lie in the distinction between 'competition' and 
partnership'. The 1997 White Paper and questionnaire survey are in harmony by advocating 
the abolition of competition which would destroy the key driver of an internal market. The 
ethos of competition has stimulated a desire for survival based on a Darwinian struggle which 
was played out in the case study with, many felt, damaging consequences. The evidence of 
the case study, however, also illustrated the extent to which real competitive forces have been 
absent from the internal market, suggesting that 'competition' represents a policy intention 
that has never properly been executed. The case study revealed the degree of accountability 
faced by elected members of parliament towards their constituents who typically cherish their 
local hospital as a symbol of care, security and community identity. In short, the evidence 
suggests that there was no market, nor could there be, in a parliamentary democracy which 
will always serve to stunt unpopular manifestations of competition. 
12.5.2 Clinical Governance and the Quality Instinct 
Consultants and their priorities have apparently come through unscathed by the 1991 reforms 
due, on the one hand, to the stability of the incentive structure determined by occupational 
control and, on the other, to market behaviour through lack of exit, i.e. political difficulty in 
closing hospitals. In terms of Trust objectives, the Labour Government reform which 
promises greater impact than market abolition is the introduction of clinical governance. 
This is intended to balance the statutory objectives of finance with an emphasis on quality 
which, according to questionnaire responses, is consistent with the existing motivation and 
behaviour of both managers and doctors. 
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Figure 12.3: 1998 Onwards - Conjecture : Incentive Structure & Objectives 
The Trust has been perceived as aiming for an uncompromising break-even position, in line 
with statutory duties defined by the NHS and Community Care Act 1990, whereas neither 
doctors nor managers have identified with this strident emphasis on financial targets. The 
empirical work thus highlighted the gap between Trusts' perceived objective, laid down in 
statute, and their actual objective produced by the interaction of the dominant actors. By 
bringing quality into the key target area and integrating perceptions with actual behaviour 
(Figure 12.3), it is reasonable to conjecture that the 1997 White Paper provides a resolution 
to this divergence between perceptions of Trust aims and reality as reflected by their 
performance. 
Aside from this, clinical governance could succeed in influencing clinical behaviour in a way 
which market reforms did not. Professional status of doctors depends upon self-regulation 
which guards the 'indeterminacy' of its work (Fincham & Rhodes, 1992), preventing a shift 
of control to outside managerial elements. Professional censure is traditionally reserved for 
matters of ethics rather than competence and competence cannot be judged by outsiders while 
the profession monopolises knowledge. Clinical governance, though still in its infancy as a 
policy, could challenge this monopoly and in consequence reduce the status of the profession. 
The case for transparency and competence-based assessment was given a sharp boost by the 
Bristol Royal Infirmary scandal in 1998 in which the Chief Executive, while also a doctor, 
felt unable to challenge the rumoured incompetence of two paediatric cardiac surgeon 
colleagues. 
The medical profession is at a juncture which sets at stake its ability to maintain occupationa 
control through self-regulation and clinical autonomy. Any dilution of status will lessen the 
rewards to the profession and ultimately affect recruitment and the calibre of consultants. 
Clinical governance moves the target of reform firmly into the territory which doctors believe 
to be the most important, namely quality. If managers are seen to trespass onto this area then 
the frustration of 1991-97 could be replaced be greater turbulence, even though in principle 
clinical governance lends greater coherence to Trust motivation and behaviour. The outcome 
will depend upon the medical profession's ability to absorb clinical governance and continue 
to regulate itself successfully as a profession from within its own ranks. 
12.5.3 Expansion of Trusts into the Primary Care Sector 
This thesis has focused on secondary and (in the questionnaire survey) community care 
Trusts, the majority of which are acute hospitals, drawing attention to the motivation of 
consultants and managers. Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) come on stream from 1 st April 2000, 
converting some Primary Care Groups formed under the 1997 White Paper which elect to 
become PCTs. Trusts will constitute groups of GP practices serving populations of up to 
250,000 residents that will contract with the Health Authority as providers of primary and 
community services and will be purchasers of secondary and community services through 
contracts with other NHS Trusts. 
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Existing NHS Trusts and the new PCTs are similar in that doctors are the main professional 
group in each and that managers will also be required to martial resources and meet 
externally set targets. The PCT Boards will include doctors and managers and the Chief 
Executives of most PCTs for the most part will have managerial rather than medical 
backgrounds. 
The analysis of motivation for NHS Trusts started from the premise that managers and 
consultants would act on the basis of self-interest, driven mainly by reputation (as shown in 
the questionnaire survey responses to Question 1). Their respective professional and 
performance incentives thereafter drove doctors to pursue quality and managers to balance 
the budget. (It was argued that professional regulations succeeded in aligning doctors' self-
interest with the interests of the patient, bringing self-interest into line with altruistic 
concern). The market environment supplied feedback which reinforced the doctors' 
motivation and weakened the managers'. In summary, therefore, self-interest is the starting 
point and incentive structures motivate behaviour. 
The shell of this analysis could be applied to PCTs, namely self-interest responding to 
incentives, but the putative behaviour is likely to vary due to significant differences in 
incentive structures relating to consultants and GPs. General practitioners are partners who 
each have a vote in decision making within the practice and, having bought a stake in the 
partnership through capital investment, share the profits of the enterprise. General practice 
draws income according to its list size and can enhance this by a range of activities such as 
meeting screening targets and running a dispensary. As in the GP Fundholding scheme 
which ran 1991-97 it is possible to put a cordon sanitaire around the commissioning budget 
to keep it ring-fenced and separate from the wider income-earning activities of the 
partnership (Glennerster et al, 1994) but the incentive to behave as a profit-making enterprise 
is embedded into the partnership structure. Hospital consultants, on the other hand, are 
salaried and, as interviews conducted in Stage 1 of the questionnaire fieldwork showed, may 
have lucrative private practices which depend on the NHS to ensure clinical reputation and 
provide a source of patient referral. 
Consultants' income maximising motivation is channeled into their private practice, reducing 
the incentive towards supply-driven demand within the NHS. The salaried arrangement 
divorces consultants from the financial gains or losses of the Trust, justifying their lack of 
interest in financial management. A tension will arise in general practice over the impact of 
PCT deficits and surpluses upon the practice income. It will be entitled to retain surpluses of 
cash earmarked for secondary care use, suggesting that GPs will attempt to change their 
referral patterns to bring services in-house. Deficits will be monitored by Health Authorities 
in the first instance and thereafter by the Commission for Health Improvement (CHI) which 
could impose management changes where PCTs consistently fail to balance their budgets 
(Hausman and Le Grand, 1999). As in the case of hospital Trusts, the incentive structure for 
managers is supposedly clear but the strength of the budget constraint will depend upon 
feedback from the external environment. If the budget constraint proves to be weak and does 
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not impact upon GPs' personal fmances then the same conflict between doctors and managers 
could arise in PCTs as in their secondary sector counterparts. The same professional and 
ethical culture will motivate both GPs and consultants and there will be no incentive to ration 
care to contain costs. If, on the other hand, the partnership earnings are affected by the 
financial performance of PCTs then this would present GPs with a potential conflict between 
their professional and their personal interests. General practice would become increasingly 
unattractive as a medical specialty and partners would leave primary care. This would 
stimulate growth of salaried workers and the consequent shortfall in GP numbers would be 
met by other professions, such as nurses, taking on functions of GPs. There is already a 
perceived 'crisis' affecting general practitioner recruitment and retention and a view that 
workload will shift from doctors to other health care practitioners (Cochrane et al, 1999). 
A problem akin to 'herding cats' will arise if GPs are required to take a consistent approach 
to policy and practice. The case study of Kingston and Queen Mary's Hospitals in Chapter 
11 showed that GPs within the Kingston and Richmond Multifund, the main GP Fundholding 
body within south west London, were divided on their attitudes to the two hospitals, with 
Kingston GPs supporting the cause of Kingston Hospital and Richmond GPs anxious to 
support Queen Mary's. The Health Authority at the outset (through the SW London Review 
of 1993) had recommended that Queen Mary's should close. Corporate behaviour above the 
level of GP practice would be difficult to secure within PCTs. 
It is reasonable to conjecture that doctors and managers within PCTs will be driven by the 
same goals of quality on the part of doctors and financial discipline on the part of managers, 
with managers fighting a losing battle42. The relationship between partnership earnings and 
PCT surpluses adds a complication, however, which could stimulate changes in activity, 
encouraging GPs to divert work away from the secondary sector and into primary care. This 
would establish a challenge for Health Authorities which, experience has shown, want to 
maintain the viability of their local hospital. PCTs will compete with hospital Trusts for 
resources, pointing to an increase in the competitive forces at work in local health economies. 
12.5.4 Competitive Forces 
The word 'competition' has been eradicated from official policy vocabulary through the 
`partnership' arrangements of the Labour Government's White Paper (Department of Health, 
1997). The underlying structure of Health Authority purchasers and NHS Trust providers 
remains intact, with GP Fundholding being abolished by, in effect, imposing full compliance 
through participation of all GPs in Primary Care Groups (PCGs). The option to graduate 
from PCG to Primary Care Trust (PCT) will restore the differences between GPs which were 
associated with the old GP Fundholding scheme. 
42  A progress report indicates that clinical governance is a key area of interest for PCGs, consistent with the 
notion that doctors are primarily interested in quality. The Health Service Journal, 25th November 1999, reports 
that 	clinical governance committees are the most developed aspect of PCGs' structure, followed by 
prescribing, information technology and commissioning. The majority of committee members are GPs'(p6). 
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The internal market in the NHS never functioned as a competitive market due, according to 
the analysis in this thesis, to lack of entry and exit from the market, shaped by politics and the 
strictures imposed by medical training regulations. Although the market did not work the 
1991 reforms were, nevertheless, successful in introducing a competitive spirit through the 
survival instinct born in Trusts. Nothing of the role or management structure of Trusts has 
changed with the 1997 reforms. It follows that the competitive instincts of Trusts to survive, 
in the teeth of failure of neighbouring hospitals, remain intact. If PCTs adopt similar survival 
aims then intensity of competition for resources in the NHS will be heightened rather than 
dampened. 
Trusts, it may be concluded from this thesis, compete on the basis of quality rather than price. 
Service developments will be promoted by clinicians on the basis of treatment quality rather 
than economic considerations, with the result that competition will increase costs. This is 
consistent with evidence from the United States in the period up to 1982 when hospitals were 
reimbursed, as many private hospitals are in the UK, on a retrospective cost-plus basis 
(Culyer and Posnett, 1990). Robinson and Luft (1985), for example, found that there was a 
positive relationship between competition and price. Unit costs were highest in the areas 
with the most competitive market structure. These results were confirmed in a subsequent 
study (Robinson and Luft, 1987) which found that hospitals with more than ten neighbouring 
hospitals within a fifteen mile radius reported average costs per admission 26% higher and 
average costs per day 15% higher than similar hospitals in a monopolistic market. The 
difference in observed cost per case widened to 35% for hospitals with more than ten 
neighbours. 
The case study in Chapter 11 revealed pressure to purchase new MRI technology, illustrating 
how competitive markets would tend to drive up unit costs through investment and potential 
duplication of services. Reputation of the hospital and of the consultants themselves depends 
on the ability to demonstrate that a high quality service is being delivered. Competition 
therefore leads to increased inputs and increased unit costs 43 . 
If the effect of expanding the number of Trusts through PCTs is to increase competition, as 
suggested here, then it follows that the cost of health care will increase and the UK will be 
obliged to dedicate a greater proportion of GDP to this sector. While health care is mainly 
provided by the NHS and funded through taxation this implies that the Government will need 
to spend more money on health to meet increasing costs, Duplication of services between 
43  An article by B Hollingsworth et al, November 1999, uses Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to analyse 
movements in productivity, efficiency and quality performance of hospitals since 1991. It suggests that quality, 
defined as standardised survival rates following admission for stroke, fractured neck of femur and myocardial 
infarction, has reduced. Technical change has increased, accounting for increases in productivity or volume of 
service. Efficiency, in the absence of technical change, showed a small decrease. These results are not 
inconsistent with the discussion of quality in this chapter since quality in this thesis is largely being defined in 
terms of inputs rather than mortality outcomes. Hollingsworth et al suggest that inputs have increased. It is 
reasonable to equate inputs with quality since it is likely to be consistent with the depth of treatment, producing 
an increase in access to previously unavailable treatments or investigations. MRI is a good example of this 
phenomenon. 
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secondary care Trusts which will have been stimulated by the internal market of 1991-1997 
will, it is contended, be followed by duplication of services between primary care and 
secondary care Trusts. This could take the form of pathology equipment, for example, where 
near-patient testing takes place through new analysers purchased in primary care while large 
central pathology departments in acute hospitals continue to invest in new technology. 
Likewise, minor injuries clinics could be established within PCTs, running alongside accident 
and emergency departments in secondary Trusts. The signs are that quality, in terms of 
access to services for patients, will increase but that cost containment will prove to be 
impossible. Political stability for the Government will inevitably carry a price tag where the 
number of Trusts is growing. 
12.6 Conclusion 
The balance of influence within Trusts has been assessed through this work as lying with the 
consultant workforce. Doctors, it is concluded, are the dominant group within Trusts, 
producing a clash against the nominal objectives of Trusts which are to break-even. A 
budgetary constraint is recognised as existing within Trusts but its enforcement is weak when 
a conflict arises between service demands and cost containment. Managers are a more 
diverse and plastic group than the clinicians and there is evidence that their priorities have 
been moulded to a greater extent than clinicians' over the last ten years with the 
organisations' acquisition of Trust status. The relative constancy of consultants' priorities 
within the organisation comes as no surprise, given the stable nature of their professional and 
personal incentive structure over the same period. 
The introduction of market reform through the purchaser/provider split was originally 
envisaged as a mechanism to bring about greater responsiveness to patient demands and to 
financial incentives. Money would follow the patient, rewarding the efficient and, by 
implication, moving resources away from the less cost-effective. But patient demand for 
health care has been defined as 'supplier-induced' since clinicians determine who receives 
what type of treatment within the NHS (Chapter 3). It is the professional-experts who define 
need, in contrast to bureaucratic-experts who are charged with increasing efficiency (Klein, 
1989, p 159). The conventional wisdom of this and the previous Government is that greater 
exposure to management responsibility and influence would produce a change in consultants' 
perceptions and behaviour. The Conservative Government demonstrated this through 
introduction of the Resource Management Initiative in 1986 and the current Government 
supported an alignment of financial and clinical duties in the 1997 White Paper. This notion, 
it could be argued, provides a rationale for the expansion of resource management 
responsibility into primary care through establishment of PCGs and PCTs. The empirical 
evidence of this study, however, indicates that exposure to management does not produce a 
marked change in doctors' motivation. Professional-expert-defined need does not 
metamorphose into bureaucratic-expert-defined (or constrained) demand. Rather, the reverse 
appears to be true. Closer proximity between consultants and managers in a decentralised 
organisational structure seems to shift the perceptions and aspirations of managers, producing 
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a gap between the motivation of those who are close to consultants and those who are 
apart at the strategic apex of the organisation. The impact of the 1997 White Pal 
proposals, therefore, described as a move towards quality through clinical governance and 
alignment of clinical and financial duties, will further weaken Trusts' drive to achit 
financial targets. At the same time, expansion of competition for resources through 1 
entrance of PCTs to the health economy will, it has been argued here, inflate costs throe 
duplication of clinical facilities. The local impact will be to raise the cost of health a 
collectively between Trusts, achieved through the strength of clinicians' desire to maint 
and expand quality, and expressed as a drive to increase inputs through technology. Thi 
pressures will be resolved only by fully funding Trusts' aspirations to maintain and impro 
quality by investing in service development. 
This thesis concludes that the 1991 market reforms and subsequent 1997 reforms have do 
nothing to alter the fundamental motivation of the dominant actors, namely doctors. A to 
contract between the public and the medical profession remains in place through the fiducil 
duty of doctors to care for patients, in return for which doctors are allowed to be se 
regulated. The democratic system of locally elected politicians adds strength to this contra 
since the public exerts a voice through the ballot box. Hence, expert-defined need mi 
ultimately be supported by Members of Parliament. This was highlighted in the case stu 
which showed that it was critical to secure clinical approval before shifting resoun 
between hospitals. Once this approval was obtained, as in the case of Queen Mary's a 
Kingston, it, was possible to achieve some change. But the overall thrust of expert-de& 
need is based upon quality, according to the evidence of this thesis, which requires Mi 
resources. To avoid financial crisis and conflict in the NHS, given the incentive struct 
which has remained unchanged for patients and doctors since 1948, the Government has 
option but to let 'good times' prevail. 
12.7 Post Script 
Expenditure data recorded in this thesis, coupled with recent events relating to health sere: 
funding, supports this interpretation. The health service budget 1949-1988 had quadrupi 
(Chapter 2). Forecasts to 2,000 suggest a six-fold increase in resources since 1949, w 
costs of £45 billion at current prices. The March 2000 Budget Statement by the Chancel 
of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, promised a further large injection of funding, averagi 
6.1% per annum, between 2000/01 and 2003/04, taking spending to £68.8 billion by the e 
of the period. The Health Service Journal (23rd March 2000) reflected the national sense 
amazement at the Government's actions: 
`Budget beyond wildest dreams 
Chancellor leaves pundits gasping with huge vote of confidence in NHS 
Mr Brown has left all [the pundits] agape. Annual growth of 6.1 per cent above inflate 
every year until 2003/04 is indeed, as he said, the largest sustained funding increase in NA 
history, and should all but fulfil the prime minister's pledge to reach European spendi 
levels. Worries about the size of the year-end deficit have been blown to oblivion in 
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instant.... As H&J goes to press we await the details of the prime minister's announcements 
about how the cash is to be spent. Whatever they are, it will be down to NHS managers now 
to make it work. ' 
The work of this study suggests that there is no point at which managers will be able to 
`make it work' once and for all, since continued increases in funding are needed to avoid 
conflict with clinicians. The incentive structure is such that the degree of resources needed to 
sustain this climate of growth is entirely open-ended since there is no check in the system to 
set a limit upon expert-defined need. What is more, the analysis of the 1997 reforms 
introducing Trust status to primary care suggests that further inflationary pressures are being 
built into the system which will work against cost-containment. By responding to political 
pressure to let good times roll the Government may be surprised and frustrated to find that it 
can never keep pace with expert-defined expectations. When it comes to curbing 
expenditure, managers at the apex of the organisation do not have the ability, and at the 
operating core do not have the desire, to exert control. There will be no resolution to this 
problem while existing public and professional incentive structures remain intact. 
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Appendix I 
	
Questionnaire 
Tracking Sheet 
Appendix la 
	Participation List 
The London School of Economics and Political Science 
WHAT DRIVES THE TRUST? 
THIS QUESTIONNAIRE WILL TAKE ABOUT 10 MINUTES TO COMPLETE 
This questionnaire asks you to consider your own priorities and those of all managers and 
consultants in the Trust. It has been designed to be simple to fill in, but the analysis will yield 
important insights about Trust behaviour within the internal market. 
Background The internal market reforms introduced a financial motive into the health 
system, which unsettled the public and many staff within the health service. They feared that 
money would overshadow clinical values once a provider became a Trust. 
Reality We know, in fact, very little about the motivation and behaviour of Trusts. There is 
little empirical evidence to tell us what drives clinicians or managers, or how service and 
financial priorities are weighted. 
Policy Development We are now at a turning point in health care policy. It is important to 
collect evidence about your attitudes and experience to understand more clearly how the 
market works within the NHS. 
Participation You are one of a selected number of people within the Trust who have been 
asked to participate in this national study, through the Chief Executive' s office. Your 
participation is voluntary and immensely valuable. 
Timing & Results Pilots show that this questionnaire takes on average about 10 minutes to 
complete. It would be helpful if you could fill it in and return it within two weeks of receipt. 
The results will be published and your Trust will receive direct feedback. 
All information will be an,onymised and treated in confidence. 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire. Should you have any queries, please contact 
Tessa Crilly on 0181-677-7046. 
Please return your response to: 
LSE Questionnaire, PO Box 16566, London, SW16 6WA 
Your Specialty/Division 	 5 6 4 4 
Trust Name : 
You are (please tick all boxes which apply to you): 	a Consultant 
© CEO 	 o Clinical Professional (non-medical) o Corporate Manager o Chairman 
© Board Director 	 a Service/Business Manager (inc clinician) 
Consultant 	Chair 	Clinical Directorate 	a Other  o 	- of 
How is your time distributed between ...? 
(Approximate percentage split ) 
Management 	 Clinical 	 Other (R&D/Teaching ) 
Are you a budget holder ? 	 I Yes 	0 No 
If yes, what is the approximate annual value of your budget? 
01. To what extent does your own career depend on the following factors? 
Please circle the word which, in your view, applies: 
A financially successful Trust 
Success of your specialty /dept. within the Trust 
Strength of your specialty/profession nationally 
Individual reputation 
Reputation of Trust/hospital 
Standard of R&D or teaching 
Low 	Moderate 
Low 	Moderate 
Low 	Moderate 
Low 	Moderate 
Low 	Moderate 
Low 	Moderate 
V. Low 
V. Low 
V. Low 
V. Low 
V. Low 
V. Low 
High 
	
V. High 
High 
	
V. High 
High 
	
V. High 
High 
	
V. High 
High 
	
V. High 
High 
	
V. High 
Survival of the Trust as an organisation V. Low Low Moderate High V. High 
Continued provision of the Trust's clinical service V. Low Low Moderate High V. High 
Other (specify) 	  V. Low Low Moderate High V. High 
Q2. Within the Trust, how would you rank the priorities for the following sets of people? 
This question asks for the order of priorities which, in your view, is held by these groups. 
For each column please rank priorities in order 1, 2, 3 etc where 1 is the most important. 
If you tie values, then please adjust rankings, e.g. 1,2,3,3,5,6. 
You Most 
Business 
& Service 
Managers 
Most 
Consultants 
The 
Trust 
Now 
The 
Trust 
Ideally 
Break-even financially 
—Maintain service volume 
You may tie these if you wish 
—Maintain service quality 
Expand revenue 
—Expand service volume 
You may tie these if you wish 
—Expand service quality 
Other (please specify) 
e.g. innovation, teaching, R&D 
03a. Which body, do you think, is achieving its main objective at the moment? 
You may tick more than one: 
CI Managers 	 i Consultants 
	
0 Trust 	 0 None 
433b. Which body, do you think, will achieve its main objective during the next 3 years? 
YOU may tick more than one: 
0 Managers 	CI Consultants 	 0 Trust 	 0 None 
03c. Which body, do you think swill achieve its main objective during the next 6 years? 
You may tick more than one: 
0 Managers 	13 Consultants 
	
0 Trust 	 cl None 
Q4. How have priorities changed since the organisation became a Trust? Have they become 
(please tick the word which applies to you and then the word which applies to the Trust): 
Your Priorities 	 Trust's Priorities 
Break-even financially 	 Weaker 	No change 	Stronger 	Weaker 	No change 	Stronger 
Maintain service volume/quality 	Weaker 	No change 	Stronger 	Weaker 	No change 	Stronger 
Expand service volume/quality 	Weaker 	No change 	Stronger 	Weaker 	No change 	Stronger 
Be responsive to patients 	Weaker 	No change 	Stronger 	Weaker 	No change 	Stronger 
Be responsive to GPs 	 Weaker 	No change 	Stronger 	Weaker 	No change 	Stronger 
Other (specify)  	Weaker 	No change 	Stronger 	Weaker 	No change 	Stronger 
05a. Since the change to Trust status, has the relationship between consultants and 
managers become...? 
0 Much worse 	0 Worse 	0 No change 
	
0 Better 	0 Much Better 
0513. Why? 
06a. Since the change to Trust status, has the service to patients become 	 
0 Much worse 	0 Worse 	0 No change 	0 Better 	0 Much Better 
Mb. Why? 
Q7. Since the change to Trust status, do you think the goals of consultant 
and managers have 	 
13 Moved closer together 	0 Not changed 
	
0 Moved 'further apart 
08. Which group, in your view, has the most control over the following aspects of service? 
(please circle the name which applies) 
(a) Development of service : 
Consultants 	Nurses 	Managers 	Chief Exec Trust Board Purchasers Other (Specify ) 	  
(b) Availability of facilities (e.g. beds, theatres) : 
Consultants 	Nurses 	Managers 	Chief Exec 
(c) Medical staffing levels : 
Trust Board Purchasers Other (Specify) 	  
Consultants 	Nurses 	Managers 	Chief Exec 
(d) Nurse staffing levels : 
Trust Board Purchasers Other (Specify ) 	  
Consultants 	Nurses 	Managers 	Chief Exec 
(e) Freedom to admit in-patient : 
Trust Board Purchasers Other (Specify ) 	  
Consultants 	Nurses 	Managers 	Chief Exec 
(f) Decision to treat patient 
Trust Board Purchasers Other (Specify ) 	  
Consultants 	Nurses 	Managers 	Chief Exec Trust Board Purchasers Other (Specify ) 	  
Q9. Do you think the NHS climate will change with the new government? 
U No - there will be little change 	0 Yes - there will be some change 	0 Yes - significant change 
010a. Would you welcome change in the future? 
0 Yes - Very Much 0 Yes - Probably 0 Not sure 0 No - Probably Not 0 No - Definitely Not 
010b. Why? 
010c. What sort of change? 
Thank you for giving your views . 
Please return this to LSE Questionnaire, PO Box 16566, London SW16 6WA 
The London School of Economics and Political Science 
TRACKING SHEET 
A record of the individuals who have received a Questionnaire 
Questionnaires are to be returned directly to the LSE. 
This sheet provides a record of the people expected to respond to the survey. 
Please identify the individual and tick whether they are a consultant or manager . 
No. Name/Position Consultant . 
5641 
5642 
5643 
5644 
5645 
5646 
S647 
5648 
5649 
5650 
5651 
5652 
5653 
5654 
5655 
5656 
5657 
5658 
5659 
5660 
Thank you for completing this tracking sheet. Should you have any queries, please con tact  
Tessa Crilly on 0181-6'77-7046 
Your Name Tele • hone No. 
Trust Name: 
Please return this Tracking Sheet to: 
LSE Questionnaire, PO Box 16566, London, SW16 6WA 
Participatio Appendix la 
Trust No. Name 	 I 	No. Qs Responses Response Rate Type Wave 
1 Aintree Hospitals 	 20 16 80% 1 2 
2 Ashford Hospitals 20 6 30% 1 2 
3 Bolton Hospitals 20 12 60% 2 	4 
4 Bradford Hospitals 20 7 35% 2 1 
5 Brighton Health Care 20 13 65% 2 	i 	3 
6 Burnley Health Care 20 5 25% 1 2 
7 Carlisle Hospitals 20 
20 
3 15% 2 4 
Es Chelsea & Westminster 17 85% 2 4 
9 Countess of Chester 20 7 35% 1 3 
10 Doncaster Royal Infirmary 20 14 70% 3 2 
11 Basildon & Thurrock 20 12 60% 2 2 
12 Barnsley District General Hospita 20 17 85% 2 3 
13 Burton Hospitals 20 15 75% 2 3 
14 Central Middlesex 20 14 70% 2 1 
15 Cheviot & Wansbeck 20 8 40% 1 4 
16 East Surrey Healthcare 20 16 80% 1 3 
17 East Yorkshire Hospitals 20 7 35% 2 3 
18 Frimley Park Hospital 20 3 	 15% 2 3 
19 Hammersmith Hospitals 20 18 90% 2 4 
20 Hastings & Rother 20 14 	 70% 1 2 
21 Heatherwood & Wexham Park 20 15 75% 2 2 
22 Hinchingbrooke Health Care 20 7 	35% 2 3 
23 Ipswich Hospital 20 16 80% 2 3 
24 James Paget Hospital 20 10 	50% 2 3 
15 75% 2 4 25 Kettering General Hospital 20 
26 Mid Kent Health Care 20 10 	 50% 2 3 
27 Mid Sussex 20 15 75% 2 4 
14 	70% 2 4 28 Mount Vernon 20 
29 Newham Health Care 20 14 70% 2 4 
30 	J Norfolk & Norwich Health Care 20 18 	90% 2 4 
31 North Hertfordshire 20 7 35% 1 1 
32 North Hampshire Hospitals 20 11 	 55% 1 1 
33 Mid Cheshire Hospitals 20 11 55% 2 1 
34 Leicester General 20 15 	 75% 2 3 
35 Lancaster Acute Hospitals 20 11 55% 2 2 
36 North East Lincolnshire 20 9 	 45% 1 3 
37 Great Ormond St 20 13 65% 5 4 
38 Good Hope Hospital 20 11 	 55% 2 3 
39 Kings Lynn & Wisbech Hospitals 21 17 81% 2 2 
40 Alexandra Health Care 20 7 	 35% 2 4 
41 Derby City General Hospital 20 15 75% 2 3 
42 Mid Essex Hospital Services 20 11 55% 2 2 
43 Kings Mill Centre 20 16 	 80% 1 4 
44 Huddersfield 20 10 50% 1 3 
45 Halton General Hospital 20 13 	 65% 2 3 
46 Freeman Group of Hospitals 20 11 55% 2 1 
47 	 
48 
Frenchay Health Care 20 12 	 60% 1 2 
Ealing Hospital 20 13 65% 2 2 
49 _ George Eliot Hospital 20 14 	 70% 2 4 
50 Blackpool Victoria Hospital 20 10 50% 2 4 
51 Birmingham Heartlands 20 11 	 55% 2 2 
52 King's Healthcare 20 12 60% 2 3 
53 North Tees Health 20 19 	 95% 1 2 
54 Oldham 21 18 86% 1 2 
55 Oxford Radcliffe Hospitals 20 6 	 30% 2 4 
56 Plymouth Hospitals 20 6 30% 2 4 
57 Darlington Memorial Hospital 21 11 	 52% 2 4 
58 Queen Mary's Sidcup 20 12 60% 2 3 
59 Premier Health 20 12 	 60% 1 4 
60 Peterborough Hospitals 20 12 60% 2 3 
18 	 69% 2 3 61 Queens Medical Centre, Nottingham 26 
62 Rochdale Health Care 20 6 30% 2 2 
63 Sandwell Health Care 20 14 	 70% 2 4 
64 Royal Victoria Hospitals 20 19 95% 2 4 
65 West Middlesex Hospital 20 7 	 35% 2 3 
66 South Buckinghamshire 20 6 30% 1 
2 
3 
I 	3 67 Thanet Health Care 20 15 	 75% 
68 Northern General Hospital 20 13 65% 2 1 
69 Preston Acute Hospitals 20 14 	 70% 2 4 
70 Walsgrave Hospital 20 13 65% 2 3 
71 Redbridge Healthcare 20 10 	T 	50% 1 3 
72 North Devon Healthcare 20 11 55% 1 1 
73 Royal Shrewsbury Hospitals 20 11 	55%  2 4 
Page 1 of 2 
Participatio Appendix la 
Trust No.  Name No. Qs Responses Response Rate Type Wave 
	 74 South Devon Healthcare 20 16 80% 1 1 
75 South Kent Hospitals 20 6 30%  2 4 
76 South Manchester Hospitals 20 15 75% 2 4 
77 South Tees Acute Hospitals 20 3 15% 2  2 
78 South Tyneside Health Care 20 13 65% 1 3 
79 Southend Health Care 20 15 	 75% 2 1 
80 Southmead Health Services 20 9 45% 1 2 
81 St Mary's Hospital, Paddington 20 15 75% 2 3 
82 St Peter ter's Hospital, Chertsey 20 11 55% 1  2 
83 Swindon & Marlborough 20 7 35% 2 4 
84 United Leeds Hospitals 20 11 55% 2 1 
85 University College London Hospitals 20 11 55% 2 4 
86 Warrington Hospital 20 7 	 35% 2 3 
87 Walsall Hospital 20 16 80% 2  1 
88 Wellhouse 20 8 	 40% 1 2 
89 West Lancashire 20 7 35% 1 3 
90 West London Healthcare 20 
20 
11 	55%  
15 	J 	75% 
1 
2 
3  
4 91 Northampton General Hospital 
92 Wirral Hospital 20 10 50% 2 1 
93 Wigan & Leigh Health Services 20 15 	 75% 1 3 
94 Worcester Royal infirmary 20 18 90% 1 4 
95 Princess Alexandra Hospital 20 8 	 40% 2 5 
96 Homerton Hospital 20 3 15% 2 5 
97 Grantham & District Hospital 20 7 	 35% 2 5 
98 Salford Royal Hospitals 20 15 75% 2 4 
99 
100 
Epsom Health Care 40 21 	 53% 2 1 
Harrow & Hillingdon Healthcare 20 11 55% 2 4 
101 North Downs Community Health 20 11 	 55% 3 4 
102 Leicestershire MH Service 20 9 45% 4 4 
103 Kingston & District Community 20 4 	 20% 3 4 
20 15 75% 3 3 104 Hounslow & Spelthorne 
Eastbourne & County Healthcare 20  9 	 45% 3 3 105 
106 Herefordshire Community Health 20 8 40% 3 2 
107  Community Health Sheffield 20 12 	 60% 3 4 
108  Nottingham Healthcare 20 13 65% 3 4 
109 Portsmouth Health  Care 20 10 	 50% 3 4 
20 12 60% 3 3  110 Lifespan Cambridge 
Trafford Healthcare 20 13 	 65% 1 4 111 
20 2 10% 4 2 112 Ravensboume Priority Health 20 11 	 55% 3 2 113 Plymouth Community 20 10 50% 3 2 114 Nottingham Community Health 20 15 	 75% 4 4 
115 Northgate & Prudhoe 20 13 65% 3 4 
116 Community Healthcare Northampton 20 16 	 80% 3 4 
117 Oxleas 20 
20 
1 
2 
5% 4 3 
118 
119 
Riverside Mental Health 
Severn 
10% 	 3 3 
20 5 	 25% 3 4 Community Health 120 Southern Birmingham 20 4 20% 	 3 3 Health Services 121  
122 
Southampton  Community 
Healthcare 20 8 	 40% 
3 4 
South Durham 20 13 65% 3  3 
123 Community Healthcare  Thameside Loddon Community  20 6 	 30% 3 3 124 North Hampshire Services 20 15 75% 2 4 125 Newham Community Health 20 10 	 50% 3 2 West Lambeth Community Care 126 10 1 10% 3 4 
127 Communicare 	 10 4 	 40% 3 3  
128 Scunthorpe Community Health Care 10 6 60% 3 3  
129 South Cumbria Community & MH 5 	 33% 4 4 Health 15 
130 South Birmingham Mental  20 3 15% 4 4  
131 Bethlem & Maudsley 18 12 	 67% 1 3 Care 
132 Bedford & Shires Health 20 13 65% 4 2  
133 Bath & West Community 20 14 	 70% 3 5 
134 Tower Hamlets Healthcare 10 5 50% 3 1  
135 First Community Health 	  10 8 	 80% 3 4 
136 Coventry Healthcare 20 6 30% 3 2 
137 North Mersey Community 20 15 	
75% 5 1 
138 Liverpool Children' 20 14 70% 5  1 Royal 
139 Nuffield Orthopaedic Centre 20 14 	 70% 5 4 
140 
141 
Moorfields Eye Hospita l 
Women's Health Care 10 
7 70% 5 4  
20 14 	 70% 5 5  Birmingham  Hospital 
20 
1 
2823 
13 65% 5 3 142  Birmingham Children's 
143 Papworth Hospital 1 	 100% 2 4 
144 Stoke Mandeville 1577 56% 
Total  
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Appendix 2b 
National Survey: Summary of Responses Showing Separate Categories of Managers 
1s lb le 	ld 1• lf 	j 	la lh 1j 21 2b 2c 2d 2e 2f 2g 2h 
Chair Mean 4 4.2 3.8 	4.4 4 3.6 4 4.2 5 2.8 2.6 2.4 4.2 4,25 3.75 3.667 2.8 
CEO Mean 4.329 3.961 2.902 4.384 4,178 3.087 3.958 4 268 21.333 1.616 3.014 2.548 3.764 3.708 2.812 3.618 2.014 
Board Director Mean 4.0e6 4.326 3.426 4.264 3.773 2,861 4.118 4.139 4.462 1.873 2,631 2.39 3.276 3.321 2.866 3.653 2.307 
Corporate Mean 3.8 4.273 3.175 4.323 3.605 2.636 4.023 3.85 4.227 2.062 2.791 2,636 3.488 3.643 3.039 3.418 2.299 
Clinical Mean 3.413 4.113 3.59 4.075 3.413 2.873 3.675 4.139 4.444 2.769 2.571 2.036 3.803 3.545 2.716 3.22 1.974 
Service Mean 3,645 4.174 3.373 4.279 3.631 2.839 4.006 4,103 4.279 2.035 2.413 2.064 3.352 3.356 2.625 3.476 1.88 
Other/Unknown Mean 3.544 4 176 3.09 4.224 3.552 2.773 3.706 3.821 4.4 2.062 2.492 2.234 3.692 3.25 2.857 2.926 2 
Total Managers Mean 3.802 4.209 3.324 4,269 3.684 2.837 3.98 4.071 4.339 2.037 2.593 2.281 3,457 3.433 2.792 3.459 2.08 
Frequencies 
CEO Score 1 0 1 5 0 0 T 	2 3 0 0 46 22 26 8 15 19 3 32 
Score 2 0 4 17 0 1 17 5 3 0 13 14 17 9 7 14 9 18 
Score 3 6 8 21 4 11 28 11 4 0 11 7 10 14 13 14 4 13 
Score 4 37 21 15 37 35 17 28 35 6 2 10 9 16 8 10 7 7 
Score 5 30 17 3 32 26 5 27 29 3 1 13 7 16 12 7 6 2 
Score 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 3 5 12 5 3 0 
Score 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 3 5 0 2 0 
Score 8 0 0 0 a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Semple Size 73 51 el 73 73 69 72 71 9 73 73 73 72 69 34 72 
Board Dir Score 1 0 1 6 1 1 26 3 2 2 129 55 76 37 28 60 22 94 
Score 2 8 2 31 1 6 54 8 12 0 28 68 60 39 48 43 15 31 
Score 3 38 10 78 13 67 73 40 31 0 35 35 32 42 45 35 11 39 
Score 4 104 115 67 129 114 54 84 80 6 9 25 20 46 34 28 6 32 
Score 6 69 87 34 76 32 11 87 91 18 8 20 15 28 34 23 20 9 
Score 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 10 8 18 22 19 9 6 
Score 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 4 1 1 12 1 
Score B 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sample Size 219 216 218 220 220 218 220 216 28 213 214 213 214 212 209 95 212 
Corporate Score 1 1 0 5 0 0 16 1 3 1 66 28 40 10 10 29 19 54 
Score 2 9 1 25 3 9 46 5 9 0 24 35 39 33 24 27 7 23 
Score 3 32 11 52 8 49 42 27 28 3 17 31 12 27 29 20 6 27 
Score 4 61 68 31 63 55 19 53 51 7 14 12 13 29 28 25 5 14 
Score 5 27 48 13 56 16 6 43 36 11 7 17 16 9 19 18 2 4 
Score 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 6 9 15 15 7 6 4 
Score 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 4 2 9 0 
Score 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Sample Size 130 128 126 130 12 129 129 127 22 130 129 129 129 129 728 55 126 
Clinical Score 1 2 1 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 16 31 47 11 13 25 11 36 
Score 2 7 0 4 0 7 27 7 3 0 17 14 10 6 11 11 4 19 
Score 3 	 30 7 30 12 36 31 25 11 1 25 9 6 16 18 13 9 13 
Score 4 38 53 30 50 34 13 27 37 3 12 9 7 11 10 14 8 6 
Score 5 	 3 19 12 18 3 5 19 28 5 5 10 4 20 11 7 7 3 
Score 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 2 10 9 4 1 0 
Score 7 	0 0 0 	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 5 0 3 0 
Score B 0 0 0 	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sample Size 	80 80 78 	80 80 79 80 TR 9 78 77 76 76 77 74 41 77 
Service Score / 	 3 2 11 1 2 23 4 8 0 136 114 148 44 60 111 29 161 
Score 2 23 2 42 7 17 94 11 10 2 78 78 76 61 53 49 22 65 
Score 3 92 38 105 27 108 118 61 39 2 68 50 36 65 58 49 16 53 
Score 4 159 171 126 148 155 62 140 148 21 18 31 24 60 41 47 17 23 
Score 5 36 103 27 	132 32 14 97 109 18 9 21 17 39 49 36 14 3 
Score 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 13 7 33 37 10 10 4 
Score 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 5 8 2 16 0 
Score 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sample Sok& 313 316 311 315 314 311 313 312 43 311 310 311 307 306 304 124 309 
Other/Unidenarred Score 1 
Score 2 
1 
4 
1 
1 
9 
11 
1 
0 
2 
3 
10 
18 
2 
3 
4 
5 
0 
0 
34 
13 
17 
22 
21 
20 
5 
13 
L 11 
13 
20 
10 
8 
5 
31 
18 
Score 3 26 5 18 	8 26 18 20 7 1 8 12 14 12 14 13 5 2 
Score 4 31 39 23 	36 28 17 31 34 1 3 7 6 16 11 12 2 7 
Score 5 6 22 6 	24 8 3 12 17 3 4 6 2 7 8 10 5 5 
Score 6 0 0 0 	0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 10 4 3 1 0 
Score 7 0 0 0 	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 3 0 1 0 
Score 8 0 0 0 	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sample Size 68 68 67 	87 87 56 68 67 5 85 85 64 65 64 63 27 63 
Chair Standard Deviation 1.228 0.837 1.304 	0.894 1 1.517 1 0.837 2.168 1.14 1.517 2,588  1.258 1.708 1.528 1.483 
CEO S.D. 0.625 0.999 1.028 	0.592 0.733 0.951 1.093 0.755 0.5 0.937 1.829 1.608 1.666 _1.968 1.584 1.724 1.132 
Board Director S.D. 0.796 0.653 1.009 	0.629 0,742 1.075 0.894 0.925 1.104 1.327 1.485 1.487 1.614 1.573 1.679 2.118 1.449 
Corporate S.D. 0.875 0.649 0.997 0.696 0.795 1.03 0.879 0.993 1.02 1.345 1.467 1.63 1.626 1.565 1.624 2.394 1.58 
Clinical S.D. 0.807 0.656 0,904 0.812 0.7013 0.952 1.016 0.796 0.726 1.328 1.712 1.607 1.889 1.832 1.583 1.851 1,147 
Service S.D. 0.816 0.707 0.945 0.739 0.765 0.977 0.873 0.876 0.766 1.165 1.513 1.354 1.609 1.767 1.587 2.074 1.129 
Other/Unknown S.D. 0.8 
0.845 
0.752 
0.71 
1.19 
1 006 
0.735 
0.686 
0.875 
0.785 
1.134 
1.025 
0.915 
0.924 
1.086 
0.914 
0.894 
0.677 
1.467 
1.287 
1.371 
1.541 
1.192 
1.478 
1.619 
1.637 
1.69 
1.71 
1.645 
1.622 
!I 1 ■.11=■1,  /  /  . I  /  ..  . 	.l.  Total Managers S.D. 
Managers 
	 Page 1 of 7 
Appendix 2b 
National Survey: Summary of Responses Showing Separate Categories of Managers 
4 	2k 2m 	2n 2p 2q 2r 2s 2t 2u 2v 2w 2x 	2y 2z 2xx 2a6 
Chair Mean 3.2 	2.6 3.2 175 4 5 3.75 3 3 	2.2 2.8 2.6 2.6 2.6 
CEO Mean 2.408 	2.521 3.543 	3.7 3.536 4.719 4.657 2.829 2.386 4.357 2.577 2.29 2.795 ' 	1.87 2.75 2.5 3.676 
Board Director Mean 2.299 	2.443 3.157 	3.129 3.234 4.31 4.448 2.737 2.208 4 2.829 2.236 2.969 	1.654 2.411 2.575 3.156 
Corporate Mean 2.44 	2.563 3.236 4.804 4.609 2.85 2.598 2.69 2.181 2.679 	1.367 2.78 2.953 2.938 
Clinical Mean 2.532 	2.844 3.026 	3.342 3.885 4.919 4.75 3.125 2.329 4.056 3.167 2.343 2.975 	1.447 2.697 3.092 2.56 
Service Mean 2.326 	2.407 3,155 3.224 3.114 4,458 4.484 2.642 2.228 4.141 2.856 2.352 2.865 	1.352 2.433 2.697 2.757 
Other/Unknown Mean 2.429 L 2.349 3.111 3.113 3.197 4.542 4.581 2.787 2.226 3.967 2.705 2.383 2.552 1.484 2.429 2.46 3.065 
Total Managers Mean 2.374 1 2.484 3,185 3.262 3.241 4.545 4.54 2.762 2.3 4.085 2.821 2.297 2.847 1.492 2,53 2.707 2.966 
Frequencies 
CEO Score 1 24 21 W 11 9 2 1 18 28 4 25 28 12 33 16 18 9 
Score 2 19 20 14 8 11 0 4 13 18 6 14 16 5 18 19 21 8 
Score 3 13 13 8 8 12 6 9 16 7 12 12 12 9 13 14 16 13 
Score 4 7 10 20 18 15 5 10 12 7 14 10 7 9 4 8 5 18 
SCOre 5 6  
2 
3 
4 
6 	1 	15 
9 	9 
15 
7 
8 
6 
31 
11 
8 
3 
8 
0 
15 
12 
7 
2 
2 
4 
1 
2 
1 
0 
7 
4 
7 
0 
10 
7 Score 6 
SC0re 7 0 0 2 	1 0 5 3 0 2 6 1 0 1 0 0 1 2 
Score 8 0 0 1 	0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Sample Size 7/ 71 70 	70 69 32 70 70 70 70 71 69 39 69 68 68 59 
Board Dir Score 1 80 67 32 	27 31 9 7 65 98 16 54 77 23 137 64 58 29 
Score 2 58 	59 45 	59 51 11 13 43 47 20 47 63 18 33 71 64 49 
Score 3 30 	41 48 	46 37 12 40 36 24 48 41 36 27 29 31 32 44 
Score 4 21 	17 51 	29 37 11 39 29 15 38 30 12 12 5 16 20 47 
Store 5 17 	20 13 	33 24 19 59 32 25 50 29 14 8 4 15 27 1$ 
Score 6 5 15 8 2 25 9 6 3 2 9 6 
-- 
Score 7 0 0 0 1 12 1 0 6 1 1 0 
Score 8 0 	0 0 	0 0 a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Saw's, Size 211 	210 210 	209 205 87 212 213 212 209 211 208 97 211 207 207 205 
Corporate 	 Score 1 43 	35 22 	12 22 4 4 37 48 9 30 47 18 103 23 27 27 
Score 2 35 	40 29 	31 25 6 5 23 22 17 35 37 13 13 51 35 36 
Score 3 17 	19 24 	27 26 4 25 18 19 29 30 25 6 8 16 23 22 
Score 4 13 	15 24 	28 26 5 18 26 18 17 13 10 10 3 14 13 20 
F 	Score 5 14 	12 7 	17 20 9 38 17 13 26 14 7 7 2 15 18 10 
Score 6 2 	4 19 	10 7 9 27 6 5 26 1 1 1 1 7 10 10 
Score 7 i 	1 2 	1 0 14 11 0 2 4 3 0 1 0 1 1 3 
Some 8 0000 0 00 0 0 00 0 00 Do 0 
Sample Size 125 	126 127 	126 126 51 128 127 127 128 125 127 58 128 127 127 125 
Clinic., 	 Score 1 19 	21 12 	14 12 1 0 14 32 6 17 2$ 6 55 22 15 20 
Score 2 25 	16 18 	9 8 5 3 14 12 5 12 12 10 13 18 17 22 
Score 3 	19 	11 22 	18 11 2 10 13 13 13 13 14 12 6 13 12 16 
Score 4 4 	16 17 	15 15 4 15 15 8 17 9 7 5 0 13 16 8 
Score 5 7 	10 3 	12 14 11 26 13 5 20 14 7 5 1 5 12 6 
Score 6 3 	2 5 	8 13 4 10 2 3 8 7 1 2 1 4 2 3 
Score 7 0 	1 1 	0 0 10 6 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 
Score 8 0 	0 0 	0 0 0 0 0 0 000 o0 0 0 a 
Sample Size 77 	77 76 	76 73 37 72 72 73 72 72 70 40 76 76 76 75 
Service 	 Score 1 103 	100 39 	45 83 7 8 88 133 23 85 107 29 246 97 77 72 
Score 2 95 	92 73 	70 62 17 18 62 60 29 61 84 39 38 94 85 76 
Score 3 53 	51 72 	85 52 21 54 81 59 58 54 48 36 14 56 62 60 
Score 4 28 	26 70 	51 50 9 57 37 33 53 50 33 11 6 26 37 63 
Score 5 19 	30 24 	43 48 23 102 36 22 81 36 28 14 5 18 31 20 
Score 6 8 	8 24 	25 24 17 51 6 3 48 15 4 9 1 12 13 9 
Score 7 1 	0 2 	4 2 23 20 0 0 15 5 0 3 0 4 2 4 
Score 8 0 	0 0 	0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sample Size 307 	307 304 	303 299 118 310 310 310 306 306 304 141 3W 3'07 307 .804 
OfherilInidentrred 	Score 1 23 	26 10 	5 81 1 19 27 3 19 22 5 43 20 18 14 
Score 2 14 	14 16 	17 14 1 3 10 14 10 11 17 11 11 23 20 10 
Score 3 12 	8 12 	19 18 5 12 11 8 12 13 9 8 6 5 13 12 
Score 4 6 	8 14 	11 7 4 10 9 6 10 8 3 2 1 5 5 16 
Score 5 6 	4 5 	7 7 7 20 10 7 15 7 6 3 1 8 4 4 
Score 6 2 	3 5 	3 7 2 11 2 0 9 3 3 0 0 2 3 6 
Score 7 0 	0 to 0 4 5 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 8 0 	0 0 	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sample Size 63 	63 63 	62 61 24 62 61 52 61 61 60 29 62 63 53 62 
Chair Standard Deviation 2.188 	1.949 2.188 	0,5 1.706 1.732 1.225 2.074 1.949 1.14 2.062 2.16 2.846 2.168 1.643 1.949 1.224 
CEO S.D. 1.41 	1.443 1.767 	1.671 1.558 1.851 1.328 1.494 1.591 1.886 1.574 1.456 1.609 1.013 1.5 1.366 1.888 
Board Director S.D. 1.394 	1.417 1.506 	1.486 1.61 1.996 1.48 1.562 1.468 1.596 1.543 1.34 1.698 1.099 1.442 1.462 1.493 
Corporate S.D. 1.478 	1.472 1.702 	1.463 1.495 2.01 1.481 1.564 1,844 1.646 1.487 1.218 1.808 0.904 1.517 1.627 1.64 
Clinical S.D. 1.373 1.433 	1.598 1.707 1.801 1.297 1,501 1.528 1.703 1.433 1.405 0.915 1.566 1.593 1.407 
Service S.D. a 1.352 	1.403 1,407 1.404 1.616 1.623 1.366 1.578 0.834 1.481 1.485 
Other/Unknown S.D. 1.467 
1.448 1.54 1.605 1.903 
1.409 1.582 
1.508 
1.57 
1.507 
1.553 
1.583 
1.519 
1.384 
0.864 
0.962 
w
 1.401 
1.505 
1.577 
1.54 Total Man. .ers S.D. 
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National Survey: Summary of Responses Showing Separate Categories of Managers 
lac tad 2ae 2af tag Zah 2a1 Zak tarn Zan 3aM 3aC 3aT 3aN 3bM 3bC 3b1 
CEO Mean 
Chair Mean 
4203 3.735 
4 
4.061 
3.4 
3.818 3.394 
3 
2.537 
3.667 1 1 
1 
fioanl Director Mean 4.033 2.402 3.073 3,191 1 1 
Corporate Mean 3.126 3.339 3.756 2.04 3.185 3.016 2.992 2.734 2.236 2.982 I 
Clinical Mean 3.373 3.63 4.308 2 653 3.56 3.092 3.243 3 2.055 3.25 1 
Service Mean 2.056 2.87 2.69 2.953 2.873 2.309 1 1 1 1 1 
Other/Unknown Mean 3.443 3.731 2.079 1 1 1 1 1 
Total Managers Mean 4.04 3.023 2.738 2.385 3.198 1 1 
Frequencies 
CEO Score 1 4 5 9 19 11 13 28 45 38 51 12 49 53 57 
Score 2 8 8 6 8 10 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 3 10 11 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 4 17 10 7 10 7 0 0 0 0 0 ❑ 0 
Score 5 19 10 2 13 15 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 6 
4 0 
3 12 a 8 7 3 0 0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 Score 7 
Score 8 0 0 
88 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 
0 0 
45 
0 
38 
0 
57 
0 
12 
0 
49 
0 0 
Sample Size 
Board Dir Score 1 36 13 108 40 25 127 104 35 134 110 159 
Score 2 40 28 38 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 3 46 38 21 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 4 35 39 15 23 40 34 34 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 5 38 31 15 6 39 20 17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 6 17 21 6 24 8 9 4 0 0 0 0 0 D 0 
Score 7 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 
0 
Q 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
5 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 Score 8 
Sample Size 205 202 m 270 206 204 204 205 202 704 35 134 110 159 
Corporate Score 1 21 40 34 33 46 20 70 46 52 96 
Score 2 28 31 16 20 22 27 39 36 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 3 28 18 14 11 10 20 13 17 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 4 22 18 10 18 13 17 20 15 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 5 17 21 8 23 24 9 9 8 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 6 8 13 6 1 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 7 2 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Semple Size 727 54 124 123 70 88 
Score 1 12 5 26 22 19 30 10 
Score 2 14 10 1 9 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 3 11 10 10 15 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 4 13 11 8 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 5 20 15 3 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 6 
1 2 6 2 
6 
3 
7 
0 
5 
5 3 
QO 
0 
4 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 Score 7 
Score 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sample Size 75 73 39 76 74 16 38 
Score 1 50 101 as 138 96 190 62 165 214 
Score 2 57 m 20 so 59 50 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 3 63 23 36 28 36 40 46 28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 4 59 13 22 35 34 51 28 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 5 50 24 21 49 41 30 31 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 6 23 40 22 20 22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 7 2 6 i 8 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 6 0 0 0 i 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sample Size 304 301 127 306 301 300 301 300 298 130 138 96 190 82 165 123 214 
OtheriUniciontifed Score 1 9 0 33 23 13 14 24 5 30 23 35 19 27 30 48 
Scare 2 11 8 9 13 10 15 11 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 3 10 10 6 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 4 4 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 5 10 10 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 6 6 1 2 5 2 0 so 0 0 0 0 
Score 7 0 3 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 8 0 
1 
1.623 
0 
1.532 
1.642 
1.733 
0 
2.019 
2.046 
1.838 
1.905 
0 
1.607 
1.509 
1.46 
0 
1.81 
1.863 
0 
2.49 
1.1344 
1.627 
1.864 
1.76 
1
 '
 
0
F. Eli ro!  
a 
1.626 
1.753 
1.565 
1.821 
1.778 
0 
60 
1.548 
1.294 
1.235 
1.504 
0 
27 
2.082 
1.544 
1.676 
2.031 
1.765 
1.797 
0
 5
3
 10 0
 0
 0
1
0
 0 
O
 	
0
.
0
.
0
0
 
O
 	
0
0
0
0
.
0
 
0
 434 	
0
  
0
  
0
  
0
  
0
  
o
 	
o
 o
 a
 0
 0
 0
 
0
g
 0
0
0
0
0
0
 
0
 	
0
 a
 o
 0
 
, 	
s 	
. 
Sample Size 
Chair Standard Deviation 
CEO S.D. 
Board Director S.D. 
Corporate S.D. 
Clinical S.D. 
Service S.D. 
Other/Unknown S.D. 1.628 1.687 1.406 1.916 1.641 1.581 0 0 0 a 0 0 0 
Total Mane •ers S.D. 1.4367 1.904 1.526 1.805 1.807 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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National Survey: Summary of Responses Showing Separate Categories of Managers 
3bN 3cM 3cC 3cT 3cN 4a 4b 4c 4d 4e 4f 4g 	I 	4h 4j 4k 4m 4n 
Chair Mean 1 1 1 1 2.2 2.8 2 2.8 2.8 2.6 2.6 2 3 2.8 
CEO Mean 1 1 1 1 1 2.451 2.471 2.38 2.775 2.789 3 2.514 2.535 2.38 2.789 2.833 
Board Director Mean 1 1 1 1 1 2.529 2.543 2.445 2.676 2.743 2.828 2.671 2.611 2.531 2.698 2.859 
Corporate Mean 1 1 1 1 1 2.632 2.52 2.496 2.629 2.718 2.857 2.778 2.659 2.606 2.63 2.835 
Clinical Mean 1 1 1 1 1 2.577 2.603 2.59 2.513 2.662 2.571 2.792 2.558 2.5 2.623 2.907 
Service Mean 1 1 1 1 1 2.632 2,637 2.543 2.689 2.742 2.622 2.857 2.583 2.555 2.69 2.848 
Other/Unknown Mean 1 1 1 i 1 2.667 2.667 2.597 2.714 2.887 2.833 2.815 2.615 2.703 2.815 2.954 
Total Managers Mean 1 1 1 1 1 2.586 2.583 2.503 2.671 2.746 2 742 2.76 2.598 2.545 2.697 2.861 
Frequencies 
CEO Score 1 3 42 55 49 2 3 8 12 0 1 0 1 7 12 0 2 
Score 2 0 0 0 0 0 33 21 20 16 13 0 33 19 20 15 8 
Score 3 0 ❑  0 0 0 35 41 39 55 57 7 38 45 39 56 62 
Score 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 
Score 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Semple Size 3 42 55 49 2 71 70 71 71 71 7 72 71 71 71 72 
&NW Ok Score 1 30 110 127 143 24 4 8 24 3 2 0 7 7 23 7 
Score 2 0 0 0 0 0 91 79 68 62 50 5 56 68 54 50 26 
Score 3 0 0 0 0 0 115 121 117 145 158 24 150 136 138 155 185 
Score 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sample Size 30 110 127 143 24 210 208 209 210 210 29 213 211 213 212 213 
Corporate Score 1 22 60 72 91 11 2 2 7 1 4 0 2 7 11 7 5 
Score 2 0 0 0 0 0 42 56 49 44 27 1 24 29 28 33 11 
Score 3 0 0 0 0 0 81 87 69 79 93 6 100 90 88 87 111 
Score 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 8 0 0 0 0 0 000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sample Size 22 60 72 91 11 125 125 125 124 124 7 126 126 127 127 127 
Clinical Some 1 10 33 33 50 11 3 1 3 2 0 1 4 9 11 6 1 
Score 2 0 0 0 0 0 27 29 28 34 28 1 8 16 18 17 5 
Score 3 0 0 0 0 0 48 413 49 42 51 5 65 52 49 54 89 
Score 4 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 7 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 8 0 0 0 0 0 000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sample Size 10 33 33 50 11 75 78 78 78 77 7 77 77 76 77 75 
Service Score 1 43 140 157 211 37 10 7 26 3 3 4 8 25 36 i 4 5 
Score 2 0 0 0 0 0 89 92 82 85 89 6 27 73 81 64 35 
Score 3 0 0 0 0 0 197 193 185 205 219 27 266 197 202 219 257 
Score 4 0 0 0 0 0 000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 5 0 0 0 0 0 000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 6 0 0 0 0 0 000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 8 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sample Size 43 149 157 211 37 295 292 293 293 291 37 301 295 299 297 297 
OtherAlnidentified Score 1 10 30 38 51 4 0 2 6 1 0 0 1 6 6 2 0 
Score 2 0000 0211713167 1 10 13 7 8 3 
Score 3 0 0 0 0 0 42 44 43 46 55 5 54 46 51 55 62 
Score 4 0 0 0 0 0 0000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sample Size 10 30 38 51 4 63 63 62 63 62 6 65 65 64 65 65 
Chair Standard Deviation 0 0 0 0 0.447 0.447 0.707 0.447 0.447 0.548 0.894 0.707 0 0.447 
CEO S.D. 0 0 0 0 0 0.58 0.696 0.763 0.421 0.445 0 0.531 0.673 0.763 ' 0.411 0.444 
Board Director S.D. 0 0 0 0 0 0.537 0.572 0.692 0.499 0.459 0.384 0.536 0.553 0.884 0.527 0.375 
Corporate S.D. 0 000 0 0.516 0.533 0.604 0.502 0.519 0.378 0.454 0.582 0.644 0.588 0.467 
Clinical S.D. 0 0 0 0 0 0.57 0.518 0.568 0.552 0.476 0.787 0.522 0.698 0.739 0.629 0.336 
Service S.D. 0 0 0 0 0 0.549 0.529 0.654 0,485 0.461 0.881 0.42 0.643 0.7 0.556 0.403 
Other/Unknown S.D. 0 0 0 0 0 0.475 0.539 0.664 0.49 0.319 0.408 0.429  0.654 0.834 0.464 0211 
Total Managers S.D. 	0 0 0 0 0 0.543 0.557 0.662 0.495 0.462 0.55 0.486 0.622 0.695 0.544 0.394 0.71 
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National Survey: Summary of Responses Showing Separate Categories of Managers 
iva ab ea eb 07 a_ Co ea_No a_Ma a_ChE 8a_TB Oa_Pu ea_Ot b Ca lib NU b Ma b_ChE 
Chair Mean 4.2 28 4 51.2 1.4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
CEO Mean 4.188 39.5 4 37.91 1.271 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Board Director Mean 3.939 41.59 3.896 33.67 1.305 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Corporate Mean 3.776 41,39 3.685 33.02 1.388 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Clinical Mean 3.312 40.85 3.392 32.38 1.776 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Service Mean 3.53 41.46 3.627 34.62 1.561 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Other/Unknown Mean 3,516 48,2 3.762 35.55 1.403 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Total Managers Mean 3.705 41,65 3.722 34.41 1.454 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Frequencies 
CEO Score 1 0 0 0 0 57 32 3 12 6 6 26 3 15 6 40 5 
Score 2 2 0 3 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 3 4 0 2 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 4 42 0 55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 5 21 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Scare 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 DO 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Semple Size 89 0 68 0 70 32 3 12 6 6 26 3 15 8 40 5 4 
Bawd Dir Score 1 3 0 0 0 185 89 7 25 35 23 84 9 	37 13 96 21 33 
Score 2 8 0 13 0 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 0 0 0 0 
Score 3 36 0 25 0 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 0 0 0 0 
SCOre 4 118 0 145 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 0 0 0 0 
Some 5 48 0 29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 0 0 00 
Score 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 M 0 0 0 0 
Score 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 0 0 0 0 
Score 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 0 0 0 0 
Sample Size 213 0 212 0 214 69 7 25 35 23 84 9 	37 13 96 21 33 
Corporate Score 1 1 0 2 0 86 39 7 21 19 11 49 4 	17 7 57 14 16 
Score 2 14 0 16 0 29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 0 0 0 0 
Score 3 19 0 13 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 0 0 0 0 
Score 4 69 0 81 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 0 0 0 0 
Score 5 22 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 0 0 0 
Score 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 0 0 0 0 
Score 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 0 0 0 0 
Score 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 0 0 L 	0 0 
Sample Size 	125 0 124 0 124 39 7 21 19 11 49 4 	17 7 57 14 1 
Clinical Score 1 	 1 0 4 0 40 20 4 15 10 7 37 3 	12 5 35 5 12 
Score 2 23 0 14 0 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 0 0 0 0 
Score 3 	 11 0 14 0 23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 0 0 0 0 
Score 4 35 0 41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 0 0 0 0 
Scare 5 	 7 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 0 0 0 0 
Score 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 0 0 0 0 
Score 7 	 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 0 0 0 0 
Score 8 00 0 0 DO 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 0 0 0 0 
Sample Size 	77 0 79 0 76 20 4 15 10 7 37 3 	12 5 35 5 12 
Service Score 1 	 9 0 3 1 187 84 12 53 24 37 148 10 	52 15 117 27 53 
Score 2 48 0 37 0 63 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 0 0 0 0 
Score 3 	53 1 48 0 52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 0 0 0 0 
Score 4 1 181 0 197 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 0 0 0 0 
Score 5 	31 0 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 0 0 0 0 
Score 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 0 0 0 0 
Score 7 	 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 0 0 0 0 
Score 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 0 0 0 0 
Sample Size 	300 1 303 1 303 84 12 53 24 37 148 10 	52 15 117 27 53 
OtherAinicientifiad Score 1 	 0 0 0 0 45 18 2 13 8 8 27 0 	14 2 30 6 8 
Score 2 11 0 4 - 9 - - 0 0 0 0 0 	0 0 0 0 0 
Score 3 	 13 0 10 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 4 33 0 46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 5 	 5 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 0 0 0 0 
Score 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 0 0 0 0 
Score 7 	 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 0 0 0 0 
Score 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 
Semple Size 	62 0 63 0 62 18 2 13 8 6 27 0 	14 2 30 6 8 
0.548 
0
0
1
  
0
0
 
0
0
  
Chair Standard Deviation 0.447 10.95 0 9.96 0 
CEO S.D. 	0.67 22.97 0.573 20.32 0.612 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Board Director S.D. 	0.619 23.66 0.701 19.31 0.601 0 0 0 D 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Corporate S.D. 	0.697 21.85 0.878 17.64 0.625 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Clinical S.D. 	1.042 21.36 1.031 19,1 0.888 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Service S.D. 	0.972 20.15 0.811 19.02 0.782 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other/Unknown S.D. 	0.882 24.88 0.64 19.21 0.712 
+I  0101  001 00 00 001 a 0 0 Total Managers S.D. 	0.932 21.99 0.804 19.02 0.723 0 0  0 
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National Survey: Summary of Responses Showing Separate Categories of Managers 
8b_Pu 1lb Ot c_Co 8c_Nu c Me c ChE 8c TEI 8c Pu 8c Ot dCo Wilt, d Ma d_ChE ed YE tici_Pu id_Ot 
Chair Mean 1 i i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i 1 
CEO Mean 1 1 1 1 1 1 i 1 I 1 1 1 
BoaniDireclor Mean 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Corporate Mean 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Clinical Mean 1 1 1 i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Service Mean 	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Other/Unknown Mean i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i 1 
Total Managers Mean 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Frequencies 
CEO SCOre 1 3 	4 23 0 15 14 9 12 6 1 18 37 5 10 7 5 
Score 2 DO 0 00000 0 0 000000 
sz. 
Score 3 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 5 0 0 0 0 0 000 0 0 00 0 00 0 
Score 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 8 0 	L 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sample Size 3 4 23 0 15 14 9 12 6 1 18 37 5 10 7 5 
Board Dir Score 1 36 10 88 1 26 46 36 29 16 5 60 113 22 28 20 9 
Score 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 4 0 0 0 0 0 000 0 0 000 0 0 0 
Score 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
o
 
1 
Score 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sample Size 36 10 88 1 26 46 36 29 16 5 60 113 22 28 20 9 193 
Corporate Score 1 23 2 64 0 8 18 20 18 10 0 29 65 5 18 15 6 110 
Score 2 0 0 0 	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 
Score 3 0 0 0 	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 
Score 4 00000000 0 0 0000000 
Score 5 0 0 0 	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 6 0 0 0 	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 7 0 0 0 	0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 8 0 0 0 	0 0 0 	0 0 0 0 a 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sample Size 23 2 64 	0 8 18 20 18 10 0 29 65 5 18 15 6 110 
clinical Score 1 17 1 30 	0 10 14 21 9 3 2 16 496 11 6256 
Score 2 0 0 0 	0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 
Score 3 0000 0 000000000000 
Score 4 00000000000000 0 00 
Score 5 0 0 0 	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 6 0 0 0 	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 
Score 7 00 0 	0 0 0 0 0 OD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 8 0 0 0 	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Semple Size 17 1 30 y 	0 10 14 21 9 3 2 16 49 6 11 6 2 56 
Service Score 1 626 133 	2 44 43 59 49 19 3 61 166 19 57 43 8 243 
Score 2 0 0 0 	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 3 0 0 0 	0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 4 0 0 0 	0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 5 0 0 0 	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 6 0 0 0 	0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 7 00 0 	0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 8 0 0 0 	0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sample Size 62 8 133 	2 44 43 59 49 19 3 61 166 19 57 43 8 243 
othai/umdenro ed Score 1 	 10 0 31 	0 11 7 10 8 5 0 17 342 14 6 3 52 
Score 2 00 0 	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 3 00 0 	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 4 0 0 0 	0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 5 0 0 0 	0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 6 0 0 0 	0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 7 0 0 0 	000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Score 8 0 0 0 	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Semple Size to 0 31 	0 11 7 10 8 5 0 17 34 2 14 6 3 52 
Chair Standard Deviation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CEO S.D. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Board Director S.D. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Corporate S.D. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Clinical S.D. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Service S.D. 0 0 	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other/Unknown S.D. 0 0 0 000 0 0000 0 
Total Mang ers S.D. 0 0 0 	0000 0 0000000 0 
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Appendix 26 
National Survey: Summary of Responses Showing Separate Categories of Managers 
Be Nu a Ma • ChE 8e TB _ IND_Pu Be_Ot If Co 8f Nu 8f_ t_ChE 81 T8 Elf Pur &Lath Q9 10a 10b 	10c 
Chair Mean 1 1 1 1 1.8 50 
CEO Mean 1 1 i i 1 1.792 12.5 	46.67 
Board Director Mean 1 
I 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 1 
1 
0 i 1 1 2.206 1.863 42.73 
► rporate Mean Co
Cl 
1 2.145 1.923 28.89 
inical Mean 1 1 1 1 1 2.025 1.75 52
36.52 
.73 	38.33 
Service Mean 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.003 1.788 34.52 	46.62 
Other/Unknown Mean 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.044 1.791 36 	13.33 
Total Managers Mean 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2.091 1.824 37.01 	40.53 
Frequencies 
CEO Score 1 3 4 0 0 2 4 70 1 2 0 0 2 9 26 0 	0 
Score 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 43 0 	0 
Score 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 5 0 	0 
Score 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 	0 
Score 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 
Score 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 
Score 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a 0 0 0 0 0 	0 
Score 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 
Sample Size 3 4 0 0 2 4 70 1 2 0 0 2 t 72 72 0 	0 
Board DN Score 1 11 14 2 2 11 7 208 14 2 3 3 15 6 17 76 0 	0 
Score 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 139 108 0 	0 
Score 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 62 24 0 	0 
Score 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 0 	0 
Score 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	a 
SCOM 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 
Score 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 
Score 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 
Sample Size 11 14 2 2 11 7 208 14 2 3 3 15 6 218 219 0 	0 
Corporate Score 1 2 0 1 114 0 0 8 5 8 40 0 	0 
Score 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 96 0 	0 
Score 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 0 	0 
Score 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 
Score 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 
Score 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 
Score 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 
Score 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 
Sample Size 3 11 2 0 9 1 114 9 3 0 0 8 5 131 130 0 	0 
CePIcat Score 1 4 12 0 0 7 1 63 6 2 1 0 11 7 10 36 0 	0 
Score 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 
Score 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 14 0 	0 
Score 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 	0 
Score 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 
Score 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 
Score 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 
Score 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 
Sample Size 4 12 0 0 7 1 B3 6 2 1 0 11 7 81 80 0 	0 
Score 1 13 44 5 6 25 7 274 16 15 3 6 27 5 48 126 0 	0 
Score 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 138 0 	0 
Score 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 
Score 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 
Score 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 
Score 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 
Score 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 
Score 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 
Sample Size 13 44 5 6 25 7 274 16 16 3 6 27 5 312 311 0 	0 
Other/Widen  Score 1 2 8 0 1 3 1 63 0 2 0 0 6 0 9 23 0 	0 
Score 2 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 47 37 0 	0 
Score 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 5 0 	0 
Score 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 	0 
Score 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a 0 0 	0 
Score 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 
Score 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 
Score 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 	0 
Sample Size 0 3 0 0 0 6 0 0 	0 
0 0 0 
1 
0
1
0
 
0.707 0.837 56.57 Chair Standard Deviation 
CEO S.D. 0 0 0.62 0.749 5 	34.45 
Board Director S.D. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.567 0101 38.39 	38.49 
Corporate S.D. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.498 0.822 38.38 	29.77 
Clinical S.D. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.524 0.788 41.01 	37.1 
Service S.D. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.558 0199 35.97 	3969 
Other/Unknown S.D. 
old 0 al  0 0 0101 0 001  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.558 0.56 0.708 0.791 35.02 36.08 Total Managers S.D. 
Managers 
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A B 	C D E F G H I j P Q Ft 
1 Retamarl Surplus £k £k 4* 
2 
NAME as % of FTP 
Ranking 
FIR 
Rank 
FTP % FTP% Region WAVE Trust 
Type 
No. TOTAL 
INCOME 
CORE rNCOME OTHER 
INCOME 
3 WI:me 1994/95 993/9 Mar 95 Mar 95 Af ar 95 
/994/9 1994/95 
8 ADDENBROOK +1. 9% 276 6 AO 3 	2 1 134,778 106,855 27,923 
AiREDALE +0 50% 288 6.7 6 NY 60,350 56,774 3,576 
8 ALEXANDRA +3,36% 0 349 5.7 WM 32,793 29,108 3,555 
9 BARNSLEY DISTRICT GENERAL HOSPITAL 4145% 217 138 7.2 . T 3 	2 4 50,134 44,932 5,232 
10 BASILDON & TF/URROCK GENERAL HOSPITALS 137 150 6.9 6.7 NT 2 5 68,720 56,649 12,07 
BASSETLAw HOSPITAL AND COMM uNITy SERVICES +0 34% 
+0,25% 
331 166 6.7 • 
6.4 
T 
AO 
2 	? 6 35,415 33.539 1,876 
BEDFORD HOSPITAL 40,411 2,982 
13 BIRMINGHAM HEARTLANDS HOSPITAL 60 87,434 76,820 10,614 
BISHOP AUCKLAND HOSPITALS +0.22% 125 6.8 NY 9 32,378 29,745 2,633 
15 BLACKPOOL VICTORIA HOSPITAL COMMUNITY 
+0.93% 64 
8.7 NW • 2 10 73,067 66,109 6,958 
16 BOLTON HOSPITALS 75,411 71,167 
BRADFORD HOSPITALS +0.00% 71 50 9.4 NY 1 	2 12 99,283 92,117 7,166 
BRIGHTON +0.54% 282 167 6.7 2 13 82,884 79.703 3,181 
BROADGREEN HOSPITAL +0.73% 258 263 5.5 2 14 38,517 31,569 6,948 
20 BROMLEY HOSPITAL 5.6 65,647 60,940 4,707 
BURTON HOSPITAL 24 42,721 4,837 
CARLISLE HOSPITALS +13 12% NY 2 17 43,164 39.304 3,860 
CENTRAL MIDDLESEX HOSPITAL + 1 .00% 328 140 NT 1 	2 47,255 41,073 6,182 
CENTRAL SHEFFIELD UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS +0.02% T 95,025 32,212 
CHASE FARM HOSPITALS +0.73% 305 109 6 NT 3 	2 20 47,197 39,638 7,559 
26 CHELSEA & WESTMINSTER +0.44% 6.5 96.230 
CHEsTERFIELD & NORTH DERBYSHIRE ROYAL HOSPI +2.33% 100 8 e 3 56,295 50,151 6,144 
CITY HOSPITAL 42 53% 9. 4 86,201 74,211 11,990 
29 CITY HOSPITAL SUNDERLAND +3. 90 7.6 NY 4 24 100,799 92,420 8,379 
30 CRAWLEY HORSHAM -2.64% 416 157 0.1 ST 3 25 43,650 41,241 2,409 
31 DARLiNGTON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL +2.27% 74 8.1 NY 4 26 40,580 34,623 5,957 
DARTFoRD AND GRAvESHAM +0 91% 262 6 1 54,358 50,801 3,557 
D ERBY CITY GENERAL HOSPITAL +3.04% 406 124 4.3 46,712 42,415 4,297 
34 DERBYSHIRE ROYAL INFIRMARY +1.42% T 2 29 74,497 7,754 
DONCASTER ROYAL & MANOTAGU HOSPITAL 4-1 55% 216 6.2 T e 2 30 71,324 7,071 
36 DUDLEY GROUP OF HOSPITALS +2 . 14% 151 WM 2 31 85,308 78,739 6,569 
EALING HOSPITAL +0 . 57% 202 160 6.7 NT 2 32 43,834 36,640 7,194 
EAST HERFORDSFORE +13.98% 275 6.8 NT 2 33 59,742 55,583 4,159 
EAST YORKSHIRE HOSPITAL +13 1.0% 43 10.2 NY 2 34 41,512 38,619 2,893 
40 EASTBOURNE HOSPITALS +0.54% 338 6.5 5.8 64.038 53,595 10,443 
EPSOM +0.01% 239 57 6.1 ST 1 	2 36 5.650 
FREEMAN GROUP OF HOSPITALS +1.21% 227 6.1 37 82,506 10,038 
43 FRIMLEY PARK HOSPITAL -0 08% 230 • 7.7 6.1 ST 2 4,685 
FURNESS HOSPITALS +0 65% NW 39 32,892 30,103 1,789 
45 GATESHEAD HOSPITALS +1.09% 203 5.8 3 40 44,500 39,360 5,140 
46 GEORGE ELIOT HOSPITAL +0 25% 8.8 40.597 35,841 4,755 
47 SLENEIELu HOSPITAL +0.47% 311 6 T 2 42 50,849 5.913 
GLOUCESTERSHIRE ROYAL +1.12% 257 198 6.4 6.1 SW 43 67,910 62,051 5,859 
GOOD HOPE HOSPITAL +0 59% 380 250 6 5.1 WM 44 47,492 42,590 4,902 
GUY'S ANC ST THOMAS' HOSPITAL +0.53% 96 79 8.4 7.4 ST 45 256,324 174,555 81,769 
HALTON GENERA! HOSPITAL +1 39% 334 NW 21,708 20,104 1,604 
HAMMERSMITH HOSPITALS 6.9 207,562 98,806 108,756 
HARTLEPOOL AND PETERLEE HOSPITAL 9.1 NY 37A77 33,930 
54 HAVERING HOSPITALS +1 98% 26 12.6 5.6 NT 3 49 94,053 80,765 
55 HEATHERWOOD AND WEXHAM PARK HOSPITALS +1.18% 233 6.1 6.7 AO 2 50 73,421 68,629 
HEREFORD HOSPITALS +1.33% 155 WM 4 	2 51 36.941 32,550 4,391 
HILLINGDON HOSPITAL +1.56% 240 8.1 NT 1 	2 52 52,510 47.121 5,389 
58 HINCHINGBROKE 235 6.2 AO 2 39,013 37,118 1,895 
HORTON GENERAL HOSPITAL +0 21% 4.8 AO 54 19,560 
60 IPSWICH HOSPITAL +0.20% AO 2 55 70,224 
61 JAMES pAGET HOSPITAL +0 . 94% 193 84 8.3 5.3 AO 3 56 54,212 50.991  
KENT & CANTERBURY HOSPITALS 210 5.4 6.2 54,205 4,808 
63 KENT AND SUSSEX WEALD 53 8.7 
64 KETTERING GENERAL HOSPITA 8 AO 4 48,539 5,866 
65 KING'S +0.74% 309 2 6D 138,536 108,497 30,039 
66 KING'S LYNN & WISBECH HOSPITALS +0 34.116 362 AO 2 61 53,840 49.382 4.458 
67 KINGSOTN HOSPITAL +0 25% 190 ST 2 62 45,612 41,213 4.399 
LANCASTER ACUTE HOSPITALS +0.89% 132 205 6.8 NW 2 63 42,740 4,0136 
LEICESTER GENERAL HOSP IT 1- 1 70% 148 8.2 6 6 63,380 54,550 8.830 
LEICESTER ROYAL INFIRMARY +0.83% 298 6.7 6 117,975 90,778 27,197 
LEWISHAM HOSPITAL +0.02% 124 130 7.4 6.8 3 64,354 53.236 11,118  Ili 
LINCOLN HOSPITALS -0.44% 0 369 5.3  4 57,879 52.023 5,856 
LOUTH AND DISTRICT •0.18% 396 4.5 4 = 14,042 13,458 584 
74 LUTON AND DUNSTABLE HOSPITAL +1.75% AO 55,440 50,363 5,077 
MAYDAY +0 99% 2 70 65,796 60,999 4,797 
76 MEDWAY +0.65% 2 71 58,145 50,326 7,819 
77 MIO CHESHIRE HOSPITALS 2 54,897 50,198 
78 MID ESSEX HOSPITALS +049% 6 65,749 59,106 6,643 
79 MID KENT +0. 76% 269 113 7.7 6 
ST 3 	2 74 58,385 53,239 5,146 
$o MID STAFFORDSHIRE GENERAL HOSPITALS +0.58% 379 29 12.1 5.1 WM 3 	2 75 56,112 48,344 7,768 
81 MILTON KEYNES GENERAL +1.00% 316 269 5.1 6 AO 2 	2 76 41,200 40,090 1,110 
Appendix 3 Page 1 of 22 
Database for Chapter 10: Trust Performance 	 Appendix 3 
A B 	C D E F G H I J P 4 R 
Retained Surplus £k £k 
2 
as% o.4 FTP 
Ranking 
FTP 
Rank 
FT? % F7p% Region WAVE Trust 
Type 
TOTAL 
INCOME 
CORE INCOME OTHER 
INCOME 
3 income /994/95 993/9 993/ 994/95 Mar95 Mar 95 Mar 95 
J994/95 1994/9 5 
MOUNT VERNON & WATFORD HOSPITALS +0.00% 5.2 NT 4 77 78,719 66,890 11,829 
NEWHAm +0. 76% 172 6 5 NT 4 63,585 44,484 9,101 
NORFOLKi NORWIC +1 1 4 31.8 AO 4 113,025 104 23,  8,792 
85 NORTH ouRHAM ACUTE HOSPITALS + 1 .93% 22 12.7 NY 4 2 80 56,107 51,410 4,697 
86 NORTH HAmPSHIRE HOSPITALS +0.63% 129 6.8 sw 4 81 44,900 38,500 6,400 
87 NORTH WO DLESEx HOSPITAL +0.01% 194 224 6.3 NT 1 82 54,464 46,226 B,238 
88 NORTH STAFFORDSHIRE HOSPITAL +108% 329 64 5.9 WM 3 83 128,744 117,050 11,694 
89 NORTHAMPTON GENERAL HOSPITAL +1.90% 63 8.3 AO 4 84 69,756 65,834 3,922 
90 NORTHERN GENERAL HOSPITAL +0 . 00% 136 103 6,7 T 1 85 117.138 98,823 18,315 
NORTHWICK PARK & ST MARK'S +1.27% 238 243 6.1 NT 3 86 79,620 58,105 21,515 
92 NOTTINGHAM CITY HOSPITAL +0 . 00% 180 246 6 6.4 T 2 87 113,214 103.530 9,664 
93 OXFORD RADCLIFFE HOSPITAL +0 . 50% 208 6.2 AO 4 88 136,437 106,105 30,332 
94 p5TERBoRouGH HOSPITALS +0.30% 281 10 181 6 AO 3 89 62,424 55,820 6,604 
95 PILGRIM HEALTH +1.51% 78 8 T 4 90 48,171 42,936 5,235 
96 PINDERFiELDS HOSPITALS +020% 390 127 7.5 4.9 NY 3 91 63,359 54,172 9,187 
97 PLYMOUTH HOSPITALS +1.79% 40 9.6 SW 4 92 111.807 103.964 7.843 
PONTEFRACT HOSPITAL +0.62% 253 80 8.3 3 2 93 39,736 36,712 3,024 
POOLE HOSPITAL -0 .37% 342 197 6.4 2 2 94 60,826 53,411 7,415 
100 PORTSMOUTH HOSPITALS +067% 320 207 6.3 6 SW 4 2 95 134,382 101,694 32,688 
101 PRESTON ACUTE HOSPITALS +1.76% 113 7 NW 4 2 96 88,878 78,041 10,837 
102 PRINCESS ROYAL HOSPITAL +i 06% 401 107 7.8 4.3 WM 3 2 97 28,230 25,721 2,509 
103 QUEEN MARY'S SIDCUP +0.15% 387 146 7 5 ST 3 2 98 43,831 40,156 3,675 
104 QUEEN VICTORIA HOSPITAL +1.19% 345 6.7 ST 4 2 99 14,664 13,590 1,074 
105 QUEENS MEDICAL CENTRE, NOTTINGHAM LIMNER +1.24% 261 82 8.3 6.1 T 3 2 100 123,468 99,658 23,810 
106 RADCLIFFE INFIRMARY +1.00% 228 101 7.9 6.2 AO 3 2 101 34,425 28,328 6,097 
107 ROBERT JONES & AGNES HUNT ORTHOPAEDIC & DIS +0.53% 195 6,3 WM 4 2 102 21,018 18,581 2,437 
108 ROCHDALE +0 .69% 223 189 6.5 6.2 NW 2 2 103 70,735 57,855 12,880 
109 ROTHERHAM GENERAL HOSPITALS +1 41% 147 274 4.9 6.6 T 3 2 104 64,057 57,621 6,436 
110 ROYAL BERKSHIRE AND BATTLE HOSPITALS +0.79% 350 158 6.8 5.6 AO 3 2 105 86,413 79,146 7.267 
ROYAL BOURNEMOUTH AND CHRISTCHURCH HOS +0.79% 274 190 6.5 6 SW 2 2 106 70,757 66,520 4,237 
112 ROYAL BROMpTON HOSPITAL +1. 17% 322 6 NT 4 2 107 56,855 18,428 38,427 
113 ROYAL. CORNWALL HOSPITALS 0 . 23% 284 193 6.4 6 SW 2 2 108 81,488 73,139 8,349 
114 ROYAL DEVON AND EXETER +0 .07% 70 8.3 SW 3 2 109 94,972 84,565 10,407 
115 ROYAL FREE HAMPSTEAD 44188%, 157 192 6.4 6.6 NT 1 2 110 126,940 100,415 26,525  
116 ROYAL HULL HOSPITALS +0.15% 326 187 6.5 6 NY 3 2 111 101,205 93,764 7,44 1 
117 ROYAL. LIVERPOOL UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL +0 90% 299 3.6 6 NW 2 112 103,546 83,788 19,758 
118 ROYAL SHREWSBURY HOSPITALS +0. 370 5.2 WM 2 113 55,926 50,754 5,162 
119 ROYAL SURREY COUNTY & ST LUKE'S HOSPITALS +00396 386 237 6 5 ST 1 2 114 54,419 48,599 5,820 
120 ROYAL UNITED HOSPITAL BATH -3.77% 410 272 5 2 SW 2 2 115 67,518 59,494 8,024 
121 ROYAL VICTORIA INFIRMARY AND ASSOCIATED HOS 8.3 NY 4 2 116 162,577 134,153 28,424 
122 ROYAL WEST SUSSEX .0. 395 4.6 4 2 35,288 4,403 
123 ROYAL wOLVERHAMPTON HOSPITALS + 1 38% 101 7.3 WM 4 2 118 83,819 73,369 10,450 
124 SALFORD ROYAL HOSPITALS +1.88% 44 9.1 NW 4 2 119 83,417 66,754 16,663 
125 SCUNTHORPE & GOOLE HOSPITALS +1 54% 236 253 5.9 6.1 NY 3 2 120 50,581 45,630 4,951 
126 SOUTH KENT HOSPITALS +1.76% 0 ST 4 2 121 65,229 57,621 7,608 
127 SOUTH MANCHESTER UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS +0.33% 105 7.2 NW 4 2 122 148,813 130,727 18,085 
128 SOUTH TEES ACUTE HOSPITALS -0.09% 384 235 6 5 NY 3 2 123 107,576 96,221 11,355 
129 SOUTH WARW/CKSHIRE GENERAL HOSPITALS .2 19% 399 289 0.2 4.4 WM 3 2 124 42,989 36,682 6,307 
130 SOUTHAMPTON UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS +0 54% 234 255 5.9 6.1 SW 3 2 125 163,761 130,153 33,608 
131 SOUTHEND . 1 59% 133 199 6.4 6.7 NT 1 2 126 68,195 61,853 6,332 
SOUTHPORT AND FORMBY +1.36% 273 213 6.2 6 NW 2 127 36,881 33.146 3,735 
ST ALBANS AND HEMEL HEMPSTE +0.51% 279 6 NT 4 128 52,685 45,481 7,204 
134 ST GEORGE'S +0. 316 343 126 7 5 5.8 ST 3 129 143,092 103,337 39.755 
135 ST HELENS AND KNOWSLEY HOSPITALS +056% 183 131 7.3 6.4 NW 1 130 87,362 79,346 8,016 
136 ST HELIER +2.21% 47 120 7.6 8.8 ST 1 131 86,752 77,386 9,366 
137 ST JAMES'S UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL +0.02% 220 136 7.3 6.2 NY 1 132 131,104 111,979 19,125 
138 ST MARY'S (10W) +0.50% 391 173 4.9 SW L33 36,285 31,208 5,077 
139 ST MARY'S +0.68% 360 230 5.5 NT 134 111,651 88,502 23,149 
140 STOCKPORT ACUTE SERVICES +0.47% 102 7.3 NW 135 54,199 42,621 11,578 
STOKE MANDEVILLE HCISPITA 10.2 AO 136 54,321 50,413 3,908 
142 SWINDON AND MARLBOROUGH -0- 82% 409 2.8 SW 4 2 137 63,347 57,830 
AND GLOSSOP ACUTE SERVICES +2.89% 45 9 NW 43,905 37,766 6.139 
144 
144  
THANET +0.23% 186 • 10 6.4 ST 36,368 33,408 2,960 
145 UNITED LEEDS TEACHING HOSPITALS .0.21% 356 1 2 140 158,801 130,297 28,504 
146 UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON HOSPITALS +1.20% 119 4 2 141 142,490 105,090 37,400 
WALSALL HOSPITALS +1.92% 88 51 9.3 WM 2 142 61,918 56,600 5,318 
WALSGRAVE HOSPITALS +0.35% 385 271 5 WM 2 143 102,916 93,303 9,613 
149 WARRINGTON HOSPITAL +0.65% 294 270 5.1 NW 2 144 48,570 44259 4,011 
150 WEST DORSET GENERAL HOSPITALS +0.21% 321 2 42,404 38,137 4,267  
WEST MIDDLESEX UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL +0 60% 2 146 50,157 7,469 
152 WEST SUFFOK HOSPITALS +0.96% 268 151 6.9 6 AO 2 147 49,755 45,651 4,104 
153 WESTMORLAND HOSPITALS +3.36% 128 260 5.5 6.8 NW 2 148 16,447 15,952 495 
1 54 wHITTINGTON HOSPITAL +1.29% 368 99 8 5.3 NT 2 149 68,317 54,208 14,109 
155 WINCHESTER & EASTLEIGH +1 14% 121 6.8 SW 2 150 61,819 58.376 3,443 
1 56 WIRRAL HOSPITAL +1.24% 150 125 7.5 6.6 NW 2 151 98,555 89.381 9,174 
157 WORTH !NG & SOUTHLANDS HOSPITAL +0.13% 67 8.3 ST 4 2 152 56,338 51,074 5,264  
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A S T U V W X Y Z AA AB 
Ek Ek .£k Ek Ek Lk Lk Ek 
NAME EXPENDITURE Net 
Retained 
Net 
Retained 
Net 
Retained 
Net 
Retained 
Operating Operating Operating Operating CORE INCOME  
Afar 95 Surplus Surplus Surplus Surplus Surplus Surplus Surplus Surplus Ma r 92  
1994/9 1991/92 1992/93 1993/9 1994/9 1991/9 1992/93 1993/94 1994/9 1991/9 
ADDENBROOKE'S 128,791 2,305 1,599 0 0 7,773 5,9137 
AIREDALE 57,151 0 -577 0 300 0 2,092 3.420 3.199 
ALEXANDRA 31,230 0 112 0 0 0 1,563 
BARNSLEY DISTRICT GENERAL HOSPITAL 47,653 1,065 728 0 0 2.786 2,481 
BASILDON & TIIURROCK GENERAL HOSPITALS 63,617 2,935 	1,343 1,363 0 6,410 5,004 5,103 
BASSETLAW HOSPITAL AND COMMUNITY SERVICES 33,363 252 	182 122 0 1,721 1.974 2,052 
BEDFOF1C1 HOSPITAL 41,717 626 1,057 107 0 1,633 2,379 1,676 
BIRMINGHAN1 HEARTLANDS HOSPITAL 80,569 0 668 1,671 2.718 0 3,853 5,147 6.865 
BISHOP AUCKLAND HOSPITALS 31,277 72 0 0 0 1,101 
BLACKPOOL VICTOR!A HOSPITAL COMMUNITY 68,599 1,635 0 0 0 4,468 
BOLTON HOSPITALS 71,402 704 0 0 0 4,009 
BRADFORD HOSPITALS 93,792 0 -1,312 0 0 3,764 3,114 5,114 5,491 76,432 
BRIGHTON 80,371 556 447 0 0 2.560 2,51 3  
BROADGREEN HOSPITAL 36,476 -326 3,079 -434 283 1,529 -741 1,908 2,041 32,798 
20 BROMLEY HOSPITALS 61,650 794 748 0 0 4,824 3,997 
BURTON HOSPITALS 44,244 2,299 718 0 0 5,616 3,314 
22 CARLISLE HOSPITALS 41,587 52 0 0 0 1,577 
CENTRAL MIDDLESEX HOSPITAL 43,982 3,345 2,593 250 473 7,814 5.683 3.976 3,273 45,378 
CENTRAL SHEFFELD UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS 121,354 808 47 27 0 5,773 5.888 5,883 
CHASE FARM HOSPITALS 44,238 1,064 343 0 0 3,331 2,959 
26 CHELSEA & WESTNIINSTER 83,685 426 0 0 0 12,545 
27 CHESTERFIELD & NORTH DERBYSHIRE ROYAL HDSPI 53,605 655 747 0 0 3,377 2,690 
CITY HOSPITAL 80,866 2,183 0 0 0 5.335 
29 CITY HOSPITAL SUNDERLAND 96,268 1,290 0 0 0 4,531 
30 CRAWLEY HORSHAM 43,612 249 •1,154 .0 0 2,245 38 
31 DARLINGTON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL 38,153 921 .0 0 0 2,427 
32 DARTFORD AND GRAVESHAM 50,553 496 0 0 0 3.805 
33 DERBY CITY GENERAL HOSPITAL 45,066 1,268 19 0 0 2,672 1,646 
34 DERBYSHIRE ROYAL INFIRMARY 70,176 1,059 0 0 0 4,321 
DONCASTER ROYAL & MANOTAGU HOSPITAL 57,349 134 1,263 552 1,175 3,121 3,826 3,777 3,975 57,748 
DUDLEY GROUP OF HOSPITALS 79,450 1,824 0 0 0 5,858 
EALING HOSPITAL 41,803 •594 548 252 0 928 2.158 2,031 
EAST HER FORDSHIRE 56,854 252 544 583 0 2,317 3.001 2,888 
• EAST YORKSHIRE HOSPITALS 40,013 790 43 0 0 3,034 1.499 
EASTBOURNE HOSPITALS 60,410 50 812 344 0 3,025 3,994 3,628 
EPSOM 46,268 204 1,050 786 3 3,167 3,059 3,151 2,113 37.542 
FREEMAN GROUP OF HOSPITALS 89,315 2,435 769 1,178 1,123 4,628 3,008 3,198 3,229 61,664 
FRIMLEY PARK HOSPITAL 47,135 682 17 -39 0 •344,624 2,562 2,521 
FURNESS HOSPITALS 29,498 212 0 0 0 2,394 
GATESHEAD HOSPITALS 42,219 687 486 0 0 2,372 2281 
GEORGE ELIOT HOSPITAL 37,186 103 0 0 0 3,411 
GLENFIELD HOSPITAL 47,584 414 240 0 0 3.976 3,265 
GLOUCESTERSHIRE ROYAL 64,654 647 758 0 0 3,153 3,256 
49 GOOD HOPE HOSPITAL 45,058 777 280 0 0 2,709 2,434 
50 GUY'S AND ST THOMAS' HOSPITAL 241,671 2,604 1,353 0 0 15,980 14,653 
51 
52 
HALTON GENERA' HOSPITAL 20,614 197 302 0 0 1,114 1,094 
HAMMERSMITH HOSPITALS 192,034 3,345 0 0 0 15,528 
53 HARTLEPOOL AND PETERLEE HOSPITALS 34,388 1,089 0 0 0 3,089 
54 HAVERING HOSPITALS 88,737 5,801 1,840 0 0 11,849 5,316 
55 HEATHERWOOD AND WEXHAM PARK HOSPITALS 69,115 1,504 369 867 0 0 0 4,306 
56 
57 
HEREFORD HOSPITALS 35,244 492 0 0 0 1,697 
FIILLINGDON HOSPITAL 49,628 1,554 873 1,926 820 3,919 2,759 3,667 2,882 41,729  
53 HINCHINGBROKE 38,168 196 -655 0 0 1,726 845 
sg HORTON GENERAL HOSPITAL 18,575 373 41 0 0 1,626 985 
60 IPSWICH HOSPITAL 66,96D 53 139 0 0 3,602 3,264 
61 JAMES PAGET HOSPITAL 52,368 972 511 0 0 2,333 1,844 
52 KENT & CANTERBURY HOSPITALS 51,877 198 569 0 
0 1,926 2,328 
63 KENT AND SUSSEX WEALD 45.021 1,020 0 0 0 2,844 
KETTERING GENERAL HOSPITAL 45,707 1,060 0 0 0 2,832 
65 KINGS J33,995 220 1,022 0 0 3,879 4,541 
66 KING'S LYNN & WISBECH HOSPITALS 51.303 502 116 182 0 2,872 2,746 2,537 
67 KINGSOTN HOSPITAL 42,724 677 305 -1.044 70 4,456 3,771 1,849 2.8118 38,656 
LANCASTER ACUTE HOSPITALS 40,214 332 112 382 0 2,107 2,399 2,526 
69 
70 
LEICESTER GENERAL HOSPITAL 59,849 721 1,075 0 0 4,013 3,531  
LEICESTER ROYAL INFIRMARY 111,607 1,201 982 0 0 6,615 6,368 
LEWISHAM HOSPITAL 60,322 420 14 0 0 4,099 4,032  
LINCOLN HOSPITALS 55,404 •257 0 0 0 2,475  
LOUTH AND DISTRICT 13,624 •25 0 0 0 418 
LUTON AND DUNSTABLE HOSPITAL 52,267 1,57 2 •3,621 972 0 2,965 2,640 3,153 
MAYDAY 62,837 492 652 0 0 3,043 2,959  
76 MEDWAY 55,041 378 0 0 0 3,104  
MID CHESHIRE HOSPITALS 52,008 410 612 18 1,418 3,163 881 1,538 2,889 42,168 
78 MID ESSEX HOSPITALS 61,782 2,067 -760 323 0 -507,712 3.972 3,967 
MID KENT 55,341 319 441 0 0 3,727 3,044 
MID STAFFORDSHIRE GENERAL HOSPITALS 53,268 2,941 325 0 0 6,495 2,844 
81 MILTON KEYNES GENERAL 38,232 510 -456 410 0 3,005 2.455 2,968 
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NAME EXPENDITURE Net 
Retained 
Ne! 
Retained 
Net 
Retained 
Net 
Retained 
Operating Operating Operating Operating CORE INCOME 
3 Mar 95 Surplus Surplus Surplus Surplus Surplus Surplus Surplus Surplus Mar 92 
4 1994/95 1991/9 1992/93 993/94 1994/95 1991/92 1992/ 93 1993/94 1394 /95 /991/92 
82 MOUNT VERNON 8, WATFORD HOSPITALS 74,652 1 0 0 a 4,067 
83 NEWHAM 51,215 409 0 0 0 2,370 
84 NORFOLK & NORWICH 108,298 1.336 0 0 0 4,727 
85 NORTH DURHAM ACUTE HOSPITALS 53.343 1,081 0 0 0 2,764 
86 NORTH HAMPSHIRE HOSPITALS 43,423 281 0 0 0 1,477 
87 NORTH MIDDLESEX HOSPITAL 51,108 -425 1,020 723 7 2,426 3,604 3,257 3,356 43,579 
88 NORTH STAFFORDSHIRE HOSPITAL 122,661 4,173 1,396 0 0 8,929 6,083 
89 NORTHAMPTON GENERAL HOSPITAL 65,139 1,328 0 0 0 4,617 
go NORTHERN GENERAL HOSPITAL 109,972 5 4 6 5 4,998 	i 	5,885 7,286 7,166 134,066 
91 NORTHWICK PARK & ST MARK'S 75,094 1,555 1,009 0 0 4,151 4,526 
92 NOTTINGHAM CITY HOSPITAL 105,618 22 68 5 0 4,620 6,783 7,596 
93 OXFORD RADCLIFFE HOSPITAL 130,175 684 0 0 0 6,262 
94 PETERBOROUGH HOSPITALS 60.716 2;238 186 0 0 5.044 1.708 
95 PILGRIM HEALTH 45,322 725 0 0 0 2.849 
95 PINDERFIELDS HOSPITALS 61.672 152 126 0 0 2,573 1,687 
97 PLYMOUTH HOSPITALS 104,546 2,000 0 0 0 7,261 
98 PONTEFRACT HOSPITALS 38,254 30 247 0 0 1,878 1,482 
99 POOLE HOSPITAL 58,231 754 88 -226 0 2.501 2,512 2,595 
too PORTSMOUTH HOSPITALS 128,842 906 0 0 0 5,540 
101 PRESTON ACUTE HOSPITALS 83,190 1,560 0 0 0 5,688 
102 PRINCESS ROYAL HOSPITAL 26,863 901 304 0 0 2,357 1,367 
103 QUEEN MARY'S S1DCUP 42,029 64 66 0 0 2,390 1,802 
104 QUEEN VICTORIA HOSPITAL 14,088 174 0 0 0 576 
105 QUEEN'S MEDICAL CENTRE NOTTINGHAM UNIVERSI 117,497 2,513 1,526 0 0 7,725 5,971 
106 RADCLIFFE INFIRMARY 32,276 894 345 0 0 2,519 2,149 
107 ROBERT JONES & AGNES HUNT ORTHOPAEDIC & DIS 19,638 112 0 0 0 1,380 
108 ROCHDALE 67,685 1,116 535 485 0 3,470 3,178 3,050 
109 ROTHERHAM GENERAL HOSPITALS 59,611 285 905 0 0 2.951 4,446 
110 ROYAL BERKSHIRE AND BATTLE HOSPITALS 81,479 1,276 686 0 0 5,625 4,934 
111 ROYAL BOURNEMOUTH AND CHRISTCHURCH HOSPI 66,542 1,543 636 560 0 4,715 4,387 4,215 
112 ROYAL BROMPTON HOSPITAL 53,281 665 0 0 0 3,574 
113 ROYAL CORNWALL HOSPITALS 77,535 299 592 185 0 3,322 3,869 3,953 
114 ROYAL DEVON AND EXETER 90,382 2,446 65 0 0 6,831 4,590 
125  ROYAL FREE HAMPSTEAD 119,928 769 765 1,128 1,119 6,525 6,195 6,748 7,012 78,684 
115.0 ROYAL HULL HOSPITALS 98,578 403 155 0 0 2,753 2,627 
117 ROYAL LIVERPOOL UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL 97,629 0 .800 -1,710 931 4,270 2300 3,391 5,917 74,905 
118 ROYAL SHREWSBURY HOSPITALS 54,440 383 0 0 0 1,486 
fig ROYAL SURREY COUNTY & ST LUKE'S HOSPITALS 51,800 2,923 -1,215 633 19 6,243 805 3,114 2,619 44,886 
120 ROYAL UNITED HOSPITAL BATH 66,049 -767 -676 -2,545 0 2,855 3,548 1,469 
121 ROYAL VICTORIA INFIRMARY AND ASSOCIATED HOSPI 155,179 2,005 
0 0 0 7,398 
122 ROYAL WEST SUSSEx 38,149 -271 0 0 0 1,542 
123 ROYAL WOLVER HAMPTON HOSPITALS 78,722 1,154 0 0 0 5,097 
124 SALFORD ROYAL HOSPITALS 78,167 1,572 0 0 0 5,250 
125 SCUNTHORPE 8, GOOLE HOSPITALS 46,667 107 779 0 0 3,577 3,914 
/26 SOUTH KENT HOSPITALS 61,225 1,148 0 0 0 4,004 
127 SOUTH MANCHESTER UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS 143,878 490 0 0 0 4,935 
/28 SOUTH TEES ACUTE HOSPITALS 103,654 -97 0 4,508 4,481 3,922 
129 SOUTH WARWICKSHIRE GENERAL HOSPITALS 41,386 -1,546 -940 0 0 70 1,603 
130 SOUTHAMPTON UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS 155,435 478 878 0 0 7,850 8,326 
131 SOUTHEND 64,647 60 166 439 -1,082 3,185 2,744 3,649 3,548 50,797 
132 SOUTHPORT AND FORMBY 34,173 -347 481 502 0 r 	2,107 2,749 2.708 
133 ST AL8ANS AND HEMEL HEMPSTEAD 48,861 270 0 0 0 3,824 
134 ST GEORGE'S 135,942 1,863 468 0 0 8,754 7,150 
135 ST HELENS AND KNOWSLEY HOSPITALS 81.476 430 827 1,125 574 5,248 4,931 6,268 5,886 68,931 
MI6 
137 
ST HELIER 81,448 348 1,401 668 1,917 3,888 4,657 4,234 5,304 65,057 
ST JAMES'S UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL 126,476 209 -521 22 29 3,129 2,788 4,433 4.628 82,801 
138 ST MARY'S (loW) 33,983 369 218 0 0 3,052 2,302 
139 ST MARY'S 107,207 240 759 0 0 4,806 4,444 
140 mil 
142 
STOCKPORT ACUTE SERVICES 51,955 257 0 0 0 2,244 
STOKE MANDEVILLE HOSPITAL 50,335 960 0 0 0 3,986 
SWINDON AND MARLBOROUGH 62,377 -522 0 0 0 970 
143 TAMESIDE AND GLOSSOP ACUTE SERVICES 40,666 1,271 0 
0 
y 	0 
0 
0 
1,814 
3,239 
1,236 144 THANET 35,132 251 82 
145 UNITED LEEDS TEACHING HOSPITALS 152,106 2,891 1,981 34 -334 7,889 5,900 6,314 6,695 109,483 
146 UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON HOSPITALS 134,995 1,704 0 0 0 7,495 
147 WALSALL HOSPITALS 57,344 2,281 -1.053 1,867 1,191 
5,767 1,483 5,184 4,574 51,346 
148 WALSGRAVE HOSPITALS 99.699 715 359 0 0 3.103 3,217 
Illa WARRINGTON HOSPITAL 46,119 156 316 0 0 1,928 2,451 
150 WEST DORSET GENERAL HOSPITALS 40,151 689 620 187 
91 36,757 37,759 40,003 2.253 34,077 
151 WEST MIDDLESEX UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL 47,310 104 299 0 0 3,498 2,847 
152 WEST SUFFOK HOSPITALS 47,682 
528 478 0 0 2,105 2,073 
/53 WESTMORLAND HOSPITALS 14,624 208 552 0 0 1,468 1,823 
154 WHITTINGTON HOSPITAL 65,438 
1,678 880 0 0 4,237 2,879 
155 WINCHESTER & EASTLEIGH 58,605 
706 0 0 0 3,214 
156 WIRRAL HOSPITAL 92,097 689 2,332 2,858 1,224 4,782 5,439 6,979 6,458 80,047 
157 WORTHING & SOUTHLANDS HOSPITALS 53,330 73 0 0 0 3.008 
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TOTAL 
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3 Mar 93 Mar 94 Mai 95 Mat 92 Mat 93 Mar 94 Mat 95 Mar 92 Mai 43 
1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1991/9 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1991/92 1992/93 
6 ADDENBROOKES 101,295 106,855 25,477 27,923 0 0 
7 AIREDALE 52,244 54,507 56,774 3,076 2,889 3,576 0 55,320  
ALEXANDRA 29,108 3,685 0 0 
BARNSLEY DISTRICT GENERAL HOSPITAL 43,911 44,932 4,469 5,202 0 0 
BASILDON & THURROCK GENERAL HOSPITALS 53,614 54,417 56,649 12,204 11,143 12,071 0 55,818 
BASSETLAW HOSPITAL AND COMMUNITY SERVICES 30,979 32,056 33,539 I 	409 1,092 1,876 0 31,388 
BEDFORD HOSPITAL 32,261 37,906 40,411 2,528 3,550 2,982 0 34,889 
BIRMINGHAM HEARTLANDS HOSPITAL 54,490 66,036 76,820 8,014 7,974 10,614 0 62,504 
BISHOP AUCKLAND HOSPITALS 29,745 2,633 0 0 
BLACKPOOL VICTORIA HOSPITAL COMMUNITY 0 0 
BOLTON HOSPITALS 0 0 
BRADFORD HOSPITALS 84,317 89,566 92,117 1,737 4,588 3,845 7.166 78,169 88,905 
BRIGHTON 78,829 79,703 2,975 3,181 0 0 
BROADGREEN HOSPITAL 34,690 32,527 31,569 5,789 7,328 8,811 6,948 38,587 42,018 
20 BROMLEY HOSPITALS 61,214 60,940 4,834 4,707 0 0 
21 BURTON HOSPITALS 41,978 42,721 5,035 4,837 0 0 
22 CARLISLE HOSPITALS 0 0 
23 CENTRAL MIDDLESEX HOSPITAL 46,673 42,041 41,073 2,845 2,743 6,299 6,182 48,229 49,416 
24 CENTRAL SHEFFIELD UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS 93,447 92,289 95,025 19,419 29,491 32,212 0 112,866 
25 CHASE FARM HOSPITALS 38,423 39,638 7,589 7,559 0 0 
26 CHELSEA & WESTMINSTER 0 0 
27 CHESTERFIELD & NORTH DERBYSHIRE ROYAL HOSPi 49,361 50,151 5,911 6,144 0 0 
28 CITY HOSPITAL 0 0 
29 CITY HOSPITAL SUNDERLAND 0 0 
30 CRAWLEY HORSHAM 41,595 .41,241 2,180 2,409 0 0 
DARLINGTON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL 0 0 
DARTFORD AND GRAVESHAM 0 0 
DERBY CITY GENERAL HOSPITAL 38,150 42,415 3,755 4,297 0 0 
DERBYSHIRE ROYAL INFIRMARY 0 ID 
36 DONCASTER ROYAL & MANOTAGU HOSPITAL 61,217 62,588 64,253 925 2,397 4,476 7,071 58,673 63,614 
36 DUDLEY GROUP OF HOSPITALS 0 0 
37 EALING HOSPITAL 35,624 36288 36,640 5,172 5,657 7,194 0 40,796 
38 EAST HEREORDSHIRE 52,876 54,080 55,583 3,037 3,914 4,159 0 55.913 
39 EAST YORKSHIRE HOSPITALS 37.980 38.619 2,246 2,893 0 0 
40 EASTBOURNE HOSPITALS 49,886 52.388 53,595 7,091 9,133 10,443 0 56,977 
41 EPSOM 42,304 41,218 42,731 6,040 5,225 5,285 5,650 43,582 47,529 
42 FREEMAN GROUP OF HOSPITALS 67,587 82,506 6,840 6,839 10,038 68,504 74,426 
43 FRIMLEY PARK HOSPITAL 39,021 2,044 4,685 0 41,065 
FURNESS HOSPITALS 0 0 
45 GATESHEAD HOSPITALS 36,764 39,360 4,830 5,140 0 0 
46 GEORGE ELIOT HOSPITAL 0 0 
47 GLENFIELD HOSPITAL 43,453 44,935 5.146 5,913 0 0 
48 GLOUCESTERSHIRE ROYAL 58,231 62,051 6.018 0 0 
GOD HOPE HSPITAL 39,059 42,59 4,221 4,902 0 0 
50 
O
HOMAS' GUY
O
'S AND ST T 	HOSPITAL 184,606 174,55 86,432 81,769 0 0 
HALTON GENERA] HOSPITAL 19,498 20,104 1,604 0 0 
HAMMERSMITH HOSPITALS 0 0 
53 HARTLEPOOL AND PETERLEE HOSPITALS 0 0 
HAvERiNG HOSPITALS 80,76 11,765 0 0 
55 HEATHERWOOD AND wEXHAM PARK HOSPITAL S 
56 HEREFORD HOSPITALS 0 0 
HILLINGDON HOSPITAL 44,380 44,363 47,121 4,810 5,544 6,951 46,539 49,924 
HINCHINGBF1OKE 34,293 37,118 2559 0 0 
HORTON GENERAL HOSPITAL 17,655 1,736 1,871 0 0 
60 IPSWICH HOSPITAL 50,945 64,745 4,481 5,479 0 0 
61 JAMES PAGET HOSPITAL 37,736 50,991 3,060 3,221 0 0 
62 KENT & CANTERBURY HOSPITALS 44,74 4,975 4,808 0 0 
63 KENT AND SUSSEX WEALD 0 0 
64 KETTERING GENERAL HOSPITAL 0 0 
KING'S 101,482 108,497 41.016 30,039 0 0 
KING'S LYNN & WISBECH HOSPITALS 46,737 4,004 4,798 4,458 0 49,971  
KINGSOTN HOSPITAL 40.741 38,021 41,213 3,246 4,319 4,399 41.902 45,060 
LANCASTER ACUTE HOSPITALS 37,645 38,258 38,654 4,278 4,086 0 41,923 
LEICESTER GENERAL HOSPITAL 51,660 54,550 8,306 8,830 0 0 
LEICESTER ROYAL INFIRMARY 85,094 90,778 22,636 27,197 0 0 
71 LEWISHAM HOSPITAL 52,536 11.418 0 0 
72 LINCOLN HOSPITALS 0 0 
LOUTH AND DISTRICT 0 0 
74 LUTON AND DUNSTABLE HOSPITAL 47,343 50,363 5,017 4.633 5,077 0 51,473 
75 MAYDAY 58,766 60,999 5,509 0 0 
76 MEDWAY 0 0 
MID CHESHIRE HOSPITALS 45,577 48,465 50,198 2,303 4,097 44,820 47,880 
78 MID ESSEX HOSPITALS 58.041 55,853 59,106 4,442 6,432 6,643 0 62,483 
79 MID KENT 50,592 53,239 4,815 5.146 0 0 
so MID STAFFORDSHIRE GE NERALHOSMALS 49,737 48,344 7,118 7.788 0 0 
81 MILTON KEYNES GENERAL 36,181 37,823 40,090 730 753 1,110 0 36,91 1 
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82 MOUNT VERNON I. WATFORD HOSPITALS 0 0 
83 NEWHAM 0 0 
NORFOLK & NORWICH 0 0 
NORTH DURHAM ACUTE HOSPITALS 0 0 
NORTH HAMPSHIRE HOSPITALS 0 0 
NORTH MIDDLESEX HOSPITAL 	 44,523 	44,136 46.226 	2,927 6,116 7,085 8.238 46.506 50,639 
NORTH STAFFORDSHIRE HOSPITAL 	 112,752 117,050 12,708 11,694 0 0 
• 	NORTHAMPTON GENERAL HOSPITAL 0 0 
NORTHERN GENERAL HOSPITAL 	 88,363 	93,097 98,823 	2.120 13.796 15,912 18,315 86.186 102.159 
gi 	NORTHWICK PARK & ST MARKS 47,571 58,105 21,515 0 0 
NOTTINGHAM CITY HOSPITAL 	 78,461 	92,343 103.530 13,070 14.340 9,664 0 41.53 1 
93 OXFORD RADCLIFFE HOSPITAL 0 0 
94 PETERBOROUGH HOSPITALS 	 54,539 55.820 6,604 0 0 
PILGRIM HEALTH 0 0 
PINDERFIELDS HOSPITALS 	 50,947 54,172 9,014 9,187 0 0 
97 PLYMOUTH HOSPITALS 0 0 
98 PONTEFRACT HOSPITALS 	 36,119 36.712 3,046 3,024 0 0 
99 POOLE HOSPITAL 	 48.078 	48,459 53.411 2.627 6)358 7,415 0 50,705 
PORTSMOUTH HOSPITALS 0 0 
101 PRESTON ACUTE HOSPITALS 0 0 
102 PRINCESS ROYAL HOSPITAL 	 24,125 25,721 2,713 2,509 0 0 
/03 QUEEN MARY'S SIDCUP 	 39,819 40,156 3,181 3,675 0 0 
104 QUEEN VICTORIA HOSPITAL 0 0 
108 QUEEN'S MEDICAL. CENTRE, NOTTINGHAM UNIVERSI 	 92,904 99.658 19,491 23,810 0 0 
106 RADCLIFFE INFIRMARY 	 27,413 28.328 4,790 6.097 0 0 
107 ROBERT JONES &AGNES HUNT ORTHOPAEDIC & DIS 0 0 
108 ROCHDALE 	 54,381 	54,868 57,855 2.067 2,959 12,680 0 56.448 
/09 ROTHERHAM GENERAL HOSPITALS 	 52,744 57,621 5,866 6,436 0 0 
110 ROYAL BERKSHIRE AND BATTLE HOSPITALS 	 76,116 79,146 6,454 7.267 0 0 
111 ROYAL BOURNEMOUTH AND CHRISTCHURCH HOSPI 	60,538 	61,239 65,520 1,936 4,015 4.237 0 62,474 
11 2 ROYAL BROM PTON HOSPITAL 0 0 
113 ROYAL CORNWALL HOSPITALS 	 1 	67,272 	68,616 73,139 6.615 8.008 8,349 0 73,887 
114 ROYAL DEVON AND EXETER 78,480 84,565 10.123 10.407 0 0 
1 15 ROYAL FREE HAMPSTEAD 89,207 	92.652 100,415 	21,703 21.934 25,581 26.525 100.387 111,141 
118 ROYAL HULL HOSPITALS 84,442 93,764 8,770 7,441 0 0 
117 ROYAL LIVERPOOL UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL 79,426 	78,850 83,788 	13,760 14,625 19,043 19,758 86,665 94,051 
118 ROYAL SHREWSBURY HOSPITALS 0 0 
119 ROYAL SURREY COUNTY & ST LUKE'S HOSPITALS 43,838 	48,291 48,599 	3,036 4,092 4,536 5,1320 47,922 47,930 
121) ROYAL UNITED HOSPITAL BATH 51,489 	54,668 59494 5,325 7,024 8,024 0 56,814 
121 ROYAL VICTORIA INFIRMARY AND ASSOCIATED HOSPI 0 0 
122 ROYAL WEST SUSSEX 0 0 
123 ROYAL WOLVERHAMPTON HOSPITALS 0 0 
SALFORD ROYAL HOSPITALS 0 0 
125 SCUNTHORPE & GOOLE HOSPITALS 45,197 45.630 4,951 0 0 
126 SOUTH KENT HOSPITALS 0 0 
127 SOUTH MANCHESTER UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS 0 0 
128 SOUTH TEES ACUTE HOSPITALS 82,232 	89,105 96,221 6.779 7,364 0 89.01 1 
in SOUTH WARWICKSHIRE GENERAL HOSPITALS 35,769 36,682 5,319 6,307 0 0 
130 SOUTHAMPTON UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS 115,991 130.153 30,866 33,606 0 0 
131 SOUTHEND 55.636 	57.441 61,863 	3,717 3,523 6,642 6.332 54,514 59.159 
SOUTHPORT AND FORMBY 30,247 0 32,580 
1 33 ST ALBANS AND HEMEL HEMPSTEAD 0 0 
ST GEORGE'S 104,633 103,337 34,476 39,755 0 0 
ST HELENS AND KNOWSLEY HOSPITALS 74,028 	76,903 79,346 6,119 6,853 8,016 76,498 80,147 
in ST HELIER 78,838 	77,065 77.386 	5,298 8,020 11,330 9.366 71,355 86,858 
137 ST JAMES'S UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL 96,166 	100,831 111,979 	10,960 13,718 19,615 19,125 93,761 109,884 
138 ST MARY'S (loW) 30,179 31,208 4,654 5,077 0 0 
In ST MARY'S 83,877 88.502 24,110 0 0 
140 STOCKPORT ACUTE SERVICES 0 0 
141 STOKE MANDEVILLE HOSPITAL 0 0 
142 SWINDON AND MARLBOROUGH 0 0 
TAMESIDE AND GLOSSOP ACUTE SERVICES 0 0 
THANET 32,505 33,408 2,031 2,960 0 0 
145 UNITED LEEDS TEACHING HOSPITALS 120,050 	124,254 130,297 	18,783 21,509 26,092 28.504 128,266 141.559 
146 UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON HOSPITALS 0 0 
WALSALL HOSPITALS 53,090 56,600 846 2,731 2,997 52,192 55,82 1 
148 WALSGRAVE HOSPITALS 89,125 93,303 9,431 9,613 0 0 
149 WARRINGTDN HOSPITAL 42,542 44,559 4,007 4,011 0 0 
150 WEST DORSET GENERAL HOSPITALS 35,198 	36,296 	38,137 2.812 2,678 3,829 4,267 36.889 37.876 
151 WEST MIDDLESEX UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL 43,309 	42,688 7,381 7,469 0 0 
WEST SUFFOK HOSPITALS 42,498 	45,651 3,755 4,104 0 0 
WESTMORLAND HOSPITALS 450 0 0 
154 WHITTINGTON HOSPITAL 55,618 	54,208 13,358 14,109 0 0 
155 WINCHESTER & EASTLEIGH 0 0 
WIRRAL HOSPITAL 82.133 	84,859 	89,381 4,551 8,912 9,762 9,174 84,598 91,045 
157 WORTHING & SOUTHLANDS HOSPITALS 0 0 
Appendix 3 Page 6 of 22 
Database for Chapter 10: Trust Performance 
	 Appendix 3 
A AL AM AN AO AP . AR 	AS 	AT 
1 Ek Ek Ek Ek 
2 
TOTAL 
INCOME 
TOTAL 
INCOME 
EXPENDITURE EXPENDI TURE EXPENDITURE EATENonuRE mta wte M&D wte MO wte 
3 Mar 94 Mat 92 Mar 93 Mar 94 Ma/ 95 
1993/9 1991/92 1992/93 1993/9 1994/95 1992/93 1993/94 
Iita 
ADDENBROOKE'S 134,778 118.999 
AIREDALE 57,3% 60,350 53,228 53,976 57,151 133 132 
ALEXANDRA 0 32,793 31.230 
9 BARNSLEY DISTRICT GENERAL HOSPITAL 48.380 50.134 45,594 47,653 
10 BASILDON & THURFIOCK GENERAL HOSPITALS 65,560 68.720 59,408 60,556 202 
8ASSETLAW HOSPITAL AND COMMUNITY SERVICES 35,415 31.174 33,363 78 82 
BEDFORD HOSPITAL 41,456 43,393 33,256 39.077 
BIRMINGHAM HEARTLANDS HOSPITAL 74,010 87,434 58,651 80,569 236 236 
BISHOP AUCKLAND HOSPITALS 0 31.277 
BLACKPOOL VICTORIA HOSPITAL COMMUNITY 0 0 
BOLTON HOSPITALS 0 0 
BRADFORD HOSPITALS 99,283 74,405 85,791 290 
18 BRIGHTON 81,804 82,884 79,244 80,371 233 
19 BROADGREEN HOSPITAL 41,338 38.517 37,058 39,430 36,476 104 108 
20 BROMLEY HOSPITALS 66,048 61,224 51,650 
BURTON HOSPITALS 47,013 47,558 41,397 103 
CARLISLE HOSPITALS 0 0 
CENTRAL MIDDLESEX HOSPITAL 48,340 47,255 40,409 43,733 44,364 43,982 139 
CENTRAL SHEFFIELD UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS 121,780 127.237 107,093 115,892 121,354 337 
CHASE FARM HOSPITALS 46,012 47,197 130 
CHELSEA & WESTMINSTER 0 0 
CHESTERFIELD & NORTH DERBYSHIRE ROYAL HOSPI 55,272 56,295 53,605 152 
CITY HOSPITAL 0 0 
CITY HOSPITAL SUNDERLAND 0 0 
30 CRAWLEY HORSHAM 43,650 41,530 43,61 11E1 
DARLINGTON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL 0 0 
DARTFORD AND GRAVESHAM 0 0 
DERBY CITY GENERAL HOSPITAL 41,905 46,712 39,233 45,066 130 
DERBYSHIRE ROYAL INF1RMARY 0 0 
DONCASTER ROYAL & MANOTAGU HOSPITAL 57,054 71,324 63,287 67,349 176 198 
DUDLEY GROUP OF HOSPITALS 0 0 
EALING HOSPITAL 42,945 43,834 39,8613 40,787 41.803 104 101 
EAST HERFORDSHIRE 59.742 53.596 54,993 56.854 173 
EAST YORKSHIRE HOSPITALS 40,226 41,512 37,192 40,013 124 
EASTBOURNE HOSPITALS 61,521 54,038 53,952 57,527 60,410 120 130 
EPSOM 47,503 48,381 40,415 44,470 44,352 46,268 133 136 138 
FREEMAN GROUP OF HOSPITALS 77,678 92,544 63,876 71,418 74,480 89,315 144 186 
FR IMLEY PARK HOSPITAL 44,909 49,656 385,689 42,347 47,135 143 
FURNESS HOSPITALS 0 0 
45 GATESHEAD HOSPITALS 41,594 44,500 39,222 42,219 133 
46 GEORGE ELIOT HOSPITAL 0 0 
GLEN FIELD HOSPITAL 50,849 44,623 
GLOUCESTERSHIRE ROYAL 67,910 61,096 
GOOD HOPE HOSPITAL 43,280 47,492 40,571 45,058 122 
GUYS AND ST THOMAS' HOSPITAL 271,038 256,324 255,058 241,671 726 
51 HALTON GENERA! HOSPITAL 21,065 21,708 19,951 20,614 53 
HAMMERSMITH HOSPITALS 0 0 
HARTLEPOOL AND PETERLEE HOSPITALS 
HAVERING HOSPITALS 
 0 0
94,053 82,290 
55 HEATHERWOOD AND WEXHAM PARK HOSPITALS 
HEREFORD HOSPITALS 0 0 
57 HILLINGDON HOSPITAL 51,314 52,510 42,620 47,165 47,647 49,628 148 
58 HINCHING8ROKE 36.852 39,013 35,126 38,168 
59 HORTON GENERAL HOSPITAL 19,391 19,560 17,765 18,575 61 
IPSWICH HOSPITAL 45,426 70,224 61,824 66.940 203 
JAMES PAGET HOSPITAL 40,796 54,212 38,463 52.368 152 
KENT 5, CANTERBURY HOSPITALS 49,718 54,205 47,792 51,877 
63 KENT AND SUSSEX WEALD 0 0 
64 KETTERING GENERAL HOSPITAL 0 0 
65 KINGS 142,498 138,536 138,620 133,995 490 
KING'S LYNN & WISBECH HOSPITALS 51,535 53,640 47,099 48,789 51,30 166 158 
• KINGSOTN HOSPITAL 42,555 45,612 41,289 40,706 42,724 125 133 133 
68 LANCASTER ACUTE HOSPITALS 41,920 42,740 39,816 39,521 40,214 125 127 
69 LEICESTER GENERAL HOSPITAL 59,966 63,380 55,953 59,849 155 
70 LEICESTER ROYAL INFIRMARY 107,730 117.975 101,115 111,607 40/ 
LEWISHAM HOSPITAL 63,954 64,354 59,855 60,322 148 
LINCOLN HOSPITALS 0 0 
LOUTH AND DISTRICT 0 0 
74 LUTON AND DUNSTABLE HOSPITAL 55,440 48,508 52,28 
75 MAYDAY 64,275 
MEDWAY 0 0 
MID CHESHIRE HOSPITALS 52,562 
62,285 
54,897 46,999 
570,195 
51,024 
58,313 
52,008 
61,782 
138 141 
78 MID ESSEX HOSPITALS 
79 MID KENT 55,407 58,385 51,680 55,341 134 
60 MID STAFFORDSHIRE GENERAL HOSPITALS 56,855 56,112 50,360 , 	53,268 136 
81 MILTON KEYNES GENERAL 38,576 41,200 33.906 36,121 38,232 119 124 
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82 MOUNT VERNON & wATFORD HOSPITALS 	 i 	0 	 0 
NEWHAM 	 o 0 
84 NORFOLK I NORWICH 	 0 	 0 
es NORTH DURHAM ACUTE HOSPITALS 	 I0 	 0 
86 NORTH HAMPS111RE HOSPITALS 0 0 
NORTH MIDDLESEX HOSPITAL 51,221 	54,464 	44,080 	47,035 47,964 51,108 
88 NORTH STAFFORDSHIRE HOSPITAL 125,460 	128,744 116,531 122,661 
89 NORTHAMPTON GENERAL HOSPITAL 0 0 
90 NORTHERN GENERAL HOSPITAL i10,009 	117,138 	81,188 	96,274 102,723 109,972 190 205 276 
gi 	NORTHWICK PARK & ST MARK'S 	 67,086 	79,620 62.935 75,094 206 
92 NOTTINGHAM CITY HOSPITAL 106,683 99,900 105,618 237 
m OXFORD RADCLiFFE HOSPITAL 	 0 	 0 
PETE REioRoLIGH HOSPITALS 60,785 	62,424 55,741 60,716 182 
PILGRIM HEALTH 	 0 0 
96 pINDERFTELDS HOSPITALS 	 59,951 	63,359 57,388 61,672 
9 	PLYMOUTH HOSPITALS 0 0 
98 PONTEFRACT HOSPITALS 	 39,736 
99 POOLE HOSPITAL 	 55,317 	60,826 	 48,204 52,805 58,231 178 
100 PORTSMOUTH HOSPITALS 	 0 	 0 
101 PRESTON ACUTE HOSPITALS 	 0 	 0 
102 PRINCESS ROYAL HOSPITAL 28,230 24,481 26,663 79 
103 QUEEN mARY'S SIDCLIP 	 43,000 	43.831 40,610 42,029 
104 QUEEN VICTORIA HOSPITAL 	 0 0 
105 QUEEN'S MEDICAL CENTRE, NOTTINGHAM UNIVERSI 	112,395 	123,468 104,570 117,497 380 
106 RADcLIFFE INFIRMARY 	 32,203 	34,425 29,684 32.276 90 
107 Ro8ERT JONES 8, AGNES HUNT ORTHOPAEDIC & DIS 	0 	 0 
108 ROcHDALE 	 57,827 	70,735 54.645 67,685 137 140 
log ROTHERHAM GENERAL HOSPITALS 	 58.610 	64,057 55.659 59.611 
110 ROYAL BERKSHIRE AND BATTLE HOSPITALS 	 82,570 	86,413 76,945 81,479 244 
ROYAL BOURNEMOUTH AND CHRISTCHURCH HOSPI 	65,254 	70.757 57,759 60,857 
112 ROYAL BROMPTON HOSPITAL 	 0 	 0 
113 ROYAL CORNWALL HOSPITALS 	 76,624 	81,488 	 70,565 72,755 77,535 236 
114 ROYAL DEvON AND ExETER 88,603 94,972 81,772 00,382 
ROYAL FREE HAMPSTEAD 	 118,233 126.940 93,862 	104,946 111,485 119,928 271 266 
116 ROYAL HULL HOSPITALS 93,212 101.205 90.459 233 
117 ROYAL LIVERPOOL UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL 	 97,893 103.546 84,395 	91,951 94,502 261 
lie ROYAL SHREWSBURY HOSPITALS i 	0 0 
119 ROYAL SURREY COUNTY &ST LuKES HOSPITALS 52,827 54,419 41.679 49,713 51,800 172 
120 ROYAL UNITED HOSPITAL BATH 61,692 57,518 58,144 65,049 240 
121 ROYAL VICTORIA INFIRMARY AND ASSOCIATED NOSPI 0 0 
122 ROYAL wEST SUSSEX 0 0 
123 ROYAL WOLVERHAMPTON HOSPITALS 0 0 
SALFORD ROYAL HOSPITALS 0 0 
SCUNTHORPE 1. GOOLE HOSPITALS T 	49,913 50.581 46.336 46.667 
SOUTH KENT HOSPITALS 0 0 
SOUTH MANCHESTER UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS 0 0 
SOUTH TEES ACUTE HOSPITALS 96,489 107.576 84.503 103,654 237 250 
129 SOUTH wARWIC,KSHME GENERAL HOSPITALS 41,088 42,909 41,018 121 
130 SOUTHAMPTON UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS 146,857 163,761 139,007 443 
131 SOUTHEND 64.083 68,195 51,329 56,415 60.434 64.647 205 199 
132 SOUTHPORT AND FORMBY 34,618 36,881 30,473 31,869 34,173 159 90 
ST ALBANS AND HEMEL F.EmPSTEAD 0 0 
ST GE0RGE'S 139.109 143.092 130.355 135,942 504 
ST HELENS AND KNOWSLEY HOSPITALS 83,756 87,362 71,250 75.216 77,486 81.476 208 212 193 
ST HELIER 88.395 86,752 67,467 82.201 84.161 81.448 209 239 260 
ST JAMES'S UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL 120,446 131,104 90,632 107,096 116,013 126.476 323 360 367 
ST MARY'S 00/10 34.833 36,285 31,781 33,983 105 
139 ST MARY'S 107,987 111,651 103.181 107,207 
140 STOCKPORT ACUTE SERVICES 0 0 
STOKE MANDEVILLE HOSPITAL 0 0 
SWINDON AND MARLDDRoUGH 0 0 
143 TAMESIDE AND GLOSSOP ACUTE SERVICES 0 0 
144 THANET 34.536 36,368 35.132 88 
UNITED LEEDS TEACHING HOSPITALS 150,346 158,801 120,377 135,659 144.032 152,106 460 324 
46 UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON HOSPITALS 0 0 
WALSALL HOSPITALS 58,634 61,918 46,425 54.338 53,450 57,344 128 132 
148 WALSGRAVE HOSPITALS 98.556 102.916 95.453 99,699 
149 WARRINGTON HOSPITAL 46.549 48,570 44,621 46,119 134 
Is° WEST DORSET GENERAL HOSPITALS 40.125 42,404 132 117 122 127 1,343 1,324 
lei WEST MIDDLESEX UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL 50,690 50,157 47,192 47,310 156 
152 WEST SUFFOK HOSPITALS 46,253 49,755 44,148 47,682 
Ise WESTMORLAND HOSPITALS 15,294 16,447 13.826 14,624 
154 WHITTINGTON HOSPITAL 68,976 68.317 64.739 65,438 233 
155 WINCHESTER & EASTLEIGH 0 0 
156 WIRRAL HOSPITAL 94,621 98,555 79.816 85.606 87,642 92.097 225 209 242 
157 WORTHING & SOUTHLANDS HOSPITALS 0 0 
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■ '1  
ADDENEIROOKE'S 379 4,195 4,053 
7 AIREDALE 145 2,232 2,232 2,246 27,497 27,215 27,074 27,724 6,426 
8 ALEXANDRA 96 1,162 17,627 19,692 
g BARNSLEY DISTRICT GENERAL HOSPITAL 143 1,659 1,658 31,464 31,209 32,234  
10  BASILDON & THURROCK GENERAL HOSPITALS 217 2,058 2,122 2,168 1 	34,832 N 	35,893 36,876 38,051 5,974 
11 BASSETLAW HOSPITAL AND COMMUNITY SERVICES 83 1,238 1,250 1,264 17,952 18,278 
12 BEDFORD HOSPITAL 140 1,210 1,392 1,457 
13 BIRMINGHAM HEARTLANDS HOSPITAL 235 1,841 2,023 2,490 41.443 
14 BISHOP AUCKLAND HOSPITALS 76 1,133 
15 BLACKPOOL VICTORIA HOSPITAL COMMUNITY 
16 BOLTON HOSPITALS 
17 BRADFORD HOSPITALS 222 2,919 2,916 2,860 2,874 
18 BRIGHTON 264 2,973 2,901 56,000 51,473 
19 BROADGREEN HOSPITAL 102 1,574 1,599 1,301 1,155 18,845 19,133 15,921 4,770 
20 BROMLEY HOSPITALS 181 2,158 2.072 39,600 47,851 
21 BURTON HOSPITALS 108 1,501 1,561 
22 CARLISLE HOSPITALS 
23 CENTRAL MIDDLESEX HOSPITAL 144 1,330 1,308 1,271 1,265 
24 CENTRAL SHEFFIELD UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS 453 5,488 5,501 5,421 60,744 64,322 64,487 
25 CHASE FARM HOSPITALS 139 1,241 1,240 22,554 22,583 
26 CHELSEA & WESTMINSTER 
27 CHESTERFIELD & NORTH DERBYSHIRE ROYAL HOSPI 186 1,969 2,040 
28 CITY HOSPITAL 
29 CITY HOSPITAL SUNDERLAND 
30 CRAWLEY HORSHAM 124 1,456 1,413 24,276 24,826 23,036 
31 DARLINGTON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL 
32 DARTFORD AND GRAVESHAM 
33 DERBY CITY GENERAL HOSPITAL 138 1,468 1,679 28,663 31,763 
34 DERBYSHIRE ROYAL INFIRMARY 
35 DONCASTER ROYAL & MANOTAGU HOSPITAL 209 2,468 2,554 2,692 2,788 58,097 62,167 
36 DUDLEY GROUP OF HOSPITALS 
37  EALING HOSPITAL 118 968 1,025 1,041 23,786 24,821 
38 EAST HERFORDSHIRE 156 2,279 1,860 1,887 35,000 
39 EAST YORKSHIRE HOSPITALS 136 1,577 1,554 
40 EASTBOURNE HOSPITALS 135 2,255 2,320 2,476 35,187 35,500 
41 EPSOM 143 1,680 1,678 1.544 1,572 
42 FREEMAN GROUP OF.HOSPITALS 207 2,263 2,304 2,355 2,500 35,809 36,577 36,299 13,245 
43 FRIMLEY PARK HOSPITAL 159 1,418 1,477 1,521 29,232 31,910 32,433 
44 FURNESS HOSPITALS 
48 GATESHEAD HOSPITALS 134 1,569 1,619 25,565 25,958 
46 GEORGE ELIOT HOSPITAL 
47 GLENFIELD HOSPITAL 125 1,458 1,393 
48 GLOUCESTERSHIRE ROYAL 164 2,225 2,265 38,300 
49 GOOD HOPE HOSPITAL 125 1,508 1,458 33,238 
50 GUY'S AND ST THOMAS' HOSPITAL 652 6,838 6,393 78,944 78,954 90,025 
51 HALTON GENERA! HOSPITAL 55 708 710 8,051 8,239 8,874 
52  HOSPITALS 
53 • HARTLEPOOL AND PETERLEE HOSPITALS 
54 HAVERING HOSPITALS 295 2,754 2,679 64,605 67,773 67,256 
55 
.. 
HEATHERWOOD AND WEXHAM PARK HOSPITALS 
56 HEREFORD HOSPITALS 
57 HILLINGDON HOSPITAL 159 1,655 1,693 1,644 1,630 
58 HINCHINGBROKE 96 [ 1,221 ' 1,278 17,639 18,159 
59 HORTON GENERAL HOSPITAL 65 650 667 
60 IPSWICH HOSPITAL 213 2,480 2,534 
61 JAMES PAGET HOSPITAL 155 1,846 1,914 23,444 28,778 
62 KENT & CANTERBURY HOSPITALS 166 1,528 1,568 25.000 
63 KENT AND SUSSEX WEALD  
64 KETTERING GENERAL HOSPITAL 
65 
66  
KING'S 440 5,123 4,524 52,196 
LYNN & WISBECH HOSPITALS 162 2,005 1.993 1,973 25,890 
67 KINGSOTN HOSPITAL 138 1.232 1,243 1,188 1,155 23,597 24,628 21,448 19,615 7,691 
68 LANCASTER ACUTE HOSPITALS 129 1,595 1,526 1,517 23,887 22,660 23,176 24,000 8,812 
69 LEICESTER GENERAL HOSPITAL 180 1,971 1,977 36,481 38,928 43,580 
70 LEICESTER ROYAL INFIRMARY 377 3,602 3,906 59,258 67,899 
71 LEWISHAM HOSPITAL 166 1.851 1,906 35,047 33,723 
72 LINCOLN HOSPITALS 
73 LOUTH AND DISTRICT 
74 LUTON AND DUNSTABLE HOSPITAL 180 1,775 1,794 1,803 
75 MAYDAY 196 1,918 1,896 33,929 33,310 
76 MEDWAY 
77 MID CHESHIRE HOSPITALS 145 1,766 1,885 1,954 1,899 34,563 33.932 32,198 	T 32,960 5,488 
78 MID ESSEX HOSPITALS 171 2,301 2,237 2,213 
79 MID KENT 140 1,836 1,839 
go MID STAFFORDSHIRE GENERAL HOSPITALS 139 2,038 1,971 
81 MILTON KEYNES GENERAL 129 1,286 1,305 1,344 24,000 25,477 25,912 28.255 
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82 MOUNT VERNON & WATFORD HOSPITALS . 
83 NEWHAM 
84 NORFOLK & NORWICH 
85 NORTH DURHAM ACUTE HOSPITALS 
86 
87 
NORTH HAMPSHIRE HOSPITALS 
NORTH MIDDLESEX HOSPITAL 157 	1,666 1,587 1,406 1,415 
4,602 88  NORTH STAFFORDSHIRE HOSPITAL 390 4,451 
89 NORTHAMPTON GENERAL HOSPITAL 
90 NORTHERN GENERAL HOSPITAL 329 	3,237 3,446 3,592 3,641 
91 
92  
NORTHWICK PARK & ST MARK'S 
NOTTINGHAM CITY HOSPITAL 
224 1,879 2,120 
254 3,506 3,643 3,748 49,927 52,889 
93 OXFORD RADCLIFFE HOSPITAL 
94 PETERBOROUGH HOSPITALS 186 2,139 2,090 44,021 46,173 48,326 
95 PILGRIM HEALTH 
96 PINDERFIELDS HOSPITALS 161 2,149 2,165 
97 PLYMOUTH HOSPITALS 
93 PONTEFRACT HOSPITALS 109 1,245 1,213 
99 P 0 0 L E HOSPITAL 201 1,865 1,967 2,070 37,491 39,980 44,073 49,000 
No PORTSMOUTH HOSPITALS 
101  PRESTON ACUTE HOSPITALS 
102 PRINCESS ROYAL HOSPITAL 81 940 950 
103 QUEEN MARY'S SIDCUP 130 1,310 1,304 
104  QUEEN VICTORIA HOSPITAL 
105  QUEEN'S MEDICAL CENTRE, NOTTINGHAM UNIVERSI 420 3,869 4,186 
106 RADCLtFFE INFIRMARY 94 1,009 1,018 
107 ROBERT JONES & AGNES HUNT ORTHOPAEDIC & DIS 
108  ROCHDALE 145 2,517 2,306 2,449 25,180 24,775 24,188 24,953 7,398 
109  ROTHERHAM GENERAL HOSPITALS 
110 ROYAL BERKSHIRE AND BATTLE HOSPITALS 247 2,779 2,832 
111  ROYAL BOURNEMOUTH AND CHRISTCHURCH HOSPI 189 2,191 2,261 2,393 50,000 56,000 
112 ROYAL BROMPTON HOSPITAL 
113 ROYAL CORNWALL HOSPITALS 244 2,454 2,486 2,563 60,183 58,903 
114 ROYAL DEVON AND EXETER 255 2,819 2,865 47,193 52,417 
115 ROYAL FREE HAMPSTEAD 325 	3,327 3,426 3,444 3,337 37,703 47,612 53,731 58,501 
116 ROYAL HULL HOSPITALS 242 3,198 3,255 
117 
1 18 
ROYAL LIVERPOOL UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL 286 	2,923 3,049 2,918 2,888 50,580 54,020 58,097 
ROYAL SHREWSBURY HOSPITALS 
119 ROYAL SURREY COUNTY & ST LUKE'S HOSPITALS 177 	1,504 1,593  1,555 1,531 
120 ROYAL UNITED HOSPITAL BATH 295 2,555 2,103 2,249 
121 ROYAL VICTORIA INFIRMARY AND ASSOCIATED HOSPI 
in ROYAL WEST SUSSEX 
123 ROYAL WOLVERHAMPTON HOSPITALS 
124 SALFORD ROYAL HOSPITALS 
125 SCUNTHORPE & GOOLE HOSPITALS 124 1,576 1,592 
126 SOUTH KENT HOSPITALS 
127 SOUTH MANCHESTER UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS 
128 SOUTH TEES ACUTE HOSPITALS 264 2,911 3,077 3,327 69,362 72,000 76,000 84,100 
129 SOUTH WARWICKSHIRE GENERAL HOSPITALS 124 1,694 1,598 
130 SOUTHAmPTON UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS 485 4,452 4,726 
131 SOUTHEND 209 	2,395 2,313 2.199 2,178 
132 SOUTHPORT AND FORMBY 97 1,886 1,279 1,298 
in ST ALBANS AND HEMEL HEMPSTEAD 
134 ST GEORGE'S 508 3,599 3,585 62.727 64,694 67,650 
135 ST HELENS AND KNOWSLEY HOSPITALS 207 	3,225 3,126 3,030 3,054 
136 ST HELIER 254 	2,103 2,488 2,389 2,372 
137 ST JAMES'S UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL 423 	3,796 4,037 4,180 4,290 33,580 39,091 42,878 47,008 - 
138 ST mARY'S pow) 118 1,075 1,139 22,162 22,538 
139 ST MARY'S 341 2,414 2,381 36,900 31,500 37,635 
140 STOCKPORT ACUTE SERVICES 
141 STOKE MANDEVILLE HOSPITAL 
142 SWINDON AND MARLBOROUGH 
143 TAMESIDE AND GLOSSOP ACUTE SERVICES 
144 THANET 91 1,097 1,085 19,243 19,445 
145 UNITED LEEDS TEACHING HOSPITALS 340 	5,763 6,389 5,095 5,227 
146 UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON HOSPITALS 
147 WALSALL HOSPITALS 135 	1,935 1,977 2,004 2,085 35,281 35,200 
148 WALSGRAVE HOSPITALS 
149 WARRINGTON HOSPITAL 146 1,911 1,724 1,745 
150 WEST DORSET GENERAL HOSPITALS 1,350 
151 WEST MIDDLESEX UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL 156 1,459 1,284 
152 WEST SUFFOK HOSPITALS 140 1,608 1,652 30,987 30,433 36,132 
153 WESTMORLAND HOSPITALS 32 523 504 6,878 7,315 7,517 
154 WHITTINGTON HOSPITAL 215 2,217 2,225 
155 WINCHESTER & EASTLEIGH 
156 WIRRAL HOSPITAL 256 	3,300 3,350 3,421 3,611 54,151 59,992 61,368 
157 WORTHING & SOUTHLANDS HOSPITALS 
AW 	 BA 
	
BB 
	
BC 
	
BD 
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4 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1991/92 1992/9 1993/94 1994/9 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 
6 ADDEN8ROOKES 52,083 54,537 11.679 
7 AIREDALE 7,756 8,527 10,253 27.391 27074 27.723 7,754 13,527 
ALEXANDRA 5.338 6,549 19,774 21,615 5.376 
• BARNSLEY DISTRICT GENERAL HOSPITAL 6,011 7,425 8,525 34,156 34,814 7,625 
BASILDON & THURROCK GENERAL HOSPITALS 7,137 8,859 11.785 35.832 36.879 38,744 7,025 8,840 
BASSETLAW HOSPITAL AND COMMUNITY SERVICES 15.774 16.568 16,344 2,577 2,751 
BEDFORD HOSPITAL 25,976 27,726 23,415 6,142 7,382 
BIRMINGHAM HEARTLANDS HOSPITAL 7,594 45.532 48,235 7,770 
BISHOP AUCKUMV0 HOSPITALS 20,519 20.785 5,384 
BLACKPOOL VICTORIA HOSPITAL COMMUNITY 43,477 45,350 11,373 
16 BOLTON HOSPITALS 42,990 42,389 9,135 
BRADFORD HOSPITALS 69,181 69,068 68.815 68.287 12,095 14,150 16,298 
BRIGHTON 43,601 43.639 10,983 
19 BROADGREEN HOSPITAL 4,823 5,157 18,845 19,133 17,484 15,921 4,770 4,823 5,559 
20 BROMLEY HOSPITALS 32,731 31,612 10,426 
21 BURTON HOSPITALS 26.291 28.167 6,487 
CARLISLE HOSPITALS 28,108 26.630 6,253 
CENTRAL MIDDLESEX HOSPITAL 22,764 23,287 20,244 21,748 5,234 5.545 5,911 
CENTRAL SHEFFIELD UNIVERSFY HOSPITALS 49,319 54,652 53,915 11,138 13,255 
CHASE FARM HOSPITALS 9,705 10,616 26,120 28,502 9,790 
CHELSEA & WESTMINSTER 28,859 
CHESTERFIELD & NORTH DERBYSHIRE ROYAL HOSPI 37,362 37,513 10,27 
28 CITY HOSPITAL 40,970 47.347 13,588 
CITY HOSPITAL SUNDERLAND 55,757 51,978 14,622 
30 CRAWLEY HORSHAM 19,293 20.307 3,936 
31 DARLINGTON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL 20,089 19,967 6,291 
32 DARTFORD AND GRAVESHAM 28,588 28,221 6,699 
33 DERBY CITY GENERAL HOSPITAL 5,206 8,923 33,603 36,543 5,204 
34 DERBYSHIRE ROYAL INFIRMARY 27,696 26,717 9,360 
35 DONCASTER ROYAL & MANOTAGU HOSPITAL 46,042 47,204 49,795 51,327 5,576 8,903 11,745 
36 DUDLEY GROUP OF HOSPITALS 51,033 51.768 17,762 
EALING HOSPITAL 20,585 21,316 21,654 5,560 6.3 
EAST HERFORDSHIRE 24,005 24.930 25,617 6,152 7,338 
39 EAST YORKSHIRE HOSPITALS 21,508 20.898 5,586 
40 EASTBOURINE HOSPITALS 28,887 31.434 31,707 5,040 6,554 
41 EPSOM J 20,986 21,687 21,485 20,851 4,643 5,396 5,774 
42 FREEMAN GROUP OF HOSPITALS 13.075 14,079 35,777 36,340 36.299 38,778 13,280 13,473 14,078 
43 FIlimLEy PARK HOSPITAL 26.829 213,187 28.948 6.657 9,308 
44 FURNESS HOSPITALS 19,072 18,666 4.544 
45 GATESHEAD HOSPITALS 3.200 3,515 25.383 25.958 3200 
GEORGE ELIOT HOSPITAL 28.890 30,156 8.648 
GLENFIELD HOSPITAL 15,608 16,583 4,73 1 
GLOUCESTERSHIRE ROYAL 9,600 41,799 41,062 9,81 5 
GOOD HOPE HOSPITAL 8.304 3I,915 33,238 6.195 
50 GUY'S AND ST THOMAS' HOSPITAL 70,697 71,024 24,835 
51 HALTON GENERAL HOSPITAL 6,575 7,352 7,495 8,282 8,924 7,417 
52 HAMMERSMITH HOSPITALS 50,866 
53 HARTLEPOOL AND PETERLEE HOSPITALS 22.630 
HAVERiNG HOSPITALS 10,778 15.712 18.479 51,025 48,777 12,898 
HEATHERWOOD AND WEXHAM PARK HOSPITALS 44,106 43,093 43,377 8,061 11,858 
56 HEREFORD HOSPITALS 22,946 23,585 6,858 
HILLINGDON HOSPITAL 25,444 24,341 25.949 25,829 4,555 4.947 6,416 
58 HINCHiNG13ROKE 8,5334 9,310 18,040 17,639 18,159 6,757 8,584 
59 KOnron GENERAL HOSPITAL 11,537 11,823 2,940 
60 IPSWiCH HOSPITAL 44,800 45.882 10.063 
61 JAMES PAGET HOSPITAL 14,696 18,279 26,222 28,778 9,592 
62 KENT & CANTEROURy HOSPITALS 10,000 28,357 28.491 10,218 
63 KENT AND SUSSEX WEALD 26,340 
64 KETTERING GENERAL HOSPITAL 34,335 35,040 9,038 
65 KING'S 38,701 40,192 13.536 
66 KING'S LYNN & W1SBECH HOSPITALS 7.727 27,743 28,438 29,161 6,261 7,709 
67 KINGSOTN HOSPITAL 10,892 12.943 26,080 29,274 23,813 24,826 7,690 9,562 10,893 
68 LANCASTER ACUTE HOSPITALS 10.394 10,569 12,000 25,234 25,089 25,133 10,768 10,569 
LEICESTER GENERAL HOSPITAL 9,430 11,548 12,399 36,416 37,627 13,992 
TO LEICESTER ROYAL INFIRMARY 20,683 23,690 63.749 72,794 20,662 
71 LEWISHAM HOSPITAL 28,355 28.050 6,626 
72 LINCOLN HOSPITALS 32•088 
73 LOUTH AND DISTRICT 5,536 5 1,670 
74 LUTON AND DUNSTABLE HOSPITAL 36.101 37.669 37.286 7,150 7,925 
75 MAYDAY 11,388 13,536 37,891 36.483 11,316 
76 MEDWAY 32.826 33.669 5,562 
MID CHESHIRE HOSPITALS 6.715 9226 12.560 	i 34.913 33,932 34,634 35,352 5,365 5,715 9,270 
MID ESSEX HOSPITALS 36,576 37,978 38,872 6,296 5,293 
MID KENT y 27,984 
31,641 
28,794 
31,337 
9,44 1 
8,027 80 MID STAFFORDSHIRE GENERAL HOSPITALS 
81 MILTON KEYNES GENERAL 25.029 27,140 25,740 3,734 4,215 
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A 	 BE 	BF BG RH 1 	BI 	J 	DJ 	I 	BK 	1 	BL 	I 	BM 	I 	Big 
1 PARENT ACTIVIIY In °Thor source Oo 
DAP CASES DAY CASES 
FCE 	FCE 
2 
DAY CASES 
Fa 
INPATIENTS 
FCE 
INPATIENTS 
FCE 
INPATIENTS 
FCE 
INPARENTS 
FCE 
DAY c,AsEs 
FCE 
DAY CASES 
FCE 
cmw CASES 
FCE 
Mar 93 Mar 93 Mar 94 Mar 95 Mat 92 Mar 93 Mar 94 
. )994/95 1992/93 1994/35 1991/92 1992/93 1953/94 
MOUNT VERNON 6 WATFORD HOSPITALS 37,378 4,583 
NEWHAM 33,052 30,016 10,156 
84 NORFOLK & NORWICH 18,529 
NORTH DURHAM ACUTE HOSPITALS 36,368 38,923 
86 NORTH HAMPSHIRE HOSPITALS 21,130 
87 NORTH MIDDLESEX HOSPITAL 25,630 24,753 24,429 24,116 9,410 8,867 10,690 
NORTH STAFFORDSHIRE HOSPITAL 78,858 78,512 
89 NORTHAMPTON GENERAL HOSPITAL 40,245 42,251 12,897 
90 NORTHERN GENERAL HOSPITAL 47,015 8,312 
91 NORTHWICK PARK & ST MARKS 29,253 30.136 9.507 
92 NOTTINGHAM CITY HOSPITAL 13,032 52,507 54.696 57,091 10.198 
93 OXFORD RADCLIFFE HOSPITAL 52.097 65,349 6,439 
94 PETERBOROUGH HOSPITALS 42.042 42,187 8.400 
95 29,912 29,310 7,555 
96 PINDERFIELDS HOSPITALS 30.589 3E4,843 9,610 
PLYMOUTH HOSPITALS 65,817 65,007 13.138 
98 PONTEFRACT HOSPITALS 27,276 6.655 
99 POOLE HOSPITAL 40,369 39.863 40,595 7.799 
PORTSMOUTH HOSPITALS 74,865 
101 PRESTON ACUTE HOSPITALS 53,003 52,461 18.571 
102 PRINCESS ROYAL HOSPITAL 15,207 16,176 4,361 
103 QUEEN MARY'S SIDcup 25,764 26,192 
QUEEN VICTORIA HOSPITAL 5,911 6,717 
QUEEN'S MEDICAL CENTRE, NOTTINGHAM UNIVERS 68,175 74,989 12,484 
106 RADCLIFFE INFIRMARY 10,949 11,517 
107 ROBERT JONES & AGNES HUNT ORTHOPAEDIC & 0 IS 5,707 
108 ROCHDALE 	 9,178 9,816 11,083 26,678 26.738 9,178 9,819 
109 ROTHERHAM GENERAL HOSPITALS 38,122 37,735 8,887 
110 ROYAL BERKSHIRE AND BATTLE HOSPITALS 49,517 50,104 13,814 
111 ROYAL BOURNEMOUTH AND CHRISTCHURCH HOSP 30,973 36,708 37,018 
112 ROYAL BROMPTON HOSPITAL 10,179 
ROYAL CORNWALL HOSPITALS 	 i 47,446 52,319 50,256 8,738 11.023 
114 ROYAL DEVON AND EXETER 12,009 14,705 51,106 52,417 11,981 
115 ROYAL FREE HAMPSTEAD 33,702 35,330 36,653 5,485 6,959 8,621 
116 ROYAL HULL HOSPITALS 59.788 63,251 12,179 
I17 ROYAL LIVERPOOL UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL 38,624 40395 42,322 11.965 14.289 
ROYAL SHREWSBURY HOSPITALS 38,010 
119 ROYAL SURREY COUNTY &ST LUKE'S HOSPITALS 27,238 28,639 29,528 8,037 7,514 
120 ROYAL UNITED HOSPITAL BAT 36,890 8.820 11,324 
ROYAL VICTORIA INFIRMARY AND ASSOCIATED HOSPi 71,617 
122 ROYAL WEST SUSSEX 21.908 21,99 4.903 
123 ROYAL WOLVERHAMPTON HOSPITALS 47,721 7 
35
59,09
51 
10,208 
124 SALFORD ROYAL HOSPITALS 37,707 ,6 11,44 1 mg SCUNTHORPE & GOOLE HOSPITALS 28,683 5,083 
126 SOUTH KENT HOSPITALS 33,350  33,103 
t 	SOUTH MANCHESTER UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS 61,118 
SOUTH TEES ACUTE HOSPITALS 19,005 
SOUTH WARWICKSHIRE GENERAL HOSPITALS 8,398 
SOUTHAMPTON UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS 76,260 82,404 26,061 
11011 SOUTHEND 40,425 41,102 40,893 8,201 10,588 11,109 
132 SOUTHPORT AND FORMBY 17,542 18,271 18,129 7,570 9,008 
ST ALBANS AND HEMEL HEMPSTEAD 24,632 24,709 
ST GEORGE'S 48,279 46,079 En ST HELENS AND KNOWSLEY HOSPITALS 40,389 41,885 42,107 45,510 11.100 12,297 
ST HELIER 44,024 43,919 41,053 10,693 12,469 
ST JAMES'S UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL 57,224 58.034 21,423 
138 sr MARY'S (10W) 18,645 18,135 
139 ST MARY'S 16,400 19.000 35,168 33.366 
140 STOCKPORT ACUTE SERVICES 30,439 30.434 
STOKE MANDEVILLE HOSPITAL 27,848 
SWINDON AND MARLBOROUGH 37,015 7,356 
TAMESIDE AND GLOSSOP ACUTE SERVICES 26,030 26,450 
THANET 5,506 7.531 19,445 5,805 
UNITED LEEDS TEACHING HOSPITALS 66,039 67,659 16,626 15,506 17,034 
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON HOSPITALS 36,331 
WALSALL HOSPITALS 7,900 40,345 
WALSGRAVE HOSPITALS 60,508 13,760 
149 WARRINGTON HOSPITAL 
1 50 WEST DORSET GENERAL HOSPITALS 22,111 22,570 22,207 
WEST MIDDLESEX UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL 20,696 20,450 
WEST SUFFOK HOSPITALS 108,457 128,198 130.194 
28,277  
24.319 
HOSPITALS 2.067 2.807 3,148 8,054 
WHITTINGTON HOSPITAL 29.038 29,841 8,041 
WINCHESTER & EASTLEIGH 25521 27,789 
WIRRAL HOSPITAL 14,847 15,832 21.360 58.047 63.847 65,044 
WORTHING & SOUTHLANDS HOSPITALS 34.988 35,933 
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A BO 	BP :4 BR BS BT 	BU 	By 	BW BX 
Total Episodes . ln accounts To 
NY 	Obstetrics 
CASES FCE 	FCE 
Obstetrics 
FCE 
Obstetrics 
FCE 
Obstetrics 
FCE 
EPISODES 
FCE 
EPISODES 
FCE 
EPISODES 
FCE 
EPISODES 
FCE 
EPISODES 
FCE 
Mar 95 	Mar 92 Mar 93 Mat 94 Mar 95 Mar 92 Mar 93 Mar 94 Mai 95 Mar 92 
1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1992/9 1991/92 
ADDENEIROOKE'S 17,025 7,840 0 0 0 0 0 
AIREDALE 10,254 3,651 33.923 34,971 35,601 0 
ALEXANDRA 6,554 3,476 0 0 22,965 0 
BARNSLEY DISTRICT GENERAL HOSPITAL 3,628 0 37,475 38,634 40,759 0 
io BASILDON 8 THURROCK GENERAL HOSPITALS 11,129 9,970 40,806 43,030 45,735 0 
BASSETLAW HOSPITAL AND COMMUNITY SERVICE 2,023 2,053 0 0 18,278 0 
BEDFORD HOSPITAL 12,429 3,016 • 2,775 0 0 0 0 
BIROA1NGHAM HEARTLANDS HOSPITAL 20,175 20.885 0 0 49,037 0 0 
BISHOP AUCKLAND FtOSPITALS 6,007 3,015 0 0 0 0 0 
BLACKPOOL VICTORIA HOSPITAL COMMUNITY 16,741 5,511 5,528 0 0 0 0 0 
16 BOLTON HOSPITALS 11,320 7,106 0 0 0 0 0 
BRADfORD HOSPITALS 21,600 9,178 9,575 0 0 0 0 
BRIGHTON 6,036 6,018 0 0 56.000 0 
19 EIROADOREEN HOSPITAL 23,956 0 21,078 
20 BROMLEY HOSPITALS 12,901 5,077 5,015 	0 
•
0 
0 39,600 47,851 0 
BURTON HOSPITALS 
CAR ISLE HOSPITALS 
7,420 4,020 0 0 0 0 
7,982 2,874 0 o a 0 0 
CENTRAL MIDDLESEX HOSPITAL 3,751 3,197 4,068 0 0 0 0 
CENTRAL SHEFFIELD UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS 14,798 6.149 0 60,744 64,322 64.457 0 
CHASE FARM HOSPITALS 10,622 4,784 6,519 0 0 32,259 33,199 0 
CHELSEA & WESTMINSTER 8,009 3,315 0 0 0 0 0 
CHESTERFIELD & NORTH DERBYSHIRE ROYAL HOSPI 12,597 5,205 5.031 0 0 0 0 0 
CITY HOSPITAL 19,900 5,382 5,324 0 0 0 0 0 
• CITY HOSPITAL SUNDERLAND 17,689 6,263 7.115 0 0 0 0 0 
CRAWLEY HORSHAM 4,445 2,464 2,735 0 24,276 24,826 23,036 0 
DARLINGTON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL 7,323 1,906 1,971 0 0 0 0 0 
DARTFORD AND GRAVESHAM 4,360 3,766 0 0 0 0 0 
DERBY CITY GENERAL HOSPITAL 8,923 7,520 0 0 33 40.686 0 
DERBYSHIRE ROYAL INFIRMARY 10,748 0 0 0 0 
35 DONCASTER ROYAL & MANOTAGU HOSPITAL 14 , 504 6,609 5,204 8,149 0 0 58,097 51,518 
Du an' GROUP OF HOSPITALS 20,728 6,971 6,79 0 0 0 0 0 
EALING HOSPITAL 7,113 2,562 4,032 0 23,786 0 24,821 0 
EAST HERFORDSHIRE 9.323 4,604 4,400 0 0 0 35,000 0 
EAST YORKSHIRE HOSPITALS 6,711 5,175 5.004 0 0 0 0 0 
40 EASTBOURNE HOSPITALS 7.140 2.516 2,503 2,450 0 35,187 0 35,500 0 
EPSOM 7,926 	2,344 2,204 2.511 0 0 0 0 
42 FREEMAN GROUP OF HOSPITALS 20,567 49,054 49.652 50,378 0 49,057 
FRIMLEY PARK HOSPITAL 10,292 3,408 0 31,910 32,433 0 
FURNESS HOSPITALS 4,807 1,768 1,767 0 0 0 0 0 
GATESHEAD HOSPITALS 3,515 2,770 2,651 0 0 28,765 29,473 0 
GEORGE ELIOT HOSPITAL 10,647 4,368 4,639 0 0 0 0 0 
GLENFIELD HOSPITAL 6,253 0 0 0 0 0 
GLOUCESTERSHIRE ROYAL 10,919 5,290 0 0 47,900 0 0 
49 GOOD HOPE HOSPITAL 8,304 6,064 0 0 0 41,542 0 
SO GUY'S AND ST THOMAs` HOSPITAL 27,319 7,943 0 78,944 78,954 90,025 0 
51 	HALTON GENERA! HOSPITAL 7,495 0 14,625 15,591 16,369 0 
HAMMERSMITH HOSPITALS 10,235 0 0 0 0 0 
HARTLEPOOL AND PETERLEE HOSPITALS 10,489 6,716 0 0 0 0 0 
54 HAVERING HOSPITALS 18,479 5,271 0 75,383 83,485 85,735 0 
HEATHERWOOD AND WEXHAM PARK HOSPITALS 12,323 3,702 11,535 31,515 0 
HEREFORD HOSPITALS 8,598 4.078 4,202 0 0 0 0 0 
57 	HILLINGDON HOSPITAL 5,092 5,305 • 0 0 0 0 29,999 
HINCHINGEIROKE 9,310 3,251 3,204 0 0 26,223 27,469 0 
59 HoRTON GENERAL HOSPITAL 2,934 2,089 1,657 0 0 0 0 0 
60 	 ICH HOSPITAL 10.875 4,458 0 0 0 0 0 
fil 	 ES PAGET HOSPITAL 3,019 sons 0 0 38.140 47,057 0 
62 KENT & CANTEREILIRY HOSPITALS 13,035 2,906 2,864 0 0 35,000 0 0 
KENT AND SUSSEX WEALO 0 0 0 0 0 
64 KETTERING GENERAL HOSPITAL 11,120 5,550 6,745 a 0 0 0 0 
65 	KING'S 16,010 6,041 • 0 0 0 52,196 0 
KING'S LYNN & WISBECH HOSPITALS 8,965 5,659 3,272 3,162 0 0 33.617 0 0 
KINGSOTN HOSPITAL 12,957 	4,048 4,529 4,888 5,393 31,288 34,190 32,340 32,558 33,770 
LANCASTER ACUTE HOSPITALS 11,999 2,449 33.054 35,000 0 
69 LEICESTER GENERAL HOSPITAL 14,582 7,795 7.482 0 45,891 50,476 55,979 0 
70 LEICESTER ROYAL INFIRMARY 23,986 10,164 13,658 0 0 79,941 91,589 0 
LEWISHAM HOSPITAL 3,858 4,007 a 0 35,047 0 
LINCOLN HOSPITALS 7,729 4,176 0 0 0 0 0 
73 LOUTH AND DISTRICT 2,106 0 0 0 0 0 
LUTON AND DUNSTABLE HOSPITAL 8,836 7,320 0 0 0 0 0 
MAYDAY 13,239 6.273 5,801 0 0 45,317 46,846 0 
76 MEDWAY 7,311 7,757 7,708 0 0 0 0 0 
77 MID CHESHIRE HOSPITALS 12,509 4,200 4,582 40,051 40,647 41 ,424 45,520 40,278 
78 MID ESSEX HOSPITALS 6,866 5,008 5,014 5,012 0 0 0 0 0 
79 MID KENT 9,381 4,378 4,835 0 0 0 0 0 
go MID STAFFORDSHIRE GENERAL HOSPITALS 9,817 3,476 3,146 0 0 0 0 0 
MILTON KEYNES GENERAL 3,702 4,005 3,940 24.000 0 
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Obstetrics 
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FCE 
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FCE 
EPISODES 
FCE 
EPISODES 
FCE 
EPISODES 
FCE 
Afar 92 Mar 94 Al.' 92 Mar 94 Mar 92 
1994/9 1994/9 1991/92 199219 1993/94 
MOUNT VERNON & wATFoRD HOSPITALS 21,435 3,075 0 0 0 0 
10,748 10,301 11.009 CI 0 a 0 0 
84 NORFOLK & NORWICH 22,750 0 0 0 0 0 
NORTH DURHAM ACUTE HOSPITALS 8,802 3.989 13 0 0 0 0 
86 NORTH HAMPSHIRE HOSPITALS 12.742 4.459 0 0 0 D 0 
NORTH MIDDLESEX HOSPITAL 12,456 4,997 5,032 5,249 5.221 0 0 0 0 35,040 
NORTH STAFFORDSHIRE HOSPITAL 20,141 12,907 12,926 0 0 0 0 0 
89 NORTHAmPTON GENERAL HOSPITAL 14,909 6,183 7,165 0 0 0 0 0 
90 NORTHERN GENERAL HOSPITAL 6,210 5,707 0 0 0 0 50,872 
91 NORTNWICK PARK & ST MARK'S 10,979 5,118 5.513 0 0 0 0 0 
92 1,40TTINGHAm CITY HOSPITAL 13,748 8,536 8,414 0 0 59,368 65,921 0 
OXFORD RADCLIFFE HOSPITAL 9.604 8,537 0 0 0 0 0 
PETERBOROUGH HOSPITALS 10,428 4,465 0 44,021 46.173 0 
PILGRIM HEALTH 8,604 0 0 0 0 0 
PINDERFIELDS HOSPITALS 11,148 3,074 2,815 0 0 0 0 0 
PLymOUTH HOSPITALS 17,126 6,515 6.357 0 0 0 0 0 
PONTEFRACT HOSPITALS 4,767 4,615 0 0 0 0 0 
99 POOLE HOSPITAL 12,253 5,317 6,060 39,980 44,073 49,000 0 
100 PORTsMouTH HOSPITALS 0 0 0 0 0 
101 PREsTON ACUTE HOSPITALS 20.008 0 0 0 0 0 
102 PRINCESS ROYAL HOSPITAL 5,389 0 0 0 0 0 
QUEEN MARY'S SIDCUP 6,30 5,825 • 0 0 D 0 0 
104 QUEEN VICTORIA HOSPITAL 3,919 0 0 0 0 0 
105 QUEEN'S MEDICAL CENTRE, NOTTINGHAM UNIVERS! 15.283 0 0 0 0 0 
106 RADcLiFFE INFIRMARY 2,040 0 0 0 0 0 
107 ROBERT BONES a AGNES HUNT ORTHOPAEDIC a DIs 1.152 0 0 0 0 0 
108 ROcHDALE 11.090 2,842 32,578 33.953 34,004 36,036 0 
109 ROTHERHAM GENERAL HOSPITALS 6,534 3,6613 0 0 0 0 0 
110 ROYAL BERKSHIRE AND BATTLE HOSPITALS 13,931 6.031 6.358 0 0 0 0 0 
11 ROYAL BOURNEMOUTH AND CHRISTCHURCH HOSPI 18.969 994 1.069 1,025 0 0 50,000 56,000 0 
112 ROYAL BROMPTON HOSPITAL 6,184 0 0 0 0 0 
113 ROYAL CORNWALL HOSPITALS 11.940 4,980 5,119 0 0 60,183 58.903 0 
ROYAL DEVON AND EXETER 14,705 6,351 0 0 59,202 67,122 0 
ROYAL FREE HAMPSTEAD 4413 37,703 53,731 58,501 
ROYAL HULL HOSPITALS 9,971 0 0 0 0 D 
ROYAL LIVERPOOL UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL 15,775 0 50.580 54.020 58,097 47.978 
ROYAL SHREWSBURY HOSPITALS 5,659 10.219 0 0 0 0 0 
ROYAL SURREY COUNTY& ST WKES HOSPITALS 3,099 3,502 3,757 0 0 0 0 
120 ROYAL UNITED HOSPITAL BATH 0 0 0 0 0 
ROYAL VICTORIA INFIRMARY AND ASSOCIATED HOSPI 27.1368 r 5,851 9,180 0 
0 
0 
0 
0 0 0 
ROYAL WEST SUSSEX 0 0 0 
in ROYAL WOLVERHAMPTON HOSPITALS 14,452 8,811 8,883 0 0 0 0 0 
124 SI■LFORD ROYAL HOSPITALS 13,566 5,370 5,924 0 0 0 0 0 
125 SCuNTHORPE & GOOLE HOSPITALS 8 2,693 2,727 0 0 0 0 0 
SOUTH KENT HOSPITALS 10,004 5,002 4,536 0 0 0 0 0 
SOUTH MANCHESTER UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS 22,026 5,191 0 0 0 0 0 
128 SOUTH TEES ACUTE HOSPITALS 20,809 6,693 6,683 69,362 72,000 76,000 84,100 0 
29 SOUTH WARWICKSHIRE GENERAL HOSPITALS 9,040 2,534 2,776 0 0 0 0 0 
130 SOUTHAMPTON UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS 30,669 8,157 10,443 0 0 0 0 0 
in SOUTHEND 13,812 7,330 9,859 9,991 10,372 0 0 0 0 49,995 
132 SOUTIIPORT AND FORMBY 1,974 2,201 0 0 0 0 0 
ST ALBANS AND HEMEL HEmPSTEA 0 0 0 0 0 
ST GEORGE'S 5,985 0 62,727 64,694 67,650 0 
135 ST HELENS AND KNOWSLEY HOSPITALS 15.183 4,571 5,026 4,780 5.073 0 0 0 0 51,489 
136 ST HELIER 7,628 8.290 0 0 0 0 44,979 
ST JAMES'S UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL 29,008 7,109 9.289 9,722 33,580 39,091 42,878 47,008 71,235 
138 ST mARY's (00W) 1.719 0 0 22,162 22,538 0 
139 ST mARYS 5,209 0 53,300 50.500 57.023 0 
140 STOCKPORT ACUTE SERVICES I7,025 0 0 0 0 0 
STOKE MANDEVILLE HOSPITAL 2,980 3,505 0 0 0 0 0 
SWINDON AND MARLBOROUGH 8,913 5,035 5,197 0 0 0 0 0 
TAMESIDE AND GLOSSOP ACUTE SERVICES 10,882 4.922 
2,139 
4,803 
2,106 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
24,749 
0 
26.976 
0 
0 
UNITED LEEDS TEACHING HOSPITALS 19,295 8,028 10,230 0 0 0 0 74,571 
146 UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON HOSPITALS 14.015 4,907 0 0 0 0 0 
WALSALL HOSPITALS 8,011 3,975 0 0 44,840 43300 38.283 
WALSGRAVE HOSPITALS 5,710 0 0 0 0 0 
149 WARRINGTON HOSPITAL 8.973 6,664 7,482 0 0 0 0 0 
150 WEST 00RsET GENERAL HOSPITALS 7.817 2,704 2,684 2.575 0 0 0 0 26.322 
151 WEST MIDDLESEX UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL 12,140 0 0 0 0 0 
152 WEST SUFFOK HOSPITALS 7.285 4,308 4,430 0 158,631 166,326 0 
WESTMORLAND HOSPITALS 1,024 0 10,122 10,565 0 
WHITTINGTON HOSPITAL 9,215 5,004 5,429 0 0 0 I) 0 
WINCHESTER & EASTLEIGH 3,063 0 0 0 0 0 
1 56 WIRRAL HOSPITAL 6,852 7,963 8,014 0 68,998 
157 WORTHIING a SOUTHLANDS HOSPITALS 10.416 0 0 0 0 0 
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ADDENBROOKE'S 0 63260 a.. 0 0 119,280 123,008 0 119,280 3,728 
7 	AIREDALE 35.601 0 53,660 54,004 55,080 53.660 343 1,076 
8 	ALEXANDRA 0 25,150 0 0 0 0 0 
9 	BARNSLEY DISTRICT GENERAL HOSPITAL 0 43,327 0 0 45,521 0 45.521 235 
0 BASILDON & THURROCK GENERAL HOSPITALS 45,719 0 63,843 61.685 1.033 
11 BASSETLAW HOSPITAL AND COMMUNITY SERVICES 18,351 19.319 0 30,446 31.189 32,322 30,446 743 1.133 
12 !LEDFORD HOSPITAL 32,118 35,108 0 33842 39,006 39,604 33.842 5,164 598 
BIRMINGHAM HEARTLANDS HOSPITAL 0 53,302 58,410 0 60629 69,636 79,799 60.629 9,007 10.163 
24 BISHOP AUCKLAND HOSPITALS 0 25,903 0 0 0 29.551 0 0 29,55 1 
25 BLACKPOOL VICTORIA HOSPITAL COMMUNITY 0 54,850 62,091 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
16 BOLTON HOSPITALS 0 52,125 53.709 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
BRADFORD HOSPITALS 03.218 85,113 89,887 78,169 86,238 87,890 90.613 0.069 2,723 
BRIGHTON 0 54,584 56,531 0 0 76,969 75,646 0 -1,323 
BROADGREEN HOSPITAL 23,956 23,043 21,078 38,587 40,757 35,153 2,170 -1,863 -3.741 
BROMLEY HOSPITALS 0 43,157 44,513 0 0 59,914 0 62,145 -2,230 
BURTON HOSPITALS 0 0 0 43,405 0 -830 
CARLISLE HOSPITALS 0 34,361 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CENTRAL MIDDLESEX HOSPITAL 28,832 26,155 48,223 47,934 45,483 43,128 -289 -2,450 -2,355 
CENTRAL SHEFFIELD UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS 60,457 67.907 0 109,480 114,583 116,126 109.480 5.103 1,543 
CHASE FARM HOSPITALS 0 35,910 0 0 43.293 43,075 0 43,293 -217 
CHELSEA & WESTMINSTER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CHESTERFIELD & NORTH DERBYSHIRE ROYAL HDSPI 0 47,633 49.130 0 0 52,005 51,379 0 52,00 -626 
CITY HOSPITAL 0 54,558 67,247 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
• CITY HOSPITAL suNOERLAND 0 70,379 69,667 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CRAWLEY HORSHAM 0 23,229 24,752 0 0 41,188 39,838 0 41,188 -1,350 
DARLINGTON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL 0 25,380 27,290 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DARTFORD AND GRAVESHAM 0 35,287 35,379 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DERBY CITY GENERAL HOSPITAL 0 38,807 45,466 0 CP 39,428 42.633 0 39,428 3,204 
DERBYSHIRE ROYAL INFIRMARY 0 37,056 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
35 DONCASTER ROYAL & MANOTAGU HOSPITAL 36,107 61.540 61,706 63,101 65,095 3,033 1,395 1,995 
38 DUDLEY GROUP OF HOSPITALS 0 68,795 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
EALING HOSPITAL 27,627 0 39,572 40,407 40.006 39,572 401 
38 EAST HERFORDSHIRE 30,137 34,940 0 54,525 54.236 
EAST YORKSHIRE HOSPITALS 0 27,094 27,609 0 0 37,849 0 
40 EASTBOURNE HOSPITALS 37,988 0 55,268 57,885 i 55,268 561 
EPSOM 27,083 27,259 43,532 45.103 •1,408 -540 
FREEMAN GROUP OF HOSPITALS 50,377 68,504 73,087 894 11,375 
FRIMLEY PARK HOSPITAL 39,240 0 45,320 39,833 2,422 3,065 
44 FURNESS HOSPITALS 0 23,616 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
GATESHEAD HOSPITALS 0 0 0 39,136 40.614 0 39,136 
GEORGE ELIOT HOSPITAL 0 37,538 40,803 0 0 0 0 0 CI 0 
GLENFIELD HOSPITAL 0 20,339 22,836 0 0 45,727 46,409 0 45,727 682 
GLOUCESTERSHIRE ROYAL 0 51,614 51,931 0 0 60,452 61,980 0 60,452 1,528 
GOOD HOPE HOSPITAL 0 38,110 41,542 0 0 40,722 0 40,722 
GUYS AND ST THOMAS` HOSPITAL 0 95,532 98,334 0 0 255,020 233,940 0 255,020 • 1,080 
HALTON GENERA' HOSPITAL 0 15.699 16,419 0 0 19,820 19,312 0 19.820 43 
HAMMERSMITH HOSPITALS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
HARTLEPOOL AND PETERLE E HOSPITALS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
HAVERING HOSPITALS 0 63,923 67,256 0 0 88,575 85,840 0 88.575 -2,736 
HEATHERWOOD AND WEXHAM PARK HOSPITALS 52,167 54,951 55,690 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
HEREFORD HOSPITALS 0 29,804 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
HILLINGDON HOSPITAL 46,539 48,426 48,281 • 45 357 
HINCHINGOROKE 0 0 35,606 0 34.674 932 
89 HORTON GENERAL HOSPITAL 0 0 0 0 18,245 .393 
60 IPSWICH HOSPITAL 0 54,863 56.757 0 0 61,559 64,092 0 61,559 2,532 
61 JAMES PAGET HOSPITAL 0 35,814 40,747 0 0 38.385 49,478 0 38,385 11,093 
KENT & CANTERBURY HOSPITALS 0 38,375 41,526 0 0 46.780 49,471 0 46.780 2,692 
KENT AND SUSSEX WEALD 0 0 35,787 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
KETTERING GENERAL HOSPITAL 0 43.373 46.160 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
68 KINGS 0 52,237 56,202 0 0 134.076 126,438 0 134076 
66 KING'S LYNN &WISBECH HOSPITALS 34,004 36,147 38,126 0 48,472 48,489 49.138 48,472 17 
KINGSOTH HOSPITAL 38,836 34,706 41,902 43,708 40,040 1.806 .3468 1,589 
LANCASTER ACUTE HOSPITALS 36,002 35.658 0 +10,665 39,008 40,665 
LEICESTER GENERAL HOSPITAL 0 50,408 52.209 0 0 0 56,422 
70 LEICESTER ROYAL INFIRMARY 0 84.411 96,780 0 0 101,363 107,673 0 101,363 6.309 
LEWISHAM HOSPITAL 0 34.981 36,622 0 0 60,174 58.734 0 60.174 .1,440 
LINCOLN HOSPITALS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
LOUTH AND DISTRICT 0 7,206 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
74 LUTON AND DUNSTABLE HOSPITAL 45,594 0 48,904 50,599 -1,025 
75 MAYDAY 0 49,207 0 0 60,476 60.050 0 60.476 
MEDWAY 0 38,388 40.900 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MID CHESHIRE HOSPITALS 40.647 44,104 44.820 46,444 50,103 3,012 647 
78 MID ESSEX HOSPITALS 42,872 0 60,609 58.604 60.007 60.609 • ,005 1.403 
MOD KENT 0 37,425 0 0 0 52,132 1.154 
80 MID STAFFORDSHIRE GENERAL. HOSPITALS 0 0 0 0 -2283 
81 MILTON KEYNES GENERAL 28,763 31,355 31,199 0 35,804 36,296 37,602 35,804 492 1,306 
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A BY 	1 	B2 I 	CA J CB 	CC 	J 	CD 	I 	CE CF CG CH 
1 I Episodes - In other sources DoH INCOME DEFLATED BY airop•a (Le. 9I/02 pees) 
2 
NAME EPISODES 
FCE 
EPISODES 
FCE 
EPISODES 
FCE 
fir Or En Etc REAL 
INCOME 
CHANGE 
REAL 
INCOME 
CHANGE 
REAL 
INCOME 
CHANGE 
3 Mar 93 Mar 94 Mar 95 Mar 92 Mar 93 Mar 94 Afar 95 Mar 92.93 Mar 93-94 Mar 94-95 
1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1991/92 1992/9 1993/94 1994195 A tk Br 
82 MOUNT VERNON & wATFORD HOSPITALS 22,625 24,636 58,813 0 a 0 0 0 0 0 
83 NEWHAM 0 43,210 40,764 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
84 NORFOLK & NORWICH 0 85.906 97,225 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
85 NORTH DURHAM ACUTE HOSPITALS 0 43,950 47,725 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
86 NORTH HAMPSHIRE HOSPITALS 0 0 33,872 0 0 0 0 0 0 
87 NORTH MIDDLESEX HOSPITAL 33,620 35.119 36,572 46,506 49,120 48.194 49,708 2,614 -926 1,514 
88 NORTH STAFFORDSHIRE HOSPITAL 0 92691 98,653 0 0 118,045 117,501 0 118.045 -544 
89 NORTHAMPTON GENERAL HOSPITAL 0 53,142 57,160 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
90 NORTHERN GENERAL HOSPITAL 52,148 56,026 58,314 136,186 99,094 103,507 106,909 12,908 4,413 3,401 
91 NORTHW1cK PARK & ST MARK'S 0 38.760 41.115 0 0 63.121 72,667 0 63,121 9546 
92 NOTTINGHAM CITY HOSPITAL 60.990 64,894 70,839 0 88,7e5 100.378 103,327 88,785 11,593 2,949 
93 OXFORD RADCLIFFE HOSPITAL 0 58,536 80,484 0 0 0 0 0 0 
94 PETERBOROUGH HOSPITALS 0 50.442 52,615 0 0 57,193 56,973 0 57.193 •220 
95 PILGRIM HEALTH 0 37,467 37,914 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
96 PINDERHELDS HOSPiTALS 0 40,199 41,991 0 0 56,417 57,826 0 56,417 1,409 
97 PLYMOUTH HOSPITALS 0 78,955 82,133 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
98 PONTEFRACT HOSPITALS 0 34,129 35.773 0 0 36,850 36,266 0 36,850 -584 
99 POOLE HOSPITAL 44.117 47,662 52,858 0 49,184 52,048 55.514 49.184 2,864 3,465 
100 PORTSMOUTH HOSPITALS 0 0 89,131 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
101 PRESTON ACUTE HOSPITALS 0 71574 72,469 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
102 PRINCESS ROYAL HOSPITAL 0 19.568 21.565 0 0 25.252 25.765 0 25252 513 
103 QUEEN MARY'S SIDCUP 0 30,761 • 32.493 0 0 40,459 40,003 0 40.459 455 
104 QUEEN VICTORIA HOSPITAL 0 81898 10,636 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
105 QUEENS MEDICAL CENTRE, NOTTINGHAM UNIVERSI 0 80,659 90,272 0 0 105.752 112,686 0 105,752 6,933 
106 RADCLIFFE INFIRMARY 0 12,525 13,557 0 0 30,300 31,419 0 30.300 1,119 
107 ROBERT JONES & AGNES HUNT ORTHOPAEDIC & DIS 0 5,889 6.859 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
108 ROCHDALE 35,856 35.780 37.828 0 54,755 54,409 64.558 54.755 • 45 20,149 
109 ROTHERHAM GENERAL HOSPITALS 0 47,009 44269 0 0 55.146 58,463 0 55,146 3,317 
110 ROYAL BERKSHIRE AND BATTLE HOSPITALS 0 63.331 64,035 0 0 77,690 78,867 0 77,690 1,177 
111 ROYAL BOURNEMOUTH AND CHRISTCHURCH HOSPI 44,359 53,141 55,987 0 60,600 61.397 64.578 60,600 798 3,181 
112 ROYAL BROMPTON HOSPITAL 0 0 16,363 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
113, ROYAL CORNWALL HOSPITALS 56,184 63,342 62,198 0 71 -,670 72,096 74,372 71,670 425 2,276 
114 ROYAL DEVON AND EXETER 0 63.087 67,122 0 0 83.367 86.678 0 83,367 3,312 
115 ROYAL FREE HAMPSTEAD 40,661 43,951 46,526 100,387 107,807 111,245 115,855 7,420 3,439 4.509 
116 ROYAL. HULL HOSPITALS 0 71,967 76,996 0 0 87,703 92,367 0 87.703 4,664 
117 ROYAL LIVERPOOL UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL 51.130 54.684 58,097 88.665 91,229 92,108 94.504 2.564 878 2.396 
118 ROYAL SHREWSBURY HOSPITALS 0 46,486 52,919 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
119 ROYAL SURREY COUNTY & ST LUKE'S HOSPITALS 35,147 36.153 38,063 47,922 46.492 49,705 49.657 .430 3,213 -38 
120 ROYAL UNITED HOSPITAL BATH 41.591 46506 49,648 0 55,110 58.046 61,622 55,110 2,936 3,576 
121 ROYAL VICTORIA INFIRMARY AND ASSOCIATED HOSPI 0 50,589 99,485 	1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
122 ROYAL WEST SUSSEX 0 26,809 28,640 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
123 ROYAL WOLVERHAMPTON HOSPITALS 0 57.929 73.559 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
124 SALFORD ROYAL HOSPITALS 0 49,148 49,084 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
125 SCUNTHORPE & GOOLE HOSPITALS 0 34,931 37,515 0 0 46,963 46,164 0 46,963 -799 
126 SOUTH KENT HOSPITALS 0 41.548 43,354 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
127 SOUTH MANCHESTER UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS 0 0 83,144 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
128 SOUTH TEES ACUTE HOSPITALS 0 85,874 85.161 0 86,341 90,768 98.182 86,341 4,427 7,414 
129 SOUTH WARWICKSHIRE GENEFUu. HOSPITALS 0 30.716 32,922 0 0 38,660 39,235 0 38,660 575 
13 600THAMPTON UNIVERSITY tiosnms 0 102,321 113,073 0 0 138,178 149460 0 138,178 11,282 
131 sou -n-1E14D 51,013 52,211 54,705 54.514 57 ,384 60,296 62,240 2,870 2,911 1,944 
132 SOUTHPORT AND FORMBY 25,212 27,279 27,323 0 31,603 32.572 33,660 32,603 969 1,088 
133 ST ALBANS AND HEMEL HEMPSTEAD 0 31,800 33,001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
134 ST GEORGE'S 0 65,653 65,256 0 0 130,888 130,596 0 130,8813 -291 
135 ST HELENS AND KNOWSLEY HOSPITALS 54,182 54,888 60,693 76,498 77,743 78.806 79,733 1,245 1.053 927 
136 ST HELIER 54.717 56,388 55.445 71.355 84,252 83,171 79,176 12,897 -1681 • ,995 
137 ST JAMES'S UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL 77.804 84,537 87,042 93,761 106.587 113,328 119.655 12,826 6,740 6,327 
138 ST MARY'S (Jrm) 0 24,107 23.652 0 0 32.774 33,116 0 32,774 342 
139 ST MARY'S 0 57,033 54,689 0 0 101.605 101,901 0 102,605 296 
140 STOCKPORT ACUTE SER0ICSS 0 45.006 47,459 0 0 0 0 0 0 
141 STOKE MANDE0ILL5 HOSPITAL 0 35,519 36.383 
45,928 
0 
r 	0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 142 SWINDON AND MARLBOROUGH 0 43,878 
143 TAMESIDE AND GLOSSOP ACUTE SERVICES 0 34,751 37.332 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
144 THARET 0 25,459 26.976 0 0 32.495 33,192 0 32495 697 
145 UNITED LEEDS TEACHING HOSPITALS 74,735 83,073 86,954 128.266137,312 141.461 
0 
144,933 
0 
ti 	  
9.046 
0 
4,148 
0 
3,473 
0 146 UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON HOSPITALS 0 0 50,346 0 	 0 
147 WALSALL HOSPITALS 40,345 48.671 45,897 52.192 	54.146 55,169 56,511 1,954 1,022 1,342 
148 WALSGRAVE HOSPITALS 0 74,268 77.615 0 	 0 92.731 93.929 D 92,731 1.197 
149 WARRINGTON HOSPITAL 0 44,746 47,507 0 0 43,798 44.329 0 43,790 531 
150 WEST DORSET GENERAL HOSPITALS 26,591 28.883 30,024 36.889 	36,740 37,754 38,701 -149 1.014 947 
151 WEST MIDDLESEX UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL 0 29,935 32,590 0 0 47.694 45,777 0 47,694 •1.917 
152 WEST SUCTOK HOSPITALS 0 29,982 32528 0 	1 	0 43,519 45410 0 43519 1.891 
153 WESTMORLAND HOSPITALS 0 10,919 11.430 0 0 14.390 15,011 0 14,390 621 
154 WHITTINGToN HOSPITAL 0 37,079 39,056 0 	 0 64.900 62,351 0 64.900 -2,548 
155 WINCHESTER & EASTLEIGH 0 31.150 31.074 0 0 0 
89.029 	r 
0 
89.948 i 
0 
3.715 
0 0 
920 156 WIRRAL HOSPITAL 72,870 79.788 86,441 84.598 	88,314 
157 WORTHING & SOUTHLANDS HOSPITALS 0 43,336 46,349 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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To 	Episodes - In accounts  
NAME % REAL 	% REAL 
INCOME 	INCOME 
CHANGE 	CHANGE 
%REAL 
INCOME 
CHANGE 
EPISODE 
VOLUME 
CHANGE 
EPISODE 
VOLUME 
CHANGE 
EPISODE 
VOLUME 
CHANGE 
% EPISODE 
VOLUME 
CHANGE 
96 EPtSODE 
VOLUME 
CHANGE 
% EPISODE 
VOLUME 
CHANGE 
DIFFERENCE 
SEIVVEEN 
annual account 
vats & doh rots 
3 Mar 92-93 Mar 94-95 Mar 9-9 3 Mar 93-94 Mar 94.9 Mar 92-93 Mar 93.94 Mar 94-95 Mar 92 
199i 192 
Nem 
6 	ADOEN8ROOKE'S *01V/Or *0 N/0 0 0 0 st1r1V/0 rrDIV/0/ toDIV/01 0 
AIREDALE *04V/G! 0.64% 1.99% 1,04B 630 2,376 3.00% 1.77% 6,26% -319 
ALEXANDRA riON/DI *DIV/01 101111v/0 0 22,965 3,276 ODIV/0 100.00% 12.48% 0 
BARNSLEY DISTRICT GENERAL HOSPITAL 0DIV/01 0DiV/01 0.529E 1,159 2,125 100.00% 3.00% 0 
IC BASILDON & THURROCX GENERAL HOSPITALS *DIv/01 .3.38 2,705 4,301 5,17% 40,806 
BASSETLAW HOSPITAL AND COMMUNITY SERVICE #DIV/01 2.44% 3.63% 0 17,952 326 *DIY/01 100.004E 1.78% 0 
12 	BEDFORD HOSPITAL. #DIV/0 15.25% 1.5396 0 0 0 rtOiV/0 roDIV/01 001V/0 0 
BIRmINGHAM HEARTLANDS HOSPITAL 0Div/0 0 49,03 -49,037 *DIV/01 100.00 *01V/01 0 
BISHOP AUCKLAND HOSPITALS trD IV/0 #DIV/01 *DIV/OI 0 0 0 ODIV/01 *DIV/01 OIDIV/01 0 
BLACKPOOL VICTORIA HOSPITAL COMMUNITY 0DIV/0 trDIV/01 #DIV/01 0 0 0 001V/01 IIDIV/0! I/DIV/01 0 
16 BOLTON HOSPITALS #DIV/0! #01$010 101V /01 0 D 0 #DIV101 MDIV/0! #D1V/01 0 
17 BRADFORD HOSPITALS 10.32% 3.10% 0 0 0 #170//0 6Diwo 11Div/01 81,27 
BRIGHTON *DIVIO *DIV/0 0 56,000 -4,527 SION/0 100.00% 4.799E 0 
19 aRoADGREEN NosPyrAt. 4,57 341 -23,956 2L,078 1A29 ODIV/01 100.00% 0 
20 BROMLEY HOSPITALS *DIv/0 *DIV/0 -3.59% 0 39.600 8`251 0131V/0 100 17.24% 0 
BURTON HOSPITALS *Dtv10 *DIV/ •I 118% 0 0 0 r/DIV/01 ItElIWOI soOrv/0! 0 
CARLISLE HOSPITALS *DIV/01 #Diwo $t17 IV/01 0 0 0 140//01 *ON/01 ODIV/01 0 
CENTRAL MIDDLESEX HOSPITAL -0.60% 0 0 0 #00//0! IrDIV/01 10131V/01 27 
CENTRAL SHEFFIELD UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS *DIV/131 
*DIV/0 
ADIV/0? 
.0.50% 
#DIV/0t 
•1.20% 
ODIV/0 
#D1VI0 
60,744 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3.578 165 100.00 
AIDIV/0/ 
II001/02 
#0N/C 
1101V/01 
5.56% 0.26% 
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CHASE FARM HOSPITALS 000//0 
001V/0 
32.259 940 100.00% 2.83 
sDivan 
ODIV/ 
IIEW/01 
CHELSEA & WESTmINSTER 0 0 401V/0? 
0011//01 
CHESTERFIELD & NORTH DERBYSHIRE ROYAL HOSPI 
Gin, HOSPITAL 
IIDN/0 
*DIV/0 
gorvan 
*DIV/0 
#DIV/O! 
orDiv/0/ 
trDIV/0 
ODIV/0 
k DIV/ 
0 
0 
0 
0 
CITY HOSPITAL SUNDERLAND 0 
- 550 
0 
0 
-1,790 
0 
*DIV/0!. 
i00.00% 
IIDIV/01 
*DN/01 40DIV/01 
30 CRAWLEY HORSHAM 
DARLINGTON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL 
32 DARTFORD AND GRAVEsNAM 
#DIV/0! 
trON/O 
•Divio 
-3.28% 
0014//0 
40IV/0 
0 
0 
2.22% 
SDN/0! 
.1.77 
001V/01 
0 
33,86 
0 
0 
0 
*135//01 
101V/0 
#0Iv/( 
1031V/01 
100.00 
00/V/01 
*DIV/01 
101V/01 
33 DERBY CITY GENERAL HOSPITAL 
34 DERBYSHIRE ROYAL INFIRMARY 
35 DONCASTER ROYAL & MANOTAGU HOSPITAL 
36 DUDLEY GROUP OF HOSPITALS 
37 	EALING HOSPITAL 
38 EAST HERFORDSHIRE 
39 EASY YORKSHIRE HOSPITALS 
tODIV/0 
iltDIV/0 
*D1V/01 
*DIV/0 
#01VIO 
ODIV/0 
#D1v/0 
#01V/01 
0 
0 
0 58,097 
0 
43.786 
4,070 001v/01 100.00% 6.55% 
0 
0 
0 
0 O0IV/01 ODIV/01 *WM 
trOIV/01 
IrDIV/OL 
2.11% 
0.61% 
-O 
0.08% 
24 821 , 100. 00N/01 100,00%  
0 
0 
35,000 101V/01 
4101V101 
100.00% 
oprwoi 
1.20% 
100.00% 
#DIVIC 
NDIV/0 
*DIV/01 100. 
OrD IV/01 
100,00% 
*DIV/0 
*DNI0 
#DIV/O I 
2.40% 
AIDIV/Ot 
ODIWO 
0D0i /0 
100.00% 
12.30% 
0DIV/0 
*DIV/0 
0DIV/01 140N/01 0-10% 0 
35,500 
0 
-50,378 
PON/01 
001V/01 
wmv,t01 
0DN/01 
100,00% 
*ON/01 
001V/0! 
100.00% 
orDIV/01 
0.01% 
0101V/0 
orDIV/13! 
40 EASTBOURNE HOSPITALS 
41 EPSOM 
4,2 FREEMAN CROUP OP HOSPITALS 
43 FAWLEY PARK HOSPITAL 
44 FURNESS HOSPITALS 
140N/01 4.74% 
-3.05% 
0.97% 
-1-21 
35,16 
0 
598 
0 
0 
0 
0 
•35,187 
0 
726 
2,678 031V/01 
ODIV/01 
124% 
6.089E 
*DN/01 
15. 
*DIV/01 0 
28,76 
0 
708 45 GATESHEAD HOSPITALS *DIM! 
IODIV/01 
*DIV/01 
*DIV/01 
*DIV/ 
*131V/0 
OW V /0 
tioN/01 
3.78% 
rIDIV/0 46 GEORGE ELIOT HOSPITAL 0 
0 
0 
0 
IrDIV/0 
013IV/01 
trDIV/01 
00N/0 
TOO. 
100.00 
ODIV/01 
*DN/0 
47 GLENFIELD HOSPITAL IrDIV/0 
*DIV/ 
IIDIV/01 
trOfV/0 
0 
0 0 
JO 11,071 
0 
0 
49 r44111411,-1 	• •-•" 	• r 	_ 
49 GOOD HOPE HOSPITAL 
50 Gurs AND ST THOMAS HOSPITAL 
51 HALTON GENERA) HOSPITAL *DIV/01 001WOI -0.04% 
0 
955 
0 52 HAMMERS/MTN HOSPITALS it0W/0! 405110! •DPI101 
0 0 53 HARTLEPOOL AND PETERLEE HOSPITALS 
54 HAVERING HOSPITALS 
*DIV/01 
SIDIV/01 
riDIV/01 
*DIV/0 
001V/0 
rsDIV/01 
*DIV/01 
-3.09% 
*DIV/01 
1/DIV/01 
75, 
0 
0 
6,102 
0 
0 
2,250 
0 
0 
100.00 
rtbiV/0 
aDiV/0 
*DIV/0 
411DIWOI 
OIDIV/01 
IrDIV/0 
000110 
IION/Ot 
90N101 
9.7 
IIDIV/01 
trDIV/01 
soiwo 
100.00% 
*DIV/01 
000//01 
100. 
100. 
110P1/0! 
2.62 
AIDIV/O 
OIDIV/Ot 
*WO, 
.41-94% 
IODIV/01 
00N/01 
18.95% 
80ivi3O1 
#04ww 
100. 
001V/01 
0.67% 
6-26% 
9-83% 
55 HEATHERW000 AND WEXHAN PARK HOSPITALS 
HEREFORD HOSPITALS 
*DIV/0/ 
trDIV/01 
0 0 
26,223 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
8,91 
-35.000 
57 HILLINGDON HOSPITAL 4.06% -0.30% .0.74 
59 •1644,0NG6808E AtOtV101 #01V/01 2.fr9% 0 
0 59 HORTON GENERAL HOSPITAL *DIV/01 *DIV/0 -2.15% 
69 IPSWICH HOSPITAL 
61 JAMES PAGET HOSPITAL 
62 KENT & CANTERBURY HOSPITALS 
001V/0 0DIV/01 4.11 
0 
0 
36,140 
35,000 
olotwoi #DlY/01 28.90% 
1/01V/01 *DIV/0 5.75 
0 0 
0 
0 
0131V/0! 
 
0 
0 
52.196 
63 KE NT AND SUSSEX WEA.D *DIV/01 *DIV/ 0113Iv 
0431V/01 
HOW/01 
8A9% 
1.07% 
100. 
*DIV/O f siDIV/01 
mOrV/01 
100.00% 
.5.72% 
2.05% 
9.08% 
64 KETTERINGTERI  GENERAL HOSPITAL 
65 XING'S 
001V/01 otomioi •;00//01 0 
0 *DIV/0/ 
IFON/Ot 
iDN/01 
0.04% 
-5.70% 
1.34% 0 
336I7 33.61 
6€ KINGS LYIN4 & INISBECH HOSP ITALS 
2,902 4.850 218 67 KINGSOTN HOSPITAL 4.31% -6.3 3.97% 691 2,255 
5,50 
68 tANCASTER ACUTE HOSPITALS 001V/0 -3.01% 1.10%  
2.5 
356 
i5.39 4.565 69 LEICESTER GENERAL HOSPITAL *0N/01 *DIV/01 
0 79,941 11. 
.1,324 
4084/0! 
101V/01 
100.00% 
100.00% 
12.729E 
.333% 
70 LEICESTER ROYAL INFIRMARY 00IV/01 00:11V/01 6.22% 
0 35,047 72 LEWISHAM HOSPITAL reDIV/01 FIDIV/0! .2.39 
0 0 
0 
0 SIONIOI aDIV/OI 001V/01 
*DIV/01 
72 LINCOLN HOSPITALS IIDIV/0/ 001V/ *D 0 *DIV/01 riDIV/0! 
73 LOUTH AND DISTRICT #01V/0 001V/01 IDN101 
0 0 1FDIV/01 /431V/01 *11w/01 
110IV/0 
9.00% 
ODIV/01 
00tV/01 
KW/01 
74 LUTON AND DUNSTABLE HOSPITAL #DIVl01 2.05% 3.45 
0 
0 
45,31 1.52 *ON/0! 100.00% 
II0IV/0 
IIDIV/01 
*DIV/01 
*DIV/CH 
/5 MAYDAY IrDIV/0 
*DIV/01 
#64V/0 
*DIV/0 
4.7cns 
roDN 
0 0 0DIV/01 
r8 MEDWAY 
777 4,096 1 .47% 
NDIV/01 
r7 MIO CHESHIRE HOSPITALS 	 T 3.52% 
ODIV/0 
6.49% 
.3.31% 
1.31% 
0 
0 
0 0 
ts MID ESSEX HOSPITALS 1 39% 
2.21% 
0 0 
0 
f/OIV/OF 
NON/01 
5.80% 
V 991:1 KENT 0D11/.101 •D1V/Of 
0 
19 MID STAFFORDSHIRE GENERAL HOSPITALS IIDIV/01 OrDIV/0 -4.27 0 
1,477 435 2.343 %I 	WA 	I'SIliCtIll • ■ 110u11.111 4 WWI' 2 an 
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A CI CJ CK CL CM CN 	CO 	CP 	111111M11 
Tata) Episodes - n accounts 
NAME 
2 
% REAL 
INCOME 
CHANGE 
% REM, 
INCOME 
CHANGE 
% REA i 
INCOME 
CHANGE 
EPISODE 
VOLUME 
CHANGE 
EPISODE 
VOLUME 
CHANGE 
EPISODE 
VOLUME 
CHANGE 
% EPISODE 
VOLUME 
CHANGE 
% EPISODE 
VOLUME 
CHANGE 
% EPISODE 
VOLUME 
CHANGE 
DIFFERENCE 
BETWEEN 
anhuaf accovni 
vds & doh vols 
3 Mar 94.95 
ni 
82 MOUNT VERNON & WATFORD HOSPITALS OIDIV/01 IIDIV/OI ItDIV/0 0 0 0 #01V/01 #DIVIDE ODIV/0 
NEWHAM AIDIV/01 *ID IV/0 f #0 IV/0! 0 0 0 *DIV/01 *DIV/0! #Div/01 0 
NORFOLK & NORWICH $101V/01 #DIV/O! OD IV/01 0 0 0 NDEWOI #DIV/01 0/01V/0 0 
85 NORTH DURHAM ACUTE HOSPITALS *DIV/01 #01V/0 *DIV/01 0 0 0 ODIV/O I #0 Iv/01 *DIV/0 0 
NORTH HAMPSHIRE HOSPITALS N DIV/0 00tWO #0 IV/01 0 0 0 4orwoi ieDIV/Ot #13 IV/Of 0 
NORTH MIDDLESEX HOSPITAL 5.62% 3.14% 0 0 0 #DIV/01 #0 01/01 ODIV/01 35,040 as NORTH STAFFORDSHIRE HOSPITAL ODIV/01 #D IV/0 -0.46% 0 0 0 4/DW/01 #D1v/01 *Div/0 0 
NORTHAMPTON GENERAL HOSPITAL 0/DIV/01 *DIV/0 ODIV/01 0 0 0 001V/01 *DtV/01 *DIV/01 0 
90 NORTHERN GENERAL HOSPITAL 14.98% 4.45% 3.29% 0 0 0 ND IV/01 *DIV/Ot ODiV/01 50.872 
91 	NORTHWICK PARK & S'T MARKS *DIV/0! #91v/0! 15.12% 0 0 0 #DIV/01 #DIV/01 #DiV/01 0 
92 NOTTINGHAM CITY HOSPITAL #DIV/0! 13.06% 2.94% 0 59.368 5,533 #0W/01 100.00% 9.94% 0 
ID OXFORD RADCLIFFE HOSPITAL 0$31V/01 *DIV/01 ODIV/01 0 0 0 001V/01 *DIV/01 *Div/01 0 
94 	PETERT3OROUGH HOSPITALS #0,1//0I 4,01v/0! 4.38% 44.021 2.152 2,153 100.00% 4.46% 0 
95 	PILGRIM HEALTH #10tV/0! #DIV/0I #DIV/01 0 0 0 #DIV/0I #DIV/01 #DIv/0 0 
95 PINDERFIELDS HOSPITALS *DP//0 *DIV/Ot 2.50% 0 0 0 #131V/01 *DIV/01 *DIV/01 0 
97 PLYMOUTH HOSPITALS ODIV/01 #DIV/01 #01V/01 0 0 0 #D IV/0! *DIV/01 #DIV/01 0 
98 PONTEFRACT HOSPITALS *DIV/01 #DIWO 0 0 0 *DIV/01 NDIV/01 I/D1w01 0 
99 PODLE HOSPITAL #DIV/01 5.82% 4,093 4.927 9.29% 10.06% 
100 PORTSMOUTH HOSPITALS *DIV/01 #D IV/0 #DIY/01 0 0 0 IMMO! #01v/0! #Div/0 0 
101 PRESTON ACUTE HOSPITALS #01V/0! #DIV/0 oODIV/01 0 0 0 filDW/01 #DIV/01 $4.1N/0 0 
102 PRINCESS ROYAL HOSPITAL #01W0 #DIV/Of i 	2.03% 0 0 0 ODIVIOI #DIV/01 100116/01 0 
103 QUEEN MARY'S SIDCUP *0tv/0 ODIV/01 0 0 0 #01V101 #DIV/O! WM/of 0 
104 QUEEN VICTORIA HOSPITAL *DIV/0 41DIV/0 ODIV/01 0 0 0 1/131V/01 NDIWOI #IDIV/0t 0 
105 QUEENS MEDICAL CENTRE, NOTTiNGHAM UNNERSI *DIV/0 IIDIV/01 0 0 0 4101V/01 #DN/01 0131V/0 0 
/06 RADCLIFFE INFIRMARY #DIY/Ot ODIV/01 0 0 0 #051/01 HMO! #0Iv/131 0 
107 ROBERT JONES & AGNES HUNT ORTHOPAEDIC & DS *DiV/0 AIDIV/01 #01V/0! 0 0 0 IDIWO1 ikorwm #DIV/01 0 
-32,578 108 ROCHDALE *DIV/01 .0.53% 51 2,032 4.05% 0.15% 5. 
109 ROTHERHAM GENERAL HOSPITALS AIDIV/01 *DIV/01 6.01% 0 0 0 #DIV/0! #DIV/01 stERwm 
110 ROYAL BERKSHIRE AND BATTLE HOSPITALS 4IOD Iv/01 
#DIV/01 
#DIV/0! 
#DIV/01 
#DWfO! 
#DIV/0! 
00 Tv/0 
-2.98% 
#DIV/OI 
#01V/0 
0.59% 
*D1v/01 
MDN/0l 
0, 
ttOrv/0! 
6.91% 
001V/01 
4.14% 
5.32% 
2.60% 
#01V/0f 
-0.08% 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
9.909 
0 
50,580 
0 
0 
0 
0 
50,000 
0 
0 
6,000 
0 
*DIV/01 
0IV/01 
#DN/01 
NOIVIO 
*DIV/01 
20.81% 
#131,1/0 
100.00% 
#DIV/Of 
10,71% 
#DW/01 
11.80% 
*DIV/01 
7.02% 
AIDIV/01 
1019101 
0 
0 
0 
ROYAL BOURNEMOUTH AND CHRISTCHURCH HOSPI 
fin ROYAL BROM PTON HOSPITAL 
113 ROYAL CORNWALL HOSPITALS 
ROYAL DEVON AND EXETER 
#131V/01 
100.00% 
100.130% 
*DIVADI 
#12M101 
#09/101 
60,183 •1,280 
7,920 
4,770 
0 
0 
2.160 
59.202 
6,119 115 ROYAL FREE HAMPSTEAD 
ROYAL HULL HOSPITALS 
ROYAL LIVERPOOL UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL 
118 ROYAL SHREWSBURY HOSPITALS 
ROYAL SURREY COUNTY & ST LUKE'S HOSPITALS 
0 
3.440 
0 
0 
0 
4,077 
0 
0 
*43IV/131 
100.00% 
*DIV/01 
AIDIV/01 
0 
0 
35,275 
120 ROYAL UNITED HOSPITAL BATH ObtV/01 5,33% 6.16% 0 0 001V/01 001V/01 4,131W01 0 
ROYAL VICTORIA INFIRMARY AND ASSOCIATED HOSPI *CN/0! 001V/01 ODIV/OI 0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
10131V/0I 
EiDIV/01 
ODIV/01 
*DIV/0 
*DIV/0 
ODIWO 
001V/01 
#01V/0! 
*DIV/01 
*DIV/01 
ODIV/01 
*DIV /Of 
6151V/03 
001V/01 
*DIV/01 
NDIV/01 
f#014/01 
Non /nil 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
ROYAL WEST SUSSEX orDrvim 
41DIV/01 
ODIV/0 
ODIV/OI 
#01v/01 
*DIV/0 
II0IV/01 
ilDIV/0 
#Divio! 
N0IV/01 
1/01V/01 
-1.70% 
ROYAL WOLVERHAMPTON HOSPITALS 
rgi SALFORD ROYAL HOSPITALS 
us SCUNTHORPE & GOOLE HOSPITALS 
126 SOUTH KENT HOSPITALS NDIV/01 #011 /0 INDIVIE8 
127 SOUTH MAHCHESTER UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS 
128 SOUTH TEES ACUTE HOSPITALS 
#131v/0 1 /DIV/0 #01V/01 0 
2,638 
0 
4.000 
0 
8,100 
#01v/01 
3,66% 
AIDIv/01 
5.26% 
"DIV/DI 
9.63% 
0 
.69,362 
ODIV/01 513% 8.17% 
129 SOUTH WARWICKSHIRE GENERAL HOSPITALS 1100//01 #01V101 0 0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
NDIV/01 
4VDN/0 
#DIV/01 
*DIV/01 
#01V/01 
OIDN 101 
NDIV/01 
#0IW01 
#01V/01 
OD IV/0! 
*DIV 
ODIV/01 
0 
0 
0 
130 SOUTHAMPTON UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS 
131 SOUTHEND 
04)9//01 
5.27% 
NDIVI01 
5.07% 122% 
0 
0 
0 0 132 SOUTHPORT AND FORMBY 11131V/0 3.07% 3.34% 
0 
0 
0 
22,162 
-2,800 
0 
2,936 
0 
0 
4,130 
376 
0 
0 
a 
NDivt01 
]00.00% 
IlD1V/0 
#01V/01 
14.10% 
*DIV/01 
100.00% 
#DN/0t 
NDIV/01 
#Dtv/01 
NDIV/0 
3.04% 
*0IV/01 
OD IV/0 
100.00% 
-5.54% 
*13R//01 
001 V IO! 
saftriot 
*DIV/01 
4.37% 
ODIV/0 
001V/0 
1.67% 
11.44% 
013N/01 
1011,101 
#00i/Of 
0 
0 
0 
0 
in ST ALBANS AND HEMEL HEMPSTEAD 
134 ST GEORGES 
135 ST HELENS ANO KNOWSLEY HOSPITALS 
136 
137 ST JAMES'S UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL 
ODIVIO 
#DIV/01 
1807% 
*DIV/0 
ODIV/0/ 
IDIV/0 
NOW/01 
WON/0 
SIDTV/0 
NEDIV/0 
IPOIV/01 
SIDIV/0 
*DIV/01 
NOIVIO 
*DIV/01 
001V/01 
-022% 
4.80%, 
1.04% 
0.29% 
0 
0 
0 
0 
53.300 
0 
0 
0 
138 ST MARY'S Oov0 
139 ST MARYS 
140 STOCKPORT ACUTE SERVICES 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
IsD1WOI 
NOIV/01 
itINVOI 
141 STOKE MANDEVILLE HOSPITAL 
142 SWINDON ANO MARLBOROUGH 
0 
0 
0 
0 
44.840 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2.227 
0 
#DWIOI 
NOIMI01 
#DIV/01 
*ONTO! 
100.00% 
81)1W01 
#D/V/01 
0 
0 
74.57 
143 TAMESIDE AND GLOSSOP ACUTE SERVICES 
144 THANET 
145 UNITED LEEDS TEACHING HOSPITALS 
146 UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON HOSPITALS 
147 WALSALL HOSPITALS 
mg WALSGRAVE HOSPITALS 
149 WARRINGTON HOSPITAL 
/50 WEST DORSET GENERAL HOSPITALS 
151 WEST MIDDLESEX UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL 
152 WEST SUFFOK HOSPITALS 
001v/0 
NON101 
7.05% 
I/DIV/01 
*DIWO! 
#DIV/0 
.0.40% 
NDIV/0 
ISDIV/0 
IIDIv/01 
NDIV/01 
#DIV/0 
#01V/01 
3.02% 
ODIV/01 
*DIV/01 
ODIV/O 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
I*DIv/01 
0 
-1,740 
0 
0 
0 
INNV/ 
#01V
01 
 /Of 
TODIV/01 
teDIWO1 
*DIV/01 
10DIV/01 
100.00% 
001V/01 
*DIV/01 
11100//01 
1 *DIV/0 
4.04% 
*DIV/01 
*DIV/ 
*DIV/0/ 
0 
0 
0 
26.322 
1.89% 2-43% 
NDIV/0 
#00//0 
2,76% 
ND IV/0 
#DIV/O1 
*DIV/01 
#DIV/01 
1.29% 
.4.02% 
-3.93% 
0 0 
1,177 
0 
543 
ODIV/01 
100.00% 
100.00% 
#DIV/CV 
12.10% 
11.63% 
#DIV/01 
5.09% 
0 
0 
0 
153 WESTMORLAND HOSPITALS 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
6,904 
0 
*DIV101 
0DIV/01 
100.00% 
*DIV/01 
*0IV/01 
#DIV/01 
*DIV/01 
OD IV/01 
#DNIOI 
0 
0 154 WHITTINGTON HOSPITAL 
155 WINCHESTER 4 EASTLEIGH WOIWO) *DIV/0! PADIWO 
0 
6,825 
0 
9.00% 
#0 IV/0! 
71,478 
0 L56 WIRRAL HOSPITAL 4.39% 0.81% 1.03% 
iv 
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A CS CT 	 CU CV 	CW 	CX 	MEM 	CZ 	DA DB 
Total Episodes - in other sources DoH 
DIFFERENCE 
BETWEEN 
annual account 
vols g doh Ws 
DIFFERENCE 	DIFFERENCE 
BETWEEN 	BETWEEN 
annual account 	annual account 
vols & doh wols 	%Vs & doh yds 
EPISODE 
VOLUME 
CHANGE 
(Inc obs) 
EPISODE 
VOLUME 
CHANGE 
(Inc obs) 
EPISODE 
VOLUME 
CHANGE 
(inc obs) 
% EPISODE 
VOLUME 
CHANCE 
(mc obs) 
%EPISODE 
VOLUME 
CHANGE 
(inc obs) 
% EPISODE 
VOLUME 
CHANGE 
(Inc obs) 
EPISODE 
VOLUME 
CHANGE 
(e)oc ohs) 
Mar 93 Mar 9d Mar 92 93 Mar 93- 
6 ADDENI3ROOKES 0 63,760 0 63,760 7,802 #01V/0! NM/ 0 
AIREDALE 0 	 0 35.145 *Wm 1_30% 
8 ALEXANDRA 0 2,185 	1,928 0 25,150 3,019 IV/ot *DIV/0 12.00% 0 
g 	BARNSLEY DISTRICT GENERAL HOSPITAL 0 41,781 1.546 OW V lei NDIV/OI 3.70% 0 
10 BASILDON & THURROCK GENERAL HOSPITALS AIDIV/Of 6.68% 9.09% 37,516 
BASSETLAW HOSPITAL AND COMMUNITY SERVICES 18,351 1,367 	1,309 18,351 968 *DIV/0! 5_27% 1.39% 16,423 
12 BEDFORD HOSPITAL 35.108 	35,844 32,1I8 2,990 736 NON/01 2.30% 29,102 
13 BIRMINGHAM HEARTLANDS HOSPITAL 0 58,410 0 53,302 5,108 *DIV/Ot IIDIV/01 0 
BISHOP AUCKLAND HOSPITALS 0 25,903 0 25 ,903 ADNI/01 stDIV/0 0 
BLACKPOOL VICTORIA HOSPITAL COMMUNITY 0 54,850 	62,091 0 M ,850 7,24 NON/0! 4431V/01 13.20% 0 
BOLTON HOSPITALS 0 52,125 	53,709 0 52,125 *DIV/0t *DIVIO 3.04% 0 
BRADFORD HOSPITALS 83.218 003 1,942 2.-39% 2.28% 5.61% 1,393 
BRIGHTON 0 5.058 0 *OIV/01 *DIV/0 3.57% 0 
19 BROADGREEN HOSPITAL o 23,043 	0 -913 43.53% 
20 BROMLEY HOSPITALS 0 3,557 0 43,15 *DN/0 otOIV/0 0 
21 BURTON HOSPITALS 0 32,778 0 32,778 2,809 TI0IV/0! IIDIVIO 0 
CARLISLE HOSPITALS 0 0 #DIV/01 MDIV/OI 0.73% 0 
CENTRAL MIDDLESEX HOSPITAL •2,677 3,508 
CENTRAL SHEFFIELD UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS 3.585 	4,226 60.457 7.450 806 *DIV/0 
25 CHASE FARM HOSPITALS 0 15,925 0 35.910 *DP/101 *DiV/IN 0 
25 0 0 0 0 81110101 1PDIV/0t o0nl/01 0 
CHESTERFIELD & NORTH DERBYSHIRE ROYAL NOSPI 0 49,110 0 47,633 1.477 stDIV/01 %DN/01 3-10% 0 
28 CITY HOSPITAL 0 54,558 0 NON/0 ODIV/01 23.26% 0 
CITY HOSPITAL SUNDERLAND 0 70,379 	69,667 0 70,379 *DIV/0i sO4V/0 .1.01% 0 
30 CRAWLEY HORShiAM -24,276 -1,597 0 23,229 1,523 TIDIV/0! #DN/01 0 
DARLINGTON! MEMORIAL HOSPITAL 0 26,380 	27,290 0 26,380 910 #DIV/01 *DIV 0 
DARTFORD AND GRAVESHAM 0 0 35,287 92 *D4V/0 t/DIV/01 O. 0 
33 DERBY CITY GENERAL HOSPITAL 0 4,938 	4,780 0 38,80 IIDIV/0 *DIv/Of 17.16% 0 
DERBYSHIRE. ROYAL INFIRMARY 
35 DONCASTER ROYAL & MANOTAGU HOSPITAL 
36 DUDLEY GROUP OF HOSPITALS 
0 
56,107 
0 
37,056 
3,443 
0 
4,489 
0 
37,056 
5.433 
409 
4,291 
3,701 
*DIV/0 
8.70% 
BOWAN 
#DIV/O4 
HOIV10 
1.10% 
5.38% 
0 
4,245 
0 
37 	EALING HOSPITAL 
38 EAST HERFORDSHIRE 
EAST YORKSHIRE HOSPITALS 
2,359 
30,157 
0 
	
27,627 	3,946 
32,268 -60 
27,094 	27,609 
30,157 
0 
I,482 
27,094 
1.140 eDIvio 
*DIV/01 
*DIV/01 
5.67% 
7-00% 
IIDIVIOt 1 .90% 
23383 
0 
40 EASTBOURNE HOSPITALS 
41 EPSOM 
.1,260 
27,083 
4,254 
0 
37,988 	3,347 
27,259 	28,777 
5,585 	6,107 
23,616 
1,454 
33,486 
0 
4,061 
4.009 
859 
8,968 
.143 
#01V/0 
5.67% 
MDIV/0 I 
*DIV/0 
0.65% 
*DIV/0 
226% 
5.57% 
17.80% 
0.61% 
31,41 1 
1.594 
0 
FREEMAN GROUP OF HOSPITALS 
43 FRIMLEY PARK HOSPITAL 
FURNESS HOSPITALS 
GATESHEAD HOSPITALS 
GEORGE EUOT HOSPITAL 
47 GLENFIELD HOSPITAL 
0 
0 
0 
-182 	 0 
40,803 
20.339 	22,836 
0 
0 
0 
28,583 
20,339 
890 1/01V/0 
litxv/0 
NDIV, 
IIINV/0 
itoivr01 
}I 
8.70% 
12.23io%, 
0 
0 
0 
3,265 
2,497 
48 GLOUCESTERSHIRE ROYAL 0 0 51,614 367 *DIW }I 0.71% 0 
49 GOOD HOPE HOSPITAL 0 38,110 	 0 0 3a,110 3,432 TIDIV, 11 9.01% 0 
50 GUY'S AND ST THOMAS' HOSPITAL 8,30/ 0 2,802 ODIVidt ODIV/0 
ODiV/Oi 
1101V/01 
7 .48% 
0 
0 51 	HALTON GENERA! HOSPITAL •14,626 108 	 50 0 720 *DIV/0 ODIV/0 
HAMMERSMITH HOSPITALS 0 0 76,729 0 0 76,729 *DIV/0! *DIV/0 I 0 
0 
0 
48,465 
0 
53 HARTLEPOOL AND PETERLEE HOSPITALS 0 0 	 33,119 0 0 33,119 IDIV/0 IIDIV/0 
54 	HAVERING HOSPITALS -75,383 0 3,333 IIDIWO NOIVroi 
HEATHERWOOD AND WEXHAM PARK HOSPITALS 52,167 • 55,690 52,167 739 ODIV/0 
56 HEREFORD HOSPITALS 0 29,804 	32,183 0 29,804 2,379 NDIV }T 
57 HILLINGDON HOSPFIAL 29,288 -711 3,077 1,159 10.51% 
HINCHINOBROKE 
0 
0 
ci 	a 
54,863 	55,757 
0 
0 54,863 
1,246 
280 
4Driya 
IIDIV/0 
*DIV/0 
IDIVIO I 
11DIV/0 3.45% 
13.77% 0
 
	 
ill 59 HORTON GENERAL HOSPITAL 50 1PSWICH HOSPITAL 1,894 JAMES PAGET HOSPITAL 0 -2,326 	6,310 0 35,814 4,933 NDIWO IIDIV/01 62 KENT & CANTERBURY HOSPITALS 0 3,375 	41,526 0 38,375 3,151 1101V/0 MDIV/01 8.21% 
KENT AND SUSSEX WEALD 
KETTERING GENERAL HOSPITAL 
KING'S 
66 KING'S LYNN & WISBECH HOSPITALS 
67 KINGSOTN HOSPITAL 
68 LANCASTER ACUTE HOSPITALS 
LEICESTER GENERAL HOSPITAL 
70 LEICESTER ROYAL INFIRMARY 
0 
0 
0 
34,004 
2,94E 
-45,891 
0 
0 35,787 
• 46,160 
4,006 
2,530 	38,126 
MEM.' 	1,132 
•3,770 
4,470 	5,191 
0 
0 
0 
34,004 
5,066 
36,002 
0 
0 
0 
43,373 
-4.130 
50.408 
2,787 
3,077 
1,801 
*DIV/0 
IDIWOI 
0DTV/0 
0/13W/0 
15.00% 
ITDIV/0 
NDIV/0 
ODIV/0 
ODIV/01 
*DIV/0 
#01V/0 
6,30% 
.10.63% 
-0.96% 
*DIV/01 
*DIV/01 
MDIV/01 
5117 % 
M
E  
LEWiSHAM HOSPITAL 0 0 34,981 4Div foi 4Divi01 0 
72 LINCOLN HOSPITALS 
LOUTH AND DISTRICT 
LUTON AND ()UNSTABLE HOSPITAL 
0 
CI 
0 
7,206 
0 
0 
0 
7,206 
39,817 
282 
NDIV/0 
ODIV/0 
NO IV/0 
4DIV101 
IIDIV/01 
*DIV/DI 0 
0 
MAYDAY 0 3,890 	2.876 0 49,207 *DIV #DPV101 1.05%  
0 
0 
0 
25.06 1 
MEDWAY 
MID CHESHIRE HOSPITALS 
0 
0 
42,872 
0 
38.388 	40,980 
2,680 
38,175 
0 
0 37,425 
2,592 
750 
1101V/ 
0.92% 
*DIV/0 
*Olv/of 
IDIWOI 
8.50% 
soDIV/0! 
*DIV/0 
9,01% 
6.75% 
2.00% 
„0. 509E 
MID ESSEX HOSPITALS 
MID KENT 
so MID STAFFORDSHIRE GENERAL HOSPITALS 
MILTON KEYNES GENERAL 
0 
3,286 
41,154 
5,443 
0 394568 1,486 *Divio! 
MDIV/01 
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A 	 CS CX 	 DA DB 
rola! Episodes - hi other sources DoH 
NAME 	 DIFFERENCE 	DIFFERENCE 	DIFFERENCE 
BETWEEN 	BETWEEN 	BE1WEEN 
annual account 	annual account 	annual account 
volt & doh loots 	waft 3 don vole 	yols & don sots 
EPISODE 
VOLUME 
CHANGE 
(Inc obs) 
EPISODE 
VOLUME 
CHANGE 
(Inc obs) 
EPISODE 
VOLUME 
CHANGE 
(Inc nobs) 
% EPISODE 
VOLUME 
CHANGE 
(Inc ohs) 
% EPISODE 
VOLUME 
CHANGE 
(Inc nobs) 
% EPISODE 
VOLUME 
CHANGE 
Om obs) 
EPISODE 
VOLUME 
CHANGE 
lexc 01142 
Mar 93 	Mar 94 	MN 95 Mar92-93 Mar 93 Nor 93-94 
1992/93 7994195 
3,209 MOUNT VERNON & WATFORD HOSPITALS 3,209 2,011 15.53% 8.89% 138-73% 
NEWHAM 	 0 	 43410 	40.764 0 43,210 4100//0! isOlv/0! 0 
84 NORFOLK & NORWICH 	 0 85,906 0 85,906 *M/0! #OIVfQ! 0 
85 NORTH DURHAM ACUTE HOSPITALS 	 0 	 43.950 	47.725 0 43,950 *Div/Oi *00//0! 0 
86 NORTH HAMPSHIRE HOSPITALS 	 0 0 0 0 nOw701 0DIV/01 #D1V/0! 0 
NORTH MIDDLESEX HOSPITAL 33,620 	35./19 	35,572 -1,420 1,499 • 4.05% 
NORTH STAFFORDSHIRE HOSPITAL 	 0 	 98,663 0 $I00/70I stDIV/OI 0 
89 NORTHAMPTON GENERAL HOSPITAL 0 53,142 	57,160 0 53,142 4,016 nDIV/01 AIDIV/0! 0 
90 NORTHERN GENERAL. HOSPITAL 	 56,026 	58,314 1,276 2.51% 4.08% 
91 	NORTHWICK PARK & ST MARK'S 0 	 38,760 0 38,760 2,355 *DIV/0! *DIV/0! 6.05% 0 
92 NOTTINGHAM CITY HOSPITAL 	 60,990 60.990 3.904 ODIV/01 640% 9.16% 52.703 
93 OXFORD RADCLIFFE HOSPITAL 0 	 80,484 0 58,536 nDiv/0! nDIV/0! 0 
94 PETERBOROUGH HOSPITALS 	 -44,021 4,289 0 50,44 #(3iv/ #O N/0! 0 
95 PILGRIM HEALTH 	 0 	 37,467 	37,914 0 37,46 *DIV/0! ODIV/0! 
4.46% 
4.03% 
0 
0 
0 
0 
PINDERFIELDS HOSPITALS 	 0 40,199 	41,991 0 40,19 0DTV/0! ODIV/0! 
97 PLYMOUTH HOSPITALS 0 	 82,133 0 78.955 3178 *DIV/01 #D/V/0/ 
PONTEFRACT HOSPITALS 	 0 35,773 0 34,129 ODIV/01 *DIV/0! 
99 	POOLE HOSPITAL 	 4,137 	3,589 5,196 #01V/01 8,04% 10.90% 
100 PORTSMOUTH HOSPITALS 	 0 0 0 0 *DIV/01 MOW/0! nDIV/01 0 
101 PRESTON ACUTE HOSPITALS 0 	 72,469 0 71,574 895 *DIV/0! 1/0 IV/01 1.25% 0 
PRINCESS ROYAL HOSPITAL 	 0 19,568 	21,565 0 19,568 1,997 *DIV/OI ODIv/01 1021 0 
103 QUEEN MARY'S SIDCUP 	 0 	 30,761 	32,493 0 30,761 1,732 NOW/01 ODIV/OI 5.63% 0 
104 QUEEN VICTORIA HOSPITAL 	 0 10,636 0 8,898 NOW/0 MOW/0 0 
105 QUEEN'S MEDICAL CENTRE, NOTTINGHAM UNIVERSE 	0 	 80,559 	90,272 0 50,659 9,613 410W/01 NOIV/0 0 
0 106 RADCLIFFE INFIRMARY 	 0 12.525 0 1,032 MO N/01 401V/0I 
107 ROBERT JONES & AGNES H UNT ORTHOPAEDIC & DIS 	0 	 5.889 
108 ROCHDALE 	 1,903 
109 ROTHERHAM GENERAL HOSPITALS 	 0 	 47,009 
ROYAL BERKSHIRE AND BATTLE HOSPITALS 	 0 64,035 
0 
0 
0 
5,889 
-76 
47,009 
63,331 
970 
2,048 
• ,740 
704 
1/DIV/01 
*DIV/01 
1IDIV/01 
ODN/01 
NOW/01 
-0.21% 
*DIV/01 
OINWEI! 
-583% 
0 
0 
1.11% 0 
43,365 ROYAL BOURNEMOUTH AND CHRISTCHURCH HOSPI 	44,359 3,141 	 -13 44.359 8,782 . /*DIV/01 19 5.36% 
ROYAL BROMPTON HOSPITAL 	 0 	 0 16,363 
ROYAL CORNWALL HOSPITALS 56,184 	3,159 
ROYAL DEVON AND EXETER 	 0 0 
ROYAL FREE HAMPSTEAD •,780 
116 ROYAL HULL HOSPITALS 	 0 	•76,995 
ROYAL LIVERPOOL UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL 	 550 664 	0 
ROYAL SHREWSBURY HOSPITALS 	 0 
119 ROYAL SURREY COUNTY & ST LUKE'S HOSPITALS 	 38,063 
120 ROYAL UNITED HOSPITAL BATH 	 41991 	46,306 	49,648 
ROYAL VICTORIA INFIRMARY AND ASSOCIATED HOSPI 	0 50,589 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
631187 
3,290 
71.967 
3,554 
1,006 
50,589 
-1.144 
4,035 
5,029 
3,910 
3,342 
48,896 
1/01V/0/ 
nnV/01 
IIDIV/Ot 
2.00% 
#171v/01' 
AtDIWO! 
4.36% 
*OP//01 
*01V/01 
#DIV/0t 
Jaw° 
8.09% 
41711//01 
6.95% 
IDIV/01 
2.85% 
11.34% 
4DIV/01 
#01v/01 
6.40% 
0 
51204 
0 
-1.060 
0 
3.252 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
5.86% 
ROyAt, wEST SUSSEX 	 0 	 25,809 	28,540 0 26,809 *DP//0 #D1W0 
ROYAL WOLVERHAMPTON HOSPITALS 	 0 57,929 0 57,929 15,630 ODIV/0 /100,/0! 
-0.13% 
7.40% 
tADIV/01 
2.88% 
124 SALFORD ROYAL HOSPITALS 	 0 	 49,084 0 .64 nOtWO 601V/01 
SCUNTHORPE & GOOLE HOSPITALS 	 0 34,931 0 34,931 *DIV/ MDIV/01 
126 SOUTH KENT HOSPITALS 	 0 0 1.806 ODW/0 #DIVfOI 
127 SOUTH MANCHESTER UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS 	 0 	 0 0 0 83,144 ornv/0 ISDIV/01 
souThr TEES ACUTE HOSPITALS 	 -72.00D 	9,874 	4,061 0 
0 
0 
1,018 
85,874 
30,716 
102,321 
2,067 
2,287 
2,206 
10,752 
34 
ODIV/0 
NDIV/0 
ODIV/0 
2.04% 
SIDIV/01 
*DIV/43 
*0 IV/OI 
MDN/01 
2.35% 
8.20% 
0 
0 
0 
129 SOUTH WARWICKSHIRE GENERAL HOSPITALS 	 0 	 30,715 	32,922 
130 SOUTHAMPTON UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS 	 0 102,321 	113,073 
SOUTHEND 	 51,013 	 54,705 
132 SOU THPORT AND FORMBy 
7-18% 
10.51% 
0.12% 
133 ST ALBANS AND HE mEL HEMPSTEAD 	 0 	 31800 	33,001 
ST GEORGE'S 	 959 	•994 
135 ST HELENS AND KNOWSLEY HOSPITALS 	 54 60,693 
136 	 56,388 
ST .1.41.4En UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL 	 38,713 	 40,034 
ST MARY'S (IOW} 	 0 
ST MARY'S 	 •53,300 	J 
140 STOCKPORT ACUTE SERVICES 	 0 45,006 	47,459 
0 
0 
2,693 
0 
0 
0 
31,800 
706 
24,10 
57,033 
45,006 
1,201 
-397 
5,805 
•943 
2,505 
2,453 
864 
*DN/0 
NDIV/ 
5.23% 
21.65 
*OIV 
*DIM 
ODIV/0 
*DIV/ 
0,DIV/0 
NOW/0! 
1.30% 
3.05% 
01 
*DIV/0 
40 IV/0 
*DIV/0 
3.78% 0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
4.60% 
10.58% • 
4.1 
STOKE MANDEVILLE HOSPITAL 0 	 35,519 	36,383 0 35,519 
SWINOON AND MARLBOROUGH 	 0 43978 
TAMESIDE AND GLOSSOP ACUTE SERVICES 	 0 
0 	 710 	 0 
0 
0 
0 '25.459 
2,050 SON 
liD IV/0 
ION/01 
*DIv/01 
*DIV/01 
i01V/0 
• 
5.96% 
0 
0 
0 
2,581 
1,517 
UNITED LEEDS TEACHING HOSPITALS 	 83,073 
146 UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON HOSPITALS 	 0 	 0 	 50,346 
147 WALSALL HOSPITALS 	 40,345 	3,831 
..., 
.... 
8.338 3.881 0.22 11.16% 4.67% M
EM
  
0 50,346 
-2.774 
2,655 
2.546 
OIDN/01 *DIV/01 
20.64% 
*DIV/01 
401V/01 
'5 - 7 8.326 5.39% 
*DIV/01 
*DP/ 
1.02% 
WALSGRAVE HOSPITALS 0 74,268 	77215 
WARRINGTON HOSPITAL 	 0 	 47,507 
74,268 
44,746 ODIV/0! 
0007/01 
0131V/01 
150 WEST DORSET GENERAL HOSPITALS 	 26.591 30,024 
151 WEST MIDDLESEX UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL 	 0 	 i 	32.590 
WEST SUFFOK HOSPITALS 	 -139,444 	-128.649 
WESTMORLAND HOSPITALS 797 
WH1T1INGTON HOSPITAL 	 0 	 37,079 	39,056 
2.292 
29.935 
29.982 
*DIM 
*DIV/0 
*DIV/01 
aDIV/01 
la D IV/01 
10,919 
37,079 
511 e3N/01 
5.33% 
4.24% 
1 ,977 • DNIO! 
#DP//01 
4DIV/01 
155 	 0 31,150 	31,074 
156 WIRRAL HOSPITAL 	 3,872 	3,964 
157 WORTHING & SOUTHLANDS HOSPITALS 	 0 	 43,336 
31.15 -76 
6.918 
43,336 
6.653 
3.013 
1.95% 
401V101 
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A DC 	DD 	DE 	J 	DF 	I 	DG 
1 001-$ Episodes minus 
— 	  
EPISODE 	EPISODE 
VOLUME 	VOLUME 
CHANGE 	CHANGE 
(exc as) 	Etas- abs) 
Obstetrics Activit 
% EPISOD 
VOLUME 
CHANGE 
(exc cats) 
% EPISODE 
VOLUME 
CHANGE 
(exc obs) 
%EPISODE 
VOLUME 
CHANGE 
(exc obs) 
NAME 
Mar9Z-93 Mar 93-94 Mar 94 , 9 
6 	ADDENBROOKE'S 	 55,920 	7,307 #01v/01 uDIV/01 13 07% 
AIREDALE 	 173 	1,876 stEl IV/01 0.54% 5.78% 
8 	ALEXANDRA 	 22,325 	2,368 *DP//0! *DIV/01 10.61% 
g 	BARNSLEY DISTRICT GENERAL HOSPITAL 	 38,110 	1.589 *DIV/01 le0 IWO! 4.17% 
10 BASILDON & THURROCK GENERAL HOSPITALS 	 •1,767 	4,202 ODIV/0 -4.71% 11.75% 
11 BASSETLAW HOSPITAL AND COMMUNITY SERVICES 	873 	238 #01V/01 5.32% 1,38% 
BEDFORD HOSPITAL 	 3,064 	903 #DIV/01 10.53% 2.81% 
13 BIRMINGHAM HEARTLANDS HOSPITAL 	 46,624 	901 ODIV/01 *01V/0 1.93% 
BISHOP AUCKLAND HOSPITALS 	 22,888 	-1,077 *D1V/0 *DIV/01 -4.71% 
BLACKPOOL VICTOR/A HOSPITAL COMMUNITY 	 49,339 	7,274 #DIV/0J #DIV/0! 14.64% 
BOLTON HOSPITALS 	 45,338 	1,265 *DIV/0 *DIV/01 2.79% 
BRADFORD HOSPITALS 	 1,498 	4,655 1.92% 2.02% 6.16% 
BRIGHTON 	 48,548 	1,965 *DIV/01 ODIV101 4.05% 
19 BROADGREEN HOSPITAL 	 913 	-1,965 1.44% -3.81% -8.53% 
20 BROMLEY HOSPITALS 38,0130 	1,418 NDIV/0! *DIV/01 3.72% 
BURTON HOSPITALS 	 28,758 	2,434 *DIV/0 • DIV/0 13.46% 
CARLISLE HOSPITALS 	 31,487 	430 *DIV/Ot 1101V/0 1.37% 
23 CENTRAL MIDDLESEX HOSPITAL 	 .2,123 	2,637 2.15% -8.46% 11.49% 
CENTRAL SHEFFIELD UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS 	 7,319 	980 *DIV/0 13.49% 1.59% 
CHASE FARM HOSPITALS 	 31.126 	1,479 #131V/0 *DIV/01 4.75% 
CHELSEA & WESTMINSTER 	 0 	33,553 *DIV/01 *DIV/OI #01V/01 
CHESTERFIELD & NORTH DERBYSHIRE ROYAL HOSPI 	42,428 	1,651 ODIV/0! #DIV/0t 3.89% 
28 CITY HOSPITAL 	 49,176 	12,747 #DIYi01 *DIV/0! 25.92% 
CITY HOSPITAL SUNDERLAND 	 54,116 	-1,564 IV/01 *Div/01 -2.44% 
CRAWLEY HORSHAM 	 20,765 	1,252 #13IY/0! RD of/Ol 5.03% 
31 	DARLINGTON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL 	 24,474 	845 0031V/01 *DIV/01 3.45% 
32 DARTFORD AND GRAVESHAM 	 30,927 	686 SIDIV/01 *DIV/01 2.22% 
33 DERBY CITY GENERAL HOSPITAL 	 31,287 	6,792 #1)1V/01 #01V/01 21.71% 
34 DERBYSHIRE ROYAL INFIRMARY 37,056 	409 taDIV/01 111)1V/01 1.10% 
DONCASTER ROYAL & MANOTAGU HOSPITAL 	 5,838 	2,346 9.38% 11.79% 4.24% 
36 DUDLEY GROUP OF HOSPITALS 	 61,824 	3.881 NOIV/01 #1131V/01 6.28% 
EALING HOSPITAL 	 12 	986 *DIV/01 0.05% 4.18%  
EAST HERfORDSHIRE 	 2,315 	3,083 #DIV/01 9.06% 11.06% 
EAST YORKSHIRE HOSPITALS 	 21,919 	686 olDIV/0! #DIV/0! 3,13% 
40 EASTBOURNE HOSPITALS 4,074 	912 #DIV/01 12.97% 2.57% 
EPSOM 	 -131 	1,683 6.85% -0.53% 680% 
FREEMAN GROUP OF HOSPITALS 	 564 	8,968 1.54% 1.13% 17130% 
FRIMLEY PARK HOSPITAL 	 4,174 	1,663 #Div/OI 13.92% 4.87% 
44 FURNESS HOSPITALS 	 21,848 	-142 *131V/01 *DIV/01 -0.65% 
45 GATESHEAD HOSPITALS 	 25,813 	1,009 ODIV/0 *DIV/01 3.91% 
GEORGE ELIOT HOSPITAL 33,170 	2,994 *DIV/01 #DIV/0! 9.03% 
GLENFIELD HOSPITAL 	 20,339 	2,497 4IDIV/0 *DIV/01 12.28% 
48 GLOUCESTERSHIRE ROYAL 	 46,324 	134 #01V/01 11131V/01 0.29% 
GOOD HOPE HOSPITAL 	 32,376 	3,102 #01V/4 *DIV/01 9.58% 
50 CUTS AND ST THOMAS' HOSPITAL 87,5139 	2,769 *DrV/0 *DIV/01 3.15% 
51 	HALTON GENERA! HOSPITAL 15,699 	720 *DIV/CTI #DIV/0! 4.59% 
52 HAMMERSMITH HOSPITALS 0 	66,494 *01V/01 ttDIV/01 *DIV/01 
HARTLEPOOL AND PETERLEE HOSPITALS 0 	26,403 11DIV/01 *DIV/0! 1,01V/0 
54 HAVERING HOSPITALS 	 56,629 	3,356 #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 5.72% 
H EATH ERWOOD AND WEXHAM PARK HOSPITALS 	-5,149 	859 #DIV/01 -10.62% 1.98% 
HEREFORD HOSPITALS 	 25.726 	2,255 *DIM #ofwot 8.77% 
HiLLINGDON HOSPITAL 	 2,663 	1,080 -3.89% 11.63% 3.99% 
HiNCH INGBROKE 	 1,304 	1,415 #DIV/0! 6.05% 6.19% 
59 HORTON GENERAL HOSPITAL 	 12,388 	712 RD IWO I *Div/01 5,75% 
60 IPSWICH HOSPITAL 	 50,522 	1,777 #DIV/0 #131V/01 3.52% 
JAMES PAGET HOSPITAL 	 32,795 	4,926 stDIV/0. *DIV/01 15.02% 
62 KENT & CANTERBURY HOSPITALS 	 35,469 eDIV/01 #131V/01 9.00% 
KENT AND SUSSEX WEALD 	 0 	31,809 #OW/0! *DIV/0! *DIV/01 
KETTERING GENERAL HOSPITAL 	 36,623 	2.592 #DIV/0I #DIV/Ol 7.04% 
.55 KINGS 	 46,196 	3,894 #DIV/01 #1111WCH 8.43% 
KINGS LyNN & WISBECH HOSPITALS 	 I 	4,530 	2,089 #DIV/01 15.98% 6.35% 
XINGSOTH HOSPITAL 	 4,3139 	2,572 15.09% -12.83% 8.63% 
68 LANCASTER ACUTE HOSPITALS 	 -271 	1,709 #DIV/01 -0.81% 5.15% 
69 LEICESTER GENERAL HOSPITAL 	 42,613 	2,114 NDIV/Ot *DIV/01 4.96% 
70 LEICESTER ROYAL INFIRMARY 74,247 	8,675 *DIV/0! solV/Oi 11.95% 
LEYOSHAM HOSPITAL 	 31,123 	1,402 #DIV/0 ioDIV/0 4.79% 
LINCOLN HOSPITALS 0 	35.641 #Divi0 #131W0 RD IWO! 
LOUTH AND DISTRICT 	 7,206 	282 *DIV/0 ODIV/01 3.91% 
74 LUTON AND DUNSTABLE HOSPITAL 	 2,668 	865 stDIV/0! 7.43% 2.24% 
MAYDAY 	 42,934 	987 #Div/01 #DIV/0! 2,30% 
MEDWAY 30,631 	2,641 • DIWOI oDIWO 8.62% 
77 MID CHESHIRE HOSPITALS 	 3,274 	3,558 1.15% 13.96% 8.96% 
78 MID ESSEX HOSPITALS 	 1,393 	1.469 #DIV/01 3.68% 3.74% 
79 MID KENT 	 33.047 	293 NDIV/01 *DIV/DI 0.89% 
80 MID STAFFORDSHIRE GENERAL HOSPITALS 	 36.192 	1,816 a.DIV/O! *DIV/01 5.02% 
81 MILTON KEYNES GENERAL 	 2,289 	-9 • DIV/01 9.13% -0.33% 
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A 
	
DC 	DO I 	DE f DF 
	
DO 
1 
	
DM Episodes minus Obstetrics Activity 
NAME 
2 
EPISODE 
VOLUME 
CHANGE 
fen obs) 
EPISODE 
VOLUME 
CHANGE 
(exc obs) 
% EPISODE 
VOLUME 
CHANGE 
(exc obs) 
% EPISODE 
VOLUME 
CHANGE 
(exc obs) 
% EPISODE 
VOLUME 
CHANGE 
(roc obs) 
3 Mar 93-94 	Mar 94.95 Mar 92-93 Mar 93.94 Mai 94-95 
4 
82 MOUNT VERNON & WATFORD HOSPITALS 2,011 	3.1,102 16.53% 8.89% 126.25 
83 NEWHAM 32,909 	.3,154 #01V /0 #01V/0 1. .9.513% 
84 NORFOLK & NORWICH 79,715 	11,256 *DIV/0 *Div/0! 14.12% 
85 NORTH DURHAM ACUTE HOSPITALS 39,834 	3,902 oDIV/0 *D Iv/ DI 9.80% 
86 NORTH HAmPSHI RE HOSPITALS 0 	29,813 *DIV/ #DIV/01 ADIV/0 
87 NORTH MIDDLESEX HOSPITAL 1,282 	1,481 -4.84% 4.48% 4.96% 
NORTH STAFFORDSHIRE HOSPITAL 79,7134 	5,943 #DIV/O. #DfV/0f 7.45% 
89 NORTHAMPTON GENERAL HOSPITAL 46,959 	3,036 NDIV/0 *DIV/0 6.47% 
go NORTHERN GENERAL HOSPITAL 3,732 	2,423 3.98% 8.04% 
NORTHWICK PARK & ST MARY'S 33,642 	1.960 *DIVIO #DIVI01 5.83% 
NOTTINGHAM CITY HOSPITAL 6,067 40 IV/0 10.77% 
OXFORD RADCLIFFE HOSPITAL 48,932 	23,015 4001V/0 1400V/Dl 47.03% 
94 PETERBOROUGH HOSPITALS 42,526 	5,623 AIDIV/0 oDIV/0 13.22% 
34,573 	460 *ON/ *DIV/0 1,33% 
96 PINDERFIELDS HOSPITALS 2,051 *OW/0 *DIV/0 
PLYMOUTH HOSPITALS 72,440 #01V/0 1$171V/0 
PONTEFRACT HOSPITALS 29,362 	1,796 #01V/0 *DIV/0 
99 POOLE HOSPITAL 
100 PORTSMOUTH HOSPITALS 
4,012 	•#01V/01 
0 	72,48 	*DIV/0 
10.47% 
*Ow/ 
10.52% 
00IV/01 
101 PRESTON ACUTE HOSPITALS 62.807 	1,749 #DIV/01 0D FY/0 2.78% 
102 PRINCESS ROYAL HOSPITAL 19,568 	1,997 #D IV/0,  #OIV/01 10.21% 
103 QUEEN MARY'S SIDCUP 1,303 #01V/0 OD IV/0 
104 QUEEN VICTORIA HOSPITAL rralV/01 SICOV/01 
105 QUEEN'S MEDICAL CENTRE, NOTTINGHAM UNIVERSI *ON/01 AIDIv/0 13.46% 
108 RADCUFFE INFIRMARY 12,525 	1,032 *DIV/0! IlDIVID 8.24% 
107 ROBERT JONES & AGNES HUNT ORTHOPAEDIC & DIS 970 *C4V/01 #DIV/01 16.47% 
log ROCHDALE 1,969 100 IV/01 0.40% 596% 
ice ROTHERHAM GENERAL HOSPITALS 770 OD IV/01 *DIV/0 113% 
no ROYAL BERKSHIRE AND BATTLE HOSPITALS 57,300 ODIV/01 NDIV/01 0.66% 
ROYAL BOURNEMOUTH AND CHRISTCHURCH HOSPI 8,707 	2,890 *DIV/Ot 20.08% 5.55% 
ROYAL BROM PTON HOSPITAL 0 #DIV/01 rsDIV/0 stOtV/01 
ROYAL, CORNWALL HOSPITALS 7,019 	893 stDP//01 -1.53% 
ROYAL DEVON AND EXETER 56,736 #001/01 #0IV 6.52% 
ROYAL FREE HAMP$TEAD -2.8955 
ROYAL HULL HOSPITALS 61.996 	5,822 isDiviOi *DIV/ 9.39% 
117 ROYAL LIVERPOOL UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL 3,554 	3,413 6.57% 6.95% 624% 
1 18 ROYAL SHREWSBURY HOSPITALS 40$27 	1,873 sOIV101 001v 4.59% 
119 ROYAL SURREY COUNTY & ST LUKE'S HOSPITALS 912 	1,749 -185% 2.8B 
120 ROYAL UNITED HOSPITAL BATH 4,715 	3,342 spiv/ 11.34% 
ROYAL VICTORIA INFIRMARY AND ASSOCIATED HOSPI 44,738 *WAN seolyr01 101.95% 
ROYAL WEST SUSSEX 23,966 *DIV/01 00W/01 
123 ROYAL WOLVERHAMPTON HOSPITALS 49,118 	15,558 *DIV/ NDIV/01 31.67% 
124 SALFORD ROYAL HOSPITALS 43,778 	618 #DWJOI *DIV/ - 1.41% 
125 SCUNTHORPE a GOOLE HOSPITALS 2,550 #01w01 0D1V10! 7:9 1 
126 SOUTH KENT HOSPITALS 2,272 iirarv/of swam 6.22% 
ODIV101 
2.90%  
SOUTH MANCHESTER UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS 0 	77,953 *DIV/01 *DIV/01 
SOUTH TEES ACUTE HOSPITALS IFDIV/01 #01V/01 
129 SOUTH WARWICKSHIRE GENERAL HOSPITALS 211,182 	1.964 *DIV/01 RDIV/01 
130 SOUTHAMPTON UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS 94,164 	8,466 4DivrOt #Diwol 
SOUTHEND 1,066 	2313 .3.54% 2.59% 
SOUTHPORT AND FORMBY 1,745 	129 
ST ALBANS AND HEMEL HEMPSTEAD 26,077 	1,379 AID1V/0, 
43.52% 
11.00% 
134 ST GEORGE1 59,668 	.308 E/DIW 
135 ST HELENS AND KNOWSLEY HOSPITALS 952 	5,512 1.94% 
ST HELIER 2,206 4.87% 4. ►7% 
57 .441f ES'S UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL 3,441 
22,312 *DIM 
aDIV/0 
9. 
POW 
or DIV/01 
.1.70% 
-3.40%  
ST MARY'S (lcW) 
ST MARY'S 
STOCKPORT ACUTE SERVICES 45,006 *DIV/01 *DIV/01 
eDIV/Ot 
001V10 
► -04% 
20% 
*IMO! 
.436% 
STOKE mANDEviLLE HOSPITAL 32,539 
1,8813 
IODIV/01 
*DIV/0 142 SWINDON AND MARLBOROUGH 
144 
TAM ESIOE AND GLOSSOP ACUTE SERVICES 29,829 
23.320 
2,700 
1,550 
1,505 
-1,910 
11DIV/0 
001V/0 
*DIV/0!  
1410//01 
145 
147 
UNITED LEEDS TEACHING HOSPITALS 
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON HOSPITALS 
WALSALL HOSPITALS 
8,512 
0 
-0.13% 
*DIV/0 
5.39% 
12.76% 
#DIV/01 
8.64% 
WALSGRAVE HOSPITALS 3311 *D1W01 *DIV/01 5.1396- 
156 
149 WARRINGTON HOSPITAL 38,082 	1,943 *DIV/0! *DIV/01 5.10% 
150 WEST DORSET GENERAL HOSPITALS 2,312 	1,250 0.60% 9.68% 4,77% 
WEST MIDDLESEX UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL 26,506 	3,246 00DIV/0! #DIV/01 12.20% 
WEST SUFFOK HOSPITALS 25,674 	2,424 IIDN/DI A0IV10! 9.44% 
15.51% 
10.63% 
6.93% 
WESTMORLAND HOSPITALS 
WHITTINGTON HOSPITAL 
9,895 
32,075 
28,087 
6,390 
1.535 
6,602 
2,687 
iDN/0 
001V/0 
01)1V, 01 
1.25% 
111DIV/0 
41Div/0! 
*DW/01 
ODIVIGI 
9.77% 
soiV/O 
WINCHESTER & EASTLEIGH 
WIRRAL HOSPITAL 
WORTHING & SOUTHLANDS HOSPITALS 38,767 
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Appendix 4 Summary of Results 
of Question 2 
Appendix 4 
Hospital A - Summary of Question 2 Results 
Q2 
Priorities Perceived as 
Belonging to : 
Objective Doctors 
Mea n 
Managers 
Mean 
Difference Total 
Mean 
You Break-even financially 3.78 1.92 1.9 2.68 
You Maintain service volume 2.22 2.54 -0.3 2.41 
You Maintain service quality 1.67 2.15 -0.5 1.95 
'1:3  You Expand revenue 4.56 3.00 1.6 3.64 
You Expand service volume 3.67 3.54 0.1 3.59 
You Expand service quality 2.33 3.31 -1.0 2.91 
You Other (specify) 4.40 4.50 -0.1 4.45 
Most Service/Business Managers Break-even financially 1.57 2.69 -1.1 2.30 
Most Service/Business Managers Maintain service volume 3.00 2.23 0.8 2.50 
Most Service/Business Managers Maintain service quality 2.14 2.54 -0.4 2.40 
E Most Service/Business Managers Expand revenue 2.57 3.54 - 1.0 3.20 
Most Service/Business Managers Expand service volume 3.14 3.62 -0.5 3.45 
Most Service/Business Managers Expand service quality 3.00 3.54 -0.5 3.35 
Most Service/Business Managers Other (specify) 6.67 6.7 5.38 
Most Consultants 	 Break-even financially 4.25 4.85 -0,6 4.62 
Most Consultants 	 Maintain service volume 2.63 2.85 -0.2 2.76 
Most Consultants 	 Maintain service quality 1.88 2.46 -0.6 2.24 
Most Consultants 	 Expand revenue 4.00 5.08 -1.1 4.67 
Most Consultants 	 Expand service volume 3.38 3.38 0.0 3.38 
Most Consultants 	 Expand service quality 2.50 3.00 -0.5 2.81 
Most Consultants 	 Other (specify) 4.00 4.43 -0.4 4.30 
y The Trust Now 	 Break-even financially 1.75 1.77 -0.0 1.76 
z The Trust Now 	 Maintain service volume 3.63 2.85 0.8 3.14 
as The Trust Now 	 Maintain service quality 2.50 2.92 -0.4 2.76 
ab The Trust Now 	 Expand revenue 2.75 2.69 0.1 2.71 
ac The Trust Now 	 Expand service volume 2.88 3.38 -0.5 3.19 
ad The Trust Now 	 Expand service quality 2.63 4.08 -1.5 3.52 
ae The Trust Now 	 Other (specify) 6.67 6.7 5.56 
of The Trust Ideally 	 Break-even financially 2.88 2.08 0.8 2.38 
ag The Trust Ideally 	 Maintain service volume 3.38 2:62 0.8 2.90 
ah The Trust Ideally 	 Maintain service quality 2.75 2.31 0.4 2.48 
aj The Trust Ideally 	 Expand revenue 2.75 2.46 0.3 2.57 
ak The Trust Ideally 	 Expand service volume . 2.50 3.31 -0.8 3.00 
am The Trust Ideally 	 Expand service quality 1.75 2.77 -1.0 2.38 
an The Trust Ideally 	 Other (specify) 4.00 4.0 4.20 
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Appendix 4 
National Survey: Two Groupings : Doctors (1-3) and Managers (4-11) 
(p value shown in table) 
Priorities Perceived as 
Belonging to : 
Objective ANOVA 2-tailed p 
Mann-Whitney 
2 a You Break-even financially 0" 0 " 
2 b You Maintain service volume 0.0477 * 0.0545 
2 c You Maintain service quality 0 ** 0 ** 
2 d You Expand revenue 0" 0 ~" 
2 e 	You Ex 	service voklme 0.6714 0.8662 
2 f 	You Expand service quality 0 ' 0 ' 
2 g 	You Other (specify) 0.0004 .0022 ** 
2 h 	Most Service/Business Managers Break-even financially 
: c g
l
 : g
  
i
n
t
 : 
0
6
0
0
0
0
0
 
0
 
0 ** 
2 j 	Most Service/Business Managers Maintain service volume 0.0045 
2 k 	Most Service/Business Managers Maintain service quality 0 ** 
2 m 	Most Service/Business Managers Expand revenue 0 ' 
2 n 	Most Service/Business Managers Expand service volume 0.0397 
2 p 	Most Service/Business Managers Expand service quality 0 " 
2 q 	Most Service/Business Managers , Other (specify) 0 ' 
2 r 	Most Consultants Break-even financially 0.4216 0.4653 
2 s 	Most Consultants Maintain service volume 0.0110* 0.0129 * 
2 t 	Most Consultants Maintain service quality 0 " 0 " 
2 u 	Most Consultants Expend revenue 0.0746 0.0709 
2 v 	Most Consultants Expand service volume 0.0001 ** 0 - 
2 w 	Most Consultants Expand service quality 0.0150 * 0.0233 * 
2 x 	Most Consultants Other (specify) 0.0004 ** 0.0003 ** 
2 y 	The Trust Now Break-even financially 0.7873 0.8788 
2 z 	The Trust Now Maintain service volume 0.1176 0.0096 ** 
2 as The Trust Now Maintain service quality 0 " 0 ' 
2 ab The Trust Now Expend revenue 0.0116 * 0.01752* 
2 ac 	The Trust Now Expand service volume 0.2815 0.2427 
2 ad The Trust Now Expand service quality 0 ** 0 ** 
2 ae 	The Trust Now Other (specify) 0 "' 0 ** 
2 of 	The Trust Ideally Break-even financially 0 ** 
2 ag 	The Trust Ideally Maintain service volume 0.1143 0.0721 
2 ah 	The Trust Ideally Maintain service quality 0.16 0.1976 
2 of 	The Trust Ideally Expand revenue 0.1026 0.2828 
2 ak 	The Trust Ideally Expand service volume 0.391 0.6954 
2 am The Trust Ideally Expand service quality 0.1298 0.1044 
2 an 	The Trust Ideally Other (specify) 0.1566 0.1273 
= Significant at 0.05 level but not at 0.0 
** = Significant at 0.01 level 
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Appendix 4 
National Survey: 	Eleven Separate Groupings of Respondents 
(p value shown in table) 
Priorities Perceived as 
Belonging to : 
Objective ANOVA Kruskal- 
Wallis H 
2 a You V Break-even financially 0 " 0 " 
2 b You Maintain service volume 0.0535 0.0417 
2 c You Maintain service quality 0 " 0 ** 
2 d You Expand revenue 0 " 0 ** 
2 e You Expand service volume 0.5338 0.527 
2 f You Expand service quality 0 ** 0 " 
2 g •You Other (specify) 0.0451 * 0.1062 
2 h Most Service/Business Managers Break-even financially 0 ** 0 ** 
2 j Most Service/Business Managers Maintain service volume 0.0169 * 0.0046 
2 k Most Service/Business Managers Maintain service quality 0 ' 0 ** 
2 m Most Service/Business Managers Expand revenue 0 ** 0 " 
2 n Most Service/Business Managers Expand service volume 0.111 0.075 
2 p Most Service/Business Managers Expand service quality 0 " 
2 q Most Service/Business Managers Other (specify) 0.0002 0.0003 ** 
2 r Most Consultants Break-even financially 0.3919 0.4619 
2 s Most Consultants Maintain service volume 0.1279 0.1461 
2 t 	Most Consultants Maintain service quality 0 " 0 " 
2 u 	Most Consultants Expand revenue 0.3355 0.3949 
2 v 	Most Consultants Expand service volume 0.0039'* 0.0020 ' 
2 w 	Most Consultants Expand service quality 0.148 0.1997 
2 x 	Most Consultants Other (specify) 0.063 0.0742 
2 y 	The Trust Now Break-even financially 0.0007 ** 
2 z The Trust Now Maintain service volume 0.36 0.0022 " 
2 as The Trust Now Maintain service quality 0 ** 0 ** 
2 ab The Trust Now Expand revenue 0 ** 
2 ac The Trust Now Expand service volume 0.0007 ** 0.0013 ' 
2 ad The Trust Now Expand service quality 0.0001 ' 0.0001 " 
2 ae The Trust Now Other (specify) 0 " 0 " 
2 of The Trust Ideally Break-even financially 0 -- 0 ** 
2 ag The Trust Ideally Maintain service volume 0.0002 ** 0.0001 ** 
2 eh The Trust Ideally Maintain service quality 0.0103 * 0.0176 * 
2 aj The Trust Ideally Expand revenue 0.0645 0.1164 
2 ek The Trust Ideally Expand service volume 0.3716 0.3389 
2 am The Trust Ideally Expand service quality 0.0937 0.1966 
2 an The Trust Ideally Other (specify) 0.3304 0.2498 
= Significant at 0.05 level but not at 0.0 
** = Significant at 0.01 level 
Appendix 4 Page 3 of 9 
Appendix 4 
National Survey: Two Groups: Doctors and Managers - Mean Ranking Scores 
Priorities Perceived as 
Belonging to : 
Objective Sample 
Mean 
Doctors 
Mean 
Managers 
Mean 
Difference 
You Break-even financially 2.836 3.908 2.037 
You Maintain service volume 2.662 2.754 2,593 
You Maintain service quality 2.065 1.776 2.281 
-C3 
C■1 You Expand revenue 3.721 4.076 3.457 
cc) 46 
You Expand service volume 3.449 3.472 3.433 
You Expand service quality 2.505 2.124 2.792 
You Other (specify) 3.209 2.97 3.459 
Most Service/Business Managers Break-even financially 1.856 1.557 2-08 
Most Service/Business Managers Maintain service volume 2.43 2.505 2.374 
Most Service/Business Managers Maintain service quality 2.733 3.067 2.484 
E C4 Most Service/Business Managers Expand revenue 3.019 2.798 3.185 Itt. 9 
Most Service/Business Managers Expand service volume 3.329 3.419 3.262 
Most Service/Business Managers Expand service quality 3.552 3.968 3.241 
Most Service/Business Managers Other (specify) 4.887 5.223 4.545 
2 r Most Consultants Break-even financially 4.566 4.601 4.54 
2 s Most Consultants Maintain service volume 2.678 2.565 2.762 
2 t Most Consultants Maintain service quality 2.07 1.756 2.3 
2 u Most Consultants Expand revenue 4.153 4.245 4.085 
■1■
1.=
  
N
 
o
 
2 v Most Consultants Expand service volume 2.962 3.154 2.821 
2 w Most Consultants Expand service quality 2.224 2.126 2.297 
2 x Most Consultants Other (specify) 3.048 3.263 2.847 
2 y The Trust Now Break-even financially 1.487 1.479 1.492 
2 z The Trust Now Maintain service volume 2.58 2.648 2.53 
2 as The Trust Now Maintain service qualify 2.876 3.107 2.707 
2 eb The Trust Now Expand revenue 2.881 2.766 2.966 
(NI 
9
 
2 ac The Trust Now Expand service volume 3.407 3.459 3.369 
2 ad The Trust Now Expand service quality 3.659 3.939 3.452 
2 ae The Trust Now Other (specify) 4.42 4.814 4.04 
2 of The Trust Ideally Break-even financially 2.488 2.911 2.177 
It-  c‘l 7
  cl '''  7  C
N
 
46
0
9
0
6
9
6
 
2 ag The Trust Ideally Maintain service volume 3.087 3.175 3.023 
2 ah The Trust Ideally Maintain service quality 2.683 2.609 2.738 
2 aj The Trust Ideally Expand revenue 3.221 3.316 3.152 
2 ak The Trust Ideally Expand service volume 2.979 3.024 2.945 
2 am The Trust Ideally Expand service quality 2.334 2.265 2.385 
2 an The Trust Ideally Other (specify) 3.287 3.382 3.196 
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Appendix 4 
National Survey.- Two Groups. - Doctors and Managers - Mean Ranking Scores 
Priorities Perceived as 
Belonging to : 
Objective Doctors' 
Mean 
anger 
Mean 
Were= ANOVA significance 
5%* only and 1%** 
2 a 	You Break-even financially 3.908 2.037 1.9 0 -- 
2  b 	You Maintain service volume 2.754 2.593 0.2 0.0477 * 
2 c 	You Maintain service quality 1.776 2.281 -0.5 0 ** 
2 d 	You Expand revenue 4.076 3.457 0.6 0 *' 
2 e 	You Expand service volume 3.472 3.433 0.0 0.6714 
2 f 	You Expand service quality 2.124 2.792 -0.7 0 " 
2 g 	You Other (specify) 2.97 3.459 -0.5 0.0004** 
2 h 	Most Service/Business Managers Break-even financially 1.557 2.08 -0.5 0 " 
2 j 	Most Service/Business Managers Maintain service volume 2.505 2.374 0.1 0.063 
2 k 	Most Service/Business Managers Maintain service quality 3.067 2.484 0.6 0 ** 
2 m 	Most Service/Business Managers Expand revenue 2.798 3.185 -0.4 0 " 
2 n 	Most Service/Business Managers Expand service volume 3.419 3.262 0.2 0.0536 
2 p 	Most sarvicemusiness Managers Expand service quality 3.968 3.241 0.7 0 ** 
2 q 	Most Service/Business Managers Other (specify) 5.223 4.545 0.7 0 ** 
2 r 	Most Consultants Break-even financially 4.601 4.54 0.1 0.4216 
2 s 	Most Consultants Maintain service volume 2.565 2.762 -0.2 0.0110* 
2 t 	Most Consultants Maintain service quality 1.756 2.3 -0.5 0 " 
2 u 	Most Consultants Expand revenue 4.245 4.085 0.2 0.0746 
2 v 	Most Consultants Expand service volume 3.154 2.821 0.3 0.0001 
2 w 	Most Consultants Expand service quality 2.126 2.297 -0.2 0.0150 
2 x 	Most Consultants Other (specify) 3.263 2.847 0.4 0.0004 
2 y 	The Trust Now Break-even financially 1.479 1.492 -0.0 0.7873 
2 z 	The Trust Now Maintain service volume 2.648 2.53 0.1 0.1 176 
2 as The Trust Now Maintain service quality 3.107 2.707 0.4 0 ** 
2 ab The Trust Now Expand revenue 2.766 2.966 -0.2 0.01 16 * 
2 ac The Trust Now Expand service volume 3.459 3.369 0.1 0.2815 
2 ad The Trust Now Expand service quality 3.939 3.452 0.5 0 " 
2 ae The Trust Now Other (specify) 4.814 4.04 0.8 0 ** 
2 of 	The Trust Ideally Break-even financially 2.911 2.177 0.7 0 ** 
2 ag 	The Trust Ideally Maintain service volume 3.175 3.023 0.2 0.1143 
2 ah 	The Trust Ideally Maintain service quality 2.609 2.738 -0,1 0.16 
2 aj 	The Trust Ideally Expand revenue 3.316 3.152 0.2 0.1026 
2 ak 	The Trust Ideally Expand service volume 3.024 2.945 0.1 0.391 
2 am The Trust Ideally Expand service quality 2.265 2.385 -0.1 0.1298 
2 an 	The Trust Ideally Other (specify) 3.382 3.196 0.2 0.1566 
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Appendix 4 
Comparison of Hospital A, Hospital B and National Survey: All Disciplines 
Q2 
Priorities Perceived as 
Belonging to : 
Objective National 
Mean 
A & B 
Mean 
Difference B 
Mean 
A 
Mean 
Different A & B 
ANOVA 
You Break-even financially 2.84 2.9 -0.1 3.15 2.68 Signif. 
You Maintain service volume 2.66 2.33 0.3 2.25 2.41 @ 5% 
You Maintain service quality , 2.07 1.9 0.2 1.85 1.95 
You Expand revenue 3.72 3.51 0.2 3.37 3.64 
11 9 
You Expand service volume 3.45 3.44 0.1 3.26 3.59 
You Expand service quality 2.51 2.9 -0.4 2.89 2.91 
You Other (specify) 3.21 4.71 -1.5 5.17 4.45 
Most Service/Business Managers Break-even financially 1.86 1.9 -0.0 1.50 2.30 -0.8 
Most Service/Business Managers Maintain service WART* 2.43 2.83 -0.4 3.15 2.50 0.7 
Most Service/Business Managers Maintain service quality 2.73 3.2 -0.5 4.00 2.40 1.6 ✓  
E Most Service/Business Managers Expand revenue 3.02 2.62 0.4 2.00 3.20 -1.2 ✓  
Most Service/Business Managers Expand service volume 3.33 3 0.3 2.53 3.45 -0.9 ✓  
Most Service/Business Managers Expand service quality 3.55 3.56 -0.1 3.79 3.35 0.4 
Most Service/Business Managers Other (specify) 4.89 5.77 -0.9 6,40 5.38 1.0 
Most Consultants Break-even financially 4.57 4.35 0.2 4.05 4.62 
(#  9
;  9
;  7
 c
i;  4
  c
i  
Most Consultants Maintain service volume 2.68 2.45 0.2 2.11 2.76 
Most Consultants Maintain service quality 2.07 2.18 -0,1 2.11 2.24 
Most Consultants Expand revenue 4.15 3.97 0.2 3.17 4.67 ✓ 
Most Consultants Expand service volume 2.96 3.13 -0.2 2.83 3.38 
Most Consultants Expand service quality 2.22 2.67 -0.4 2.50 2.81 
Most Consultants Other (specify) 3.05 4.43 -1.4 4.75 4.30 
y The Trust Now Break-even financially 1.49 1.53 -0.0 1.26 1.76 -0.5 
z The Trust Now Maintain service volume 2.58 2.98 -0.4 2.79 3.14 -0.4 
as The Trust Now Maintain service quality 2.88 3.05 -0.2 3.37 2.76 0.6 
ab The Trust Now Expand revenue 2.88 2.31 0.6 1.83 2.71 -0.9 ✓  
ac The Trust Now Expand service volume 3.41 2.97 0.4 2.72 3.19 -0.5 
ad The Trust Now Expand service quality 3.66 3.62 0.0 3.72 3.52 0.2 
ae The Trust Now Other (specify) 4.42 5.92 -1.5 6.75 5.56 1.2 
of The Trust Ideally Break-even financially 2.49 2.8 -0.3 3.26 2.38 0.9 
ag The Trust Ideally Maintain service volume 3.09 3.03 0.1 3.16 2.90 0.3 
ah The Trust Ideally Maintain service quality 2.68 2.53 0.2 2.58 2.48 0.1 
aj The Trust Ideally Expand revenue 3.22 2.62 0.6 2.67 2.57 0.1 
ak The Trust Ideally Expend service volume 2.98 2.82 0.2 2.61 3.00 -0.4 
am The Trust Ideally Expand service quality 2.33 2.26 0.1 2.11 2.38 -0.3 
an The Trust Ideally Other (specify) 3.29 4.31 -1.0 4.67 4.20 0.5 
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Appendix 4 
Comparison of Hospital A, Hospital B and National Survey: Doctors' Views 
Q2 
Priorities Perceived as 
Belonging to : 
Objective National 
Mean 
A & B 
Mean 
Difference B 
Mean • 
A 
Mean 
Differenc 
You Break-even financially 3.91 3.78 0.1 3.79 3.78 0.1 
You Maintain service volume 2.75 2.39 0.4 2.50 2.22 0.3 
You Maintain service quality 1.78 1.7 0.1 1.71 1.67 0.0 
.1:3 You Expand revenue 4.08 3.87 0.2 3.43 4.56 -1.1 
You Expand service volume 3.47 3.43 0.0 3.29 3.67 -0.4 
You Expand service quafity 2.12 2.48 -0.4 2.57 2.33 0.2 
You Other (specify) 2.97 4.82 -1.9 5.17 4.40 0.8 
Most Service/Business Managers Break-even financially 1.56 1.43 0.1 1.36 1.57 
Most Service/Business Managers Maintain service KAMM 2.51 3.33 -0.8 3.50 3.00 
Most Service/Business Managers Maintain service quality 3.07 3.67 -0.6 4.43 2.14 
E Most Service/Business Managers Expand revenue 2.80 2.05 0.7 1.79 2.57 
co Si  
Most Service/Business Managers Expand service volume 3.42 2.71 0.7 2.50 3.14 
Most Service/Business Managers , Expand service quality 3.97 3.57 0.4 3.86 3.00 
Most Service/Business Managers Other (specify) 5.22 6.5 -1.3 6.40 6.67 
Most Consultants Break-even financially 4.60 4.19 0.4 4.15 4.25 -0.1 
Most Consultants Maintain service volume 2.57 2.24 0.3 2.00 2.63 -0.6 
Most Consultants Maintain service quality 1.76 1.95 -0.2 2.00 1.88 0.1 
z
 Most Consultants Expand revenue 4.25 3.52 0.7 3.23 4.00 -0.8 
Most Consultants Expand service volume 3.15 3.33 -0.2 3.31 3.38 -0.1 
Most Consultants Expand service qualify 2.13 2.62 -0.5 2.69 2.50 0.2 
Most Consultants Other (specify) 3.26 4.43 -1.2 4.75 4.00 0.8 
The Trust Now Break-even financially 1.48 1.52 -0.0 1.38 1.75 -0.4 
The Trust Now Maintain service volume 2.65 3.38 -0.7 3.23 3.63 -0.4 
The Trust Now Maintain service quality 3.11 3.43 -0.3 4.00 2.50 1.5 
4
:t 
03 The Trust Now Expand revenue 2.77 2.05 0.7 1.62 2.75 -1.1 
The Trust Now Expand service 1/01101161 3.46 2.57 0.9 2.38 2.88 -0.5 
The Trust Now Expand service qualify 3.94 3.29 0.6 3.69 2.63 1.1 
The Trust Now Other (specify) 4.81 6.71 -1.9 6.75 6.67 0.1 
of The Trust Ideally Break-even financially 2.91 3.1 
c`i
 7
 ,
-
 in
 .4-  
T
t
 °
?  
9
 9
 0
 c :«  
c
i c
i 9 
3.23 2.88 0.4 
ag The Trust Ideally Maintain service volume 3.18 3.24 3.15 3.38 -0.2 
ah The Trust Ideally Maintain service quality 2.61 2.52 2.38 2.75 -0.4 
aj The Trust Ideally Expand revenue 3.32 2.86 2.92 2.75 0.2 
ak The Trust Ideally Expand service volume 3.02 2.67 2.77 2.50 0.3 
am The Trust ideally Expand service quality 2.27 1.9 2.00 1.75 0.3 
an The Trust Ideally Other (specify) 3.38 4.29 4.67 4.00 0.7 
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Appendix 4 
_,omparison of Hospital A, Hospital B and National Survey: Managers' Views 
Q2 
Priorities Perceived as 
Belonging to : 
Objective National 
Mean 
A & B 
Mean 
Difference B 
Mean 
A 
Mean 
Differeec 
You Break-even financially 2.04 1.84 0.2 1.67 1.92 -0.3 
You Maintain service volumg 2.59 2.26 0.3 1.67 2,54 -0.9 
You Maintain service quality 2.28 2.16 0.1 2.17 2.15 0.0 
-13 You Expand revenue 3.46 3.06 0.4 3.20 3.00 0.2 
You Expand service volume 3.43 3.44 -0.1 3.20 3.54 -0.3 
You Expand service quality 2.79 3.44 -0.6 3.80 3.31 0.5 
You Other (specify) 3.46 4.5 -1.0 4.50 -4.5 
Most Service/Business Managers Break-even financially 2.08 2.42 -0.3 1.83 2.69 -0.9 
Most Service/Business Managers Maintain service volume 2.37 2.26 0.1 2.33 2.23 0.1 
Most Service/Business Managers Maintain service quality 2.48 2.68 -0.2 3.00 2.54 0.5 
E Most Service/Business Managers Expand revenue 3.19 3.28 -0.1 2.60 3.54 -0.9 
Most Service/Business Managers Expand service volume 3.26 3.33 -0.1 2.60 3.62 -1.0 
Most Service/Business Managers Expand service quality 3.24 3.56 -0.3 3.60 3.54 0.1 
Most Service/Business Managers Other (specify) 4.55 4.6 -0.1 0.0 
I.-
 	
Cg
 ..... 	
Z
 	
N. 	
3
 	
1.4 
Most Consultant Break-even financially 4.54 4.53 0.0 3.83 4.85 -1.0 
Most Consultants Maintain service volume 2.76 2.68 0.1 2.33 2.85 -0.5 
Most Consultants Maintain service quality 2.30 2.42 -0.1 2.33 2.46 -0.1 
Most Consultants Expand revenue 4.09 4.5 -0.4 3.00 5.08 -2.1 
Most Consultants Expand service volume 2.82 2.89 -0.1 1.60 3.38 -1.8 
Most Consultants Expand service quality 2.30 2.72 -0.4 2.00 3.00 -1.0 
Most Consultant Other (specify) 2.85 4.43 -1.6 4.43 -4.4 
y The Trust Now Break-even financially 1.49 1.53 -0.0 1.00 1.77 -0.8 
z The Trust Now Maintain service volume 2.53 2.53 0.0 1.83 2.85 -1.0 
as The Trust Now Maintain service quality 2.71 2.63 0.1 2.00 2.92 -0.9 
ab The Trust Now Expand revenue 2.97 2.61 0.4 2.40 2.69 -0.3 
ac The Trust Now 	- Expand service volume 3.37 3.44 -0.1 3.60 3.38 0.2 
ad The Trust Now Expand service quality 3.45 4 -0.5 3.80 4.08 -0.3 
ae The Trust Now Other (specify) 4.04 5 -1.0 0,0 
of The Trust Ideally Break-even financially 2.18 2.47 -0.3 3.33 2.08 1.3 
ag The Trust Ideally Maintain service volume 3.02 2.79 0.2 3.17 2.62 0.6 
ah The Trust Ideally Maintain service quality 2.74 2.53 0.2 3.00 2.31 0.7 
aj The Trust Ideally Expand revenue 3.15 2.33 0.8 2.00 2.46 -0.5 
ak The Trust Ideally Expand service volume 2.95 3 -0.1 2.20 3.31 -1.1 
am 
an 
The Trust Ideally 
The Trust Ideally 
Expand service quality 
Other (specify) 
2.39 2.67 -0.3 2.40 2.77 -0.4 
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Appendix 4 
Comparison of Hospital A, Hospital B and National Survey: Comparison of Doctors ' and 
Managers' Views 
Q2 
Priorities Perceived as 
Belonging to : 
Objective National 
Mean 
A & B 
Mean 
Difference B 
Mean 
A 
Mean 
i 	rem 
You Break-even financially 3.91 2.04 1.9 3.78 1.84 1.9 
You Maintain service volume 2.75 2.59 0.2 2.39 2.26 0.1 
You Maintain service quality 1.78 2.28 -0.5 1,7 2.16 -0.5 
"a You Expand revenue 4.08 3.46 0.6 3.87 3.06 0.8 
You Expand service volume 3.47 3.43 0.0 3.43 3.44 -0,1 
You Expand service quality 2.12 2.79 -0.7 2.48 3.44 -1.0 
You Other (specify) 2.97 3.46 -0.5 4.82 4.5 0.3 
Most Service/Business Managers Break-even financially 1.56 2.08 -0.5 1.43 2.42 -1.0 
Most Service/Business Managers Maintain service volume 2.51 2.37 0.1 3.33 2.26 1.1 
Most Service/Business Managers Maintain service quality 3.07 2.48 0.6 3.67 2.68 1.0 
E Most Service/Business Manage • Expend revenue 2.80 3.19 -0,4 2.05 3.28 -1.2 
Most Service/Business Man - • - - Expand service volume 3.42 3.26 0.2 2.71 3.33 -0.6 
Most Service/Business Manage Expand service quality 3.97 3.24 0.7 3.57 3.56 0.0 
Most Service/Business Managers Other (specify) 5.22 4.55 0.7 6.5 4.6 1.9 
Most Consultants Break-even financially 4.60 4.54 0.1 4.19 4.53 -0.3 
Most Consultants Maintain service volume 2.57 2.76 -0.2 2.24 2.68 -0.4 
Most Consultants Maintain service quality 1.76 2.30 -0.5 1.95 2.42 -0.5 
Most Consultants Expand revenue 4.25 4.09 0.2 3.52 4.5 -1.0 
Most Consultants Expand service volume 3.15 2.82 0.3 3.33 2.89 0.4 
Most Consultants Expand service quality 2.13 2.30 -0.2 2.62 2.72 -0.1 
Most Consultants Other (specify) 3.26 2.85 0.4 4.43 4.43 0.0 
y The Trust Now Break-even financially 1.48 1.49 -0.0 1.52 1.53 
1 
q
 o
) co c q
 c:I  
N
:
 t 
.
 
 
9
 ci  
ci  
9
 9
 9
 ,'  
z The Trust Now Maintain service volume 2.65 2.53 0.1 3.38 2.53 
as The Trust Now Maintain service quality 3.11 2.71 0,4 3.43 2.63 
ab The Trust Now Expand revenue 2.77 2.97 -0.2 2.05 2.61 
ac The Trust Now Expend service volume 3.46 3.37 0.1 2.57 3.44 
ad The Trust Now Expand service quality 3.94 3.45 0.5 3.29 4 
ae The Trust Now Other (specify) 4.81 4.04 0.8 6.71 5 
of The Trust Ideally Break-even financially 2.91 2.18 0.7 3.1 2.47 0.6 
ag The Trust Ideally Maintain service volume 3.18 3.02 0.2 3.24 2.79 0.5 
eh The Trust Ideally Maintain service quality 2.61 2.74 -0.1 2.52 2.53 -0.0 
al The Trust Ideally Expand revenue 3.32 3.15 0.2 2.86 2.33 0.5 
ak The Trust Ideally Expand service volume 3.02 2.95 0.1 2.67 3 -0.3 
am The Trust Ideally Expand service quality 2.27 2.39 -0.1 1.9 2.67 -0.8 
an The Trust Ideally Other (specify) 3,38 3.20 0.2 4.29 4.3 
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